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Abstract 
Since the 1970s, Anglo-Saxon financial hegemony has enhanced international 
capital mobility, promoting financial disintermediation in many countries. This 
thesis explores why disintermediation in Japan has stalled since the mid-2000s 
despite its financial deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s by examining an 
ideational conflict within Japanese elites between the market liberalisation and 
anti-free market camps, particularly between the American and Japanese credit 
rating agencies and between the two industrial associations. I adopt a neo -
Gramscian approach in tandem with sociological, psychological and 
philosophical concepts and emphasise the concept of ‘systemic support’ as a 
solution to the research puzzle. Although the original, narrow definition of 
systemic support is government and bank support for financially strained 
financial institutions and companies, its broadened definition incorporates 
dominant elites’ support and protection of subordinates in exchange for 
obedience.  
     Since the late-1990s, many scholars have focused on the possible convergence 
of Japanese capitalism to Anglo-Saxon capitalism and paid insufficient attention 
to the persistence of social norms. In contrast, I argue that Japanese society’s 
anti-liberal, anti-free market norms centred on systemic support are a form of 
counter-hegemony, and this has resisted Anglo-Saxon financial hegemony and 
disintermediation and prevented capitalist dominance from severing social ties 
(e.g., management-labour cooperation). Japanese style stakeholder capitalism is 
based on a management-labour alliance against capitalists and interlocking 
business relationships, supported by the confederation of anti -free market elites 
including bureaucrats, corporate executives (who share similar characteristics to 
bureaucrats), and conservative  politicians. Under the Hashimoto (1996-8) and 
Koizumi (2001-6) administrations, market liberals advocating shareholder 
capitalism gained influence, and systemic support weakened temporarily. 
However, since 2006, both anti-free market elites and subordinates (regular 
workers and small business owners) conflicting with the market-friendly, short-
term profit seeking mental framework of Anglo-Saxon capitalism, have driven an 
anti-neoliberal backlash. Consequently, systemic support has resurged, bu t this 
has generated growing contradictions in Japan.  
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Introduction 
 
Research Puzzle  
Credit markets dealing with government, corporate and household debts, whose 
social foundations vary by region and country,  are double-edged swords for 
capitalist states. Whereas periodic credit crises create destructive impacts on 
these states, credit is a driving force for the economic development of capitalist 
states. Credit markets are politically important as they are heavily involved in 
the distribution of wealth within states, and all of the people and institutions 
under the sun are either directly or indirectly influenced by credit markets. 
Nevertheless, managing credit markets has proved to be extremely difficult for 
states. If a state provides excessive autonomy for a credit market, it can make the 
latter overly volatile and potentially lead to the formation and subsequ ent 
bursting of a credit bubble, as the recent global financial crisis (hereafter GFC) 
indicated. In contrast, if a state heavily regulates a credit market, it hamper s 
market efficiency, resulting in economic stagnation, as the collapse of the Soviet 
Union showed.  
     A credit market’s levels of autonomy change over time and are strongly 
affected by influential economic ideologies and international capital mobility 
(hereafter ICM). The growing influence of higher ICM has driven the 
‘financialisation’ of industrialised countries’ political economies. Clift (2014: 
241) argues that the financial sector’s enhanced profitability and enlarged role 
within the economy and society are included in common themes of 
financialisation, which can change not only the features of firms and financial 
markets but also the society encompassing them. Higher ICM is likely to promote 
a government’s regulatory adjustments to attract mobile capital to its financial 
market, retain capital within its jurisdiction and achieve its policy objectives in 
competition with other governments seeking similar goals (Holt -Dwyer 2001: 28-
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35). Furthermore, enhanced capital mobility is also expected to diminish the role 
of banks as intermediators of debt capital to corporate borrowers because of th e 
increased access of companies to ‘more efficient and lower cost capital markets’, 
namely ‘financial disintermediation’ (Rethel and Sinclair 2012: 3).  
     The research puzzle of this thesis is why Japan’s financial disintermediation 
(i.e., shift from a bank-centred to market-based financial system) has stalled since 
the mid-2000s despite its financial deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s. In 
the 1980s, Japanese blue-chip firms increasingly tapped the Eurobond market due 
to its very low-cost funding and the foreign exchange deregulation by the 
government. The growing Eurobond issuance, the requests from Japanese large 
firms and securities companies to relax the domestic bond regulation, and the US 
government pressure to pry open Japanese financial markets encouraged the 
Japanese government to deregulate its domestic corporate bond market in the 
1980s, but the Japanese government itself also needed to deregulate the bond 
market in order to deal with the expansion of Japanese government bonds 
(hereafter JGBs). The Japanese government incrementally liberalised the heavily 
regulated bank-centred financial system during the 1980s and the first half of the 
1990s. Furthermore, the enormous bad debt problem, which reflected the 
malfunctioning of the system, prompted the announcement of Japan’s Big Bang 
financial deregulation in November 1996. The US and local credit rating agencies 
(hereafter CRAs) have assigned Japanese borrowers credit ratings since the mid-
1980s, and the volume of corporate bond issuance in Japan rapidly increased 
during the mid to late 1990s. However, the growth of the corporate bond market 
has become stagnant since the mid-2000s, and the market mechanism of Japan’s 
financial system is still underdeveloped.  
     Japan’s annual domestic corporate bond issuance amount increased from 5.8 
trillion yen in 1994 to 11.4 trillion yen in 1998, but it has been range-bound 
between 8.6 and 12.5 trillion yen, merely 2% of its GDP, since then. Consequently, 
the outstanding amount of domestic corporate bonds moderately increased from 
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52 trillion yen in 2004 to 60 trillion yen (12% of GDP) - still dwarfed by that of 
bank loans for companies (roughly 400 trillion yen)  - in 2014. Jackson and 
Miyajima’s (2008: 10-31) comment that bank loans for large firms have been 
displaced by corporate bonds and other capital market financing, while the main 
bank system1 has been diminished by the greater influence of the US CRAs does 
not reflect the reality accurately. The recent trend of the Japanese credit market 
is different from some European countries. Both France and Germany, the 
financial systems of which are categorised in the ‘bank-centred camp’ along with 
that of Japan (Zysman 1983; Allen and Gale 2000),2 have substantially developed 
their capital markets (Clift 2014: 244-55). The outstanding amount of German 
corporate bonds dramatically expanded from 710 billion euro in 1988 to 2,055 
billion euro in 2008. Although the outstanding amount of its bank debt securities 
plunged from 1,876 billion euro in 2008 to 1,231 billion euro (42% of GDP) in 
2014 due to the GFC, that issued by non-financial corporates soared from 2 
billion euro in 1988 to 232 billion euro (8% of GDP) in 2014.  
     Types of financial systems are closely related to those of corporate 
governance, which relate to the structure of power and responsibility within firms. 
Generally, a bank-centred financial system favours long-termist, relationship-
oriented ‘stakeholder capitalism’, whereas a market-centred financial system 
prioritises short-termist, profit-prioritising ‘shareholder capitalism’ (Clift 2014: 
230-40). 3 Clift (ibid.: 231-55) maintains that along with their capital market 
                                                   
1 Aoki, Patrick and Sheard (1994: 3) comment that the main bank, which has the largest 
credit exposure to and tight relationship with the corporate borro wer, ‘not only provides 
loans, it holds equity and, in the eyes of capital market participants and regulators, is 
expected to monitor the firm and intervene when things go wrong’.  
2 Zysman (1983: 17) classified the financial systems of developed countries  into three 
types: 1) the Anglo-Saxon system, mainly based on capital markets, 2) a bank loan-based 
system with heavy state intervention represented by countries such as Japan and France, 
and 3) a bank loan-based system dominated by financial institutions,  typically represented 
by Germany. 
3 In addition to shareholders, debt investors and CRAs affect corporate governance, albeit 
to a lesser extent, under a market-oriented financial system.  
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development, both France and Germany have recently witnessed the 
‘hybridisation’ of corporate governance (i.e., combining elements from both 
stakeholder and shareholder capitalism). However, such hybridisation could  be 
less applicable to the case of Japan. Although Matsuura et al. (2003: 1003-13) 
claim that the two roles of the main bank system – providing both corporate 
finance and corporate governance for companies – have been eroded since the 
1980s, this exaggerates the extent of the changes in the Japanese financial system 
and corporate governance. Although some scholars believe that the main banks 
contributed to corporate governance through monitoring corporate borrowers in 
the rapid economic growth period (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein 1990; Aoki, 
Patrick and Sheard 1994), the effectiveness of the monitoring by the main banks 
even during that period was questionable - these scholars have failed to provide 
empirical evidence to support their claims (Scher 1997; Okumura 2005).  
     There are three hypotheses in this thesis that may also have implications for 
other countries. Firstly, the characteristics of the Japanese credit market are co -
constituted by the Japanese government and market participants, with the 
influence of exogenous factors. Secondly, the exogenous factors that potentially 
affect features of the credit market as well as domestic social relations and norms 
include internationally influential ideas, regulatory trends of key global financial 
centres and levels of ICM. Lastly, endogenous factors such as domestic social 
relations and norms also significantly affect the characteristics of both the credit 
market and corporate governance, which are closely correlated.  
     The research puzzle – why disintermediation has lost steam despite the 
Japanese government’s deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s – is related to 
the varieties of capitalism debate, comparing liberal market economies (LMEs) 
including Anglo-Saxon countries, which rely on the market mechanism, with 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) such as Germany, France and Japan , 
which rely on mutual cooperation among economic actors connected by a dense 
network of institutions (Hall and Soskice 2001). The growing convergence of 
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CMEs’ financial practices towards those of LMEs is often called financial 
globalisation. Moreover, the puzzle is also linked to the convergence-diversity 
debate regarding whether CMEs would converge with LMEs (Yamamura 1997; 
Yamamura and Streeck 2003; Clift 2014).  According to Yamamura (1997), 
proponents of the convergence view (mainly neoclassical economists) focus on 
market forces enhancing economic efficiency and believe market forces promote 
convergence, whilst those of the diversity (non-convergence) view are concerned 
with both ‘formal institutions’ (e.g., the state, ministries and firms) and ‘informal 
institutions’ (e.g., norms and ideologies) and think that such institutions shape 
differences in national preferences, for instance, the trade-off between efficiency 
and equality. Calder (1988: 465-6) and Okimoto (1989: 31-2) have slightly 
different perspectives from Yamamura and focus on the trade-off between 
efficiency and stability / security.  
     The effectiveness of bank monitoring in Japanese corporate governance 
deteriorated due to excessive liquidity and a decreased corporate demand for 
funds in the Japanese economy from the latter half of the 1990s onwards. Batten 
and Szilagyi (2003: 83-4) point out that the Japanese corporate sector’s 
significant excess capacity and excessively high leverage built up during the high 
economic growth period led to its balance sheet restructuring, and warn  of ‘the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems’ that could stem from the Japanese 
financial system being overly dependent on intermediated financing when it faces 
excessive liquidity and a lack of investment choice. They maintain that the 
banking sector’s bad debt problem and the corporate sector’s excess capacity 
questioned the effectiveness of the banks’ monitoring of the corporate sector, and 
emphasise the necessity to promote ‘parallel credit channels’ through developing 
the corporate bond market (ibid.: 96). Market-based financial systems prioritise 
‘exit’ over ‘voice’ in order to influence corporate governance, whilst bank-
centred ones prefer ‘voice’ (Hirschman 1970; Zysman 1983: 57). Ikeo (2003: 92-
5) claims that voice (or a bank-centred financial system) may be more effective 
than exit (or a market-based financial system) when the economy is at the 
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relatively predictable stage of catching up with more advanced economies, 
whereas exit may be more efficient when the economy requires a drastic shift 
from low growth industries to high growth ones.   
     Despite the above-mentioned rationales for shifting from a bank-centred to a 
market-based financial system, why has Japan’s disintermediation stalled? Did 
the Japanese government merely demonstrate mock obedience to the United 
States (US) since it could not openly resist the US’ liberalisation pressure? This 
explanation might hold some truth, yet it neglects the fact that domestic securities 
firms and big businesses also urged the government to deregulate, whilst the 
government recognised the necessity of it. Then, was the government’s 
deregulation initiative owing to external and internal pressures constrained by its 
close ties with banks? This account might be more persuasive but it cannot 
explain why households and companies, the expected beneficiaries of 
liberalisation, have supported the status quo – the aggregate outstanding amount 
of bank loans for the corporate sector remains over six times as large as that of 
corporate bonds, while households keep immense bank deposits despite 
extremely low interest rates. Despite the inefficiency of the financial system, 
Japan has not encountered serious capital flight unlike some European countries. 
Has Japanese society behaved irrationally? Seemingly, the society has long been 
accustomed to the ‘socialisation of risk’ (Woo-Cummings 1999: 13) through the 
banking sector, strongly supported by the state, and cannot escape it easily.  
 
Three Major Factors Affecting Features of Financial Systems  
There are three major factors that significantly affect the features of financial 
systems including the relative autonomy of markets vis-à-vis states and interest 
groups. The first factor is domestic social relations in which both state and non -
state actors interact with each other and form or undermine a dominant coalition 
over the financial system. The second one is a level of ICM, which can constrain 
a state’s autonomy. The third factor is ideas and norms, which greatly influence 
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national political economic systems and world orders (Gill and Law 1988 ; 
Sinclair 2001). These three aspects are often closely interrelated.  
     With regard to the first factor, in the case of early post-war Japan, most of the 
major capitalists were eliminated by the dissolution of the Zaibatsu groups 
(industrial and financial business conglomerates), the agricultural land reform 
(which virtually deprived landowners of their property rights) and the heavy 
wealth tax under the US occupation (1945-52),4 as well as the wartime economic 
damage and the post-war hyperinflation. Unlike the US and Britain, where the 
powerful capitalist class has been influential in economic policymaking, the 
absence of a major capitalist class in the early post-war period was one key reason 
for the delayed capital market recovery and it cemented the dominant position of 
the banks in the Japanese financial system. During the early post-war period, the 
major banks held relatively strong bargaining power over borrowers due to a 
scarcity of capital, yet the export expansion and capital accumulation during the 
rapid economic growth period empowered export-oriented businesses and 
securities firms, which demanded financial deregulation from the mid-1970s 
onwards.   
     Regarding the second factor, Thomas (2001: 115-8) views mobility as a power 
resource for owners of capital and a potential threat to the state and the working 
class, arguing that ‘since states and labour are both relatively immobile, this 
implies that the power of capital has risen relative to both the state and labour’ 
(ibid.: 123). Although this argument generally holds true in regard to Anglo-
Saxon countries from the 1980s onwards, ‘ICM is not a law of nature or a machine’ 
(Sinclair 2001: 109), and its power and impact on capital’s bargaining position 
vis-à-vis a state and labour are contingent on a state’s history and domestic social 
norms as well as internationally influential ideologies. The relative strength of 
capital over labour in a certain country may significantly alter depending on  the 
                                                   
4 The US occupation forces adopted a pro-labour policy in the early stage of occupation, 
influenced by the New Deal policy (Gao 1997: 127).  
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financial market conditions. In a credit boom, when labour enjoys conducive 
employment conditions and good access to credit, capital has  a relatively strong 
voice and state financial deregulation, which accelerates ICM, is likely to be 
legitimised. By contrast, in a credit crisis, when labour’s employment conditions 
and credit access deteriorate, financial deregulation loses its legitimacy, and 
labour tends to demand stricter regulation, which can constrain ICM.   
     A typical example of the third factor occurred when a liberal economic 
ideology was permeated globally under British leadership in the 19 th and early 
20th centuries, while the market failures in the Great Depression beginning in 
1929, the wartime experience and Keynesian ideas made state intervention in the 
economy more acceptable among business leaders (Gill and Law 1988: 96). It 
was not a mere coincidence that Japan adopted a fairly liberal economic policy 
from the Meiji restoration until the 1920s, when liberalism was internationally 
dominant under British leadership. Subsequently, Japan’s post -war dirigiste 
policy was internationally tolerated because of the prevalence of Keynesianism 
and the Cold War.5 Due to the decline of major capitalists, many Japanese big 
businesses were run by internally promoted managers, relatively freed from 
shareholder pressure, with government intervention as well as support from banks, 
in the early post-war period. As this example demonstrates, an internationally 
widespread ideology is often intimately related to specific domestic social groups. 
Nevertheless, the dissolution of the Bretton Wood system centred on ‘embedded 
liberalism’ in 1971 and the stagflation during the 1970s discredited Keynesianism, 
and the 1980s saw the rise of neoliberalism, which promotes a free market and 
criticises excessive state intervention. Afterwards, the US became less tolerant 
of Japan’s interventionism and pressured Japan to deregulate its financial market. 
In addition to influential economic ideologies, norms deeply ingrained in society 
play a key role in shaping the features of its financial system. Social norms vary 
across states and change over time. Although the number of proponents of 
                                                   
5 During the Cold War, the US considered Japan a bulwark against communism.  
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neoliberalism increased in the Japanese dominant groups after the burst ing of the 
bubble economy in the early 1990s, anti-liberal, anti-free market social norms 
have been persistent and prevented the transformation of the financial market 
from bank-centred to market-based. This will be discussed later in detail.  
     The credit market, including bank loans, bonds and various credit derivative 
instruments, is a key component of the financial system in Japan. Interestingly, 
while equity markets tend to attract a larger proportion of international investors 
than credit markets and are fairly standardised globally, credit markets are 
inclined to retain more local elements such as regulations, practices and high 
proportions of local participants. One possible reason for this difference is that 
state regulations and home bias 6 are much stronger in credit markets than in 
equity markets because of the former’s much greater market size, larger market 
participants (including savers, investors and borrowers) and lower risks and 
returns (albeit some exceptions). The state is likely to have stronger incentives 
to regulate the credit market because of its larger potential impact on the national 
economy. In addition, most states are the largest borrowers in their credit markets. 
In these respects, the credit market is a politically sensitive arena. Generally 
speaking, investors are less likely to be attracted to overseas credit markets  unless 
these markets offer compellingly higher potential returns to overcome home bias.  
     As Strange (1988: 89-90) argued, ‘credit is literally the lifeblood of a 
developed economy’ and ‘the power to create credit is politically important.’ The 
major roles of credit markets are not only providing credit for growing and 
competent borrowers but also forcing less competent borrowers to improve their 
performance or weeding them out. In capitalist states, who decides on the 
allocation of capital and who has good access to credit are critically important 
                                                   
6 Home bias still remains in investment as financial markets are ‘dependent on information 
about the intensions of other parties, trust and the power to secure fulfilment of contractual 
commitments’ (Epstein 1996, quoted by Sinclair 2001: 96). The home bias of capital varies 
across countries, and is strongly affected by domestic social norms. Japan seems to have 
particularly high home bias of capital.  
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and reflect the characteristics of the credit market. If a state allows substantial 
autonomy to its credit market, the market mechanism rather than specific 
financial institutions will decide on the allocation of credit, which tends to cover 
a very broad-range of borrowers including subordinate groups 7  though the 
borrowing conditions of these groups are much stricter than those of privileged 
groups. This archetype can be seen in the context of the US. The market system 
excels in terms of efficiency, flexibility, inclusiveness and adaptability to change 
and innovation; but it is more aggressive in its risk-taking and unstable (ibid.: 
90).  
     Periodic credit crises have destructive impacts on capitalist states. Strange 
(1986 and 1998) repeatedly warned of the danger of the unstable global financial 
markets centred on the US, in particular of a credit crisis, and her concern was 
realised in the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the GFC, which started in 2007. 
She ascribed such danger to states’ weakened control over financial markets  
(Strange 1998: 179-90).  
     In contrast, countries with less liberal credit markets, such as Japan, have 
different financial problems. In these countries, specific financial institutions 
rather than the market mechanism tend to decide on the allocation of credit, often 
based on their long-term relationships with borrowers; credit covers a relatively 
narrow range of borrowers, while the state directly or indirectly intervenes in 
their decision-making. In Japan, big businesses and their employees generally 
enjoy better access to credit than subordinate groups despite the latter’s 
significant collective contribution to bank deposits.8 Big banks are often regarded 
                                                   
7 Subordinate groups include small and medium-sized enterprises and their employees, 
subprime consumers, and firms under bankruptcy proceedings.  
8  Although subordinate groups’ credit access temporarily improved through non -bank 
financial institutions (including financiers for small and medium-sized enterprises and 
subprime consumers during the 1980s and 1990s), many of the non -banks failed or were 
acquired by banks and their subsidiaries with a stricter credit policy. Chapters 3 and 5 will 
discuss this point in greater detail.  
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as de facto semi-public entities rather than purely private entities. CMEs are 
inclined to be more stable but less efficient,  inflexible and less inclusive than 
LMEs, whilst the former provide larger social security, corporate bailouts and 
other support (e.g., long-term employment and business relations) to sustain their 
system, potentially leading to excessive public / bank debt burdens and 
deteriorating economic vigour.      
 
Characteristics of Japan’s Financial System and Capitalism 
The focus of this thesis is the resistance towards the transformation of Japan’s 
financial system from bank-centred to capital market-based. However, the 
features of its wartime and post-war financial system and capitalism, as well as 
the financial deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s need to be scrutinised in order 
to tackle this main point.  
     From the Meiji restoration in 1868 until the early 1930s, although the 
Japanese government adopted a policy of increasing wealth and military power, 
its economic policy was fairly liberal, and there was little government regulation 
in its banking sector (Allen and Gale 2000: 39). The capital market was quite 
active until the early 1930s,9 and for instance, 87% of the industrial funds on a 
flow basis in 1931 came from the capital markets including both equities and 
bonds (Noguchi 2010: 34). However, the series of financial crises , including the 
Showa financial crisis in 1927 and the Great Depression beginning in 1929, and 
the rise of the military after the Manchurian incident in 1931 dramatically 
transformed the characteristics of the Japanese financial system. After the Showa 
financial crisis broke out, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) enacted the Banking 
                                                   
 
9 While Japan could finance the Sino-Japanese War (in 1894-5) mainly through domestic 
public bond issuance which proved the development of the financial system in the 1880s, 
the financing of the Russo-Japanese War (in 1904-5) had to rely on overseas bond issuance 
in both London and New York.  
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Law, which significantly strengthened the state’s regulation and supervision over 
the banking industry. Due to the state-led consolidation, the number of banks 
drastically decreased from 1,402 in 1926, to 61 in 1945 and the corporate bond 
market was placed under the control of the Japanese government and major banks. 
Moreover, the Temporary Fund Adjustment Act in 1937 placed the allocation of 
industrial funds under state control and the National Mobilisation Law in 1938 
enabled the finance minister to determine which military-related industries and 
firms the banks should provide with loans. 
     In Japanese politics and economics, there has been the so-called ‘continuity-
discontinuity debate over pre-war/wartime and post-war Japan’ (Muramatsu 
1981: 7-11, Noguchi 2010: 13-9). The discontinuity camp, mainly neoclassical 
economists, claims that Japan transformed from controlled economy during the 
wartime period (1936-45) to liberal economy in the post-war period (Eki 2012, 
Okita 2010). In contrast, the continuity camp, including Noguchi (2010) and 
Okazaki (1993), emphasises the continuity of anti-free market characteristics of 
the Japanese economic and corporate systems between the wartime and post -war 
periods. I share the same perspective with the continuity camp. Japan’s liberal 
economic system led by major capitalists from 1868 until the early 1930s was 
heavily influenced by the liberal world order of Pax Britannica. However, anti-
liberal norms (exemplified by Confucianism) had long been used by ruling elites 
(e.g., high-ranking samurai warriors) to dominate subordinates in Japanese 
society since the feudal period. Dramatically increased class conflicts (e.g., 
labour and agrarian disputes) in Japan from WWI (1914-8) until the mid-1930s 
reflected the tension between liberal global norms and anti -liberal Japanese 
social norms, promoting government intervention into the economy and 
ultimately leading to controlled economy (Teranishi 2003: 143-7). 
      Japan’s post-war financial system originated from its control economy during 
WWII. Noguchi (2010) argues that anti-liberal, anti-free market norms and 
institutions of the ‘1940 system’ developed for total war have remained in 
13 
 
Japanese society to date, and they can be witnessed in the bureaucratic 
intervention, the bank-centred financial system, the Japanese style corporate 
system, and the prioritisation of producer over consumer interests. The bank-
centred financial system enabled the government to control the corporate sector 
through its tight grip on the banks, while the rigid credit control greatly 
contributed to the formation of keiretsu (interlocking business networks often 
with cross shareholdings and human relationships)10 under the wartime economy. 
Only dominant groups such as big businesses were allowed to obtain good access 
to credit during wartime and the early post-war period. In fact, there was a nexus 
of big businesses, finance (MOF and state banks) and the military during wartime.  
     After WWII, the US occupation forces eliminated not only militarists but also 
major capitalists, such as landlords and executives of Zaibatsu conglomerates and 
large firms, accidentally reinforcing the power of ‘administrators’ (anti -free 
market elites), including bureaucrats, corporate executives, bankers and Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) politicians (van Wolferen 1989:109-11). The US 
government accepted Japan’s state interventionism in order to promote its 
economic recovery during the Cold War. Furthermore, the US accommodative 
trade policy and dollar-yen exchange rate (1 US dollar = 360 yen), which were 
favourable for Japanese exporters, as well as the US military protection of Japan 
contributed to Japan’s rapid economic growth during the early post -war period, 
when Japanese companies faced less competition with their rivals in other Asian 
countries. In this respect, the US support indirectly facilitated the development 
of the Japanese corporate and financial systems.  
     The Japanese credit market in the early post-war period had the following 
three features. Firstly, the credit allocation was decided quite subjectively by 
banks with heavy state intervention, in contrast to objective credit ratings by the 
                                                   
10 There are three types of keiretsu in Japan: horizontally diversified business groups (such 
as Mitsubishi and Sumitomo), vertical manufacturing networks and vertical distribution 
networks. Unlike Zaibatsu conglomerates, keiretsu networks do not have their headquarters 
(holding companies).  
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US CRAs. Secondly, large firms had good access to credit, while SMEs and 
households had limited credit access. Lastly, most financially troubled large firms 
were bailed out by banks and the state. The empirical part  of this thesis examines 
the extent to which these features have been changed or retained while exploring 
the reasons for this. 
     The restricted international capital mobility under the Bretton Woods  System 
fitted well with Japanese society’s anti-liberal, anti-free market norms. The 
restrictive world financial order (i.e., the constraint of capitalist power) 
contributed to the continuity of the 1940 system and the dominance of anti -free 
market elites in Japan. However, since Anglo-Saxon financial hegemony 
enhanced international capital mobility after the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
System and the end of the Cold War, the tension between liberal global norms 
and anti-liberal Japanese social norms has been re-intensified. Although the 
power of anti-free market elites was challenged by market liberals from the mid-
1990s to the mid-2000s, an anti-neoliberal backlash started in 2006, which 
demonstrated the persistence of anti-liberal, anti-free market Japanese social 
norms. There are similarities in the tension between liberal global norms and anti -
liberal Japanese social norms between the pre-war period (from the mid-1910s to 
the mid-1930s) and now. 
     I argue that anti-liberal, anti-free market social norms were created and 
promoted by the administrators of the 1940 system, and consented to by 
subordinates such as labour, and small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) 
owners, contributing to a management-labour alliance against capitalists as well 
as the formation of keiretsu. The economic bureaucracy formed an alliance with 
the LDP and big businesses during the early post-war period. Unlike their Anglo-
Saxon peers, most Japanese corporate executives and bankers share similar traits 
with bureaucrats rather than entrepreneurs. Japanese large firms perform public 
functions such as contributing to stable employment, and banks behave in 
accordance with political directives rather than as profit-seeking organisations. 
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     Historically, transformations in state-finance relations appear to have been 
caused by external and/or internal factors. Cox (1987: 4) defines historical 
structures as ‘persistent social practices, made by collective human activity and 
transformed through collective human activity,’ and maintains that the three 
levels of historical structure – social relations of production (where dominant 
elites control production and subordinate groups work under the former’s control), 
forms of state and world orders – are interrelated (Cox 1981: 138). In this respect, 
if contradictions and conflicts in social relations of production (i.e., power 
relations between social groups within society) and/or world orders exceed 
coherence and stability (Cox 1987: 269), which has a major impact on forms of 
state, this will lead to changes in state-finance relationships. Then, how are these 
contradictions and conflicts intensified? Cox (1981: 136) claims that three 
categories of social forces, namely material capabilities (power), ideas (including 
norms and ideologies) and institutions, interact within historical structures. For 
instance, technological development may strengthen the material capabilities of 
certain social groups, while the major political and/or economic failure of some 
dominant groups will lead to decreases in their material capabilities. A new 
powerful ideology or the rise or decline of a hegemon can transform world orders.    
     Since the 1980s, Japan has encountered a number of profound domestic and 
international changes. Firstly, towards the end of and after the Cold War, 11 the 
US economic policy towards Japan became harsh, and the US government tried 
to curb its trade deficit vis-à-vis Japan and pry open the Japanese financial market 
through political pressure. After the US-Japan Dollar-Yen Committee in 1983, 
MOF introduced market-based interest rate products, liberalised Euro-yen bonds 
issuance, and allowed the establishment of CRAs in Japan. Secondly, the 
Japanese economy slowed down, while Japanese companies faced fierce 
international competition in the midst of the yen’s appreciation against the US 
dollar and other major currencies. Thirdly, higher ICM, which was initiated by 
                                                   
11 The end of the Cold War lowered the strategic importance of Japan for the US. 
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the US and the UK, made it difficult for Japanese financial authorities to maintain 
autonomous financial and macroeconomic policy making. An increas ing number 
of Japanese blue chip companies were attracted to the Eurobond market during 
the 1980s. Fourthly, the influential economic ideology shifted from 
Keynesianism to neoclassical economics (neoliberalism), which was critical of 
government interventionism and promoted capitalist power. Fifth, Japan’s public 
debt ballooned as its government tried to boost economic growth through fiscal 
expansion. Lastly, the bad debt problem, political and financial scandals and the 
prolonged economic slump weakened the power of the economic bureaucracy, the 
banking sector and the LDP.  
     In the 1990s, a series of political scandals12 weakened the power of the LDP, 
while a wave of scandals 13  also hit MOF. According to Toya (2006), Prime 
Minister Hashimoto, the LDP’s Administrative Reform Promotion Headquarters 
and MOF took initiatives in carrying out the Japanese Financial Big Bang in 1996 
– the LDP sought to regain public support in the face of fierce electoral 
competition, and MOF also chose to win back public support to ensure its survival. 
However, although the Big Bang itself was an appropriate policy, both MOF and 
the LDP underestimated the actual size of the bad debts in the banking sector. 
Japan faced an array of banking crises from 1995 to 1998,14 which dramatically 
increased the annual corporate bond issuance in 1998.   
     During the banking crises and their aftermath from 1995 through to 2003, the 
Japanese economy suffered from a serious bad debt problem, and the banking 
sector witnessed major corporate bankruptcies, most of which involved real 
                                                   
12 These political scandals included the Recruit Scandal in 1988 and the Sagawa Express 
scandal in 1992. 
13 These include the Daiwa Bank New York Branch scandal in 1995, the Housing Loan 
Affair in 1995-6 and MOF officers’ wining and dining scandals in 1994 -6. 
14 The banking crises during this period entail the failures of Hyogo Bank, Kizu Credit 
Cooperative, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities and the nationalisation of 
the Long Term Credit Bank of Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank.  
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estate companies, construction firms and non-banks. These sectors were not as 
politically powerful as manufacturing establishments. 15  In 2001, the yen-
denominated bonds issued by Mycal (a major Japanese retailer) and Enron (a US 
energy trader), with respective amounts of approximately $30bn and $12bn, went 
into default, and the Japanese corporate bond market experienced major credit 
events for the first time. However, from 2002 to 2004, the government and major 
banks provided all-out support to stabilise the financial system due to the public 
call for stability. Such support entailed: 1) the enforcement of enormous public 
capital injections into banks and bad debt disposals, 2) banks’ support for 
financially troubled major companies, 16 3) the establishment of the Industrial 
Revitalization Corporation of Japan (IRCJ), a governmental institution to support 
the restructuring of companies through management consulting and provision of 
public funds, and 4) quantitative monetary easing. These measures made it 
difficult for credit market participants to perceive credit risk, causing the 
marketisation of the financial system to stall. 
     Prime Ministers Hashimoto (1996-8) and Koizumi (2001-6) adopted 
neoliberal policies, including the abolition of the Large-scale Retail Store Law, 
which had protected small shops, the reduction in public works, the Japanese 
Financial Big Bang and the privatisation of public-sector entities. In addition to 
the deregulation of industries such as finance, retail, transportation and 
telecommunications, Anglo-Saxon style business and financial practices 
including corporate restructuring, active use of M&A, structured finance (which 
creates saleable financial instruments based on cash flows from financial assets), 
mark-to-market accounting, and pay-for-performance, executive officer and 
                                                   
15 In real estate, construction and non-bank sectors, there are some notable exceptions such 
as Mitsubishi Estate and Mitsui Fudosan, which are regarded as establishments.  
16  Banks’ support measures for financially troubled companies include interest rate 
deductions, ‘forbearance lending’, debt forgiveness and debt -for-equity swaps. 
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outside director systems were introduced into Japan during the 1990s and the first 
half of the 2000s.  
     However, the prolonged economic slump, neoliberal policies and protection 
of existing regular workers under lifetime employment generated a large number 
of low income non-regular workers – according to the 2009 OECD statistics, 
Japan’s relative poverty rate (16.0%) was substantially higher than those of 
Western European countries (the majority of which was less than 10%). Watanabe 
(2007) claims that neoliberal policies have had a more detrimental impact on 
Japan than Western Europe because the former has neither experience as a social 
welfare state nor a strong political party that promotes welfare policies. An anti-
neoliberal backlash took place in 2006 when the Koizumi administration ended. 
The GFC intensified the backlash, resulting in strong distrust of Anglo-Saxon 
style financial capitalism. 
 
Argument in Brief  
Why has Japan resisted financial disintermediation despite the deregulation 
during the 1980s and 1990s as well as the financial crisis associated with  the 
enormous bad debts of the banking sector? I emphasise the concept of ‘systemic 
support’ as a solution to this puzzle. The original, narrow definition of systemic 
support, which is a term used in the credit markets, is government and bank 
support for financially strained financial institutions and companies. However, I 
contend that its broadened definition is dominant elites’ support and protection 
of subordinates in exchange for loyalty and obedience, which is exemplified by 
broad-ranging domestic social relations in Japan such as the main bank system, 
lifetime employment, and long-term subcontracting between large firms and 
SMEs.  
     The conflict between anti-liberal, anti-free market Japanese social norms 
(exemplified by systemic support) and Anglo-Saxon style norms promoting 
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market liberalisation including financial disintermediation and neoliberal 
restructuring has been witnessed in Japan since the early 1990s. I argue that such 
Japanese social norms are a form of counter-hegemony that constrain capitalist 
domination in Japan, under Anglo-Saxon financial hegemony, which promotes 
transnational capitalist power. Systemic support has not only persisted but also 
generated contradictions and conflicts within Japanese society.  
     Even if contradictions and conflicts in social relations of production and/or 
world orders are intensified, the state-finance relationship will not change over a 
short period of time. Cox (1987: 269) maintains that ‘elements of coherence and 
stability are matched against contradictions and conflicts,’ and that coherence 
and stability here can be viewed as the staying power of the historical structure 
and attempts by dominant groups to preserve their vested interests. If an old 
historical structure is losing its hegemonic status, it will take a new historical 
structure a long period of time to obtain legitimacy in society. Under such 
circumstances, the new structure will have to compete against the old one until it 
acquires a hegemonic position. 
     Despite the financial deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s, the transition 
from a bank-centred to capital market-based financial system has struggled. The 
old financial system worked effectively for a long time, and has been firmly 
embedded in Japan’s political economy. Therefore, the question arises, who 
opposed the shift to a market-based financial system? Many commentators have 
stated that Japanese bureaucrats were the culprits in the delay. In this vein, 
government and bank support (the narrowly defined systemic support) can be 
viewed as a major obstacle to the transition. Such support will not fade out easily 
in Japan, partly because the economic bureaucracy and major banks are unlikely 
to give up their desire to regulate the market, and partly because both creditors 
and debtors get accustomed to systemic support and are still reluctant to take 
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large risks without external support.17 Interestingly, MOF took initiatives in the 
financial deregulation, and the Bank of Japan (BOJ, Japan’s central bank ) 
promoted the introduction of new financial products such as syndicated loans and 
credit default swaps. However, MOF’s initiatives were constrained by its close 
ties with the banking sector. Such constraints were evident when MOF allowed 
the banks to establish securities brokerage subsidiaries in 1993-4 and tacitly 
assisted the establishment of local CRAs in 1985. It is possible to claim that 
banks and other interest groups may be more strongly opposed to the transition 
than bureaucrats. 
     Why have the Japanese government and society endeavoured to preserve the 
old regime despite the increasing malfunctioning of the 1940 system and the 
relatively weakened power of dominant elites such as the economic bureaucracy, 
the banking sector and the LDP? While this could be explained partly by the 
vested interests of some social groups, the more persuasive account stems from 
deeply ingrained social norms. Clift (2014: 219) maintains that ‘the ideational 
element – social norms and how market relations are understood in different 
contexts – has its part to play in explaining ongoing diversity as capitalisms 
transform’. 
     Typical Japanese social norms can be observed in the government’s 
paternalistic stance towards its people and people’s submissive attitude towards 
dominant elites. In Japan, subordinates receive protection (i.e., systemic support) 
from dominant elites in exchange for loyalty and submission to the latter. 
Furthermore, Japanese people are inclined to cooperate closely with other 
members of social groups, such as local communities, and (subdivisions of) 
companies and bureaucracies, and exclude outsiders from such social groups in 
order to pursue stability and minimise uncertainty (Yamagishi 1999:56-88), while 
their mutual surveillance and regulation make them prioritise the collective 
                                                   
17 In other words, the risk averse nature has been deeply embedded in the behaviour of 
Japanese creditors and debtors.  
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benefit of their social groups over their own individual benefit (ibid.: 45-9). 
Subordinates’ loyalty and submission to dominant elites have developed not only 
through the latter’s coercion but also through the former’s consent to the social 
norms created by the latter.  
     Why is the rescue of financially troubled companies justified in Japan? A 
management-labour alliance against capitalists, which is bolstered by both 
systemic support and in-group favouritism, has dominated most large Japanese 
companies. Frequent corporate bankruptcies would ruin this management -labour 
alliance, strengthening capitalist power through enhanced capital mobility such 
as restructuring, overseas investment and M&A. If capitalists were to dominate 
Japanese corporate society, management (administrators) would no longer be able 
to maintain their power within their firms, whilst regular workers would lose their 
employment stability. In this respect, I contend that the broadly defined systemic 
support, together with in-group favouritism, rather than the narrowly defined 
systemic support, has stalled financial disintermediation, which could sever  the 
long-term social relations sustained by systemic support – for instance, keiretsu, 
the main bank system, lifetime employment and long-term subcontracting. 
     I argue that the Japanese credit market is a battlefield between the market 
liberalisation and anti-free market camps within the Japanese elite, and that an 
ideational conflict between the two camps was observed from the early 1990s 
until the mid-2000s. The former camp included reformist bureaucrats and 
politicians, Keizai Doyukai (hereafter Doyukai, a neoliberal -oriented industrial 
association)18, neoclassical economists, non-Japanese firms and the US CRAs, 
whereas the latter one consisted of interventionist bureaucrats, anti -free market 
politicians, Keidanren (the largest, conservative business lobby) 19, banks, legal 
elites and the local Japanese CRAs. Although the market liberalisation camp was 
influential under the Hashimoto and Koizumi administrations, an anti -neoliberal 
                                                   
18 Keizai Doyukai’s English name is the Japan Association of Corporate Executives.  
19 Keidanren’s English name is the Japan Business Federation.  
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backlash has been driven not only by anti-free market elites but also by 
subordinates such as regular workers and SME owners.  
     Excessive systemic support from the government and banks together with the 
underdevelopment of the corporate bond market has lowered the efficiency of the 
Japanese economy and hampered risk-taking by both creditors and debtors. 
However, the eradication of systemic support is likely to be extremely painful for 
a vast number of people due to low mobility in the labour market and weak actual 
risk-taking in the credit market. Many big businesses and their employees still 
have incentives to preserve the 1940 system and its bank-centred financial system. 
In addition, most subordinate groups (including employees of SMEs, farmers and 
retired people) are heavily dependent on long-term subcontracting, subsidies, 
public investment and social welfare benefits, which are other forms of systemic 
support. In these respects, a large proportion of Japanese people are motivated to 
maintain a high level of systemic support. Having said that, the costs of 
sustaining the old system are becoming increasingly heavy. The preservation of 
the old system has aggravated the following contradictions within it: 1) the 
corporate and household sectors’ excessively weakened risk taking, 2) the 
skyrocketing public debt, and 3) the sharply rising number of working poor.  
     My normative position is in between the anti-free market and market 
liberalisation camps and is critical of both camps. After obtaining my 
undergraduate degree in economics, I worked for the Industrial Bank of Japan 
(IBJ, presently Mizuho Bank), which was the main bank for numerous big 
businesses (mainly manufacturers) and belonged to the anti -free market camp. 
Subsequently, I conducted credit research at non-Japanese investment banks in 
Tokyo, first Merrill Lynch and then UBS, which belong to the market 
liberalisation camp, as I thought that building a fair, open and transparent credit 
market was indispensable for the revitalisation of the Japanese economy. 
However, I have become disillusioned with both camps. The anti-free market 
camp has made every effort to preserve their vested interests and opposed to 
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capitalist dominance, resulting in the prolonged economic stagnation. In contrast, 
the market liberalisation camp has aimed for capitalist dominance and short -term 
profit making in financial markets, which sever long-term social ties and promote 
inequality in society. I contend that market liberalisation without sufficient social 
protection would make lives of many people precarious, while systemic support 
should be provided for individuals (particularly among young generation) rather 
than established organisations.  
     In summary, there are three key arguments in this thesis. Firstly, Japanese 
society’s anti-liberal, anti-free market social norms (epitomised by systemic 
support) have been at odds with financial disintermediation and globalisation 
aligned with Anglo-Saxon style capitalism. Secondly, there was an ideational 
conflict between the market liberalisation and anti-free market camps within the 
Japanese elite from the early 1990s until the mid-2000. Lastly, the strong ties 
binding social groups and society tend to limit the leadership of dominant elites 
pursuing change and the mobility of capital, and systemic support has long 
hampered the transition of the Japanese financial system from bank-centred to 
market-based. 
 
Analytical Method 
The analytical method of the thesis is qualitative and empirical – the extensive 
study of secondary sources and over 50 interviews with current and former 
bureaucrats (including those at MOF and the Bank of Japan), politicians, 
academics in economics, sociology, social psychology and business studies, and 
various professionals (including senior bankers, banking sector analysts, 
corporate executives, an SME professional and management of both the US and 
local CRAs) have been conducted. This is because the thesis does not seek a 
general theory of the state-finance relationship, but rather specifically analyses 
the resistance to the transformation of the Japanese financial system since the 
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1980s. Contradictory causal factors will not be filtered out but instead examined 
closely within the historicised framework.  
     The empirical study focuses on three aspects of the Japanese credit market: 1) 
major corporate bailouts and bankruptcies, which reflect the strengths and 
weaknesses of systemic support and their influence in Japan, 2) differences 
between the American and local Japanese CRAs, and 3) change and resistance to 
change in corporate governance.  
     Major corporate failures have strengthened the market mechanism of the 
credit market, which differentiates the risk premiums of debts according to their 
creditworthiness (i.e., probability of timely debt repayment), whereas corporate 
bailouts have constrained the mechanism. Three examples of major corporate 
bailouts selected in this thesis illustrate the continuous strength of systemic 
support. Four examples of major corporate failures were different from ordinary 
bankruptcies and did not necessarily indicate weakened systemic support.   
     There are substantial differentials between the US and local CRAs in regard 
to credit ratings for the same Japanese companies, and the gaps stem mainly from 
differences in the extent to which CRAs take systemic support into account when 
assessing creditworthiness (Morita 2010: 122-33). The US CRAs were influential 
in Japan from the mid-1990s until the early 2000s when MOF and the banking 
industry lost power and thereby systemic support weakened, but their influence  
waned when the banking industry recovered and systemic support resurged.  
     Analysing change and resistance to change in Japanese corporate governance 
during the 1990s and 2000s will shed light on: 1) who promoted market 
liberalisation for what reasons, and who was opposed to it and why? 2) To what 
extent has Japanese style corporate governance actually changed? And 3) why 
has financial disintermediation in Japan lost momentum? Both credit ratings and 
corporate governance can be viewed as battlegrounds between the market 
liberalisation and anti-free market camps within the elites. An ideational conflict 
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between Doyukai and Keidanren  over corporate governance and employment is 
worth paying particular attention to.  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 will review literature on both change and resistance to change in the 
Japanese financial system or more generally Japanese political economy from the 
1980s onwards. The review will focus on the ‘network state’ view of Japan, 
neoliberalism and financial globalisation, Japanese corporate governance and the 
convergence-diversity debate, and subsequently points of departure from the 
previous literature will be discussed.  
     Chapter 2 will discuss the analytical framework and methodologies. The main 
analytical framework is Neo-Gramscian, which fits the thesis theme well. 
Analytic eclecticism, which is adopted in this thesis in the sense of Sil and 
Katzenstein (2010), is indispensable to operationalise Neo-Gramscian 
approaches, which are macroscopic and require a supplementary toolkit for meso 
and micro level analyses. Specifically, the three pairs of contrasting conceptions 
– ‘weak and strong ties’ (sociology), ‘promotion and prevention orientations’ 
(psychology) and ‘guardian and commercial moral syndromes’ (moral 
philosophy) – are effective to elucidate Japanese social norms. This chapter 
highlights that systemic support, which is closely linked with the notions of 
strong ties, a prevention orientation and guardian morals, is at the centre of anti-
liberal, anti-free market Japanese social norms. Later in the chapter, major actors’ 
interests, ideas and alliances in Japanese political economy will be examined in 
order to clarify how the 1940 system developed and why some of its elements 
have survived. 
     Chapter 3 will deliberate over Japan’s post-war bank-centred financial system, 
the financial deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s, and the persistent systemic 
support. After examining the features of the early post -war financial system and 
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the financial deregulation, the determinants of the major corporate bailouts and 
failures after 2000, and the political background of the government’s 
establishment of corporate restructuring funds and the SME Financing 
Facilitation Act will be investigated. Furthermore, this chapter will discuss why 
systemic support has been justified in Japan, despite its market distortion leading 
to economic inefficiencies.  
     Chapter 4 will investigate how the Japanese local CRAs have developed since 
the mid-1980s and how they are different from the US CRAs, after examining the 
growth, power and transformation of the US CRAs under financial globalisation. 
Focusing on the two contrasting forms of finance – the synchronic form, which 
focuses on short-term profit making in financial markets, and the diachronic form, 
which links finance with investment in productive assets for the growth of so cial 
wealth (Sinclair 2005: 58-9) – and systemic support, the rise and fall of the US 
CRAs’ influence in Japan in tandem with the persistence of the local CRAs will 
be analysed. 
     Chapter 5 will examine the ideational conflict within the Japanese elite 
between the market liberalisation and anti-free market camps from the early 
1990s until the mid-2000s, which coincided with the rise and fall of the US CRAs. 
The two major industrial associations, i.e., Keidanren and Doyukai, played a role 
as ideational platforms for Japanese corporate society. The contrast between 
Keidanren and Doyukai can be described as: 1) administrators vs. capitalists / 
entrepreneurs, 2) stakeholder capitalism vs. shareholder capitalism, and 3) 
proponents vs. opponents of systemic support. Later in the chapter, whilst the 
Livedoor and Murakami Fund incidents of 2006 will be highlighted as blatant 
examples of anti-neoliberal backlash, persistent systemic support and in-group 
favouritism in Japanese corporate governance will be the main focus.   
     Chapter 6 will explore why and how the weakened dominance of 
administrators has changed the nature of systemic support in Japan from quasi -
public goods to virtual subsidies to specific interest groups. The US economic 
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support to and military protection of Japan during the early post -war period can 
be viewed as systemic support, and the fading out of such support indirectly 
contributed to the relative power decline of administrators. Furthermore, growing 
contradictions within the 1940 system generated by systemic support – weakened 
risk taking of the corporate and household sectors, the rapid expansion of public 
debt and sharp increases in the number of poor non-regular workers – will be 
examined. 
     The concluding chapter will summarise the main arguments of the thesis , 
probe potentially fruitful areas of further study stemming from the concepts and 
findings, and explore the future prospects of systemic support in Japan. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 
This chapter will review literature on both changes and resistance towards change 
in the Japanese financial system or its political economy in general from the 
1980s onwards. The purpose of the literature review is to identify research gaps 
related to the research puzzle and establish an analytical framework to solve the 
puzzle, which is, in a broad sense, associated with whether, or to what extent, 
Japanese style capitalism has converged and would converge with LMEs. The 
literature review will start with the ‘network state’ view of Japan, then discuss 
financial globalisation and Japanese corporate governance, and finally the 
convergence-diversity debate. The review will lead to three main points of 
departure from the previous literature. Firstly, the research puzzle of this thesis 
cannot be solved by single-mindedly focusing on a single one out of the actors 
involved: banks, big businesses, major political parties and financial authorities. 
Attention should be also paid to subordinate groups and both internal and external 
factors. Secondly, a key to solving the research puzzle lies in the anti -liberal, 
anti-free market social norms in Japan. Lastly, further eclectic approaches which 
combine a supplementary toolkit of sociological, psychological and 
philosophical concepts with an analytical framework of political science are 
needed to analyse the social norms.  
 
1.1 The Network State View of Japan 
According to Eki (2012: 212), there are three major perspectives that account for 
the rapid growth of the early post-war Japanese economy, namely ‘market-led 
growth’, ‘state-led growth’ and ‘network state’ views. The market-led growth 
view is synonymous with neoclassical economics, and its advocates believe that 
state intervention had a limited impact on economic growth. However, this view 
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did not reflect the reality of the Japanese economy. In contrast, the state-led 
growth view argues that the state dominated business through regulatory and 
resource control, while state intervention, particularly by economic bureaucracy, 
significantly contributed to the rapid growth. This view is often categorised as 
the ‘developmental state’ view by non-Japanese scholars (Johnson 1982; Woo-
Cumings 1999). Proponents of the network state view, such as Okimoto (1989)20 
and Samuels (1987), claim that the state-led growth view exaggerates the power 
of the Japanese state bureaucracy, as it had relatively small manpower, a small 
budget and weak legal regulatory capacity, and a network state can exert power 
only through its networks with the private sector.  
     The network state view maintains that the networks and collaboration between 
the state and business entailed a key to Japan’s rapid economic growth - the state 
bureaucracy ‘gently shepherded its myopic business sheep’ (Broadbent 2000: 8). 
Such policy networks can be observed not only between the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI, previously the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry) and private sector companies but also between financial authorities and 
financial institutions. Okimoto (1989: 29-30) rightly argues that it is 
fundamentally important to understand that Japanese society (both the 
government and the private sector) has had a deep-rooted preoccupation with its 
economic security stemming from its lack of raw materials, geographical 
isolation and traumatic pre-war experiences (e.g., threat of Western colonisation 
and the economic blockade). My perspective is close to the network state view 
although I agree with Johnson’s (1999: 59-60) claim that Japanese ‘private-sector’ 
managers of big businesses and banks are different from their American 
counterparts, who are short-term profit maximisers, and have public-oriented and 
bureaucratic characteristics.  
                                                   
20 The following comments from Okimoto (1989: 226-7) are relevant to the theme of this 
thesis: ‘the Japanese state derives its legitimacy from its capacity to coordinate industry -
specific efforts and national goals’ and ‘in Japan, the state symbolizes and functionally 
affirms the solidarity of the national collectivity’.  
30 
 
     Amyx can be categorised into the network state view camp, and her book 
(Amyx: 2004) is very relevant to this thesis. She tackles the two research puzzles 
associated with the Japanese financial crisis from 1992 to 2003. The first is why 
the Japanese government’s intervention to address the bad debt problem in the 
banking sector was significantly delayed. The other is why the government’s 
financial reform and efforts to recover from the bad debt problem were 
ineffective. Her book highlights the function of ‘networks’ – a sociological term 
defined as ‘the collection of people, organisations, or objects connected to each 
other in some way’ (ibid.: 11) – in Japanese financial policymaking and 
regulation.    
     Amyx addresses the question of why Japanese financial policy networks 
between MOF and the banking industry have failed to work properly since the 
1980s, despite their success in the early post-war period (ibid.: 8). The metaphor 
of networks and ties, for instance, applicable to the ‘iron triangle’ of the LDP, 
bureaucrats and big business, keiretsu, the main banking system, subcontracting 
between large companies and SMEs and lifetime employment, has frequently 
been used to describe Japanese society and political  economy by political 
scientists and sociologists (Lockwood 1965; Okimoto 1989; Calder 1993; Gao 
2001; Lincoln & Gerlach 2004). However, the policy networks between the state 
bureaucracy and business in Japan seem to be more informal and opaque than 
keiretsu, while such policy networks can be seen in all countries.       
     The crucial point is to identify the characteristics of specific policy networks. 
Buchanan (2002, quoted by Amyx 2004: 21) divides networks into two 
categories: ‘aristocratic’ and ‘egalitarian’. The former’s connections are 
concentrated in a small number of hubs (such as MOF, the LDP and major banks) 
and form a ‘hierarchical, command-and-control political system’ in the most 
extreme case, while those of the latter are more diversified and constitute a 
‘market-like pluralistic system’ at the opposite end of the spectrum (Amyx 2004: 
21). Other major characteristics of the former include high pervasiveness, 
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informality, low accessibility, a low capacity for external monitoring, limitations 
on individual interests by organisational interests and high durability beyond the 
immediate context, whereas the latter has features contrasting to the former. 
Amyx argues that ‘Japanese financial policy networks over the post -war period 
appear to be “aristocratic” or “elite” networks’ (ibid.: 22), and that ‘disruption in 
any hub of an “aristocratic” network can be catastrophic’ (ibid .: 33). However, 
she does not explain why such networks developed in Japan.  
     Prior to Amyx publishing her book (2004), Gao (2001) tried to solve his 
research puzzle: How can Japan’s seemingly abrupt reversal from the rapid 
economic growth in the early post-war period to the subsequent dismal stagnation 
be explained? He argues that ‘the dilemma in Japanese corporate governance 
between, on the one hand, “strong coordination” and, on the other, “weak control 
and monitoring” 21  provided the causal mechanism that led to excessive 
competition, a phenomenon that was critical both to Japan’s high growth and the 
bubble’ – ‘coordination’ in this context means the establishment and maintenance 
of a long-term relationship between companies, while ‘control’ and ‘monitoring’ 
are defined as shareholders’ control over corporate management by separating 
ownership from management and the mechanisms established by banks to 
evaluate the creditworthiness of proposed projects, respectively (Gao 2001: 15).  
     Gao claims that excessive competition among Japanese companies and banks 
did not result in a major economic crisis in the 1950s and 1960s due  to three 
contingent conditions (ibid.: 37).22 Firstly, fixed exchange rates and tight control 
                                                   
21 Traditional Japanese corporate governance is based on internal surveillance and audit as 
well as the segregation of duties, unlike Anglo-Saxon style monitoring by investors and 
outside board members.  
22  Quoting Yamamura (1982: 77-112), Drucker (1975: 228-44), and Murakami and 
Yamamura (1982: 113-21), Okimoto (1989: 39-47) maintains that the cause of excessive 
corporate competition can be the combination of industrial policy, market share 
maximisation strategy based on two features of Japanese firms  (i.e., lifetime employment 
and high debt-to-equity financing), and falling average costs of production. Moreover, 
Japan’s overcapacity of its production facilities was mainly attributed to the excessive 
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over ICM under the Bretton Woods system enabled the BOJ’s monetary policy to 
simultaneously balance payments and promote economic growth. Secondly, the 
Japanese financial authorities supported the banks in aggressively expanding 
loans for corporate borrowers. Lastly, the US tolerated Japan’s export expansion 
and absorbed the latter’s overbuilt production capacity. However, after the end 
of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, these conditions began to disappear (ibid.: 
36-39). Although Amyx (2004) focuses on the Japanese financial crisis, her theme 
and approach share some similarities with Gao (2001) – the latter highlights the 
distinctive characteristics of Japanese networks (i.e., strong coordination and 
weak control and monitoring).  
     Amyx (2004: 209) contends that ‘the character of the former network 
institutions – and the ways in which they served to diffuse risks, rewards, and 
responsibilities, in particular – would severely hamper the capacity of officials 
to successfully couple financial and corporate sector reforms’ after the spin-off 
of the financial supervisory function from MOF (MOF breakup). The Financial 
Supervisory Agency (old FSA) was established in 1998 and reorganised as the 
Financial Services Agency (new FSA) in 2000. She also maintains that the ‘high 
embeddedness’ of Japanese policy networks (i.e., the close linkages or 
interdependence between network institutions) in numerous domains of the 
political economy makes system transformation extremely difficult and costly 
and requires higher levels of political coordination and strong political leadership 
(ibid.: 229-37). The diffusion of risks, rewards, and responsibilities can be 
regarded as one of the major features of the post-war Japanese political economy, 
and bears some resemblance to Lockwood’s (1965: 503) metaphor - ‘a web with 
no spider’ who dominates and controls the networks. 23   
                                                   
systemic support provided by the government and the banking sector as well as the herd 
mentality of corporate managers.   
23 Alternatively, Lincoln and Gerlach (2003: 14) describe the Japanese state as ‘a web with 
many spiders, none of them dominant’. This means that each actor does not  have strong 
leadership but veto power to protect vested interests of itself or its allies.   
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     Amyx concludes that while system-wide change was needed for the Japanese 
political economy to contain the financial crisis, the state lacked strong political 
leadership24 to encourage the relevant parties to trade long-term gain for short-
term pain, and the MOF-centred financial policy networks became dysfunctional  
by the 1990s owing to two factors. Firstly, the enhanced information requirements 
due to more complex financial business made MOF’s traditional approach, which 
was dependent on informal relations-based regulation, less effective. Secondly, 
the disrupted relationship with the LDP and financial scandals forced the ministry 
to expend more energy on defending itself from political attack than on managing 
the financial crisis. 
     One weakness of Amyx’s arguments is that key factors such as heightened 
ICM, macroeconomic policy failures, the influence of neoliberal thoughts and the 
deteriorated legitimacy of the economic bureaucracy, which magnified the 
Japanese financial crisis and delayed its management, are not highlighted 
sufficiently. Higher ICM together with floating exchange rates made both 
Japanese financial and macroeconomic policy making less autonomous. When 
the BOJ’s monetary tightening to reduce the US trade deficit vis -à-vis Japan 
caused the Japanese economic slowdown in late 1986, the bank reversed  its 
monetary policy to boost domestic demand, resulting in an oversupply of money. 
Furthermore, from the bursting of the bubble economy in the early 1990s until 
the late 1990s financial crisis, the increased influence of neoliberalism in Japan 
made public opinion towards state intervention in the private sector, including 
public capital injections into banks, less favourable – though the backlash against 
neoliberalism was witnessed after Japan’s financial crisis and the GFC. More 
importantly, as MOF officials were not chosen through elections, the legitimacy 
of MOF’s leadership in the financial system hinged on the societal perception of 
                                                   
24 Power in Japan tends to be divided by peers and/or allies and delegated to lower ranks so 
that Japanese leaders such as Prime Minister, administrative vice mini sters (heads of 
ministerial bureaucracies) and CEOs do not have as much power as their US and European 
counterparts.   
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their strong dedication to economic success, but the bursting of the bubble 
economy and the subsequent corruption scandals tarnished this legitimacy.   
     Another weakness is that Amyx often views MOF as a unitary actor, but each 
bureau within the ministry has its own interests and they do not necessarily share 
key information between them. For instance, according to Kazuhito Ikeo, MOF 
mainstream divisions (the Budget and Tax Administration Bureaus) drove 
forward the Japanese Financial Big Bang, as they were dissatisfied with the 
damaged reputation of the entire MOF due to the bad debt problem, which was 
handled by MOF’s minor branch (the Banking Bureau), although the mainstream 
divisions were less market-oriented and had limited information on the size of 
the bad debts.25  Although Amyx assumes that key information is widely shared 
by dominant Japanese groups (particularly their leaders), this assumption is 
incorrect. In particular in an adverse situation such as a financial crisis, Japanese 
leaders often struggle to gather negative information from their subordinates and 
to take initiatives. 
 
1.2 Neoliberalism and Financial Globalisation 
The growing influence of neoliberalism and financial globalisation had a 
significant impact on the Japanese financial system from the mid -1990s to the 
early 2000s. In Japan, scholars, journalists and politicians often loosely or 
ambiguously define neoliberalism, resulting in confused discussion. Any policy 
or movement promoting trade liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, 
government support reduction, competition or corporate restructuring tends to be 
labelled neoliberal. Harvey (2005: 2) defines neoliberalism as ‘a theory of 
political economic practices that proposes that human well -being can best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
                                                   
25 Interview with Kazuhito Ikeo, Professor of Economics at Keio University and a former 
member of the government’s Financial Council and Financial System Council, in October 
2014 
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institutional framework characterised by strong private propert y rights, free 
markets, and free trade’. He contends that neoliberalism advocates free capital 
mobility between sectors, regions and countries (ibid.: 66), which suggests the 
restoration of power to a narrowly defined capitalist class (ibid .: 38). According 
to Chwieroth (2010: 17), the neoliberal continuum of thought, including 
neoclassical orthodoxy, neoliberalism, monetarism and neoclassical synthesis, 
views capital freedom as a desirable long-term goal. Furthermore, Kotz (2008) 
maintains that financialisation, which is a long-term inclination towards 
capitalism and involves the growing separation of finance from non-financial 
activity enabling capital to pursue short-term financial profits, was curbed by the 
embedded liberalism during the early post-war period, and subsequently released 
due to the neoliberal restructuring that started in the late 1970s.  
     In this respect, capital freedom is an indispensable element of neoliberalism 
or Anglo-Saxon style market liberalism. Although the ownership of capitalists is 
not confined to shareholding, shareholder capitalism or financial capitalism, 
which prioritises the interests of capitalists over those of the rest of society, is 
intertwined with neoliberalism. The current financial globalisation aligned with 
American credit rating orthodoxy reflects the hegemony of Anglo-Saxon style 
market liberalism. Neoliberal restructuring, which loosens the ties of capital with 
the rest of society and the real economy, enhances the power of capital and 
promotes shareholder capitalism. However, capital mobility is restricted not only 
by government regulation but also by social norms, which are closely related with 
the interests of both dominant elites and subordinate groups, and social relations, 
so deregulation alone may not achieve capital freedom in the short term. How 
finance works in different countries is likely to vary even under financial 
globalisation. 
     Malcolm (2001: 18-29) argues that three factors have promoted economic 
globalisation since the 1970s. The first is the unprecedented level of ICM and 
transnational businesses facilitated by the accelerated pace of innovation and 
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technological development. Secondly, the power of internationally mobile capital 
relative to labour, nationally constrained capital and states has been boosted by 
the financial and knowledge structures as well as the political economic 
structures through which credit and knowledge are created primarily for the 
benefit of transnational elites (Strange 1988: 26-32). Lastly, the relations between 
states and markets have been reconfigured due to a replacement of Keynesian 
welfare states with ‘Competition States’ (Cerny and Evans 2000). The first and 
second factors reflect the transformation from Fordism to post -Fordism and 
financialisation of the economy, respectively. Cox (1996b: 300) describes 
financialisation as a social phenomenon in which ‘finance has become decoupled 
from production to become an independent power, an autocrat over the real 
economy’. In terms of the last point, Cerny and Evans (2000: 1-5) claim that state 
actors in Competition States seek more prosperous and internationally 
competitive domestic economies through economic policies of liberalisation and 
marketisation, whilst they accept the loss of major traditional social and 
economic roles to insulate key elements of economic life such as ful l employment 
and public and social services from market forces.  
     Hardie et al. (2013: 1) put forward a provocative argument regarding financial 
globalisation and the convergence of national financial systems that the 
dichotomy that divides financial systems into two major components – bank 
credit and capital markets – has led to ‘the widespread intellectual incapacity to 
grasp the nature of changes to national financial systems and to explain, much 
less predict, the different impact of the recent financial crisis on advanced 
industrialised economies’. They propound ‘market-based banking’ as an 
analytical tool to shed light on the decade-long development of national financial 
systems until the outbreak of the GFC in 2007 (ibid.: 1-17).  Although market-
based banking is often applied narrowly to the ‘shadow banking system’ where 
non-commercial banks such as investment banks, money market funds and some 
off-balance-sheet vehicles provide credit, Hardie and Howarth (2013b: 25) 
broaden its definition to encompass all market-based commercial banking in 
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which ‘loans are made with the intention of selling them into the market, directly 
or via securitisation, and determined by the market price’. 26  This ‘originate and 
distribute’ model of banking developed in tandem with new financial innovations 
such as securitisation and various derivatives in the US and to a lesser extent 
Europe from the early 1990s to the early 2000s. In contrast, ‘traditional’ banking 
can be described as banks providing customers with loans that  are financed by 
customer deposits and kept on their balance sheet without any hedging (for 
instance, through credit default swaps) apart from collateral.  
     Zysman (1983) categorised the financial systems of advanced industrialised 
economies into three types: government-led credit based (typically France and 
Japan), bank credit based (Germany), and capital market based (Anglo-Saxon 
countries). Banks’ ‘financial power’ stems from the fact that ‘a limited number 
of financial institutions dominate the system’ (ibid.: 72, originally quoted by 
Hardie et al. 2013: 4). In relation to this categorisation, Germany, France and 
Japan are often labelled as CMEs that rely on various ‘non-market-based 
coordinating mechanisms and networks’ (for instance, between the st ate, the 
corporate sector and the banking sector) and ‘are characterised by long-term 
trust-based relationships within firms and between economic actors’, 27  in 
contrast to LMEs such as the US and the UK, which principally depend on 
‘markets and market mechanisms for coordination’ with an emphasis on ‘short -
term contractual relations’ (Clift 2014: 107-8).  
                                                   
26 Securitisation (i.e., the process of taking relatively illiquid assets and transforming them 
into securities through financial engineering) is different from disintermediation (i.e., the 
process of bypassing the intermediary to reduce funding costs) as the former does not 
eliminate the need for the intermediary. However, given that the purpose of securitisation 
is to provide marketability for financial claims such as bank loans, it achieves a similar 
effect to disintermediation. Both securitisation and disintermediation promote a shift from 
a bank-centred to a market-oriented financial system.  
27 Yamagishi (1999: 34-53), a social psychologist, contends that the long-term relationships 
within Japanese communities and organisations are based on mutual surveillance and 
regulation by their members rather than inherent trust among them.  
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     Hardie and Howarth (2013b: 23-8) claim that Zysman’s typology has become 
outdated and rather misleading, as financial institutions have lost their dominance 
within national financial systems with higher ICM and financial deregulations. 
The US CRAs started opening their overseas offices in Japan and Europe in the 
mid-1980s with the expectation of disintermediation of the banks (i.e., a shift 
from bank-based to capital market-based financial systems) in Continental 
Europe and Japan, but bank assets in advanced countries have not necessarily 
decreased. In fact, bank assets in the most advanced industrialised economies, 
including the Anglo-Saxon countries, increased their presence in national 
financial systems through the expansion of market-based banking with the 
sacrifice of equity from 2000 until 2007; 28 one notable exception to this was 
Japan.  Among countries that had previously indicated disintermediation, France 
and the Netherlands conspicuously changed their direction. Meanwhile, the UK 
demonstrated the highest rise in bank assets to GDP ratio during this period.  
      Hardie et al. (2013: 4) contend that the distinction between bank-centred and 
capital market-based financial systems is less meaningful when price movements 
in both bank lending and other financial assets (such as bonds and derivatives) 
are determined by market mechanisms in a similar manner. More importantly, 
they emphasise that market-based assets are financed by market-based liabilities, 
which include wholesale funding such as short-term money market funds, and 
that during a financial crisis, wholesale lenders tend to run away far more quickly 
than depositors. This caused a liquidity crunch of many American and European 
financial institutions during the GFC. Of the financial systems worst damaged by 
the financial crisis, two (the US and the UK) were defined as ‘capital -market-
based’ by the traditional typology, while the other two (the Netherlands and 
Belgium) were bank-centred. Hardie and Howarth (2013b: 50) conclude that ‘the 
most important source of change in most national financial systems studied in 
                                                   
28 In a sense, higher financial leverage (including bank loans) was utilised with the aim of 
enhancing shareholder value in the corporate and financial sectors and household wealth in 
North America and Europe. 
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this volume has not been in the use of bond and equity financing by non-financial 
companies, but rather in changes in the nature of banks and banking’.  
     Although market-based lending is a useful concept to demonstrate significant 
changes in CMEs’ financial systems, Hardie and Howarth’s argument has two 
weaknesses. Firstly, its focus is confined mainly to financial institutions, capital 
markets and governments, and it does not pay sufficient attention to these actors’ 
relationship with debtors, such as companies and households and broad society. 
Finance is politically important because the structure of financial markets shapes 
the boundaries of state-business (or society) relations (Zysman 1983: 7-8). 
Zysman’s categorisation of financial systems is slightly old-fashioned, but his 
perspective on finance is still valid. Secondly, they overstate the diminished 
financial power of banks in CMEs (particularly in France and Germany) to resist 
market pressure (Hardie and Howarth 2013b: 24). It is true that French and 
German banks have significantly increased their dependence on market -based 
liabilities such as financing from interbank, commercial paper and bond markets. 
Their market-based assets are expanded chiefly by interbank deposits and 
government bonds. More importantly, the corporate sector in both Germany and 
France is still primarily dependent on bank borrowing despite increased issuance 
of debt securities by non-financial corporates. In this respect, Zysman’s financial 
system categorisation is still valid. 
     The enhanced market-based banking in France and Germany can best be 
described as ‘hybridisation’, which combines elements of both the long-term and 
relationship-oriented stakeholder capitalism in CMEs and the short-term and 
rate-of-return-oriented shareholder capitalism in LMEs, rather than a 
convergence towards Anglo-Saxon financial capitalism (Clift 2013: 230-1). Clift 
maintains that the distinctively French idea of the ‘social interest’ of a company 
regarding the purpose of its existence (i.e., a social entity with social obligations 
to its employees and others) is a major obstacle to the convergence (ibid.: 248). 
Japanese society also has a similar idea in regard to the social obligations of 
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companies, but Japan falls short of the hybridisation of CME and LME in France 
and Germany.  
     Kamikawa (2013) seeks reasons for the limited development of market-based 
banking in Japan. Kamikawa points out that despite the regulatory and 
institutional restraints, Japanese banks became more market -based in the late 
1980s due to two factors. Firstly, the banking sector’s loans to deposits r atio at 
the end of 1990 was 112.3%, indicating the necessity for market -based financing 
owing partly to speculative financial and property-related investments. Secondly, 
major Japanese banks rapidly increased their funding in overseas inter-bank and 
bond markets in order to expand their international banking transactions. A 
speculative bubble in the domestic stock market attracted numerous household 
investors from 1986 to 1991. Furthermore, during the bubble economy years, 
Japanese big businesses made active use of overseas capital markets, while major 
Japanese securities firms also enlarged their international footprint. However, the 
bursting of the bubble economy from 1991 to 1993 and the financial crisis in the 
late 1990s made the domestic stock market crash and sharply contracted the 
international banking operations of Japanese financial institutions. Japanese 
banks had to prioritise the disposal of bad loans and the recovery of their financial 
health over the enhancement of their earnings through market -based banking, 
including securitisation, when the US and Europe witnessed rapid financial 
innovations from the early 1990s until the early 2000s. However, I emphasise 
that the domestic transactions of Japanese banks in the late 1980s were not 
market-based, while these banks’ overseas market-based transactions merely 
reflected the trends and norms of these overseas (mainly Anglo-Saxon) markets. 
     Kamikawa maintains that five factors contributed to the underdevelopment of 
Japan’s market-based banking. Firstly, the preference of most Japanese 
households for low-risk, low-return bank deposits over high-risk, high-return 
financial assets was strengthened by the Japanese financial crisis and scandals. 
Secondly, the decrease in bank loans after the late 1990s financial crisis led to a 
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very low loans to deposits ratio (80.6% in 2007). Thirdly, Japanese bank 
employees under the seniority-based wage system were not motivated to pursue 
short-term profits through high-risk, high-return investments - banks with 
abundant deposits in excess of their loans purchased JGBs. Fourthly, the financial 
crisis also made the Japanese financial authorities provide much more rigorous 
supervision and auditing for financial institutions – financial institutions became 
cautious about originating and investing in securitised products whose risks were 
not sufficiently clear. Lastly, securities firms did not have sufficient financial 
strength to develop investment banking operations due to the stagnant Japanese 
stock market. Kamikawa concludes that Japan’s CME model remained intact 
primarily because of its own financial crisis after the collapse of the bubble 
economy rather than its financial regulation. However, he does not explain the 
reasons for the low-risk, low-return preference of Japanese households, the less 
meritocratic corporate culture and the underdevelopment of Japanese securities 
firms vis-à-vis commercial banks – even when the Japanese stock market was 
buoyant, these securities firms could not expand their investment banking 
operations.  
     Moreover, Kamikawa’s explanation does not fully elucidate why loan trading 
and securitisation are underdeveloped in Japan. There are at least three other 
possible factors that have contributed to the underdevelopment of Japan’s market -
based banking. Firstly, the homogeneity of Japanese banks and other financial 
institutions may hinder loan trading and securitisation (Omura and Mizukami 
2007). If all players have a similar risk appetite and preference, they have little 
incentive to buy or sell financial assets actively in a secondary market and tend 
to move in the same direction, potentially increasing the systemic risk. This 
homogeneity was likely to be nurtured by the MOF-led convoy banking system.29 
                                                   
29  Under the convoy banking system, MOF tightly controlled entry into the financial 
markets, protected the convoy of banks from financial instability and kept the banking 
industry evolved with all banks more or less in step (Gao 2001: 31; Malcom 2001: 68; 
Schoppa 2006: 10-1).   
42 
 
Even since the collapse of the convoy system owing to the financial deregulation 
and crisis in the late 1990s, Japanese financial institutions have still not shifted 
sufficiently to more autonomous and diverse management.  
     Secondly, another obstacle to market-based banking may be banks’ close 
relational ties with corporate borrowers. The outstanding amount of a bank’s loan 
to a borrower is a very important token of their relationship in Japan so in most 
cases both parties are reluctant to reduce the amount through loan trading or 
securitisation. In addition, many Japanese corporate borrowers, who are asked 
for loan transfer by their current creditors, are concerned about the risk of new 
creditors not rolling over loans when they come due. Likewise, many Japanese 
corporate borrowers prefer loans from banks in long-term relationship to bonds 
held by ‘faceless’ investors.  
     Lastly, the Japanese government failed to implement drastic financial 
deregulation in order to mitigate the systemic credit risk concentrated in the 
banking sector in the 1980s (i.e., before the bursting of the bubble economy) and 
failed to propose any drastic policy to promote the international competitiveness 
and attraction of the Japanese credit market. Nishimura (1999: 170), the former 
head of MOF’s banking bureau, comments that drastic financial deregulation was 
difficult to implement before the financial crisis because of the convoy banking 
system, which was not supposed to allow the failure of any banks, and Japanese 
style administration, which emphasises harmony among members, and that the 
deregulation could not proceed without a crisis. The Japanese financial 
authorities understood the necessity of drastic financial deregulation, but could 
not implement such deregulation because they were constrained by a tacit 
obligation to protect weak institutions within the financial sector – the exchange 
of MOF’s protection of their subordinates (financial institutions) for loyalty and 
obedience was observed in their relationship. As many political scientists point 
out, financial systems are co-constituted by both states and market participants. 
The US and British financial authorities assisted the financial deregulation in 
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these countries, as they believed that New York’s and London’s status as leading 
financial centres was in the interest of their states (Helleiner 1994). This kind of 
pro-deregulation nexus was not formed in Japan.  
     Given the fact that both Japanese companies’ investments and banks’ credit 
provision expanded during the early post-war period and the bubble economy, 
does Kamikawa believe that the preference of Japanese society shifted 
dramatically from risk loving to risk averse? His argument regarding the impact 
of the late 1990s financial crisis on the risk preference of Japanese financial 
institutions, companies and households is insufficient and potentially misleading. 
Have Anglo-Saxon societies become significantly risk averse since the GFC and 
are they likely to remain so in the future? The answer is probably no, although 
financial risk taking in these societies has been moderated by tighter regulations. 
The Japanese have been traditionally risk averse and have endeavoured to 
socialise risk, while they have a strong herd mentality with regard to risk taking 
– when most actors take a similar risk, individual actors are less concerned about 
this risk. Put differently, although the inherent risk tolerance of individual 
Japanese companies and households is low, when there is a consensus regarding 
risk taking within society, they tend to take an enormous risk collec tively.  
     The MOF-led convoy banking system significantly contributed to risk 
socialisation and consensus making in regard to risk taking among individual 
actors through multi-layered systemic support from banks and the government. 
Under the convoy system, if large companies experienced financial difficulties, 
creditor banks were expected to rescue these corporate borrowers, whereas if 
these banks faced financial troubles, the government was supposed to bail them 
out. However, the bursting of the bubble economy and the financial crisis 
enfeebled Japanese society’s confidence in systemic support. The magnitude of 
the systemic risk far exceeded the level that MOF and the banks had anticipated 
(Nishimura 1999: 205-9). Although the government and banks have continuously 
provided systemic support, since the major corporate bankruptcies and banking 
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crisis occurred, the confidence in this systemic support has not recovered 
sufficiently. 
 
1.3 Japanese Corporate Governance  
Corporate governance is a major determinant of how finance works in a certain 
country. Much of the previous literature focus on the main bank system (e.g., 
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein 1990; Aoki, Patrick and Sheard 1994) and the 
relationship between shareholders, management and labour (e.g., Okumura 1991; 
Nishiyama 1992). Jackson and Miyajima (2008)30 tackle the evolving patterns of 
corporate governance among Japanese companies during the 1990s and the early 
2000s and is directly relevant to this thesis. They broadly define corporate 
governance as ‘involving relations among multiple stakeholders, such as 
individual shareholders, institutional investors, banks, employees, unions and 
various groups of managers’. The characteristics of corporate governance in a 
country significantly affect those of its financial system (ibid .: 1). Jackson and 
Miyajima intend to address four inter-related questions (ibid.: 2). Firstly, what 
changes in Japanese corporate governance can be empirically identified? 
Secondly, do the above changes indicate a fundamental transformation in Japan’s 
post-war corporate governance institutions or a modification of the past system 
to new circumstances? Thirdly, how are the respective corporate governance 
changes related to each other? Lastly, what are the correlations between corporate 
governance schemes and performance?  
     Japanese style corporate governance is often described as stakeholder, 
network, relationship-oriented or bank-based, in contrast to Anglo-Saxon 
                                                   
30 Their research project was supported by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (RIETI), a governmental policy think tank founded by METI. RIETI’s mission is 
to conduct theoretical and empirical research in order to support economic and political 
reforms. Both RIETI and METI might have had an incentive to make changes in Japanese 
corporate governance widely known through the project.  
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corporate governance, which typically focuses on companies’ outside investors, 
mainly shareholders. Key stakeholders of typical Japanese companies include not 
only shareholders but also employees, banks, suppliers and customers, whose 
interests are reflected in the corporate governance arrangements (such as long-
term relationships and employment). Japanese CEOs can best be described as 
‘top employees’ rather than ‘representative of shareholders’ (ibid .: 5), whilst 
most directors of the board at large companies are internally promoted and merely 
subordinate to CEOs. In addition, the main banks are not just the largest providers 
of debt capital for companies but also major shareholders, and they often rescue 
large corporate borrowers in financial distress. Jackson and Miyajima argue that 
‘the competitive strength of post-war Japan seemed not to rest on the allocative 
efficiency of the market, but the organisational efficiency of firms generated by 
the investment of stakeholders in developing and maintaining firm-specific 
capabilities’ (ibid.: 3). 
     However, Japanese style corporate governance has been forced to change by 
both domestic and international factors, including the growing influence of 
heightened ICM and neoliberalism, the underperformance of Japanese companies 
facing fierce international competition, the banking crisis and the MOF’s 
weakened grip of the banking industry. Cross-shareholdings between large 
Japanese firms and banks were substantially unwound due to the serious bad debt 
problem of the banking sector and large companies’ better access to capital 
markets owing to the financial market deregulation. Major changes in Japanese 
corporate governance, Jackson and Miyajima point out, include 1) the weakened 
power of banks vis-à-vis large companies and the greater influence of non-
Japanese shareholders and international (American) CRAs, 2) the introduction of 
international accounting rules and Anglo-American style corporate governance 
(i.e., the emphasis on shareholder value, outsider board, thorough disclosure, 
market-oriented employment, etc.), and 3) the shift from informal, opaque, and 
relationship-oriented to more transparent and rule-based financial regulation and 
the creation of the FSA, independent from MOF. 
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     The key message from Jackson and Miyajima is that although some major 
characteristics of Japanese corporate governance have witnessed substantial 
changes, the extent of change varies according to aspects of corporate governance, 
and these changes have failed to reach ‘convergence on Anglo-American 
corporate governance’ (ibid.: 18). Furthermore, they argue that changes in 
corporate governance have been uneven across different types of firms, resulting 
in less homogeneity among Japanese firms, and that there is some degree of 
correlation between financial and ownership characteristics (market -oriented or 
relational), board and management features (outsider-oriented or insider-
oriented) and employment and incentive patterns (market-based or relational). 
For example, ‘patient capital’ from banks and cross-shareholdings may be 
preconditions for lifetime employment and ‘insider boards’ consisting mainly of 
insiders promoted internally from the ranks of employees.  
     Although the arguments above are generally appropriate, they exaggerate the 
changes in Japanese corporate finance, management and employment 
characteristics. For instance, they emphasise the shift from bank-centred to 
capital market-based corporate finance, and maintain that ‘while the main bank 
system has not disappeared, it has been institutionally displaced and its scope 
limited to a more specific niche segment of firms than in the past’ (ibid .: 19). 
Nevertheless, the reality is different from this - the great majority of Japanese 
firms still rely on the main bank system, while the growth of the corporate bond 
market has lost its momentum since the mid-2000s. I contend that there have been 
uneven changes across the Japanese financial market – the equity market has 
changed substantially due to the increased influence of non-Japanese investors, 
whereas the credit market, which is still dominated by local players, has 
witnessed moderate change. The pressure in regard to changes in board and 
management characteristics has primarily stemmed from non-Japanese equity 
investors in tandem with neoliberal thoughts.  
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     Jackson and Miyajima observed that the financial crisis dramatically 
increased major bankruptcies, and intensified corporate restructuring and the 
introduction of Anglo-Saxon style business and financial practices during the late 
1990s and early 2000s, and probably expected Japanese style corporate 
management to change gradually. However, Japanese corporate governance is 
much more persistent than they expected. The period of Japan’s financial 
instability from 1997 until 2003 witnessed enormous amounts of aggregated 
liabilities held by bankrupt firms, but those amounts sharply decreased after the 
establishment of a government-backed corporate restructuring fund in April 2003 
and the government rescue of Resona Bank, a major commercial bank, in May 
2003.  
     Furthermore, some Japanese companies might indicate ‘mock convergence’ 
towards Anglo-American corporate governance by inviting less influential 
outsiders on to their boards and nominally introducing an execut ive officer 
system in order to attract non-Japanese investors rather than genuinely improving 
their corporate governance.31 In addition, there is a possibility that numerous 
Japanese firms have shifted from seniority-based to (pseudo) merit-based wage 
systems in order to reduce their over-all personnel costs rather than to promote 
meritocracy.  Jackson (2008: 282-92) emphasises the drastic increase in non-
regular workers, but he fails to point out that this is mainly because many 
companies have tried to protect the vested interests (e.g., lifetime employment 
and relatively generous salaries) of existing regular employees by hiring cheap, 
easily dischargeable non-regular workers instead of young regular ones. An 
increasing number of non-regular workers have fallen into a state of poverty. 32 
                                                   
31 Wakasugi (2015), emeritus economics professor at the University of Tokyo and head of 
the Japanese Corporate Governance Research Institute, claims that corporate governance 
reforms in Japan have been perfunctory and lacked substance, pointing out that few outside 
board members contribute to corporate governance, while the introduction of independent 
audit committee has been blocked by Keidanren, the largest business lobbying group.  
32 Ito (2007: 241-3) maintains that Japan has three social classes – namely capitalists, 
regular workers at large firms and their equivalents in other sectors and people outside the 
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     Jackson and Miyajima (2008: 33) develop the following typology of Japanese 
firms: 1) ‘traditional Japanese firms (J-firms) with strong relational elements on 
all dimensions’, 2) ‘hybrid’ firms with market-oriented financial and ownership 
characteristics together with relational employment and partially insider board 
features, and 3) ‘inverse hybrid’ firms, which are in an intermediate position 
between J-firms and hybrid firms. One major problem with this typology is that 
the hybrid firm cluster includes two very different sub-groups of companies. The 
first sub-group, which mainly consists of prominent blue-chips (such as Toyota 
Motor, Canon and Kao), shares such features as relatively high levels of foreign 
shareholdings and merit-based pay systems, while the other (such as Tokyo 
Electric Power, Mitsubishi Chemicals and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) is 
characterised by a heavier issuance of corporate bonds as well as moderate 
reforms in regard to board structures and disclosure. As overseas equity investors 
are much more vocal about corporate governance reforms than domestic bond 
investors, the pressure towards the former should be stronger than that t owards 
the latter so that the corporate governance of the two sub-groups is different. 
Monopolistic utilities protected by the state regulations and most members of 
major corporate groups have maintained a degree of relational corporate 
governance. CRAs assess the creditworthiness (i.e., their ability and willingness 
to repay debts in a timely manner) of borrowers but their credit ratings do not 
necessarily reflect whether the corporate governance of borrowers is market -
oriented or relational. 
     Another weakness of Jackson and Miyajima (ibid.) is that they fail to describe 
the disagreement between major industrial associations (i.e., business lobbying 
groups) over corporate governance. They argue that major industrial associations, 
such as Keidanren (the Japan Business Federation) and Doyukai (the Japan 
Association of Corporate Executives), ‘largely opposed reforms that would 
                                                   
‘regular employment’ – whilst the top and middle classes are unsympathetic with lower 
classes, and that the existence of an increasing number of people living in inhu mane 
conditions is unjust.  
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represent major inroads against managerial autonomy’ (ibid.: 16), which is a 
misconception. Although many members of the two associations overlap, 
Doyukai, which includes top managers of entrepreneurial firms and foreign-
owned or internationally-oriented companies (including Ushio Electric, Orix, 
IBM Japan and Fuji-Xerox), has a tendency to be more market-oriented and 
reform-minded than Keidanren, whose core members are from those of leading 
manufacturing establishments (such as Nippon Steel, Toshiba, Toyota and Canon). 
Doyukai’s core members have leant towards neoliberalism, emphasising the 
importance of shareholder value and labour market flexibility since the mid-
1990s, and it was politically close to the LDP-led Koizumi cabinet and the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led Noda cabinet. Key members of Keidanren 
have been opposed to neoliberalism and have tried to defend their tradition al 
corporate governance. Ideational conflict between Doyukai and Keidanren from 
the early 1990s until the mid-2000s will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.  
     However, ironically, a large number of manufacturing establishments have 
had to streamline their workforce and cut wages due to the prolonged economic 
stagnation and decreased international competitiveness. They have also been 
forced to change their board and management characteristics owing to the 
pressure from non-Japanese equity investors. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, 
these are merely cosmetic changes in many cases and do not reflect convergence 
towards Anglo-Saxon corporate governance. More importantly, the influence of 
neoliberal thought, led by Doyukai, within the business community was 
weakened by the ‘Murakami Fund incident’ in 200633 and the GFC from 2007 to 
2010. 
                                                   
33  The so-called Murakami Fund, an activist investment fund established by Yoshiaki 
Murakami, a former METI official, was involved in insider trading. Murakami had close 
ties with bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, while Orix  and Ushio Electric, Doyukai’s core 
member companies, and the BOJ governor, invested in the fund. The Japanese media heavily 
criticised not only Murakami but also Miyauchi (the chairman of Orix) and Fukui (the BOJ 
governor at that time).  
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1.4 The Convergence-Diversity Debate  
The convergence-diversity debate regarding whether Japan would converge with 
LMEs attracted much attention from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s (Vogel 
1996; Yamamura 1997; Laurence 2001; Malcom 2001; Streeck and Yamamura 
2001; Yamamura and Streeck 2003; Schoppa 2006). Exemplifying the 
comparative analysis of the British and Japanese financial reforms, Vogel (1996: 
261) argues that the governments ‘have converged to the extent that they have 
been compelled in a specific direction by common market forces, and they have 
varied to the extent that different ideas and institutions have pushed in different 
ways’. He continues by stating that, whilst ‘market outcomes’, which refer to 
changes in the nature of competition, are converging internationally, ‘regulatory 
outcomes’, which indicate changes in the form of regulation, still vary by country. 
He emphasises that the national variation is substantial as ‘regulatory outcomes 
ultimately structure market outcomes’ (ibid.). Laurence (2001: 48) disagrees with 
this view and maintains that the significance of financial globalisation, 
particularly in the form of Euromarkets, is manifested in its influence on 
transforming financial institutions’ preferences. He also challenges Vogel’s 
(1996: 4) claim that MOF, even more than private interest groups, drove the 
financial reform following their own priorities; he quotes Rosenbluth’s comment 
that, ‘deregulation has been propelled by financial institutions, acting in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Finance and sometimes politicians, to construct 
a new set of rules they need[ed] to compete in a changing economic environment’ 
(Laurence 2001: 46, citing Rosenbluth 1989: 5).  
     The disagreement between Vogel and Laurence seems to stem partly from 
which parts of the elephant they are touching: both national preferences (based 
on social norms) and financial globalisation are key determinants of any recent 
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financial reforms. However, Vogel’s perspective better fits the case of the 
Japanese financial reform before the late-1990s, while both Laurence and 
Rosenbluth underestimate MOF’s dominance in the Japanese financial system as 
well as the characteristic of banks as political extensions of the dominant elites. 
If regulatory outcomes virtually remain unchanged, market outcomes might be 
merely mock or cosmetic. Nevertheless, Vogel’s argument that regulatory 
outcomes ultimately structure market outcomes sounds excessively path 
dependent, and both regulatory and market outcomes are mutually interactive in 
the long term. Moreover, the late-1990s, after 1996, when Vogel published his 
book, witnessed the transformation of the Japanese financial regulation from 
discretionary interventionist to relatively arm’s length principle-based due to the 
enormous bad debt problem, the MOF wining and dining scandals in 1998 and 
the US pressure. 
     Vogel (1996: 3) rightly points out that ‘deregulation’ by the governments of 
advanced industrialised countries is actually ‘re-regulation’ with which the 
governments ‘have reorganised the control of private sector behaviour, but not 
substantially reduced the level of regulation’, though he tends to overly downplay 
the political power of non-state actors such as major financial institutions and 
companies.  Furthermore, he also maintains that the major purposes of MOF’s 
slow financial liberalisation were 1) to make complaining interest groups 
understand that they had to accept their fate with compensation packages and 
prepare for new competition, and 2) to preserve or even enhance their power over 
financial institutions through re-regulation by transforming themselves from ‘a 
conservative and stingy regulator to a more multifaceted supervisor, monitor and 
advisor’ (ibid.: 192-3). The first purpose might reflect the ministry’s intention to 
provide a weak version of systemic support to the financial institutions, as MOF 
could not have maintained the latter’s loyalty (i.e., the ministry’s authority) 
without providing support, although financial globalisation no longer allowed the 
ministry to keep the financial convoy intact.  
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     Despite the second purpose, Vogel virtually admits that the substance of 
MOF’s regulation to pursue stability and control of the financial system did not 
change (ibid.: 263). Moreover, I contend that Vogel’s terms, market and 
regulatory outcomes, reflect economic / business rationalities and political / 
social norms, respectively, and that changes in social norms take much longer 
than changes in economic rationalities. Toshio Yamagishi, a social psychologist, 
claims that changes in people’s behaviour lag behind those in economic and 
social environments because a transformation in norms, which are based on 
expectations in regard to other people’s responses to their behaviour, take a long 
while. 34  This is why scholars who focus on economic rationalities (such as 
Rosenbluth and Laurence) are inclined to highlight the convergence of financial 
systems in advanced industrialised countries, whereas those who concentrate on 
national preferences or social norms (including Vogel and to a lesser extent 
Yamamura) tend to emphasise non-convergence (Malcolm 2001: 271-2 citing 
Yamamura 1997). However, the two camps seem to both be at the extremes, and 
the reality may exist in between.  In addition, social norms sometimes counteract 
economic rationalities and this was particularly true of the Japanese financial 
reforms.   
     Rosenbluth and Thies (2010), who belong to the convergence camp, describe 
how globalisation and Japan’s urbanisation undermined Japan’s early post -war 
political coalition between the ruling LDP, big businesses (mainly heavy 
industrialists), farmers and SMEs, forcing the LDP to change its electoral system 
from a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts, which 
tended to promote intense competition between factions within the LDP and pork-
barrel politics, to single-member districts (SMD) in 1994.  They maintain that 
Japan’s peculiar electoral system since 1925, which caused economic inefficiency, 
‘became a serious problem only after Japan came under irresistible pressure to 
open its markets to foreign trade and finance’ (ibid.: 174).  
                                                   
34 Interview with Professor Toshio Yamagishi in October 2014  
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     Rosenbluth and Thies delineate the establishment of a political coalition 
between the dominant elites (bureaucrats, LDP politicians and corporate 
executives), a portion of labour (mainly employees of big businesses) and the 
traditional middle class (independent farmers and SME owners) and its 
unravelling. During the 1950s, top management of big businesses cunningly 
formed an ‘alliance’ with their regular employees by offering lifetime 
employment, seniority-based wage systems and in-house unions, which undercut 
the power of labour unions and the socialist party in Japan. Furthermore, big 
businesses and their largest industrial association (Keidanren) provided the LDP 
with enormous political donations and tax revenues, which enabled factions of 
the party to win votes from various interest groups, such as farmers and 
construction companies, in return for subsidies and import protection. In 
exchange, the LDP provided big businesses with a favourable business  climate 
such as regulatory protection and low interest rates. Thanks to this grand coalition, 
the LDP stayed at the political helm for a long period of time, while the existence 
of social classes and class conflicts was less perceivable in Japan. However,  as 
Rosenbluth and Thies rightly point out, consumers were left out of the coalition 
and faced high prices and a limited choice of goods and services (ibid .: 54). 
     They argue that ‘a large political party supported by a coalition of big firms 
and small farmers underwrote a system of “convoy capitalism” 35 characterised 
by closed and cartelised markets, heavy subsidies, and expensive personalistic 
elections’ (ibid.: 51-2) – the term ‘convoy’ stems from the ‘convoy banking 
system’ and  reflects a key element of CME. However, Japan’s convoy capitalism 
and the grand political coalition were under strong pressure from the 1980s 
onwards. Farmers had accounted for the majority of the labour population during 
the early post-war period, but Japan’s demographic transformation towards a 
nation of urban workers together with global economic integration made the 
                                                   
35  Schoppa (2006) also uses the term ‘convoy capitalism’, which shares some similar 
elements with the broadly defined ‘systemic support’ from dominant elites for subordinate 
groups. 
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above-mentioned political coalition costly and less effective for the LDP in the 
early 1980s.  
     It was increasingly difficult for the LDP to satisfy both big businesses, whose 
interests lay in cheap raw materials and finance and unrestricted access to 
overseas markets, and farmers and SME owners, who sought import protection 
and subsidies. The LDP also had to attract whimsical urban voters, whose policy 
demands such as better environment and social welfare were not necessarily 
compatible with those of the traditional LDP supporters, while the LDP needed 
to shake off its ‘corrupt image’ associated with serial political scandals.  
Furthermore, the US and other trading partners of Japan tried to pry open the 
Japanese market and threatened to retaliate against Japanese exporters. After the 
bursting of the bubble economy, corporate earnings slumped due to the higher 
yen, intensified international competition and stagnant domestic demand, making 
big businesses reluctant to keep supporting farmers and SME owners. In 1994, 
these domestic and international factors forced the LDP to decide to transform 
the electoral system to SMD, resulting in diminished intra-party competition and 
more centralised authority within parties and in the prime minister’s office. 
Under the new electoral rules, political parties have strong incentives to seek a 
legislative majority.   
     Rosenbluth and Thies’ key message is that the shift to majoritarian politics 
has re-established politicians’ incentives in Japan, and that ‘majoritarian politics, 
more than many other forms of electoral competition, tend to generate relatively 
free markets because productive economic sectors find natural allies  in the 
average consumers and taxpayers who are politically privileged under 
majoritarian rules’ (ibid.: 174). They believe that Japan is moving towards an 
LME due to the electoral system change, although its capital and labour markets 
lack a sufficiently developed market mechanism, as the manufacturing exporters 
are reluctant to give up their vested interests. They think that the fully-fledged 
transition to an LME will require Japan to move aggressively into the services 
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industries such as finance, IT and leisure, which lead productivity growth in 
Anglo-Saxon countries. However, Japan has been less innovative in the services 
industries, partly because its society has seemingly agreed that manufacturing is 
Japan’s key strategic industry.36  
     In Japan, many people still regard the services industries as ‘fake businesses 
(kyogyo)’. Furthermore, the main characteristics of typical Japanese firms, such 
as 1) homogeneous employees with long-term employment and their strong 
loyalty to employers, 2) most board members appointed through internal 
promotion, 3) the emphasis on company-specific skills, and 4) long-term 
corporate relationships with suppliers and clients would be less suitable for the 
services industries, particularly finance. Japan’s transition to a services-led 
economy may require the transformation of Japanese corporate characteristics. 
In this sense, Japan’s transition to an LME would be more difficult than 
Rosenbluth and Thies argue. They concede that the negative aspect of Japan’s 
transformation to neoliberalism is growing income inequality, but this argument 
is not necessarily correct. The much lower wages of non-regular workers are not 
based on a comparison of their work performance with that of regular workers 
but, rather, are decided by the hierarchical status of non-regular workers, who are 
subordinate to regular ones. Consequently, the significantly increased proportion 
of non-regular employees has not been due mainly to the transition to an LME.  
     Rosenbluth and Thies (2010: 80-2) claim that under convoy capitalism, 
Japanese banks did not necessarily monitor corporate borrowers prudently. 
Teranishi (2003: 60) shares the same view, and argues that banks provided 
excessive lending for the heavy and chemical industries under Japan’s full -set 
industrial structure, which neglected the comparison of production cost structures 
with other countries.  Rosenbluth and Thies (2010: 74-6) point out that both 
                                                   
36 Noguchi (2010: 253-7) contends that a major reason for Japan’s prolonged economic 
stagnation is the preservation of its old economic model centred on the manufacturing sector, 
which has lower growth potential than the services sector.  
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heavy industry, which shouldered enormous ‘sunk costs’ stemming from the 
excessive capital investments during the pre-war and war times, and the banking 
sector received significant political favours (i.e., ‘policy rents’) from the 
government. Although many economists, such as Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard 
(1994), argue that main banks’ monitoring contributes to the corporate 
governance of their major corporate borrowers, these banks could be regarded as 
‘quasi-insiders’ given their long-term relationships with them, the large amounts 
of their loans to them and their leading shareholder positions. According ly, it 
would be difficult for the banks to monitor the borrowers in an arm’s length 
manner.   
     Rosenbluth and Thies (2010) do not mention the future of the Japanese 
financial system, but they are likely to believe that the system will move towards 
market-based along with the transition to an LME. However, many Japanese firms, 
particularly weak ones, faced difficulties in tapping the domestic corporate bond 
market in 2002 after the bankruptcies of Mycal (a major Japanese retailer) and 
Enron (a major American energy trader that issued a large amount of yen-
denominated bonds), and in 2008-9, after the failure of Lehman Brothers, and 
strengthened their ties with banks in order to secure lower cost financing as well 
as emergency borrowing. In some areas such as securities, investment trusts and 
derivatives, ‘the Japanese government has moved ahead of the private sector by 
making many of the reforms that could push Japan toward a liberal market model, 
yet corporations and consumers have not changed their practices accordingly’ 
(Vogel 2006: 216). 
     Another reason for Rosenbluth and Thies’ exaggeration of Japan’s 
transformation to neoliberalism may derive from their underestimation of the 
deeply rooted anti-liberal, anti-free market social norms in Japan. Such norms 
are reflected in the peculiar company-centric system within Japanese society. 
Hiroshi Okumura, a former journalist and currently economics professor, views 
Japan as a ‘company state’ or a ‘company-centric society’ where the company-
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centric system rules – the social status and credibility of Japanese people - are 
decided mainly by the prestige of their employers and their corporate titles rather 
than their individual abilities (Okumura 1991: 18-20; Matsumoto 2011: 241; van 
Wolferen 1989: 172). While shareholders’ voice in Japanese companies is weaker 
(although it is becoming stronger) than that in Anglo-Saxon ones, Japanese 
regular workers under lifetime employment who collectively shoulder a large 
corporate risk have a strong voice within their companies (Matsumoto 2011). In 
addition, Koji Matsumoto, a former official of the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI, which was reorganised as METI in 2001), argues that ‘the 
essence of Kigyoism (company-centric system) as an economic system lies in the 
management autonomy attained in corporations through integration with labour’ 
and that ‘companies became the objects of a commitment by corporate employees 
internally, thus becoming strongly integrated, and they became highly self-
sufficient social groups externally’ (ibid.: 218).  
     Japanese companies provide not only salaries but also a large portion of social 
welfare for their current and retired employees. For Japanese employees, 
companies are more than workplaces where people earn income. In Japan, strong 
safety nets are extended for large companies by the government and banks, while 
the social security per capita provided by the government is relatively low.  
Matsumoto argues that ‘most Japanese who are members of corporate society, are 
more effectively governed by the company than the State’ (ibid .: 231). In this 
respect, it should not be a big surprise that employees of Japanese companies, 
particularly those of less competitive ones, are reluctant to accept the 
transformation to an LME. During the 1980s and early 1990s, when the white -
collars of big businesses were not concerned about their job security, many of 
them supported neoliberal thoughts and financial deregulation (Teranishi 2003: 
334-7). However, the prolonged economic stagnation has forced Japanese 
companies to re-evaluate their long-term relationships with employees, banks, 
suppliers and clients, and companies have become more selective in these 
relationships and severed some of them (Vogel 2006: 220). Fears regarding job 
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security among Japanese white-collars and the GFC have decreased support for 
neoliberalism in Japan. 
 
1.5 Points of Departure from Previous Literature  
This thesis has three major points of departure from the previous  literature on the 
Japanese political economy. Firstly, well-balanced attention should be paid to 
both dominant elites and subordinate groups (including labour and SME owners) 
as well as both internal and external factors. Secondly, deeply ingrained domest ic 
social norms and ideologies that guide and constrain the Japanese people and 
organisations need to be focused on in more depth. Lastly, although some of the 
previous literature has utilised sociological concepts, more effective use of  
sociological, psychological and philosophical toolkits that complement the 
analytical framework of political science is needed to analyse the social norms 
that have maintained the old regime in Japan.   
     Regarding the first point, it is important to pay well-balanced attention to 1) 
the ‘iron triangle’ of the ruling LDP, bureaucracy and big businesses, 2) the 
closely correlated long-term relationships between financial institutions and 
companies, between companies and between employers and employees, 3) 
external pressure (e.g., higher ICM, US political pressure and neoliberalism) to 
change the Japanese political economy, and 4) Japanese domestic social norms to 
resist external pressure. Although most scholars of the Japanese political 
economy have focused on specific institutions such as MOF, MITI, major 
financial institutions, big businesses and the LDP, these actors are closely linked 
with each other. If an analysis highlights only one or two actors in the entire 
system, this is likely to lead to an inaccurate or distorted account.  
     Furthermore, the preferences and behaviour of the Japanese public, which 
consists mainly of corporate employees, also need to be examined. In particular, 
since the collapse of the early post-war political coalition and the financial crisis, 
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the LDP has needed to win the favour of urban workers, whereas the economic 
bureaucracy has had to re-establish their tarnished legitimacy by regaining the 
public’s trust. Another important point is that apart from Marxists oppressed by 
dominant groups, Japanese social scientists tend not to admit the existence of 
class conflicts, but Japanese society is far from monolithic (Watanabe 2009: 6 -
8).37 One major difficulty in grasping the social classes in Japan can be attributed 
to the nature of its dominant elites (the majority of whom are not capitalists but 
anti-free market administrators) and their relationship with labour (i.e., 
management-labour alliance against capitalists), which are very different from 
those in Anglo-Saxon countries where capitalists dominate labour. 
     Concerning the second point, most of the existing literature does not pay 
sufficient attention to the anti-liberal, anti-free market social norms in Japan, 
which contrast with the norms in Anglo-Saxon societies. What is right or rational 
in the latter does not necessarily fit the former’s social norms. A key to solving 
the research puzzle of this thesis lies in the norms of the peculiar corporate -
centric society, which were created by anti-free market elites, as well as the 
interests and preferences of the LDP, economic bureaucracy, big businesses and 
major banks. Japanese banks and large companies are more politicised than their 
peers in Anglo-Saxon countries. Furthermore, the guiding principles for Japanese 
society (such as the socialisation of risk, strong exclusiveness and severe 
penalties for defectors or opportunists) are relevant to the research puzzle.  
     The characteristics of the Japanese financial system and the banking sector 
reflect those of the company-centric society and its norms. Anti-liberal, anti-free 
                                                   
37 Watanabe (2009) is a Marxist sociologist. Dominant elites tend to describe post-war Japan 
as an egalitarian classless society. According to Matsumoto (2011: 213), ‘Hiroshi Arabori 
(a member of the Japanese Communist Party) claims that the ideology of kigyoism 
(corporate-centric system) conceals the Marxist situation in Japanese society in which 
companies are controlled by capitalists and an intrinsic conflict of interests exists between 
the workers and the capitalists … in fact, however, the reality is exactly the opposite of that 
viewpoint. Marxist thinking prevents one from directly realizing the true nature of Japanese 
companies.’ 
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market social norms are at odds with neoliberalism and the US credit rating 
orthodoxy. In addition, as discussed in the previous section, the reasons why 
Japanese society, from time to time in the past, has taken enormous risks 
collectively, whereas Japanese individuals are rather risk averse, lies in the 
socialisation of risk and the strong herd mentality.  To what extent is such a 
society resilient? Japanese companies have become more selective in their 
recruitment by streamlining their privileged regular workforce and increasing 
non-regular workers so the company-centric society has become increasingly 
selective and exclusive. This means that the number of working poor, i.e., people 
who receive limited systemic support within the company-centric society, has 
been rising sharply. Japanese society’s resistance towards the transformation to 
an LME is stronger than the above literature claim, whilst the economic and 
political stability has been narrowly maintained at the expense of these people.  
     Regarding the third point, in conjunction with the second one, although some 
of the existing literature utilises sociological concepts such as cultural norms and 
networks (for instance, Katzenstein 1996; Lincoln and Gerlach 2004), further 
eclectic approaches in which a supplementary toolkit of sociological, 
psychological and philosophical concepts is used together with an analytical 
framework in political science are required to analyse the social norms in Japan. 
According to Cohen (2008: 120-1), the cognitive analysis in IPE highlights ‘the 
base of ideas and consensual knowledge that legitimate governmental 
policymaking’ in contrast with the rationalist features of ‘the systemic and 
domestic levels of analysis’, while the cognitive analysis has two, namely, 
sociological and psychological, tracks.38  
     Without the above toolkit, it is difficult to answer the following questions: 1) 
what are the Japanese social norms and how they are different from Anglo -Saxon 
                                                   
38 Cohen (2008: 121) maintains that constructivism is sociological in nature and deals with 
relations between individuals and inter-subjectivity, whereas the psychological track 
focuses on individual beliefs.  
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ones? 2) Why is systemic support for financially troubled companies justified in 
Japan? 3) Why are subordinate groups (such as labour and SME owners) in Japan 
obedient to dominant groups? And, 4) why have the US credit rating orthodoxy 
and neoliberalism not been fully accepted in Japan? We need to grasp the guiding 
principles of Japan’s corporate-centric society in order to answer the above 
questions and solve the research puzzle. In Chapter 2, the contrasting sociological 
concepts of ‘strong ties and weak ties’, the conflicting psychological conceptions 
of ‘prevention and promotion orientation (or focus)’ and the completely divergent 
ethical precepts of ‘Guardian and Commercial morals’ will be discussed.  
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Chapter 2: Analytical Framework and Methodologies 
 
Chapter 1 claims that much of the previous literature on the Japanese political 
economy has tended to focus on specific institutions such as MOF, the BOJ, 
METI (previously MITI), the LDP, big banks and large companies, but does not 
pay sufficient attention to Japanese social norms. This chapter will start by 
reviewing the limitations of rationalism and the significance of social norms, and 
discuss why neo-Gramscian approaches are suitable as the main analytical 
framework of this thesis. The neo-Gramscian framework is effective in unveiling 
the links between Japanese social norms and major actors’ interests, the formula 
of global hegemony (Anglo-Saxon financial hegemony) versus counter-
hegemony (anti-liberal, anti-free market Japanese social norms) and latent social 
class conflicts. Subsequently, analytical eclecticism, and the three pairs of 
contrasting concepts in sociology, psychology and moral philosophy, which are 
supplementary to macroscopic neo-Gramscian approaches, will be examined. In 
conjunction with these concepts, the concept of systemic support, which is 
centred on the anti-liberal, anti-free market norms of Japanese society, as a 
solution to the research puzzle of this thesis, will be highlighted. Finally, major 
Japanese political actors’ ideas and interests and US-Japan relations will be 
analysed because neo-Gramscian approaches link together ideas, interests and 
material capabilities among dominant elites and subordinates as well as both 
internal and external factors (i.e., forms of state and world orders). 
 
2.1 Limitations of Rationalism and Significance of Social Norms  
Among the political scientists of older generations who specialise in the Japanese 
political economy, Johnson (1982) focused on the influence of unique 
institutions, such as MITI, in terms of his analysis of Japan’s rapid economic 
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development, and had a negative view of socio-cultural approaches. Although I 
understand his view, that these approaches are ‘overgeneralised and tend to cut 
off rather than advance serious research’ (ibid.: 8) to some extent, I contend that 
removing socio-cultural factors entirely from political economic analysis makes 
the analysis remote from the reality.  
     Okimoto’s (1989: 237-8) argument regarding an analytical approach contrasts 
with Johnson’s.    
 
The position taken in this book is that all three elements – rational 
choice, culture and institutional structure – coexist in an interwoven 
relationship of complexity. Culture conditions rational choice and 
permeates institutional structures; rationality and institutional 
structures, in turn, give contextual shape to the ways in which 
individuals and groups draw upon and enact cultural values.  
 
My perspective is close to that of Okimoto, but he does not clarify sufficiently 
the nature of Japanese social norms and culture. Importantly, this issue is related 
to the debate on the convergence or non-convergence of financial systems in 
advanced industrialised countries. Scholars who focus on economic rationalities 
or the significance of financial globalisation (Laurence 2001; Schoppa 2006; 
Jackson and Miyajima 2008; Rosenbluth and Thies 2010) are inclined to highlight 
the convergence of financial systems, while those who concentrate on national 
preferences or social norms (including van Wolferen 1989; Vogel 1996; Dore 
2000) tend to emphasise non-convergence. Van Wolferen (1989: 245-9) contends 
that Japan’s dominant elites (‘administrators’) have taken advantage of ‘Japanese 
culture’ or the ideology of ‘Japanese-ness’ (such as harmony within the 
community and obedience to superiors) in order to suppress the individuality of 
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Japanese people. This is a keen insight into Japanese society. However, he is 
caught in a trap of culture determinism. Van Wolferen (1989) fails to illustrate 
sufficiently how administrators created and have promoted Japanese culture and 
social norms and why subordinate groups have been obedient to such norms, and 
exaggerates the uniqueness of Japanese social norms, which indicate some 
similarities to those of other collectivist societies. 39  
     Both neoclassical economics and political realism, which are utilised to 
analyse Japanese economy and politics, embrace rationalist approaches. 
Neoclassical economics, which has various branches, rests on three major 
assumptions (Weintraub 2002). Firstly, all actors have rational preferences and 
interests. Secondly, they seek to maximise their utility and profit. Lastly, each 
actor has full and relevant information and makes an independent decision based 
on it. Moreover, in addition to political realism, l iberalism, strongly influenced 
by neoclassical economics, has appropriated rational choice. Rationalist 
approaches have been dominant in various areas of the political science 
discipline, particularly at US universities, since the mid-1990s (Ravenhill 2008: 
23; Cohen 2008: 16-43).40 One major strength of rationalist approaches is that 
they simplify complicated real world problems so that they can be analysed and 
explained based on certain assumptions. However, Sinclair (2005: 11) states that 
‘rationalist approaches adopt the assumption that there is a one-to-one match 
between imputed material interests and social action’. The term ‘rational’ sounds 
                                                   
39  Van Wolferen (1989: 246-8) claims that culture ‘becomes an excuse for systematic 
exploitation, for legal abuses, for racketeering and for other forms of uncontrolled exercise 
of power’, and that the ‘culture of submission (to the group) – the essence of what the 
Japanese generally refer to as “typical Japanese culture” – constitutes a pervasive, powerful 
creed that feeds communal sentiment and supports and justifies political arrangements ’. 
However, this argument does not adequately explain why the Japanese public are servile to 
such a culture.  
40 Cohen (2008: 41) contends that ‘as the epistemology of the American school has become 
increasingly standardized, it has come to resemble nothing so much as the methodology of 
neoclassical economics’.  
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scientific and academic, but how rationality can be measured is not very clear or 
straightforward. 
     Rationalism has two major weaknesses. Firstly, its assumptions, particularly 
those in regard to neoclassical economics, are not necessarily true or realistic in 
the real world. For example, whilst rationalists assume that agents make decisions 
independently in terms of the agent-structure issue, some of their decisions are 
constrained by structures such as ideologies and norms, which can sometimes 
conflict with the individual preferences of agents. As Walter and Sen (2009: 24) 
claim, ‘we should be open to the possibility that actors’ preferences can be 
manipulated … by political entrepreneurs who wield ideas as weapons in the 
battle for influence’. In addition, actors’ preferences and interests are not 
constant, and often change case by case, while not all of them a re necessarily 
utility and profit maximisers. It is also impossible for any agent to obtain full and 
relevant information for their decision making. Secondly, the criteria for 
rationality vary by country although rational choice approaches are often 
effective in analysing cause-effect relations. Although natural science tends to 
believe that there is only one universal truth (theory), rationality in social science 
is neither value-free nor completely separable from social norms, which 
constitute the boundary of rationality. 
     Secondly, rationalism requires substantial abstraction and simplification so 
that it may have to turn a blind eye to inconvenient empirical data in order to 
maintain theoretical parsimony. Constructivism can make up for the above 
weaknesses of rational choice approaches. Constructivists emphasise the 
importance of ideologies, norms, social identities and collectively shared ideas 
in shaping actors’ recognition of self-interest, and they view rationality as a 
relative phenomenon. According to Adler, ‘constructivism sees the world as a 
project under construction, as becoming rather than being’ (Adler 2002: 95), 
while it assumes a holist ontology, unlike rationalism, which assumes an 
individualist ontology (ibid.: 96). In other words, constructivists believe that 
66 
 
agents and structures are mutually constitutive. In order to explain changes in 
policy, rationalists are inclined to focus on shifts in the relative power of different 
actors, assuming that actors’ preferences are constant, while constructivists focus 
on the possibility for transformation in actors’ preferences resulting from an 
alteration in their world views (Walter and Sen 2009: 21-2). However, it is 
inappropriate to think that constructivism is better than rationalism; rather, they 
are complementary (Abdelal 2009: 75-6). The following argument from 
Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner (1998: 42) is insightful.  
 
The core of the constructivist project is to explicate variations in 
preferences, available strategies, and the nature of players, across 
space and time. The core of the rationalist project is to explain 
strategies, given preferences, information, and common knowledge. 
Neither project can be complete without the other.  
 
Constructivists highlight a significant impact of economic thoughts, identities, 
religions and political ideologies on international relations and international 
political economy (IPE). For instance, the transition from Keynesianism to 
neoliberalism as a mainstream economic idea from the 1970s through to the 1990s 
had a significant impact on the political economies of the US, Western Europe 
and East Asia (Helleiner 1994; McNamara 1999; Walter 2008) and the behaviour 
of the International Monetary Fund (Chwieroth 2010). Constructivists also deal 
with social norms, which strongly affect the behaviour of social groups and 
societies. While a norm is generally described as ‘a standard of appropriate 
behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), a 
social norm can be defined as an unwritten customary rule or expectation that 
governs how to behave in a certain social group or culture. Furthermore, morals 
are the core of social norms and are regarded as principles of right and wrong in 
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a particular culture. However, few scholars have emphasised the significant 
influence of social norms on the Japanese political economy. 41 The influence of 
norms on society may be less visible than that of economic thoughts and political 
ideologies for researchers, but norms can guide the behaviour of actors based on  
their expectation that if they do not comply with these norms they will be socially 
penalised (Broome 2014: 25).     
 
2.2 Gramsci’s Concept of Hegemony and Neo-Gramscian Approaches 
Like contemporary constructivists, Antonio Gramsci, an Italian neo-Marxist 
theorist and politician, emphasised the power of norms and ideas. Gramsci’s most 
salient ideas concern his concept of hegemony, which is used to indicate how 
social norms are related to power under capitalism (Jackson Lears 1985: 567). 
His concept of hegemony can be defined as the supremacy of dominant groups in 
instilling their view of reality into a wide range of subordinated groups in a 
society through social norms, values and beliefs in accordance with the former’s 
interests. He pointed out that dominant groups successfully avoid confrontation 
with subordinate groups using cultural, normative or ideational power (ibid. : 
572).  Importantly, for Gramsci, hegemony is achieved through a combination of 
coercion exerted by the state (political society) and consent achieved by civil 
society.  Fontana (2008: 87) emphasises that coercion (force) and consent 
(persuasion) require each other in order to achieve hegemony, while Engel (2008: 
160) claims that ‘consent can be obtained by combining the interests of vario us 
social forces around particular populist causes such as struggles for democracy; 
or it can be obtained through compromise and persuasion’.  The concept of 
                                                   
41 With regard to national security of Japan, Katzenstein (1996) and Berger (1998) highlight 
Japanese social norms.  
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hegemony enlarged Gramsci’s definition of the state, which includes ‘the 
underpinnings of the political society and civil society’ (Cox 1993: 51).  
     Another key concept in neo-Gramscian perspectives is ‘historic bloc’, which 
can be described as a dominant ‘social structure’ (i.e., alignment of social forces) 
in which ruling groups, through their political party, form alliances with other 
groups based on economic and cultural ties (Jackson Lears 1985: 580). A historic 
bloc ‘rests on a specific configuration of social groups, economic structures and 
concomitant ideological superstructures’ (Levy and Egan 2003: 806), while a 
conscious social force initiates a historic bloc in order to establish a new 
hegemony. However, a historic bloc is not a simple political alliance, nor is it 
monolithic. Sassoon (1987: 121) argues that ‘an historic bloc is not to be reduced 
to a mere political alliance since it assumes a complex construction within which 
there can be sub-blocs … each of these containing different elements and 
potential contradiction’. Three types of social forces, namely material 
capabilities, ideas (including norms) and institutions, interact in a historical 
structure, and Cox applies the method of historical structure to the three levels: 
social forces generated by changing production processes, forms of state and 
world orders (Cox 1981: 136-8). Institutions, which are useful to stabilise and 
perpetuate a particular order, are specific ‘amalgams of ideas and material power 
which in turn influence the development of ideas and material capabilities’ (ibid. : 
136-7).   
     A historic bloc can be clearly observed in the domination of Japanese society 
during the high economic growth period by the ruling elites (including 
bureaucrats, LDP politicians, corporate managers and bankers), which 
successfully made extensive alliances with other groups (such as labour, SME 
owners and farmers). Although the power of these ruling groups has relatively 
declined since the bursting of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, some 
elements of the historic bloc – particularly subordinates’ expectation that 
dominant elites will provide support and protection – have remained and become 
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even stronger today. Lifetime employment in large firms for regular workers, 
subcontracting between large firms and SMEs and bailouts of large corporate 
borrowers by the government and banks have two factors in common. Firstly, 
dominant elites (superiors) provide protection and support for subordinates in 
exchange for the latter’s loyalty and obedience. Secondly, both parties would like 
to maintain long-term relationships.  
     Cox applied Gramsci’s perspective on domestic politics to international 
relations in a neo-Gramscian approach (Cox 1981). While realism as 
conventional IR theory ‘reduces hegemony to a single dimension of dominance 
based on the economic and military capabilities of states, a  neo-Gramscian 
perspective developed by Cox broadens the domain of hegemony’ (Bieler and 
Morton 2006: 10). The strength of neo-Gramscian perspectives relative to 
constructivism is that the former do not separate ideas from material structure. 
Furthermore, constructivism cannot fully answer the question of why certain 
ideas are generally accepted in a society and others are not (Bieler 2001: 94). 
Cox (1993: 56) stresses that ‘ideas and material conditions are always bound 
together, mutually influencing one another, and not reducible one to the other’. 
Neo-Gramscian perspectives shed light on which actors utilise which ideas as 
weapons to achieve their goals – ‘theory is always for someone and for some 
purpose’ (Cox 1981: 128). The balance between coercion and  consent is vital to 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, but neo-Gramscian approaches do not downplay 
the importance of material capabilities. Neo-Gramscian perspectives can be 
viewed as a supplementary combination of holistic (constructivist) and individual 
(rationalist) ontologies.   
     So, who disseminates ideas, norms and beliefs in line with the dominant 
group’s interests? Quoting Sunstein (1997),  Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) claim 
that ‘norm entrepreneurs’ are interested in changing social norms, and that if their 
endeavours are successful they can produce ‘norm cascades’ (which involve 
broad norm acceptance) and then ‘norm internalisation’ (which means that norms 
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obtain a ‘taken-for-granted’ status, which requires actors’ conformity), causing 
substantial changes in social norms. One example of norm entrepreneurs in Japan 
is ‘neo-Confucian’ scholars during the Edo period (1603-1868). They modified 
the original Chinese Confucianism to the Japanese version, conducive with the 
dominance of samurai warriors over other social classes and that of the Tokugawa 
shogunate. Another example is ‘reformist bureaucrats (Kakushin Kanryo)’, who 
created the 1940 system and some of whom became political leaders in the early 
post-war period. 
     In addition, Gramsci explained that ‘organic intellectuals’ play a crucial role 
in constructing a historic bloc. These intellectuals, who are organically connected 
with a social class, cultivate and maintain ‘the mental images, technologies and 
organisations which bind together the members of a class and of an historic bloc 
into a common identity’ (Cox 1993: 53).  Dominant ideas and norms are 
disseminated via institutions of civil society, such as educational, political and 
religious institutions, families and the media, while these ideas and norms 
reproduce the social structure through various social institutions (Levy and Egan 
2003: 805-6). Although Sunstein, Finnemore and Sikkink are not neo-Gramscian, 
their perspectives fit with a neo-Gramscian view of hegemony – new norms 
created by norm entrepreneurs are gradually supported and distributed by an 
increasing number of organic intellectuals, and they are subsequently ingrained 
into broader institutions. 
     Neo-Gramscian perspectives regard a historic bloc or hegemony as dynamic 
rather than static. Gill (1993: 41) argues that ‘the achievement of hegemony 
within a particular social formation is a complex and contradictory process, since 
counter-hegemonic forces will come to challenge the prevailing institutional and 
political arrangements’. Any hegemony comprises within it subordinates’ 
discontent regarding the dominant elites, which potentially leads to conflict 
between the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces. Worth (2002: 301) 
maintains that the conception of world hegemony is less united and more 
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disintegrated than neo-Gramscian researchers believe, while various forms of 
counter-hegemony vis-à-vis neoliberalism and globalisation can take place. He 
also states that neoliberal hegemony, which produces an increasing number of 
economic losers, is expected to promote progressive counter-hegemonic forces, 
which demand that the global economy should be more democratic, as well as 
nationalist counter-hegemonic forces, which are concerned about the influence 
of neoliberalism on national identities (ibid.: 314). Such counter-hegemonic 
forces have been witnessed in Japan as the resistance towards neoliberalism and 
the US credit rating orthodoxy even since the political power of the dominant 
groups began to deteriorate in the 1990s.  
     This thesis adopts an approach based on neo-Gramscian concepts as the main 
analytical framework for the following three reasons. Firstly, a key to the 
research puzzle lies in Japanese social norms, while major actors’ interests and 
preferences (including those of subordinate groups) are also critically important. 
The three types of social forces – ideas (including social norms), material 
capabilities (such as political and economic power, industrial competitiveness 
and wealth accumulation) and institutions (including bureaucracies, business 
lobbies, CRAs, lifetime employment, and the main bank system) – are closely 
related to one another. Secondly, a formula of global hegemony (such as 
neoliberalism and the US credit rating orthodoxy) versus counter -hegemony 
(such as the anti-liberal, anti-free market social norms in Japan) fits very well in 
this thesis.42  Thirdly, neo-Gramscian approaches are useful to shed light on the 
latent social class conflict (i.e., between administrators, capitalists, regular 
workers and non-regular workers) in Japan. Although financial globalisation and 
neoliberalism caused the early post-war political-economic system to gradually 
                                                   
42 In this context, the neo-Gramscian concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony have 
some similarities with Polanyi’s (1944) conceptions of the ‘first movement’ (first market 
expansion) and the ‘second movement’, which is society’s attempt to protect itself from the 
disruptive effects of the first movement (Cohen 2008: 90).  
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malfunction, the vested interests of both the dominant elites and subordinates 
have hampered fully-fledged changes in the system. 
     Neo-Gramscian approaches are often concerned with continuous historical 
changes – for instance, neoliberal thoughts had a major impact on Western 
Europe and some Asian countries such as South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia  
through various channels including American government agencies, international 
organisations (e.g., the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation) 
and multinational corporations and banks, including the American CRAs. 
However, these approaches can also be applied to the case of Japanese society’s 
resistance towards Anglo-Saxon hegemonic ideas (i.e., neoliberalism and the US 
credit rating orthodoxy). This counter-hegemony stems primarily from Japanese 
social norms, which are reflected in the society’s reluctance to promote the 
‘marketisation’ of the economic and financial systems and the significance of 
membership for social locations (companies in particular). Partial 
neoliberalisation of the Japanese economic and financial systems started in th e 
early-1990s.43  
      Major proponents of neoliberalism from the early 1990s to the mid -2000s 
include former Prime Ministers Hosokawa, Hashimoto and Koizumi, Doyukai, 
neoclassical economists and non-Japanese firms (including investment banks, 
management consultancies and the American CRAs). Among these, economists 
and core members of Doyukai who were heavily involved in neoliberal 
policymaking can be viewed as norm entrepreneurs, while the other proponents 
played a role as organic intellectuals. The institutions that particularly 
contributed to disseminating neoliberal ideas in Japan comprised American 
                                                   
43 Watanabe (2007), a Japanese political scientist, is opposed to the perspective that former 
Prime Minister Nakasone’s administrative and fiscal reforms, including the privatisation of 
the state-run companies in 1982, constituted the initiation of neoliberal policy in Japan, and 
contends that the initial neoliberal reform was conducted by former Prime Minister 
Hosokawa (1993-4). 
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management consultancies (such as McKinsey & Company and Boston 
Consulting Group), American and European investment banks (including 
Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank) and the major American CRAs. However, 
while neoliberalism and the US credit rating orthodoxy failed to obtain support 
from the majority of Japanese society, the resistance towards these ideas has 
aggravated the contradictions (including corporate inefficiencies and the 
enhanced social welfare burden) within society, leading to ballooning public 
debts and an increasing number of economic losers.  
    
2.3 Analytic Eclecticism and How to Operationalise Neo-Gramscian 
Approaches  
Despite the analytical usefulness of neo-Gramscian approaches, operationalising 
them is not an easy task. One difficulty in utilising neo-Gramscian approaches 
lies in ‘applying the elegant theoretical edifice to concrete conditions’ (Clift 
2014: 157). A major problem in operationalising neo-Gramscian approaches is 
that these approaches are macroscopic – in social science, the level of analysis 
(or the unit of analysis) points to the size or scale of the entity that is analysed, 
and three general levels are the micro or microscopic level (such as individuals 
and families), the meso level (including communities and organisations) and the 
macro or macroscopic level (such as nation states and world order). This thesis 
deals not only with the globally hegemonic trend of neoliberalism but also with 
the behaviour of Japanese individuals and organisations. Accordingly, a 
supplementary toolkit (e.g., sociology, psychology, cultural anthropology and 
philosophy) is needed to analyse meso and micro level issues such as bureaucracy 
and corporate governance. Furthermore, the focus on social norms also requires 
the use of sociological, psychological, socio-psychological and philosophical 
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approaches. Accordingly, the thesis will adopt the analytic eclecticism of neo -
Gramscian, sociological, psychological and philosophical approaches.44 
     The sense of analytic eclecticism to be adopted in this thesis is that of Sil and 
Katzenstein (2010). They define analytic eclecticism as the creation of 
intellectually and practically useful links among collections of analyses, which 
are divided by different research paradigms although essentially related (ibid. : 2). 
Katzenstein (1995: 10) argues that ‘scholars do their best research because of the 
political problems and intellectual puzzles that engage them, not because of the 
sage advice of prophets of their profession’, suggesting that interesting and 
crucial questions are more important than theories and methods. According to Sil 
and Katzenstein (2010: 3), the purpose of analytic eclecticism is not to combine, 
encompass or take over paradigms, but to indicate the pragmatic relevance of and 
meaningful connections among theories and explanations within seemingly 
separate and incompatible perspectives. In other words, analytic eclecticism is a 
question- or puzzle-driven research - which allows scholars to choose a range of 
theoretical tools pragmatically. Sil and Katzenstein (ibid. : 16-8) also specify 
‘what analytic eclecticism is not’. Firstly, it is not a measure ‘to hedge one’s bets 
to cope with uncertainty’. Secondly, its value addition does not lie in 
circumventing ‘paradigm-bound scholarship’. Thirdly, it is not a theoretical 
amalgamation. Lastly, it is not co-extensive with ‘multi-method research or 
methodological triangulation’.  
     Neo-Gramscian perspectives are analytically eclectic by nature, and one 
major criticism of analytic eclecticism in IPE is the lack of commitment to a 
specific ontology based on particular concepts and assumptions to abstract the 
complexity of real world issues (Bruff 2011: 81).  Put differently, opponents of 
                                                   
44  Whilst neo-Gramscian approaches offer an analytically flexible framework, each 
researcher needs to devise how to operationalise them with supplementary toolkits. 
According to Cohen (2008: 92-3), Cox’s scholarship entails the wide-ranging eclecticism, 
which draws from such disciplines as religion and anthropology, ethnic studies and feminist 
theory, philosophy and even ecology.  
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analytic eclecticism believe that theoretical parsimony, which contributes to the 
accumulation of knowledge based on a clear ontology, should not be 
compromised. However, proponents of analytic eclecticism believe that its 
empirical benefits in terms of analytic flexibility more than offset its weaknesses 
(Broome 2014: 38). Analytic eclecticism is in tandem with rigorous empirical 
investigation since, unlike a single paradigm, the former does not allow itself to 
avoid complex reality and inconvenient facts (Sil and Katzenstein 2010: 9-23). 
Furthermore, ‘simplifications based on a single theoretical lens involve trade -
offs, and can produce enduring blind spots unless accompanied by 
complementary, countervailing efforts to “recomplexify” problems’ (Scott 1995, 
quoted by Sil and Katzenstein 2010: 9). Abdelal (2009: 76) maintains that when 
the analytical eclecticism of rationalism and constructivism are useful, they 
should be combined, whereas IPE has the DNA of analytic eclecticism or 
‘intellectual bridge-building’ by origin – Broome (2014: 39) claims that 
‘intellectual bridge-building is at the heart of attempts to operationalize analytic 
eclecticism in the study of IPE’.  
 
Figure 1: How to Operationalise Neo-Gramscian Approaches 
Identifying Three Key Points 
Alliances between Social Groups via Norms  
 
Supplemental Toolkit to Analyse Meso / Micro Issues  
 
Class Structure 
 
 
Operationalising Macroscopic Neo-Gramscian Approaches 
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There are three key points in terms of operationalising neo-Gramscian approaches 
to analyse a real world case (Figure 1). Firstly, one key question is, which actors 
(social groups) make an alliance with other actors and increase their power by 
using ideas and norms as weapons? Bieler utilizes a neo-Gramscian approach to 
explain that the intensified neoliberal restructuring of European social relations 
of production, led by transnational class fractions, has deepened and widened 
European integration (Bieler et al. 2006: 3). He points out that the European 
Round Table of Industrialists, consisting of industrial captains from European 
transnational companies as members, has played a key role in the revitalisation 
of European integration, and that when the ideological conflict occurred between 
the mercantilists and neoliberals within the round table, the latter ultimately won 
over the former (Bieler 2006: 82). Ideational confrontation in Japan, similar to 
the European case, took place, for instance, between the two major industrial 
associations, namely Keidanren and Doyukai, and between the local and US 
CRAs after the bursting of the bubble economy. Furthermore, powerful 
institutions such as MOF, METI and the LDP have been far from monolithic and 
have experienced internal conflicts over policies and ideologies. The int erests 
and ideas of the major actors are discussed in a later section. Japanese people 
tend to prioritise the benefit of the small social groups (e.g., bureaus of ministries 
and divisions of companies) to which they primarily belong over that of entire 
organisations or communities (Nakane 2009: 23-52).45 
     Secondly, as mentioned above, sociological, psychological and philosophical 
approaches, which are effective to analyse micro and meso level issues, are 
needed to supplement macroscopic neo-Gramscian approaches. The three 
contrasting pairs of concepts in sociology, psychology and philosophy, i.e., 
‘strong ties and weak ties’, proposed by Granovetter (1973), ‘prevention and 
                                                   
45 Sociologists define a ‘primary group’ as a small social group whose members are bound 
by intimate, emotionally intensive ties. Its typical examples include family and childhood 
friends, but in Japan, small units of social locations can be regarded as primary groups.  
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promotion orientations’ advocated by Higgins (1997), and the ‘Guardian and 
Commercial  syndromes’ advanced by Jacobs (1992) are useful to grasp the 
differences in social norms between Japan and Anglo-Saxon countries, and 
elucidate why Japanese society is reluctant to promote the marketisation of its 
economic and financial systems and justifies support for economic losers. All of 
these conceptions and their explanations regarding Japanese social norms will be 
discussed in the following sections.  
     Thirdly, the characteristics of financial systems in economically advanced 
countries including Japan are closely associated with those of firm and labour 
market structures or social relations of production, namely class structures 
(Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara 1993; Aoki and Dore 1994; Hall and Soskice 
2001).46  In this respect, a drastic change in the social relations of production is 
likely to transform an entire political economic system comprising a financial 
system. It is almost impossible to alter the financial system alone, which is a 
component of the entire political economic system, without transforming the 
system. One example of previous revolutionary changes in Japanese social 
relations of production is the Meiji Restoration in 1868, which can be viewed as 
an implosion of the old regime, partly triggered by growing discontent among the 
lower-class samurai warriors and the younger sons of farmers – the eldest sons 
inherited all of the assets of families in principle at that time – who faced an 
increasingly serious economic plight (Yonaha 2011), in addition to the pressures 
from European countries and the US to open the country to international trade 
and diplomatic relations, the prevailing ideology of revering the emperor and the 
deteriorated authority of the Tokugawa shogunate. These struggling people of 
150 years ago might be equivalent to the current working poor.  
                                                   
46 This kind of interdependence between institutions in different spheres (such as financ ial 
and labour markets) is denominated as ‘institutional complementarity’, which is discussed 
in a later section.  
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2.4 Strong and Weak Ties and Prevention and Promotion Orientations  
Granovetter (1973: 1361) defines the strength of a tie as ‘a combination of the 
amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the 
reciprocal services which characterize the tie’. He argues that some ties can play 
the role of a ‘bridge’ between different parts of a social network, and concludes 
that ‘weak ties are more likely to link members of different small groups than are 
strong ones, which tend to be concentrated in particular groups’ (ibid .: 1376). 
Most people have both strong and weak ties. Strong ties are close relationships 
such as family members and good friends, while weak ties are more nebulous 
relationships. 47  Although people can obtain less new information from their 
strong ties as the former often share information flows with the latter, there is a 
higher probability that people can acquire new information from weak ties who 
do not share the same interests and information flows with them. In this sense, 
weak ties are crucial in ‘bridging’ with various strong ties. Both strong and weak 
ties can be seen in the financial market. I argue that the Japanese main bank 
system (under which the bank having the closest relationship and usually the 
largest credit exposure with the corporate borrower is made responsible for 
monitoring the company as a main bank) and cross shareholdings between 
companies and financial institutions in the same corporate groups exemplify 
strong ties, whereas numerous weak ties provide ample liquidity for the Anglo -
Saxon financial markets. 
                                                   
47 The respective aristocratic and egalitarian networks used by Amyx (2004) have some 
similarity to strong and weak ties. Furthermore, Nakane (1973: 24), a Japanese sociologist, 
argues that the essential human relations can be categorised into two types: ‘vertical’ and 
‘horizontal’. According to her, ‘theoretically, the horizontal tie between those (individuals) 
of the same stratum functions in the development of caste and class, while the vertical tie 
functions in forming the cluster within which the upper-lower hierarchical order becomes 
more pronounced’ (ibid.: 25). Vertical and horizontal ties also share some elements with 
strong and weak ties, respectively. 
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     Brinton, an American sociologist, contends that a relationship of trust among 
people through weak ties is a social foundation in the US (Yamagishi and Brinton 
2010: 38). Even if some American workers are laid off, many of them can find 
new jobs through weak ties, which are indispensable for liquidity in both the 
financial and labour markets.  Markets not only drive some workers out of 
employment, but also play a role as a safety net for them. In contrast, as 
Yamagishi, a Japanese social psychologist, points out (ibid. : 204-5), Japanese 
society has a strong preference for strong ties (close long-term relations) over 
weak ties (arm’s length short-term relations). This may partly explain the less 
liquid financial and labour markets in Japan. Yamagishi also emphasises that 
Japanese people tend to pursue ‘stability’ and ‘security’ in their lives strongly 
and minimise uncertainty, which results in their low trust in outsiders (Yamagishi 
1999: 56-88). Japanese society’s preferences are reflected in the main bank 
system, cross shareholdings, the employment customs of large companies such 
as lifetime employment, seniority-based wages and in-house unions, and long-
term subcontracting between large companies and SMEs.  
     Does Japanese people’s preference to pursue stability and securi ty and 
exclude outsiders merely reflect their inherent collectivist tendency? How 
exactly have they removed uncertainties within their communities and 
organisations? Yamagishi (1999: 34-53) argues that based on his experiments, in 
which the behaviour of the participants could not be checked and regulated by 
other participants, Japanese people tend to be more individualistic (i.e., less 
cooperative and more selfish) than Americans, contrary to the conventional 
notion, but that the former have been forced to behave collectively and 
harmoniously within their communities and organisations. Mutual surveillance 
and regulation have made Japanese people prioritise the collective benefits of 
communities and organisations over their own personal benefits, and if some 
members breach the (unwritten) rules and norms, they are penalised severely 
(ibid.: 45-9).   
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     These customs penetrated widely in Japan in the Edo period. For instance, 
when some members of an agrarian village breached the rules and norms, the rest 
of the villagers collectively cut their relationship with them – at that time, village 
members could not survive without mutual support. This is called Mura -Hachibu 
or social ostracism. Drawing on Foucault’s (1977) perspective, Japan can be 
regarded as a typical ‘panopticon society’ in which people feel as if they are 
under surveillance all the time. The submission and loyalty of Japanese people to 
the dominant elites and their social groups (such as communities and 
companies)48 have been nurtured not only by elites’ coercion but also by the 
mutual surveillance and regulation among subordinate groups, which the 
dominant elites have instilled into their subordinates as norms.  
     Triandis (1995: 2) defines collectivism as a social pattern consisting of closely 
connected individuals who regard themselves primarily as parts of collectives 
such as family, company and nation and are mainly motivated by the norms and 
duties imposed by the collectives, in contrast to individualism, which releases 
individuals motivated by personal goals from collectives. He categorises Japan 
along with Brazil, India, Russia, China and Korea as collectivist societies (ibid .: 
1-7). Japan’s collectivism based on mutual surveillance and regulation was 
temporarily weakened by the importing of the Western ideal of individualism 
during the Meiji and Taisho period (1868-1926), but it was re-strengthened and 
the controlled economy was introduced by the military and economic bureaucracy 
during the wartime period (1936-45). A Tonarigumi (neighbourhood association) 
formed in the wartime period was the smallest unit of the national mobilisation 
programme established by the government and these played a role in mutual 
surveillance and regulation. 
                                                   
48 Brinton (2011: 4-5) emphasises the importance of ‘ba’ (social locations in Japanese, 
including local communities, schools and companies) ‘for individual identity and 
psychological and economic security’ in Japan.  
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     The collectivist trait in Japan was moderated by the post-war urbanisation, 
but some of its elements still remain rooted in Japanese people’s behaviour today.  
Noguchi (2010: 21-38) calls the controlled economic system, consisting of the 
economic planning and control by bureaucracy, the strict financial regu lation by 
the government, the main bank system, keiretsu, the restriction of shareholders’ 
rights, the lifetime employment and seniority-based wage system, in-house 
unions and subcontracting, the 1940 system, and claims that some elements of 
this system remain in the present Japanese socio-economic system.  The 1940s 
system is based on extensive networks of long-term, restrictive and exclusive 
strong ties. 
     Then, why do the Japanese generally prefer strong ties, while Americans make 
better use of weak ties? In psychology, there is a way of categorising people into 
two types based on their personality attributes to predict performance: 
‘prevention orientation or focus’ and ‘promotion orientation or focus’ (Higgins 
1997). These concepts are useful to explain the behaviour of Japanese individuals, 
communities and organisations. A prevention-oriented person or society 
emphasises ‘responsibility and safety’, regards goals as ‘oughts’ and is concerned 
with ‘non-losses (security) and losses (threat)’, whilst a promotion-oriented one 
focuses on ‘aspirations and accomplishments’, views goals as ‘ideals’ and is 
concerned with ‘gains (advancement) and non-gains (non-fulfilment)’ (ibid.: 
1282-3).  Put simply, promotion-focused people care primarily about ‘the 
presence versus the absence of a positive outcome’, whereas prevention-focused 
people are chiefly concerned about ‘the absence versus the presence of a negative 
outcome’ (Kurman and Hui 2011: 3). Prevention orientation may have something 
to do with the above-mentioned customs in Japanese society, including social 
ostracism.  
     Individualism and collectivism, a contrasting pair of moral and social 
orientations, contribute substantially to shaping society’s prevention or 
promotion orientation although their relationship has not been fully analysed 
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(Lee, Aaker and Gardner 2000). Importantly, the distinction between 
individualist and collectivist societies is not dichotomous but relative. Triandis 
(1995: 89) emphasises that all societies have both individualistic and  collectivist 
characteristics, and that some societies are regarded as collectivist, as their 
collectivist attributes are stronger than their individualistic traits. Moreover, both 
individualism and collectivism can be divided by the vertical -horizontal 
dimension, which is also relative. Whilst the verticals are orientated to hierarchy 
and willing to accept differences in wealth and social status within society, the 
horizontals stress equality (ibid.: 44-5). Combining the collectivism-
individualism dimension with the vertical-horizontal dimension creates four 
types of social and individual orientations: horizontal individualism, vertical 
individualism, horizontal collectivism, and vertical collectivism, whose key traits 
can be described as unique, achievement-oriented, cooperative, and dutiful (ibid.: 
44-7).   
     Japan, along with other Asian countries such as China, South Korea and India, 
falls into the category of vertical collectivism. Vertical collectivism shows a 
strong identification with the in-group (a group united by common identities and 
norms).49 People need to comply with the group requirements and rules as well 
as social roles and obligations, ‘even at the expense of self-desires and self-needs’ 
(Triandis 1995, quoted by Kurman and Hui 2011: 5). According to Triandis (1995: 
47), the respective hypothetical proportions of horizontal individualism, vertical 
individualism, horizontal collectivism, and vertical collectivism within Japanese 
society, based on sampled individuals’ profiles of behaviour, are 20%, 5%, 25% 
and 50%, in stark contrast to those of individualist societies such as the US (40%, 
30%, 20% and 10%) and the UK (20%, 50%, 10% and 20%). Importantly, the 
                                                   
49 The distinctive and persistent ‘internalism’ (i.e., in-group favouritism) of Japanese style 
corporate governance, Buchanan (2007) claims, seems to derive from this strong 
identification with the in-group. 
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hierarchy of vertical collectivism is highly correlated with age and seniority in 
an organisation (ibid.: 45). 
     The prevention and promotion orientations tend to be closely related to 
strong-ties-centred and weak-ties-centred societies, respectively. The prevention 
orientation of vertical collectivism, in particular, forces people to prioritise their 
relationships with in-groups significantly over those with outsiders and makes 
the effective use of weak ties difficult. On the one hand, the prevention 
orientation tends to generate harmonious and cooperative relationships within 
communities and organisations. Such cooperative relationships are likely to have 
contributed to Japan’s economic growth in the early post-war period. On the other 
hand, however, they also cause people to hinder other members of communities 
and organisations from obtaining personal financial  gain and prevent them from 
taking risks independently. It is said that Japanese people tend to stand in each 
other’s ways – the Japanese proverb that ‘the stake that sticks out gets hammered 
in’ clearly reflects the strong prevention orientation of Japanese society. This may 
stem from Japanese style egalitarianism, which assumes the equality of people’s 
capabilities (Nakane 1973: 38).  
     Many people in vertically collectivist societies feel that they could not survive 
outside their social groups (such as communities and companies). Vertical 
collectivism in Japan is not necessarily based on the inherent traits of Japanese 
people but on the mutual surveillance and regulation system that intends to create 
and maintain safety and security within communities and organisations. 
Yamagishi (1999: 248-51) claims that people need to make good use of laws as a 
(minimum) safety net in order to escape the yoke of vertical collectivism and 
survive outside their original communities and organisations. However, the 
Japanese still regard law as ‘an instrument of constraint used by the government 
to impose its will’ (van Wolferen 1989: 210).  
     The great majority of Japanese people relied on the communities of their 
birthplaces before WWII, and despite the urbanisation, a large proportion of the 
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people have remained dependent on their social groups, such as companies, since 
the end of WWII. In addition to the good use of laws, the English language, which 
is widely used across the world, may encourage the promotion orienta tion of 
Anglo-Saxons.  
 
2.5 Guardian and Commercial Morals, and the Concept of Systemic 
Support   
The two sets of contrasting conceptions discussed in the previous section – strong 
and weak ties and the prevention and promotion orientations – are useful to 
explain the characteristics of Japanese society (e.g., anti -free market orientation 
and risk aversion). However, these concepts alone cannot fully explain why these 
characteristics have been developed. Why is Japanese society prevention focused 
while Anglo-Saxon societies are promotion oriented? I argue that the above 
characteristics and preferences of Japanese society stem from the ‘Guardian 
moral syndrome’ proposed by Jane Jacobs, an influential author and self -taught 
philosopher. Jacobs claims that human beings have only two basic strategies for 
survival – taking and trading – which have produced two basic ‘systems of 
survival’ or ‘moral syndromes’: the ‘Guardian and Commercial moral syndromes’ 
(Jacobs 1992).  
     Commercial morals should be complied with by the great majority of the 
private sector – occupations concerned with commerce, the production of goods 
and services and most scientific work (ibid.: 28). In contrast, guardian morals 
should be precepts of the public sector or more precisely ‘guardians’, who protect, 
exploit, administer or controls territories – the armed forces, the police, 
aristocracies, landlords, bureaucracies, law courts, legislatures, religions and 
exceptionally commercial monopolies. Guardians can also be described as 
administrators. Some occupations such as medicine, agriculture and law are 
influenced by both guardian and commercial morals (ibid. : 28-9). However, 
although guardian morals are excessively influential in the Japanese corporate 
85 
 
sector, this can be partially explained by the fact that commercial monopolies 
(including monopolistic utilities, and major companies and financial institutions 
in keiretsu), which are highly politicised and have close relationships with the 
government, account for a large proportion of big businesses in Japan. 
     Whilst guardian morals value long-term loyal relationships among people, 
commercial morals promote opportunistic short-term relationships. Guardian 
morals value loyalty, honour, obedience, hierarchy, tradition (status quo), 
largesse (including support for subordinates) and exclusiveness, and restrict 
trading with external groups to seek individual financial gain. Commercial 
morals appraise fairness, honesty, efficiency, competition, respect for contracts, 
initiative and openness (collaboration with strangers and aliens), and shun force 
(ibid.: 23-4). Guardian morals believe that all evil stems from the love of money, 
while commercial ones regard the love of power as the origin of all evil (ibid. : 
128). The preferences of Japanese society have gradually changed since WWII, 
but the society as a whole still tends to value guardian morals more highly than 
commercial morals. This may be partly due to the deeply ingrained influence of 
the wartime control. Right and wrong are dependent on which of the two 
divergent sets of moral precepts a person takes sides with. What is recognised as 
morally right (or rational) under one set of moral precepts is not necessarily 
acceptable (or rational) under the other. For example, although pursuing persona l 
short-term profit and initiative is appropriate under commercial moral precepts, 
it is inappropriate under the guardian ones.  
     Subordinates demonstrate their loyalty to social groups such as communities 
and organisations in order to gain protection by the latter under guardian moral 
precepts. Loyalty in this context has some similarity to the neo-Gramscian 
concept of consent. Consequently, subordinates do not appreciate profit and 
initiative, which do not assure their safety and security under these precepts. The 
ancient or medieval guardian morals restricted trading, as it was considered to 
potentially lead to betrayal or corruption (ibid. : 59-61).  Contrastingly, 
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commercial morals promote trading with outsiders through the precept: 
‘collaborate easily with strangers and aliens’ (ibid.: 34-5). Furthermore, most 
commercial moral precepts have been built up by youngsters, whilst elderly 
people are venerated for no particular reason in many societies (ibid. : 110). 
Japan’s political economic system, which is advantageous for elderly people at 
the expense of youngsters, may reflect its orientation towards anti -commercial 
morals.50 
     The respective potential weak points of guardian and commercial morals are 
loyalty and honesty, both of which are vulnerable to temptation and require 
constant indoctrination and vigilance (ibid.: 68-9). Largesse (or protection) for 
subordinates can be regarded as ‘the guardian form of investment: specifically, 
an investment in power, influence and control’, ultimately creating the 
dependency of subordinates through manipulation (ibid. : 84-6). However, the 
opposite side of the coin is that the stable leadership of dominant elites requires 
the loyalty of subordinates in a guardian moral-orientated society, whose 
members are bound through emotionally intensive strong ties.  The foundation of 
cosmopolitanism is the premise of the commercial moral that defrauding 
strangers and aliens is as disgraceful and intolerable as cheating friends, while in 
an insular society orientated towards guardian morals, people behave very 
cautiously in front of other members as they inexorably depend on one another 
throughout their lifetime (ibid.: 35-6). However, Jacobs describes 
cosmopolitanism and insularity as two poles ‘with shadings and degrees and 
mixtures all the way from one pole to the other’ rather than ‘a tidy, discrete pair’ 
(ibid.: 36).  Japanese society has moved along the spectrum slightly from extreme 
insularity towards cosmopolitanism, but their insularity still remains strong.  
                                                   
50 The respect for the elderly promoted by Confucianism may be favourable for older people 
in Japan. However, more importantly, Nakane (1973: 26-42) argues that the length of 
service in a vertical organisation provides a significant advantage for senior people on the 
assumption that the basic capabilities of people should be equal.   
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     All societies need both guardian and commercial morals as they require both 
the public and private sectors. However, Jacobs warns that when the two 
contrasting moral precepts are mixed, this can produce serious problems (ibid. : 
93-111). For instance, if commercial morals are applied to the government, 
corruption or civil war (through divided loyalty) will take place.  If guardian 
morals are used for the private sector, its efficiency and wealth creation will 
deteriorate.  Jacobs indicates the two solutions to avoid mixing the two 
conflicting sets of moral precepts: 1) the occupational caste system, which 
distinguishes guardians from the people involved in commerce, and 2) 
‘knowledgeable flexibility’ – the ability of people to move between the two sets 
of moral precepts to avoid the problematic mixture of the conflicting morals in a 
harmful manner (ibid.: 180-211). While under democracy, the latter is the only 
plausible solution, knowledgeable flexibility has to rely on individuals’ morality 
and is likely to result in systemic corruption in the long run. Jacobs does not 
clearly mention that markets require both of the two sets of moral precepts, as 
they are fundamentally constituted by both the government and private actors. 
However, she seems to be aware of this issue, judging from her comment: ‘this 
is good symbiosis: guardians taking political responsibility for enacting policies 
into law, and enforcing them; commerce taking responsibility for innovative ways 
and means of complying’ (ibid.: 178). More importantly, her insight sheds light 
on how social norms based on these two sets of moral precepts affect the 
behaviour of communities and organisations. 
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Table 1: Three Pairs of Contrasting Concepts  
      
  Collectivism Individualism 
    
    
Strength of Ties Strong Weak 
    
    
Self-regulatory Orientations  Prevention Promotion 
    
    
Moral Precepts Guardian Commercial 
    
 
The three concepts – strong ties, prevention orientation and guardian morals – 
are generally consistent with each other, as are weak ties, the promotion 
orientation and commercial morals. Both the prevention orientation and guardian 
morals emphasise responsibility (loyalty) and safety (stability or the status quo) 
and might have developed through the lives of people bound by strong ties 
preserving their territories (social groups) from threats posed by outsiders. In 
contrast, people with a promotion orientation and commercial morals tend to seek 
opportunities and be more mobile by using weak ties. Commerce is governed by 
laws and contracts, and laws make people less dependent on their existing social 
groups. However, in Japan, ordinary people do not make good use of the laws, so 
they have to rely on other members of their communities and organisations.  
     According to Yamagishi, Japanese society’s collectivist, parochial and risk -
averse features were presumably shared by most societies during the pre -modern 
period. But some societies, especially Anglo-Saxon ones, nurtured a liberal, 
individualist, and more risk-taking culture through the expansion of commerce.51 
In collectivist societies dependent on networks of strong ties, within which in -
                                                   
51 Interview with Professor Toshio Yamagishi in November 2015  
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group members are assured by mutual surveillance that others will comply with 
the social norms (i.e., guardian morals), strong in-group favouritism produces 
security within the group boundaries, but destroys the general trust of people 
outside them (Yamagishi 2011: 1-6). Importantly, ‘risk taking is a critical element 
of trust building’ between different social groups (ibid.: 165). There is a bilateral 
correlation between risk taking and trust – general trust in society (i.e., social 
openness) facilitates risk taking. General trust is a prerequisite for market 
liberalisation, but has been very weak in Japan. The weakness of general trust in 
Japanese society relative to America, is demonstrated by Yamagishi’s (1994) 
survey (1,136 Japanese and 501 American respondents)-based research and 
subsequent empirical research (Cook et al. 2005; Gheorghiu et al. 2009). 
     Weak general trust in collectivist societies, including Japan, needs to be offset 
by systemic support, which is a term used in the credit markets. The original, 
narrow definition of systemic support is support for financially troubled financial 
institutions and companies extended by the government, banks and other 
members of corporate groups to which distressed corporate borrowers belong, but 
its broadened definition is dominant elites’ support and protection of subordinates 
in exchange for their loyalty and obedience. This is exemplified by wide -ranging 
Japanese social relations such as the main bank system, lifetime employment 
offered by large firms, and long-term subcontracting between large firms and 
SMEs. 52 Such a mutual commitment, instilled deeply as a social norm through 
coercion and consent, does not reflect general trust but security of assurance by 
both dominant elites (superiors) and subordinates, who mutuall y abandon their 
alternative options. Although systemic support can be observed in any country, 
in Japan it is much stronger and broader than in Anglo-Saxon countries.  
Dominant and subordinate groups in Japan, sharing a consensus on the pursuit of 
stability, have formed a historic bloc that dominates society, through the 
                                                   
52 As discussed in Chapter 1, systemic support has some elements that are similar to ‘convoy 
capitalism’, described by Schoppa (2006) and Rosenbluth and Thies (2010).  
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exchange of systemic support for obedience, which is required for the elites’ 
exercise of power.  
     Collectivist societies with an orientation towards strong ties, prevention and 
guardian morals tend to have the following characteristics: 1) risk sharing 
(socialisation of risk), 2) power and responsibility sharing through the division 
of power among peers and allies as well as delegation to lower ranks, 53 3) a strong 
attachment to social groups and in-group favouritism, 4) close cooperation and 
harmony based on mutual surveillance and regulation within social groups, 5) 
paternalism and respect for hierarchy, 6) a herd mentality and 7) exclusion of 
uncertainty deriving from outside (risk aversion) and social exclusiveness.54 All 
of these traits can be seen in traditional Japanese society. Furthermore, another 
important implication is that emotionally intensive strong ties tend to constrain 
the leadership of dominant groups pursuing change and the mobility of capital in 
this type of society. 
     Japan’s CME has been strongly influenced by guardian morals. Social groups 
are expected to provide protection (or systemic support) for their members in 
exchange for their loyalty to the group.  However, the 1940 system has 
increasingly malfunctioned over the last two decades. Yamagishi claims that 
since the old system orientated towards guardian morals started to deteriorate in 
the 1990s, ironically, a large proportion of Japanese people have turned to and 
tried to preserve this system in order to regain stability and security, which has 
                                                   
53 Nakane (1973: 51) contends that a vertical relationship in Japan functions effectively 
when the subordinates satisfy the paternalistic support and protection provided by the leader 
and repay their debt with loyalty. As the Japanese leader is bound to their subordinates with 
emotional ties, the power of leadership is constrained by the human relations within a group. 
Furthermore, as she points out, the leader also tends to form a leadership team (Nakane 
2009: 86-9). 
54 Matsuo (2009:  35-9) claims that a society orientated towards commercial morals tries to 
manage risk, while one centred on guardian morals endeavours to avoid risk or exclude it.  
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led Japanese society to excessive risk aversion and further difficulty in promoting 
commercial morals (Yamagishi and Brinton 2010: 33-48).  
     I argue that the seriousness of the problems stemming from the application of 
guardian morals to the private sector was mitigated during the early post -war 
period due to knowledgeable flexibility. The Japanese government narrowed the 
scope of systemic support for the private sector, partly following US proposals 
such as the Dodge Line, which will be discussed in Section 2.7. For example, 
although large companies (some of which can be categorised as ‘commercial 
monopolies’) were bailed out by the government and the banks, a number of 
SMEs went bankrupt until the 1980s. However, since the 1990s, when the power 
of the dominant elites was relatively weakened, the realm of systemic support 
has expanded, as can be seen in the SME Financing Facilitation Act, which 
followed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the rising social security costs. 
Since the 1990s, guardian morals have been increasingly applied to the private 
sector in an excessive manner, resulting in a decrease in private debts and a sharp 
increase in public debts, which reflects the deteriorated knowledgeable flexibility 
of Japanese society. 
 
 
2.6 Institutional Complementarity and Systemic Change  
The previous section poses the question, what makes the financial and labour 
markets closely related to each other? It is often claimed that there is 
‘institutional complementarity’ between the two markets (Jackson 2003: 261 ; 
Gospel and Pendleton 2005: 4). Hall and Soskice (2001: 17) define institutional 
complementarity as follows: ‘two institutions can be said to be complementary if  
the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency of) 
the other’. The conception of institutional complementarity is often discussed in 
tandem with ‘path dependency’ arguments. However, there are different forms of 
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path dependency. A moderate form of path dependency means that ‘what 
happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a 
sequence of events occurring at a later point in time’ (Swell 1996: 262-3). 
Pierson’s notion of path dependency is a stronger form. He thinks that path 
dependency consists of three phases: 1) the critical juncture, at which a move 
towards a particular path out of multiple possibilities is decided by certain events, 
2) the reproduction period, during which a sequence of events reinforces the 
chosen path, and 3) the next critical juncture, at which new events terminate the 
long-lasting path (Pierson 2000: 74-7). Proponents of institutional 
complementarity and path dependency often take on rational choice approaches.  
     A strong form of path dependency may be useful to explain the stability of a 
certain political economic system, while it faces a difficulty in explaining a 
systemic change. Based on the strong version of path dependency, a systemic 
change can stem only from exogenous shocks (such as strong foreign pressure, 
wars and natural disasters) which drastically change the preferences and interests 
of the major actors. However, this argument is empirically flawed because 
systemic changes such as the neoliberalisation of Western Europe and the Meiji 
Restoration were not solely caused by exogenous factors. Exogenous and 
endogenous factors often interact with each other, resulting in systemic changes. 
Political economic systems are not as stable as the strong form of path 
dependency indicates, and these systems contain contradictions within them.  As 
neo-Gramscian perspectives indicate, political economic systems or historic 
blocs are based on both consent and coercion at the expense of subordinate groups. 
Growing discontent among subordinate groups can destabilise an existing historic 
bloc and contribute to the possible formation of a new historic bloc.   
     There are close correlations between the characteristics of financial and 
labour markets; the two markets entail ‘two key elements of the production 
regime (capital and labour) in any capitalist society’ (Kang 2006: 12). Kang 
claims that financial markets are relatively vulnerable to external pressure for 
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change given the mobility of capital, whereas labour markets are resilient to such 
pressure as it is deeply rooted in ‘national socio-political arrangements’ (ibid.: 
12). On the other hand, labour markets are more directly susceptible to domestic 
social relations (particularly the management-labour relation) than financial 
markets. Financial markets are dominated by ruling groups (either capitalists or 
administrators), and in CMEs orientated towards guardian morals, subordinate 
groups are inclined to regard the financial market as a highly specialised area for 
dominant elites (such as financial authorities and bankers). 55 Moreover, Kang 
argues that in LMEs, the mobility of large firms’ capital promotes flexibility in 
the labour market, which enables these firms to be well adapted to changing 
labour demands and drastic technological innovation, whereas in CMEs, highly 
skilled long-term employees who have the right to be involved in corporate 
decisions are fostered by stable shareholders’ and banks’ commitment to long-
term capital investments in large firms (ibid.: 14).56 
     However, the institutional complementarity argument has encountered various 
criticisms. For instance, institutional complementarity is difficult to quantify, 
while the introduction of a new institution cannot be explained only by 
complementarity without taking into account historical accidents (Kwon 2004:  
88). The institutional complementarity argument makes it more difficult to 
explain changes in political economic systems. The most acute criticism is that 
institutional complementarity might hinge on ‘post hoc rationalisation’ (Clift 
2014: 112). Blyth argues that ‘the concepts of institutional complementarity, 
feedback, increasing returns and the like all suggest a rather static and indeed 
functionalist picture’ (Blyth 2003: 219, quoted by Clift 2014: 114) – 
                                                   
55  However, the bursting of the bubble economy and the financial crisis changed 
subordinates’ view of the financial market as specialised a reas for administrators to some 
extent. 
56 Whilst corporate managers are agents of investors and have a relatively arm’s length 
relationship with employees in LMEs, internally promoted corporate managers, who could 
be described as ‘top employees’, have strong ties with employees in the Japanese style CME.  
94 
 
functionalism believes that each part of society is functional for the stability of 
the whole society. Like path dependency, there are both moderate and strong 
forms of institutional complementarity, and the former, which takes into account 
the influence of historical accidents, is more realistic than the latter. The strong 
form of institutional complementarity may be misleading, while the moderate 
form contributes to explaining why a certain type of financial market fits well 
with a particular kind of labour market. Social norms and morals shared by 
financial and labour markets as common factors may partly elucidate the 
correlation between the two markets. Furthermore, I contend that the linchpin of 
Japan’s CME is not the financial market but the firm and labour market structure, 
which has affected the characteristics of the financial market. If the firm and 
labour market structures change, the financial market is likely to follow suit, not 
vice versa. 
 
2.7 Major Japanese Political Actors’ Ideas and Interests and the US-Japan 
Relations 
Who exactly are the ruling groups that dominate the post-war Japanese political 
economic system, and how have they retained their dominance?  The military and 
the ‘reformist bureaucrats’ (who created the controlled economy) dominated 
Japan during the Asia-Pacific War, including the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45). 
These bureaucrats came from various ministries, mainly the powerful Ministry 
of Interior (Naimusho), which covered the local administration, the police, the 
Gestapo-like secret service police, construction, healthcare and Shinto (Japan’s 
indigenous religion), MOF, which tightly regulated the financial system, the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (the predecessor of the post -war MITI), and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The reformist bureaucrats were strongly 
influenced by the ideas of Nazi Germany and Mussolini’s corporatism although 
some of them had been Marxists. The freedom of businesses, even the activities 
of major Zaibatsu, was restricted by laws such as the Temporary Fund Adjustment 
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Act of 1937, which stipulated government financial control and the National 
Mobilisation Law of 1938, which provided for government control over private -
sector organisations, the nationalisation of strategic industries and the news 
media, price controls and rationing.  
     Immediately after the war, while the Japanese military, the Naimusho and the 
conglomerates were dissolved by the occupation forces, the economic 
bureaucracy, such as MOF and MITI, survived despite the purge (which was 
cancelled by the occupation forces in 1951 and 1952) of some bureaucrats, mainly 
those of the Naimusho. The secret service police cracked down on people with 
ideologies that were considered dangerous to the totalitarian government, such 
as communism, liberalism and anarchism, during war time. The temporarily 
purged secret police officers subsequently became members of the Parliament, 
prefectural governors and high-ranking officers of local public safety committees, 
among others. Consequently, some elements of the wartime regime – for example, 
bureaucratic intervention, the bank-centred financial system, the Japanese-style 
corporate system and the prioritisation of producers over consumer interests – 
remain even today (Noguchi 2010).  
     The economic bureaucracy was in a commanding position and formed 
alliances with the LDP and big businesses (mainly large manufacturers) during 
the early post-war period. The LDP was established through the merger of the 
two conservative parties, the Liberal Party of Japan and the Democratic Party of 
Japan (which has nothing to do with the current DPJ), in 1955. The LDP and its 
predecessors had a large number of ex-bureaucrats57 so there was a close tie 
between the bureaucracy and the LDP. The characteristics of Japanese corporate 
management changed dramatically from the pre-war period to the post-war one. 
In the pre-war period, corporate management was inclined to be entrepreneurial, 
                                                   
57 Out of the twelve Prime Ministers from 1946 to 1980, seven were former bureaucrats 
(including 3 former MOF officials). However, after 1980, only Nakasone (1982 -7) and 
Miyazawa (1991-3) were ex-bureaucrat Prime Ministers. 
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whereas in the post-war era management tended to behave more like bureaucrats. 
Van Wolferen (1989: 109) maintains that the members of post-war Japan’s 
distinctively dominant groups consist mainly of bureaucrats, corporate 
executives and some factions of the LDP, all of which can be described as 
administrators rather than rulers. However, he does not clearly demonstrate the 
anti-capitalist trait of most of the administrators although he points out their anti-
leftist attributes (ibid.: 196-8). These administrators, with some exceptions, share 
an anti-liberal, anti-free market ideology, which is largely identical to guardian 
morals, and they are closely related to each other through informal networks 
(including old school ties). By the mid-1950s, they had founded the post-war 
political economic system.  
     Why did anti-liberal administrators (guardians) become dominant in the early 
post-war Japanese political economy? The US occupation forces’ reforms 
eliminated not only militarists but also major capitalists in Japan, inadvertently 
strengthening the power of administrators. The US occupation forces had two 
conflicting factions: the Government Section (consisting mainly of New Dealers), 
which was pro-communist and anti-capitalist and the Intelligence Section, which 
was anti-communist (Magosaki 2012: 78-80). At first, the Government Section 
was more influential within the forces, and the New Dealers supported Japanese 
labour unions while removing major capitalists such as top landlords and the 
management of Zaibatsu conglomerates and large firms because they believed 
that it was not only Japanese militarists who were responsible for the war, but 
also capitalists (Kikuchi 2005: 40-3). The US occupation forces destroyed the 
shareholder capitalism of the pre-WWII period (Okazaki et al. 1996: 23).  
However, with the beginning of the Cold War, the Intelligence Section became 
dominant, and the US policy towards Japan changed from pro-labour to pro-
management and supported corporate management in starting to enfeeble the 
labour unions in 1948 (Crump 2003: 34-5). The administrators created and 
promoted anti-liberal, anti-free market social norms under the 1940 system, 
which contributed to the formation of both a management-labour alliance against 
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capitalists and keiretsu. Subordinates, such as labour and SME owners, in Japan 
obtained systemic support from the dominant elites in exchange for their 
obedience and loyalty. Even today, unlike their Anglo-Saxon peers, most 
Japanese corporate executives and bankers share similar traits with bureaucrats 
rather than entrepreneurs and capitalists.  
     Teranishi (2003: 202-14) points out that the wartime economic control and the 
reforms by the US occupation forces had three major influences on the post -war 
economic system. Firstly, the wartime economic control metamorphosed the 
industrial structure from light industry-centred in the pre-war period to heavy and 
chemical industry-led at the end of WWII. Secondly, many reformist bureaucrats 
with know-how to control the economy survived in the post-war bureaucracy. 
Lastly, the power of the private sector was deteriorated by 1) the significant 
restriction of shareholders’ rights in wartime, 2) the enormous losses of private-
sector companies and banks stemming from the government’s termination of war 
compensation, and 3) the Zaibatsu dissolution, the land reform and the wealth tax 
conducted by the US occupation forces, which resulted in the extinction of large 
capitalists.  Relatively young top managers were at the helm of big businesses 
(which resulted from the splitting of conglomerates) due to the purge of their 
predecessors (Ito 2007: 60). Whilst these top managers were freed from the 
constraints of the military and their major shareholders, they had to depend 
financially and politically on the economic bureaucracy and the banking sector. 
The origin of the main bank system can be traced back to wartime.  
     Japanese big businesses have been much more politicised than their US and 
European counterparts due to their close ties with the economic bureaucracy and 
the LDP. One reason for the successful partnership between the economic 
bureaucracy and big businesses is that the bureaucrats responsible for the wartime 
economic mobilisation and the bureaucratised leaders of the wartime cartels 
became leaders of industrial associations, which were at the top of the industrial 
sector in the early post-war period, and these people provided a major impulse 
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for the merger of the rivalling conservative parties to form the LDP in 1955. In 
this respect, Japanese companies at that time were more like political 
organisations that mobilised the national economy and maintained social order 
than profit seeking organisations.  
     One element of the 1940 system, which still remains today, is the Japanese-
style corporate model, and this model has two major characteristics: 1) its closed 
nature – for instance, most of the top managers are internally promoted,  and 2) 
the negative view on a market-based economic system (Noguchi 2010: 220-3). 
Although it is natural for private-sector companies to make decisions based 
mainly on commercial morals, typical Japanese companies tend to be strongly 
affected by guardian morals, as they are highly politicised. Generally speaking, 
Japanese-style companies value loyalty, tradition, obedience / discipline and 
exclusiveness, avoid short-term opportunistic trading as well as the single-
minded pursuit of profit and expect the government and banks to provide support 
for them when they face financial difficulty. It may be puzzling when Keidanren  
insists that Japanese companies should not merely follow the logic of capitalism, 
but this is no surprise given the fact that the umbrella organisation of the ‘control 
associations’ (which were established for the state control of industries during 
wartime) renamed itself Keidanren in 1945 (ibid.: 223).  
     Who were the adversaries of the above-mentioned dominant groups in the 
early post-war period? Following the wartime crackdown on communists, 
anarchists and liberals by the secret service police, corporate management and 
the Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations (Nikkeiren), a major industrial 
association, together with a number of former reformist bureaucrats and secret 
service police officers, fiercely oppressed the radical activities of labour unions, 
which were influenced by Marxism.58 Japan’s management-labour confrontation 
                                                   
58 Crump (2003), a British political scientist, conducted extensive empirical research on 
Nikkeiren, and argues against its ideology that Japan is a classless society. He reveals a 
darker side of Japanese capitalism: ‘Nikkeiren could exempl ify the organized power of 
capital and its techniques of coercion, manipulation and mystification’ (ibid .: 157). 
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resulted in the defeat of the labour unions when the major industrial action at the 
Mitsui Miike Coal Mine yielded to the violent pressure from the police and 
gangsters hired by the management in 1960. However, corporate management 
also started to provide rewards for employees who were loyal to them. 
Management-labour cooperation, based on the Japanese-style employment model, 
which includes lifetime employment, seniority-based wages and in-house unions, 
has become the norm at most Japanese companies. Japanese employees 
(particularly at large companies) provide loyalty and obedience to their 
employers in exchange for stability and security – this is a typical relationship 
between superiors and subordinates under the guardian moral precept.  
     It is often claimed that post-war Japan has a classless society, but this 
description is inappropriate. Labour in Japan has long taken management -labour 
cooperation for granted through both coercion and compromise by management 
and their allies. Japanese corporate employees have come to believe that 
something good for their employers is also favourable for them. The LDP 
gradually attracted an increasing number of votes from urban corporate 
employees in addition to its traditional supporters, namely farmers and SME 
owners. In contrast, the diminished influence of labour unions significantly 
weakened the Japan Socialist Party from the 1950s onwards. The relatively small 
income differentials in Japanese society during the high growth period were not 
necessarily proof of ‘classlessness’. The incomes of the dominant elites in Japan 
are inevitably not much larger than those of their subordinates. This can be 
regarded as a variant of ‘status inconsistency’. Bureaucrats, corporate executives 
and LDP politicians have strong political power, which their earnings do not 
necessarily match. This kind of inconsistency has been adopted probably in order 
to alleviate subordinates’ discontent, while it is associated with guardian morals 
(which regard the love of money as the origin of all evil).  
     The LDP kept itself in power from 1955 until  1995 by gerrymandering and 
pork-barrel politics – for example, electoral promises to provide infrastructure 
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improvements for rural districts and protect the agricultural sector (van Wolferen 
1989: 29). The latter strategy required both close ties with bureaucrats and strong 
financial backing from big businesses. Keidanren made the largest contribution 
to the LDP until 2009, while large companies wanted the LDP to sustain the post -
war political economic system, which was propitious for them. Under the 
guardian moral precept, subordinate groups such as labour, SMEs and the 
agricultural sector became accustomed to providing loyalty and obedience to 
dominant groups in pursuance of support and protection, instead of establishing 
counter-hegemony.  
     The Japanese bureaucracy is far from monolithic, and power is hardly shared 
by different ministries – MOF, METI, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), etc. It is 
well known that these ministries pursue their own interests and are often engaged 
in conflict with each other. Their major interests include the expansion / 
maintenance of their sphere of influence (such as formal and informal power of 
supervision over and connections with certain industries)  and their organisation’s 
survival. Furthermore, each ministry is not necessarily cohesive inside, and 
bureaus (for instance, MOF had the Budget, Tax, Banking, Securities, Customs 
and Tariff and International Bureaus prior to the spin-off of the FSA and the 
Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission in 1998) tend to prioritise 
their bureau-level interests over ministry-wide interests. Within MOF, the Budget 
and Tax Bureaus are regarded as mainstream and less market-oriented. There has 
been a long-term conflict between the ‘interventionist faction’ and the 
‘framework-oriented faction’, which believes that the ministry should focus on 
the establishment of a framework for competition within METI. Although the 
latter was in a stronger position than the former from the 1980s until the mid-
1990s, the former has become dominant since the late-1990s financial crisis. 
Furthermore, the ideological conflict between the two major business lobbies, the 
conservative Keidanren and the neoliberalism-oriented Doyukai, drew much 
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attention from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s.59  In general, Keidanren has a 
guardian moral orientation, whilst Doyukai has a commercial moral orientation.  
     The banks played a key role in the bank-centred financial system during the 
early post-war period because large capitalists (such as the founding families of 
Zaibatsu, other major pre-war shareholders and landlords) were significantly 
weakened and the capital market was underdeveloped. Japanese banks, which are 
highly politicised compared with their US counterparts, can be regarded as de 
facto a half-public and half-private extension of the economic bureaucracy – 
Japanese bankers are administrators rather than capitalists. Bankers’ power 
stemmed from their discretion to allocate credit to borrowers and the scarcity of 
capital during the high growth period, but their power should not be exaggerated, 
as the government frequently intervened in their credit allocations and their risk 
taking needed backing from the government. Japanese banks often bail out 
troubled large corporate borrowers in order to avoid being criticised for 
abandoning corporate borrowers with whom they are in a long-term relationship, 
rather than based on the calculation of loss and gain. In this respect, the banks 
make decisions based primarily on guardian morals rather than commercial 
morals.  
     Japanese bankers have to take into consideration the social norm that for 
employees, companies are more than just workplaces where they earn incomes.  
Okumura (1991), Matsumoto (2011) and Ito (2007) describe Japan as a corporate-
centric society. Japan’s wealth is concentrated in private-sector companies (not 
individual capitalists), while the rankings of Japanese companies dictate the 
social status of their employees (Okumura 1991: 20-43). Japanese companies, 
rather than the state, provide a large proportion of social welfare for their 
employees. Furthermore, due to the illiquid labour market, it is quite difficult for 
                                                   
59  Keidanren supported stakeholder capitalism and traditional Japanese style corporate 
governance (such as in-group favouritism and lifetime employment), whereas the core 
members of Doyukai advocated shareholder capitalism and the necessity of a flexible lab our 
market. 
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regular employees (especially at large companies) to find new good jobs outside 
their current employers. Lifetime employment may also mean employees selling 
off their future options to change jobs. The major determinant of social status and 
credibility in Japan is not income level but the ranking of companies for which 
people work and their corporate titles, and Japanese corporate employees are 
more loyal to their employers than to the state (Matsumoto 2011: 230-42). 
Administrators endeavour to prevent the bankruptcy of large companies, which 
could potentially lead unemployed people to social unrest.  
     In contrast to banks, the political power of securities firms is limited in Japan, 
as they have failed to win the trust of society and the financial authorities. Their 
short-term trading-centred business may not fit the guardian moral orientation of 
Japanese society. Apart from the largest Nomura Securities, all of the major 
domestic securities firms are under the umbrellas of major banks, whilst the 
financial authorities are satisfied with the bank-led financial conglomerates. At 
first glance, the CRAs seem to be politically much weaker than the economic 
bureaucracy and the banks, but the entry of the US CRAs, Moody’s Investor 
Services (Moody’s) and Standard and Poor’s (S&P), into the Japanese market in 
the mid-1980s was regarded as a potential threat to the Japanese financial system 
by MOF and the banks. MOF encouraged the establishment of local CRAs, while 
Japanese financial institutions provided equity and human capital for these local 
raters. The US CRAs’ influence in Japan weakened after the Japanese financial 
crisis and has waned further since the GFC. This is mainly because the US credit 
rating orthodoxy, which is closely linked with neoliberal thought, is conflicting 
with the anti-liberal, anti-free market social norms in Japan.  
     Why could Japan achieve high economic growth during the early post-war 
period although its system leant towards guardian morals? Japan’s social 
cohesiveness, business efforts and industrial policy alone cannot fully explain 
this growth. External factors, particularly US hegemonic support fo r Japan, 
which could be regarded as systemic support, should be taken into account. 
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Firstly, the global economic stability bolstered by the Bretton Woods-GATT 
system provided a favourable economic environment for Japan, while other Asian 
countries were still underdeveloped at that time. Secondly, the Cold War 
enhanced Japan’s strategic importance for the US, while the prevalence of 
Keynesianism made the US tolerate the Japanese government’s interventionist 
economic policies. The US accommodative trade policy and dollar-yen exchange 
rate, which was favourable for Japanese exporters, as well as the US military 
protection of Japan significantly contributed to the rapid growth. Lastly, the 
market-oriented economic policy, which was promoted by the General Staff 
Section of the occupation forces (including Douglas Dodge), enhanced the 
knowledgeable flexibility and mitigated the private sector’s excessive 
dependence on the government, which might have hindered economic growth. 
The US occupation forces’ market-oriented policy prescription and the Japanese 
government’s aim of rapid economic growth narrowed the scope of systemic 
support within the Japanese political economy.  
     Okita (2010: 57) points out that there were two contrasting economic ideas 
within the US occupation forces: the Government Section, which emphasised 
market failure (Keynesian economics or government interventionism) and the 
Intelligence Section, which stressed the importance of market competition 
(similar to neoclassical economics). 60  Dodge, the financial advisor to the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, submitted the economic reform 
recommendations (the so-called ‘Dodge Line’) to the Japanese government in 
1949. His proposals included 1) balancing the national consolidated budget, 2) 
shifting to more efficient tax collection, 3) decreasing the scope of government 
                                                   
60 Just after WWII, the interventionist New Dealers (Democrats), who were sympathetic to 
Japanese labour and tenant farmers, were more influential within the occupation forces, and 
implemented the Zaibatsu dissolution, the land reform and the wealth tax. Subsequently, 
however, the anti-communist, economically liberal sect (Republicans) gained power within 
the forces. In 1950, with the rising anti-communist sentiment, a large number of communists 
(including New Dealers) were purged in both the US and Japan. The influence of the labour 
unions was substantially enfeebled by the Red Purge.  
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economic intervention (particularly through subsidies and price controls), and 4) 
fixing the exchange rate to 360 yen to the US dollar in order to keep Japanese 
export prices low. The early post-war economic system was not as controlled as 
the wartime one – there was sufficient room for start-up companies such as Sony, 
Honda and Canon to achieve great success. Furthermore, under the chaotic 
economic situation, the competitive landscape and hierarchy of companies were 
not yet fixated so start-up companies with new ideas and technologies could 
manoeuvre and flourish. The economic growth during the early post -war period 
was dualistic – the ‘top-down’ (government-intervened) growth driven corporate 
establishments, mainly under the guardian moral precept, and the ‘bottom-up’ 
growth by SMEs, primarily under the commercial moral precept.  
     To what extent has the 1940 system been eroded? The domestic and 
international political and economic environments conducive to Japan’s rapid 
economic growth changed dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s.  Japan was 
exposed to enhanced ICM and intensified economic competition with other Asian 
countries, and the shift of the main economic idea from Keynesian ism to 
neoliberalism, and the end of the Cold War made the US less tolerant of Japan’s 
economic interventionism. Japanese bureaucrats’ grip of its political economic 
system was enfeebled, while the power of the banking sector waned due to the 
glut of capital stemming from the enhanced ICM and the financial deregulation, 
which made it possible for large companies to access both domestic and overseas 
capital markets. The glut of capital resulted in the creation and subsequent 
bursting of the bubble economy. The corruption scandals in the 1990s and the 
prolonged economic slump tarnished the legitimacy of the economic bureaucracy 
and eroded the foundation of the LDP. The economic deregulation and the 
progress of the market economy from the 1980s onwards weakened the power of 
MOF and METI, while one element of the 1940s system that still survives today 
is the Japanese-style corporate model (Noguchi 2010: 215-25). Japanese society 
as a whole has emphasised safety and security since the bursting of the bubble 
economy. Accordingly, guardian morals have permeated the society widely, and 
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knowledgeable flexibility has deteriorated. Japanese companies have 
continuously cut wages and hired an increasing number of cheap non-regular 
workers in order to protect the lifetime employment of their existing regular 
employees, which has resulted in a sharp rise in the number of people in poverty. 
SMEs have become risk averse and increasingly dependent on subcontracting 
from large companies and financial support from the government and banks. 
Although the power of administrators has weakened, the guardian morals of 
society (calling for systemic support) have strengthened.  
 
2.8 Sources and Corroboration  
The empirical research of this thesis is based both on existing literature and news 
articles and on over fifty interviews with current and former bureaucrats and 
politicians, executives of big businesses, financial institutions and CRAs, and 
academics specialised in the disciplines relevant to the thesis (e.g., economics, 
economic history, sociology, social psychology and management studies). The 
thesis utilises wide ranging published materials in both English and Japanese. In 
addition to academic literature, some books in Japanese written by former 
practitioners and journalists (e.g., Nishimura 1999, Shima 2006, Asahi Shimbun 
2009, Morita 2010, Kawakita 2011) are very informative and useful. However, 
when I created main narratives of the thesis, I avoided relying on a single source 
and triangulated multiple published materials and interviews.  
      The extensive interviews made me realise that the American CRAs, Doyukai, 
neoclassical economists, and reformist bureaucrats and politicians share the 
common ideas and norms consistent with the orientation for weak ties, promotion 
and commercial morals and the negative view of systemic support, whereas the 
local Japanese CRAs, Keidanren, legal professionals and interventionist 
bureaucrats and conservative politicians share those congruous with the 
orientation for strong ties, prevention and guardian morals and the positive view 
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of systemic support. Another fruit of my interviews is that they assist my use of 
analytical eclecticism. Particularly, the interviews with Toshio Yamagishi, a 
distinguished social psychologist, contributed to the operationalisation of Neo -
Gramscian approaches.  
      In terms of Chapter 3 of this thesis, my interviews with many academics and 
financial professionals such as Taggart Murphy (Professor of International 
Political Economy at the University of Tsukuba), Yoshitake Masuhara (Professor 
of Economics at Hiroshima University of Economics, previously a member of the 
House of the Representatives, a high ranked MOF official), Yoshio Shima 
(Professor of Management at Tamagawa University, formerly a senior credit 
analyst at S&P and Deutsche Bank), Hajime Takata (Chief Economist at the 
Mizuho Research Institute), Nana Otsuki (banking sector analyst at Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch), Tsutomu Okubo (member of the House of Councillors, 
previously managing director at Morgan Stanley) provided me with a better 
understanding of both the Japanese credit market and systemic support for 
financially strained companies and financial institutions. Also, the interviews 
with CRA officials and financial professionals gave me a clearer picture of the 
major corporate bailout and bankruptcy examples.  
     With regard to Chapter 4, I interviewed current and former executives of all 
the major five CRAs in Japan (Moody’s, S&P, Fitch, R&I and JCR), which 
clarified differences between the American and local Japanese CRAs. Particularly, 
I recognised that the respective American and Japanese CRAs are closely linked 
to synchronic financing and diachronic one, which, in turn,  are based on Anglo-
Saxon and Japanese social norms. What I obtained from the interviews are 
consistent with Kurosawa (2001), Shima (2006) and Morita (2010). Furthermore, 
the interviews with business executives and former CRA analysts made me 
understand why many Japanese companies and financial institutions became 
antagonistic towards the American CRAs from the mid-2000s. 
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     In terms of Chapter 5, I triangulated my interviews with corporate executives 
and academics on the two major industrial associations and relevant books and 
news articles to corroborate my argument on an ideational conflict between 
neoliberal-oriented Doyukai and conservative Keidanren from the early 1990s to 
the mid-2000s. The interviews confirmed the ideational conflict between the 
industrial associations as well as the rise and fall of Doyukai’s influence on 
economic policy making. The interview with Tetsuji Okazaki (Professor of 
economic history at the University of Tokyo) helped me understand the historical 
development of the associations and the background for their ideational 
differences. 
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Chapter 3: Japan’s Financial System and Persistence of Systemic 
Support  
  
It is not well known that Japan’s financial system used to be capital market -based 
during the pre-WWII period. Then, what was the origin of its post-war bank-
centred financial system, and which political actors created it? Why has the bank-
centred financial system been so durable? This chapter will start by reviewing 
the development and characteristics of Japan’s bank-centred financial system and 
the financial deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s. Subsequently, it will 
examine the persistence of the systemic support from the government and banks 
to financially distressed companies with reference to several major examples of 
corporate rescues and failures after the financial deregulation and crisis in the 
late 1990s as well as other forms of systemic support in the financial system. 
Finally, the question of why systemic support has been persistent in Japan will 
be explored.  
 
3.1 Japan’s Bank-Centred Financial System and Financial Deregulation 
As discussed in Introduction, Japan transformed its financial system from capital 
market-based to bank-centred during the 1930s and 1940s. The origin of Japan’s 
post-war financial system dates back to the periods of the pre-WWII financial 
crises and wartime. As Rosenbluth (1989: 138) describes, ‘the 1920s were the 
“golden age” of Japan’s bond market’. However, due to the economic slump after 
WWI, the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923, the fragile financial system (mainly 
the risk concentration of banks on specific firms) and the impact of the Great 
Depression, Japan suffered from the Showa Financial Crisis (in 1927) and the 
Showa Depression (during 1929-31).  The governmental banks, i.e., the Industrial 
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Bank of Japan (IBJ) and the Nippon Kangyo Bank, provided rescue loans for 
companies unaffiliated with Zaibatsu groups, whereas the government promoted 
industry cartelisation by Zaibatsu in order to remove both the overlap and 
instability that stemmed from competition at that time (Teranishi 2003: 142 -3).61  
Moreover, the Showa Depression caused numerous corporate bond defaults in 
Japan, and banks, as the largest underwriters, promoted the ‘purification 
movement of corporate bonds’ to exclude financially weak companies from the 
bond market.  
     Subsequently, the state’s control over the financial system was further 
reinforced, for instance, through 1) the state-led consolidation of the banking 
sector, 2) the Temporary Fund Adjustment Act in 1937, which stipulated state 
control of the industrial funds allocation, 3)  the National Mobilisation Law in 
1938, which enabled the finance minister to decide which military-related 
industries and firms should be recipients of bank loans, 4) the Financial 
Institutions Control Ordinance in 1942, which placed all financial institu tions 
under state control by segment (e.g., city banks, regional banks and trust 
companies), and 5) the revision of the BOJ Law in 1942, which denied the 
independence of the central bank and stipulated its mission as the pursuit of state 
goals. The government also restricted the capital markets significantly, promoting 
the transformation of the financial system to bank-centred. Immediately after 
WWII, the occupation forces conducted financial reforms, which consisted of i) 
dissolving the Zaibatsu system, ii) separating the securities sector from the 
banking sector by replicating the US Glass-Steagall Act of the 1930s, and iii) 
reorganising Japan’s financial regulatory framework along the US lines, restoring 
the independence of the BOJ and setting up a distinct Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in order to democratise the country’s financial system. In 
addition to these reforms, the agricultural land reform, the heavy wealth tax, the 
wartime economic damage and the post-war hyperinflation eliminated most of 
                                                   
61 Both the IBJ and the Nippon Kangyo Bank were privatised in 1950.  
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the major capitalists, who had been involved in the pre-war capital markets. In 
contrast, MOF emerged from the defeat virtually unscathed, absorbed the newly 
established SEC at the end of the US occupation in 1952 and maintained its 
dominant position over the BOJ.  
     As Malcolm (2001: 64) claims, the five distinguishing characteristics of the 
Japanese financial regulatory regime that re-emerged in the 1950s and 1960s 
entailed 1) a strong bias towards bank-centred financing (i.e., the restriction of 
capital markets), 2) rigid segmentation of financial institutions by functional type, 
3) administrative guidance (gyosei shido), 4) the ‘escorted convoy method 
(gososendan hoshiki)’ of regulation, and 5) international isolation. The escorted 
convoy method, convoy system or financial convoy can be defined as a regulatory 
method in which the financial authorities make sure that all of the financial 
institutions keep in step without any dropouts (e.g., bank failures) by utilising 
their administrative power. The corporate bond market was virtually under the 
control of the banking sector, while corporate bond market access was heavily 
restricted, leading corporate finance to rely heavily on bank loans. The bank -
centred financial system reflected the government’s intention to seize 
discretionary control over credit allocation as well as its distrust of market 
mechanisms. In this sense, Japanese banks were not purely profit -making 
organisations but often behaved in accord with political directives . Furthermore, 
Malcolm maintains that the efficacy of the structural and administrative 
characteristics fundamentally required international isolation of the financial 
system through capital control (ibid.: 70). The convoy system nurtured the 
following norms: the government should supervise and protect banks in order not 
to allow any loss on bank deposits; main banks should prevent their corporate 
borrowers from bankruptcy; and companies should maintain employment.   
     Although the distinctive bank-centred financial system had contributed 
greatly to Japan’s rapid economic growth in the early post -war period, its 
effectiveness was called into question due to the slower economic growth and 
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higher ICM in the 1970s. Teranishi (2003: 310) argues that the banking sector 
faced a difficulty because of its excessive risk concentration on the heavy and 
chemical industries and the numerous corporate bailouts when the end of Japan’s 
catch-up growth and intensified competition with other Asian countries stalled 
these industries, who were their major borrowers. Banks tend to cope with a 
rapidly changing world less efficiently than capital markets (Ikeo 2003:  92-94; 
Allen & Gale 2001: 19-22).62  
     The Japanese corporate bond market in the early post-war period was under 
the control of the Bond Issue Arrangement Committee (Kisaikai), which was 
virtually dominated by the major banks. These banks were more influential than 
securities firms because of the former’s status as the largest investors in the 
corporate bond market and strong state backing for the banking industry. The 
post-war Kisaikai inherited the stance of the pre-war purification movement of 
corporate bonds, and created its own ratings for companies. The Kisaikai ratings 
determined access to the bond market, allowing only a limited number of 
corporate borrowers to issue bonds, while trustee banks (mostly main banks) had 
to purchase all bonds in default at par if bond issuers had fallen into financial 
difficulty. Accordingly, corporate bond issuers had to provide collateral for 
trustee banks, and this was called the collateral principle. The main bank system, 
under which main banks often take initiatives to rescue financially distressed 
firms, was also applied to the bond market. The Kisaikai’s rating data – the most 
important of which was the size of a company’s equity capital – favoured big 
businesses, particularly those in the heavy and chemical industries, which were 
key clients of the major banks as well as strategically important sectors for the 
                                                   
62 Ikeo (2003: 92-4) argues that the existing ties between banks and corporate borrowers 
would hamper a dynamic shift of funds from one industry to another. Allen and Gale (2001: 
19-22) maintain that there are trade-offs between the bank-centred and market-based 
financial systems: for example, the latter’s superior efficiency through wide dissemination  
of diverse information is offset by its inferior stability due to fluctuations in asset values 
driven by modifications in market information and investors’ views, as well as weak risk 
sharing by investors.  
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government. However, they were not necessarily appropriate for analysing the 
financial health of companies.  
     However, the major banks’ influence started to diminish when an increasing 
number of large, highly creditworthy Japanese firms issued bonds in the 
Euromarkets in the late 1970s and the 1980s. According to Vogel (1996: 173-4), 
MOF wanted to establish a fully-fledged short-term money market in order to 
facilitate the refinancing of enormous government bonds that were due from 1985 
onwards, while the ministry’s Financial System Research Council recommended 
the gradual liberalisation of interest rates and de-segmentation of the financial 
system in 1983. During the 1980s, the US government tried to pressure Japan into 
deregulating its markets including the financial ones – the establishment of the 
‘Joint Japan-US Ad Hoc Group on Yen-Dollar Exchange Rate and Capital Market 
Issues’ (the so-called Yen-Dollar Committee) was also announced in 1983. From 
1984 to 1987, MOF liberalised Euro-yen bond issuance and domestic corporate 
issue terms, authorised the entry of non-Japanese banks into the trust business 
and allowed the establishment of CRAs in Japan. Most commentators believe that 
MOF exploited the foreign pressure to facilitate the progress of their own agenda 
for the reform (Malcolm 2001: 81).  Japanese local CRAs were established with 
the support from MOF and major banks, and the Tokyo offices of both Moody’s 
and S&P were opened in the mid-1980s.63 Nevertheless, as was the case for the 
interest rates liberalisation, the deregulation of the corporate bond market was 
only incremental.  
     Although the CRAs’ ratings were allowed along with the Kisaikai ratings to 
decide whether borrowers could issue unsecured corporate bonds in 1987, it took 
the CRAs’ ratings quite a long time to become the primary measurements of 
corporate bonds’ creditworthiness in Japan. The collateral requirement for 
corporate bonds was terminated in 1988. Subsequently, MOF authorised six 
                                                   
63 The establishment of the local CRAs and the opening of the US CRAs’ Tokyo offices will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.  
113 
 
CRAs, including Moody’s and S&P, as designated CRAs in 1992, and the Kisaikai 
ratings were finally abolished in January 1996, just before the announcement of 
the Japanese Financial Big Bang.  One major reason for the slow liberalisation 
was the fierce battle between the banking and securities industries over entry into 
each other’s turf. The Big Bang eventually de-segmented the financial system, 
enabling mutual entry by banking, securities and insurance businesses through 
financial holding companies, which shifted responsibility for financial 
supervision from MOF to the newly established FSA and liberalised the capital 
and foreign exchange markets in Japan. Unlike the Banking Bureau of MOF, 
which had a discretionary interventionist regulatory style, the FSA has created a 
relatively arm’s length rule-based supervisory relationship with the banking 
sector. A series of deregulations substantially expanded corporate bond issuance 
in the late 1980s and 1990s, but the disintermediation ran out of steam during the 
mid-2000s.    
  
3.2 Systemic Support in the Corporate Sector  
National preferences and social norms are more difficult to grasp than economic 
rationalities. Even Vogel (1996) and Yamamura (1997) do not fully elucidate 
Japanese social norms and their influence on the financial reforms. Vogel tends 
to focus on the structures and norms of the dominant elites, but social norms are 
also shared by subordinates such as workers and SMEs. However, Vogel’s (1996: 
263) arguments that ‘reinforcement’ favoured by French, German and Japanese 
bureaucrats and ‘disengagement’ chosen by US and British counterparts are two 
major patterns of regulatory reforms, and that the choice of these patterns is 
affected by which of them bureaucrats (or societies) prioritise among values such 
as ‘efficiency, stability, fairness and flexibility’ give  us important clues. The 
disengagement pattern is expected to generate greater efficiency and fairness 
(transparency) and lead to fast liberalisation, whilst societies that prefer stability 
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and flexibility tend to choose the reinforcement pattern, which should grant 
governments more control and result in slow liberalisation (ibid .: 263-4).  
     As discussed in the previous chapters, Japanese social relations centre on in -
group favouritism and the exchange of dominant elites’ (or superiors’) support 
and protection of subordinates for loyalty and obedience. Japanese financial 
authorities and financial institutions tend to behave according to these guiding 
principles. Nishimura (1999: 234), former head of the banking bureau, MOF, 
admits that the Japanese financial administration prioritised stability and public 
interests over efficiency until the early 1990s. In terms of systemic support, he 
maintains that Japanese society created a ‘Japanese mutual insurance’, a 
mechanism through which actors share risks in order to moderate the competition 
for survival, whilst the idea that exiting losers out of markets enhances economic 
efficiency and results in social progress is unpopular in Japan (ibid .: 207-8). The 
financial convoy matched the social norms of early post-war Japan.  
     Schoppa (2006: xi) points out that one major uniqueness of Japanese society 
is its tightly woven ‘social safety net’ or ‘system of social protection’, which is 
reflected in the lifetime employment and corporate bailouts. He describes 
Japanese style capitalism as ‘convoy capitalism’ (ibid.: 10-3). Systemic support 
is central to the convoy system of social protection. Schoppa describes the 
Japanese system of convoy capitalism as follows.  
 
(The system of convoy capitalism) was able to provide most citizens 
with unprecedented economic security: care for those who needed it, 
job security for workers, and a safety net that bought time for firms to 
restructure their operations … The government continued to back up 
the banks that continued to back up firms who continued to back up 
their core male workforce, and women continued to back up the whole 
system by going along with policies that encouraged them to be full -
time housewives (ibid.: 65-6).  
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Schoppa claims that Japan’s convoy system is ‘unravelling’ due to socioeconomic 
changes such as globalisation and changing female aspirations (ibid .: xi-xii). 
According to him, many Japanese firms have exited the system by shifting 
production overseas rather than lobbying for change in the system, and a larger  
proportion of women are not marrying and / or not having children (ibid .: 4-13). 
However, this view may be misleading because the great majority of Japanese 
companies shifting production overseas have kept their corporate headquarters in 
Japan and do not intend to exit Japanese society. Similarly, numerous Japanese 
women who are frustrated with the old system have married and had children, 
and only a small proportion of them have decided not to do so. Since the late 
1990s, Japanese banks have no longer been able to bail out all of the large 
financially distressed companies and large firms do not fully honour lifetime 
employment, but systemic support as a social norm has persistently survived, and 
many Japanese firms and women still seem to consider that the positives (such as 
economic stability) of the convoy system outweigh the negatives (including 
restrictions of individuals’ freedom).  
     The main bank system, which was created under the wartime state -led 
financial system, is a linchpin of Japan’s convoy system. One distinct 
characteristic of main banks is that they have a much stronger commitment to 
their corporate borrowers than other creditor banks, whilst they enjoy a 
significantly large proportion of lucrative ancillary businesses with the borrowers , 
such as deposits, bond issuance, foreign exchange and derivatives. When a 
company faces financial difficulty, its main bank often takes an initiative in 
rescuing and/or restructuring it, and occasionally has to shoulder 
disproportionately a heavy financial burden, for instance, by refinancing other 
banks’ loans and bonds, providing emergency loans to prevent the borrower from 
going bankrupt and forgiving some portion of their claims. Takata and Shibasaki 
(2004) contend that main banks’ senior loans, until  the early 1990s, could be 
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regarded as de facto ‘quasi-equities’ or ‘subordinate loans’ whose recovery was 
subordinate to that of other banks’ loans, bonds and other claims at the time of 
bankruptcy, and that such practices dramatically enlarged main banks’ financial 
damage, although they could not rescue many distressed firms due to the limits 
of their own financial durability in the 1990s and early 2000s.  
     A main bank relationship with borrowers is not a written contract, but is 
widely recognised as a norm by main banks, borrowers, other creditors and 
financial authorities.  It is difficult for economic rationality alone to explain why 
the main bank relationship has been created, although main banks enjoyed both 
financial and reputational benefits until the 1980s. Hajime Takata maintains that 
Japan’s early post-war financial system can be viewed as a gigantic sovereign 
wealth fund pumping risk money into the corporate sector and that the close 
companies-banks-government nexus enabled main banks to provide quasi-
equities for large companies.64 His view is verified by Nishimura’s (1999: 205) 
comment that the banks supported the corporate sector, whereas the government 
backed up the banking sector. Main banks supporting their distressed borrowers 
was based on political and social norms. If a main bank had eschewed its 
commitment to a corporate borrower before the late 1990s, it might have been 
ostracised from the banking community and politically penalised.   
     Some scholars (including Hoshi and Kashyap 2001; Jackson and Miyajima 
2007) and media argue that the importance of main banks is diminishing or is 
likely to wane for four reasons. Firstly, financial deregulation has facilitated 
Japanese firms’ access to both domestic and overseas capital markets.  S econdly, 
the financial convoy collapsed in the late 1990s financial crisis, and main banks 
could not prevent numerous firms from going bankrupt. Thirdly, both main banks 
and companies had to reduce their cross shareholdings due to the serious bad debt 
problem of the banking sector and the introduction of both the Basel capital rules 
                                                   
64 Interview with Hajime Takata, chief economist at the Mizuho Research Institute, in 
October 2014 
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and mark-to-market accounting. Lastly, committed credit facilities, which reflect 
an explicit written lending commitment to borrowers, have started to be utilised 
in Japan since the late 1990s. However, according to Hirota’s (2009: 1-4) study 
on 500 major Japanese companies from 1973 to 2008, most of the companies still 
maintain a strong relationship with their main banks despite the above issues. 
Their main incentive to maintain this relationship is to hedge funding and 
bankruptcy risks: corporate borrowers want main banks to provide stable 
financing for them and rescue them if they face financial difficulty (Hirota 2012: 
843).  
     Four points demonstrate the robust main bank relationship (Hirota 2009: 5-
16). Firstly, given the risks associated with the possible downgrading of credit 
ratings and capital market paralysis, many companies believe that main banks are 
more reliable funding sources than bond markets. Secondly, the reduction in cross 
shareholdings did not affect the main bank relationship significantly. Thirdly, the 
lead arrangers of committed credit facilities are usually main banks. Lastly, many 
companies show their loyalty to their main banks by choosing security brokerage 
subsidiaries of the banks as underwriters when they issue bonds. Nevertheless, 
main banks are no longer willing or able to rescue all large firms in distress 
because of their traumatic experience during the previous financial crisis, the 
tighter bank supervision and the risk of being sued by their own shareholders.  
Furthermore, the financial authorities have shifted their supervisory relationship 
with the banking sector from informal, discretionary administrative guidance -
based to relatively remote rule-based, which, in tandem with the Basel capital 
rules, has weakened the characteristic of main banks’ senior loans as quasi -
equities.65  Having said that, main banks still have to meet borrowers’ needs in 
                                                   
65 It is said that the Banking Bureau of MOF played the role of both referee (financial 
supervision) and coach (administrative guidance) for the banking sector (Nishimura 1999: 
209-10), but the FSA, to which responsibility for financial supervision was trans ferred in 
1998, has adopted a relatively remote and rule-based regulatory stance. However, some 
elements of discretion have remained in the FSA’s administration, as witnessed in the public 
capital injection into Resona Bank in 2003 and  the relaxed classif ication of restructured 
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regard to hedging their funding and bankruptcy r isks to some extent. Even Hoshi, 
who emphasises the necessary of Japan’s financial system shifting from bank-
centred to capital market-based, concedes that the social norm that companies 
should maintain employment, while protecting corporate borrowers from 
bankruptcy is main banks’ responsibility, still survives in Japan (Hoshi 2009).   
 
3.3 Recent Examples of Major Corporate Failures and Bailouts  
Since the disposal of massive bad loans assisted by additional public capital 
injections into the banking sector in the early 2000s, the number of corporate 
bankruptcies in Japan has decreased sharply.  However, over the last fifteen years, 
both many major corporate failures and bailouts have been witnessed. In Japan, 
a bankruptcy is still regarded as a social stigma – a corporate bankruptcy not only 
causes large unemployment but also tarnishes the corporate brand, so financial 
institutions, suppliers and consumers are reluctant to deal with a bankrupt 
company. There is a great difference between legal (bankruptcy) proceedings, in 
which all creditors suffer, and out-of-court restructurings, which usually require 
debt waiver by only core creditors (such as main banks) – put differently, non-
core creditors are protected under out-of-court restructuring. In Japan, whilst 
only bankruptcies are usually categorised as corporate failures, out -of-court 
restructurings are viewed as corporate bailouts. Furthermore, it should be noted 
that systemic support has not been provided evenly: companies with large 
employment, manufacturers and publicly important sectors (such as banking, 
utilities and transportation) tend to be prioritised.  
     Although some people may insist that the recent major bankruptcies of Mycal, 
Japan Airlines, Takefuji (consumer finance) and Elpida Memory (semiconductor 
manufacturing) illustrate the waning trend of systemic support from the 
                                                   
loans (which are part of broadly defined bad debts) for SMEs into the ‘normal’ category to 
support the SME sector in 2008.  
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government and banks, a close examination of these cases will prove that there 
were peculiar reasons for these bankruptcies that were exceptional for major 
Japanese firms. The Japan Airlines case can be regarded as both a corporate 
failure and rescue. Furthermore, the Takefuji case also demonstrates Japan’s 
restrictive policy stance regarding consumer credit, contrary to those of other 
advanced industrialised countries. On the other hand, the examples of Tokyo 
Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and Olympus, which have been selected from 
numerous recent corporate bailouts, manifest the persistence of systemic support 
from the government and banks despite the collapse of the financial convoy and 
the transformation of the financial regulation.66 However, the transformation of 
the financial authorities’ supervisory relationship to relatively arm’s length rule -
based has made systemic support from the government and banks less certain  for 
the corporate sector and thereby has discouraged corporate risk taking.  
 
i) Mycal 
Mycal, one of Japan’s largest general merchandise store chains, faced excessive 
debts owing to enormous investment projects in the 1990s, many of which turned 
out to be disastrous. The retailer’s reckless investments were financed through 
the issuance of corporate bonds and asset-backed securities in addition to bank 
borrowing.67 Although Mycal sold off its financial and fitness club subsidiaries 
and reduced its total debt by around 20%, it could not meet the debt reduction 
target and encountered a liquidity crisis. In addition, Mycal suffered a loss of 
over 100 billion yen from the revaluation of securities holdings associated with 
                                                   
66 Other examples of major corporate bailouts from 2000 onwards include Daiei (a retail 
chain), Sojitz (a general trading house), Mitsubishi Motors, Isuzu Motors, Orient 
Corporation (a non-bank), Sanyo Electric (an electronics manufacturer) and Sharp (an 
electronics manufacturer). 
67 Asset-backed securities can be defined as financial securities backed by loan, lea se and 
other financial receivables; they are also called securitisation or structured finance.  
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its speculative financial investment. But the company’s financial report did not 
fully reflect this revaluation loss, which, together with its reckless investments 
and internal strife, resulted in a loss of trust in Mycal by its main bank, Dai-ichi 
Kangyo Bank (DKB). To make matters worse, DKB was scheduled to merge with 
the IBJ and Fuji Bank into Mizuho Financial Group in April 2002.  
     In August 2001, out of Mycal’s total debt, which amounted to approximately 
1 trillion yen, DKB had loans outstanding of over 160 billion yen, whilst the 
aggregate exposure of the three banks reached over 310 billion yen.  It was 
reported that DKB had to give up rescuing the borrower because the two banks 
had criticised the rescue. 68  However, DKB and Mycal’s president agreed to 
provide a new loan for Mycal of 60 billion yen on the condition that the retailer 
filed for the application of the Corporate Rehabilitation Law (one of Japanese 
bankruptcy laws) to pursue rigorous restructuring, while a group of anti -DKB 
executives at the retailer sought its reconstruction based on an alliance with US-
based Wal-Mart, without relying on the main bank. When the president held a 
meeting of the board on 14 September 2001 to decide on the restructuring, two 
thirds of the directors decided to remove both the president and the direc tor 
dispatched from DKB and file for the application of the Civil Rehabilitation Law 
(another bankruptcy law), under which the incumbent directors could take a 
restructuring initiative. Nevertheless, the Tokyo District Court was not content 
with the coercive procedure and counselled the new president to resign. 
Subsequently, in November 2011, whilst DKB announced support for Mycal, the 
company filed for the application of the Corporate Rehabilitation Law to pursue 
the reorganisation under sponsorship from Aeon, a larger general merchandise 
store chain. 
 
 
                                                   
68 The Asahi Shimbun newspaper dated 15 September 2001  
121 
 
ii) Japan Airlines 
Japan Airlines (JAL), which used to be Japan’s national flag carrier and was 
partially owned by the government, was privatised in 1987. Prior to the 
privatisation, in 1985, the Ministry of Transport (the current Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, or MLIT) relaxed its policy of protecting 
the domestic airline industry due to the deregulation policy of the Nakasone 
administration, influenced by Reaganomics and Thatcherism. Afterwards, JAL 
faced a series of problems – the plane crash in 1985, the failure of its domestic 
and overseas hotel and resort business, the loss-making long-term forward 
foreign exchange and fuel purchasing contracts, the aggressive activities of its 
multiple trade unions (which resulted in higher personnel costs) and the 
antagonism between its factions. Furthermore, the airline’s creditworthiness 
suffered from more serious downward pressure, which arose from the September 
11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the merger with Japan Air System (JAS), the third 
largest airline in Japan, in 2002. The demand for international flights plummeted 
due to the terrorist attacks and the subsequent wars, whilst the heavy debt burden 
of JAS and its unprofitable domestic routes further weakened JAL financially. 
The resistance by the eight trade unions and the delayed disposal of its fuel 
inefficient Boeing 747 fleet made it difficult for the airline to streamline its 
operational costs.  
     In contrast, All Nippon Airways (ANA), the second largest airline, shifted its 
fleet from large aircraft to fuel efficient mid- to small-sized aircraft, disposed of 
its unprofitable routes and reduced its costs through code-sharing with members 
of Star Alliance, a global airline alliance, which improved its financial 
performance. JAL dealt with the problems it faced less proactively – the fuel 
hikes after the Iraqi War and the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, the frequent occurrence of operational incidents, 
which shifted business passengers to ANA in 2005, and the GFC, and the outbreak 
of swine flu.  Although JAL avoided a liquidity crunch thanks to the Development 
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Bank of Japan (DBJ, a governmental bank) providing emergency loans to airlines 
that had suffered due to the Iraqi War and SARS, as well as the equity issuance 
in 2006 and 2008, in June 2009 the airline fell into a liquidity crisis despite its 
additional borrowing. 
     The DPJ defeating the LDP in the September 2009 election significantly 
affected JAL’s fate. At first, the DPJ considered an out-of-court restructuring of 
JAL, which included an enormous amount of debt waiver by its core creditor 
banks, public capital injection through the DBJ, a 50% reduction in the corporate 
pension benefits and personnel cuts of 9,000 people. Nevertheless, both the 
private-sector banks and the DBJ were opposed to the plan. Subsequently, the 
Enterprise Turnaround Initiative Corporation of Japan (ETIC), the public -private 
fund established for the purpose of supporting the turnaround of mainly 
financially distressed SMEs with useful business resources, stepped into JAL’s 
restructuring and proposed a ‘pre-packaged’ bankruptcy, which consisted of 
drastic restructuring under the Corporate Rehabilitation Law, a public capital  
injection into JAL through the ETIC, the waiver of a large proportion of the 
creditor banks’ exposure, and the protection of commercial transaction claims, 
mileage claims and leasing receivables. The private sector banks were against 
this plan, but the DPJ, MOF and DBJ supported it.  
     JAL filed for the application of the Corporate Rehabilitation Law on 19 
January 2010.  JAL’s pre-packaged bankruptcy was similar to that of General 
Motors in the US, and pre-packaged bankruptcy has some similarities to out-of-
court restructuring. The investigation committee on JAL’s compliance issues 
claims in its report that JAL’s inclination to be dependent on the bureaucracies 
(the MLIT and MOF) and escape management responsibility was nurtured under 
strongly protective regulation by the Ministry of Transport and that its previous 
national flag carrier status made the airline’s management and employees 
complacent enough to believe that their company was exempt from bankruptcy 
despite privatisation.  Despite some similari ties between pre-packaged 
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bankruptcy and out-of-court restructuring, why did the DPJ choose bankruptcy? 
The DPJ thought that the bankruptcy of JAL, which had been spoiled under the 
LDP administration, would give a good impression to voters in the forthcoming 
election.69 JAL was unpopular with the public due to its frequent operational 
incidents and its employees’ high salaries despite its poor financial performance. 
The results of a survey conducted by the Nikkei, dated 25 January 2010, on how 
people assessed the bankruptcy of the airline revealed that 57% of the 
respondents either positively evaluated it or favoured it, if anything.  Although 
JAL was socially penalised mainly by countless negative media reports, it 
completed its corporate rehabilitation in March 2011 and was successfully 
relisted in September 2012.  
 
iii) Takefuji 
Under Japan’s early post-war financial system, the banking sector focused on 
corporate finance, whilst non-mortgage consumer finance was primarily covered 
by non-banks such as consumer finance companies, which offered loans at 
extremely high interest rates. Despite the fact that the household sector was the 
largest source of banks’ fundraising, the government prioritised finance for large 
companies over that for consumers and SMEs. In contrast to the highly regulated 
banking sector, consumer lenders were less regulated non-establishments that 
existed outside typical Japanese social relations, exchanging dominant elites’ 
support and protection of subordinates for the latter’s loyalty and obedience. 
Borrowers from consumer lenders are mainly low income workers, housewives 
and less creditworthy SMEs. In Japanese society, traditionally, personal 
borrowing tends to be regarded as shameful, while lending money and exploiting 
borrowers’ weakness is viewed as despicable conduct. Although consumer 
                                                   
69 The Mainichi Shimbun newspaper dated 23 February 2010  
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finance businesses grew steadily in the early post -war period, they remained 
social outcasts.  
     From the bursting of the bubble economy until the early 2000s, the consumer 
credit market dramatically expanded owing to the following factors: 1) the 
economic slowdown and increases in low income workers, 2) technological 
development enabling consumers’ easy access to credit such as unstaffed 
automatic loan dispenser booths, 3) significant expansion of TV adve rtising 
campaigns on consumer finance, 4) the financial deregulation, which made it 
possible for non-banks to tap the capital markets, and excessive cash in banks, 
which increased lending to consumer finance companies, and 5) the ‘sweat box’ 
business model of consumer lending (Kozuka and Nottage 2007: 12-3). With 
regard to the fifth point, Kozuka and Nottage point out that large lenders were 
generally willing to provide additional loans for borrowers up to their credit 
ceilings, whereas they introduced distressed borrowers to smaller lenders who 
would impose higher interest rates in order to enable them to repay the original 
debts (ibid.: 13). This model worked in Japan chiefly because bankruptcy is 
viewed as a serious social stigma.  The expansion of the consumer credit market 
meant that the founders of the big four consumer lenders - Takefuji, Acom, 
Promise and Aiful – were ranked among the wealthiest Japanese business people 
in the early 2000s. Takefuji became the first consumer lender to be listed in 1998 , 
and both Moody’s and S&P assigned single A ratings to the lender. In addition, 
the lucrative consumer credit market in Japan attracted not only the two Japanese 
mega banks, which acquired stakes in Acom and Promise, but also foreign capital, 
including General Electric Capital and Citigroup, which acquired second-tier 
Japanese consumer lenders. However, public concern over millions of struggling 
borrowers, the severe debt collecting measures utilised by consumer lenders, and 
the associated suicides of borrowers and their families rose sharply.  
     Japan implemented two different interest rate laws to control its money 
lending market in 1954. The Capital Subscription Law (CSL) stipulated that any 
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bank or non-bank lending with interest rates above 109.5% constituted a criminal 
act, whilst in terms of non-bank money lenders, the Interest Rate Restriction Law 
(IRRL) placed interest rate caps of 20% on loans of less than 100,000 yen, 18% 
for those exceeding 100,000 yen but less than 1 million yen and 15% for those 
above 1 million yen. This resulted in the creation of ‘grey zone interest rates’ 
between the limits established by the two laws. The Money Lending Control Law 
(MLCL) of 1983, which gradually lowered the cap imposed by the CSL, to 29.2% 
by 2000, stipulated that the grey zone interest rates could be received by money 
lenders given two conditions: appropriate contract documentation and immediate 
receipts for payments were provided by lenders; and such interest rates were paid 
‘voluntarily’.  
     A sudden death knell for the booming consumer finance industry was struck 
by the Supreme Court in early 2006. A series of court rulings in January and 
March 2006 effectively repudiated the validity of grey zone interest rates by 
denying the voluntary nature of borrowers’ payments due to the existence of 
acceleration clauses in money lenders’ loan documents. The court rulings made 
money lenders liable for reimbursing excess interest charges from the past, as 
unjust enrichment specified in Article 703 of the Civil Code. Following the 
rulings, despite the opposition from consumer lenders and the internal conflict 
within the LDP, the amendments to the MLCL, which was renamed the Money 
Lenders Law, and related laws passed the Diet in December 2006. The major 
points of the reform included: 1) lowering the interest rate cap imposed by the 
CSL to that under the IRRL (i.e. abolishing the grey zone interest rates); 2) 
imposing an ‘Aggregate Debt Control’ that limited the aggregate amount of loans 
from money lenders to one third of the borrower’s gross annual income, and 3) 
requiring minimum assets of 50 million yen for a money lender to be licensed.  
     This reform had a destructive impact on the overall money lending industry. 
According to FSA statistics, the number of ‘legal money lenders’ plummeted from 
18,000 in 2005 to 2,000 in 2015, and the respective outstanding balances of 
126 
 
aggregate money lender loans for consumers and businesses (mostly SMEs) also 
declined sharply, from 19.9 trillion yen and 23.5 trillion yen, to 6.2 tr illion yen 
and 16.7 trillion yen, respectively, during the same period. Although the two 
major consumer lenders, Acom and Promise70, under the respective umbrellas of 
the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (BTMU) and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Corporation (SMBC), could survive, Takefuji, which did not have a strong 
relationship with banks, filed for bankruptcy in September 2010 due to the 
enormous excess interest reimbursement burden. On 21 February 2011, 
Bloomberg reported that the aggregate amount of excess interest reimbursement 
liabilities as of the end of October 2010 had reached 2.4 trillion yen, while the 
net outstanding balance of aggregate loans subtracting these liabilities was only 
75 billion yen.71 Some scholars and commentators have positively evaluated the 
court rulings and the reform, specifically in regard to the decline in both the 
number of borrowers with five or more consumer lenders and personal 
bankruptcies (Suda 2010; Gibbons 2012). Others have criticised it, arguing that 
the excessive government restriction of money lenders’ credit extension to 
consumers and SMEs does not actually rescue economic losers, but rather, lowers 
market efficiencies and stifles the economy (Masuhara 2012; Kobayashi 2009). 
     Japan’s reform in the consumer finance industry was exceptionally radical, 
and from the viewpoint of neoliberalism it was irrational and wrong. Why did 
Japan radically re-regulate consumer credit? It is said that morality and 
reputation are sometimes more powerful determinants of people’s behaviour than 
laws and contracts due to the strong group consciousness in Japan (Habuka 2014). 
One of the Supreme Court judges, who denied the validity of the grey zone 
interest rates, commented that it was unjust that a number of people had 
committed suicide due to extremely high interest rates, while consumer lenders 
                                                   
70 Promise is SMBC Consumer Finance at present.  
71 This report was in line with Kobayashi’s (2009: 54) estimate that the amount of excess 
interest reimbursement liabilities was likely to be 2.5 to 3 times the outstanding balance of 
aggregate consumer lender loans.  
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earned unprecedented profits.72  Kaoru Yosano, Minister of State for Economic 
and Fiscal Policy and Financial Services, and Masuzumi Gotoda, Parliamentary 
Secretary of the Cabinet Office, took an initiative in the re -regulation of the 
consumer finance industry within the LDP. Yosano stated that whether the 
government should let distressed debtors borrow further or prevent them from 
borrowing was a matter of philosophy, and he clearly preferred the latter (Ide 
2007: 105-6). He also revealed his belief that the government should prioritise 
the restriction of excessive lending over the negative effect of a restricted credit 
supply on the economy (ibid.).  
     In contrast, Masuhara (2012: 79), a former MOF official and LDP politician, 
criticised this view as paternalistic or contemptuous of the public. He stated that 
Japanese politics is excessively skewed towards protecting socially vulnerable 
people, which results in market inefficiencies and vested interests, while 
vulnerable people lose self-help measures and efforts (ibid.: 27-44). However, 
Gotoda’s statements, that the consumer credit industry reform was associated 
with the question of what kind of country Japan should be and that the safety of 
households should be a foundation of economic growth, were well -received by 
the media (Ide 2007: 135). The stance of the FSA towards the reform was more 
cautious than that of Yosano and Gotoda, but the agency supported the drastic 
reform partly because of its belief that consumer lending should be covered 
mainly by banks (ibid.: 77-8). Yasuhito Omori, head of the Credit System Office, 
who was in charge of the reform in the FSA, had a similar view on the consumer 
credit industry to that of Yosano (Suda 2010: 98-121). This case epitomises the 
Japanese dominant elites’ tendency to prioritise social stability and protection 
over market efficiencies and self-help. I argue that systemic support for 
financially distressed consumers forced Takefuji and many other money lenders 
to go bankrupt. Furthermore, the most effective way to rescue distressed debtors 
is to relieve them of the fear of bankruptcy as a social stigma, along with 
                                                   
72 The Mainichi Shimbun newspaper dated 5 November 2006 
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providing financial education. However, this is probably the last thing that most 
Japanese dominant elites want, as they apprehend that frequent bankruptcies 
indicate the deterioration of social morality.  
 
iv) Elpida Memory 
Although Japan had been the world’s largest producer of dynamic random-access 
memory (DRAM), a semiconductor mainly used for computers and mobile 
handsets, from 1986 until 1992, subsequently, its share in the global DRAM 
market plummeted, due to the strong yen and the rise of Korean and Taiwanese 
rivals. Most Japanese electronics manufacturers withdrew from the DRAM 
business during the late 1990s, while Hitachi and NEC, Japanese electronics 
establishments, spun off their DRAM businesses into their joint subsidiary, which 
was renamed Elpida Memory in 2000 and acquired the DRAM business from 
Mitsubishi Electric in 2003.  Both Hitachi and NEC appointed Yukio Sakamoto, 
who had been Executive Vice President of Texas Instruments Japan, as the CEO 
of Elpida and delegated its reconstruction to him, but they were reluctant to 
provide sufficient business resources including capital expenditure funds for the 
subsidiary. As a result of Elpida’s new share sales and the parent companies’ 
partial sales of Elpida shares, by 2007 their relationship had become remote.  
     Elpida, as the last remaining Japanese DRAM maker, had increased its global 
market share from 4% in 2002 to 10% in 2006, but it encountered financial 
difficulty in early 2009 due to the extraordinary decline in DRAM prices caused 
by the GFC. However, the government bailed Elpida out under the Industrial 
Revitalisation Law, which was established in order to facilitate corporate 
restructuring in consideration of employment stability. The rescue package for 
Elpida consisted of 1) the DBJ’s purchase of 30 billion yen of preferred shares 
issued by the company, 2) the borrowing of 20 billion yen from the DBJ, 3) loans 
amounting to 100 billion yen from 14 private sector banks, and 4) the purchase 
of 20 billion yen of new shares by the Taiwan Memory Company, to be 
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established by the Taiwanese government.73 This bailout may be justified by three 
factors. Firstly, other governments also financially supported industries, such as 
the automobile and semiconductor industries,  in order to mitigate the economic 
disruption caused by the GFC. Secondly, METI was deeply involved in the 
reorganisation of the semiconductor industry after the US-Japan semiconductor 
agreement (1985-95), which stabilised semiconductor prices and eventual ly 
delayed Japanese manufacturers’ efforts to enhance cost competitiveness (Sato 
2006). Lastly, MOF, which had supervised the DBJ, seemed to have an incentive 
to demonstrate the necessity of governmental banks, by providing emergency 
loans for JAL from the DBJ, and involving the revival of Elpida in order to shelve 
the complete privatisation of the DBJ, which had been decided by the Koizumi 
administration.   
     Elpida earned unprecedented profits between October 2009 and September 
2010, but it recorded large operating losses afterwards and fell into a liquidity 
crisis in late 2011. Although the company sought financial support from the 
government, banks and clients and an alliance with its competitors, such as the 
US-based Micron Technology, Nikkei Business Daily reported on 3 February 2012 
that private sector banks had demanded continuous support from the DBJ for 
Elpida and METI’s re-authorisation to apply the Industrial Revitalisation Law to 
the company as conditions for the renewal of their loans, but the DBJ was 
reluctant to continue to support Elpida and had commented that it was 
inappropriate to rescue the company, which had failed to reconstruct itself over 
the last two and half years, once again. Furthermore, according to the report, 
METI officials had stated that the ministry was not a stakeholder of Elpida, and 
that the responsibility lay with its creditor banks. On 27 February 2012, Elpida 
filed for bankruptcy; it was the largest bankruptcy in the manufacturing industry.  
                                                   
73 Eventually, Taiwan Memory Company’s equity investment in Elpida was not realised due 
to the internal conflict within both the Taiwanese government and semiconductor industry.  
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     Why did the government not rescue it from the second crisis?  There are four 
major differences between Elpida’s first and second crises. Firstly, at the time of 
the first crisis, the government had widely extended a safety net for corporate 
borrowers because of the GFC, while the second crisis might be regarded as an 
individual corporate issue. Elpida did not have a main bank, partly as both Hitachi 
and NEC kept themselves remote from it, and the non-existence of a main bank 
might have made the negotiations with the DBJ and METI difficult. Secondly, it 
was extremely difficult for METI to build a consensus towards the second bailout 
within the ministry given the failed first rescue, as there was internal conflict 
between METI’s interventionist and liberal factions. Furthermore, the deputy 
director-general who had spearheaded the rescue of Elpida was arrested for 
alleged insider trading of Elpida shares, though he was not prosecuted in the end. 
This made it more difficult for METI to support the company publicly. Thirdly, 
MOF did not have any incentive to have the DBJ rescue Elpida from the second 
crisis. The ministry was concerned about the ballooning costs associated with the 
recovery from the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 and the compensation for 
the nuclear plant disaster, so they might have been reluctant to bail out distressed 
firms with public funds. Lastly, while Elpida was rescued under the LDP -led 
administration, the DPJ-led administration, under which the second crisis 
occurred, was generally less sympathetic to the business community than the LDP, 
as was the case of JAL. 
 
v) Olympus 
Olympus Corporation is a major multinational optical equipment manufacturer 
headquartered in Tokyo. Its world leading gastrointestinal endoscope business 
has earned a lucrative and stable profit, whilst other businesses such as digital 
cameras have been unprofitable recently. In October 2011, the CEO of Olympus, 
Michael Woodford, originally from the UK, was dismissed by the Chairman, 
Tsuyoshi Kikukawa. However, Woodford revealed that he had persistently asked 
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Kikukawa to explain the dubious extraordinary advisory fee associated with the 
acquisition of a British medical equipment manufacturer, which had resulted in 
his dismissal. 74  After the resignation of Kikukawa, Olympus announced in 
November 2011 that it had concealed its latent losses of 130 billion yen, which 
stemmed from failed speculative securities investments in the 1990s, with various 
cover-up gimmicks including fictitious M&A advisory fees and the false 
repurchase of preferred shares of an acquired firm. Meanwhile the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE) designated Olympus shares as Securities under Supervision for 
possible delisting, as its annual securities reports contained false statements. 75  
     If Olympus had been delisted, the firm might have had to pay an enormous 
amount of compensation, potentially leading it to insolvency. SMBC (the main 
bank for Olympus) and the BTMU (the ‘sub-main’ bank) had the respective 
aggregate exposures of 228 billion yen and 143 billion yen to the firm. 76 The 
President of the BTMU commented that the two banks would fully support the 
corporate borrower which faced a financial difficulty, while they would be 
vigilant in the forthcoming report to be published by the independent 
investigation committee, as the banks would not be able to continue to support 
the firm if Olympus had connections with anti -social groups. However, the 
committee concluded that only a limited number of top management and 
executives had been clandestinely involved in the accounting fraud, and no proof 
of financial outflow from Olympus to anti-social groups could be identified. In 
January 2012, the TSE announced the continued listing of Olympus on the ground 
                                                   
74  Olympus’ financial fraud was originally scooped by a maverick monthly magazine, 
FACTA, and Woodford took its reports seriously.  
75 Major companies that were delisted and / or went bankrupt due to false statements in 
their annual securities reports include Yamaichi Securities, Seibu Railway, Kanebo and 
Livedoor.  When Nippon Life Insurance and five trust banks filed lawsuits against Livedoor, 
seeking compensation for the damage caused by its share price decline, the Tokyo District 
Court ordered the defendant to pay 9.5 billion yen.  
76 The Nikkei dated 17 November 2011 
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that the revisions to the securities statements would have a limited impact on th e 
turnover and operating profit despite the significantly decreased equity capital, 
whilst there had been no company-wide involvement in fraud. However, one of 
the reasons for the continued listing - no company-wide involvement in fraud - 
was questionable. This type of long-term and complicated accounting fraud could 
not have been conducted without a large number of people, and the top 
management’s involvement alone is an extremely serious corporate governance 
problem.    
     If the government had really wanted to improve weak corporate governance, 
it should have delisted Olympus, which could potentially have resulted in the 
revamping of Japanese corporate culture. Then, how could Olympus have avoided 
its delisting? According to media reports, the consensus that the continued listing 
of Olympus was in Japan’s national interest, otherwise it would be acquired by 
foreign capital, was formed within the government in late November 2011. 77 A 
likely scenario is that the main and sub-main banks and Keidanren strongly urged 
the DPJ, the LDP and the bureaucracy for the continued listing, emphasising the 
risk of foreign capital acquiring Olympus.  These banks had enormous exposure 
to the company, whilst Keidanren was concerned that the potential revision to the 
Company Law would impose more rigorous corporate governance on Japanese 
companies – the industrial association did not want the delisting of Olympus to 
attract attention to the necessity of stricter corporate governance. 78 The DPJ, the 
                                                   
77 The Nikkei VERITAS dated 27 November 2011 reported that the main and sub-main banks 
requested ‘relevant parties’ for the continued listing of Olympus. According to the Nikkei 
VERITAS dated 11 December 2011, some DPJ politicians were opposed to the delistin g and 
concerned about possible acquisition of Olympus by foreign capital. Furthermore, the 
Weekly Toyo Keizai dated 17 December 2011 revealed that both METI and the MHLW 
intended not to allow the delisting and the acquisition by foreign capital, while the FSA 
wanted to put an end to the incident with a small amount of administrative financial penalty.  
 
78  The Asahi Shimbun newspaper dated 25 January 2012 reported that Keidanren was 
opposed to the compulsory introduction of an outside director system, while it pressured 
journalists not to write articles linking the Olympus incident with how to improve Japanese 
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LDP and the bureaucracy are inclined to have a strong allergy to foreign capital’s 
acquisition of Japanese firms. In addition, non-Japanese shareholders with a 
significant investment in Olympus shares also solicited the TSE for the continued 
listing, as delisting could have been detrimental to their investment. Although 
these actors agreed on the continued listing, Japan missed a great opportunity to 
change its corporate culture. Woodford desired reinstatement as the CEO, but the 
main and sub-main banks and domestic shareholders refused this. This may 
reflect the Japanese business community’s guardian morals (which emphasise 
loyalty, obedience, hierarchy and exclusiveness). From a western perspective 
(commercial morals), Woodford’s whistleblowing was truly praiseworthy, but 
according to guardian morals it could be viewed as betrayal or disloyalty to the 
company. 
 
vi) TEPCO 
Prior to the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011, Tokyo Electric Power 
Company (TEPCO), the largest of the ten Japanese general electric utilities, 
enjoyed very high creditworthiness due primarily to its monopoly status in the 
Tokyo Metropolitan area and its strong government backing under the Electric 
Utility Industry Law. TEPCO has played a critical role in the Japanese economy 
and energy policy. The stable profitability of the general electric utilities is 
guaranteed by the ‘cost-plus pricing method’ and the ‘fuel cost adjustment 
system’. Electrical tariffs are decided by adding certain profits to aggregate costs, 
where tariffs are adjusted monthly according to changes in fuel costs. The 
stability of the power supply is prioritised over market efficiency and consumer 
benefits through open competition among the power companies in Japan. Despite 
the increasing number of independent power producers since 1995, when the 
power generation business was deregulated, the market shares of these producers 
                                                   
corporate governance. In contrast, Doyukai commented that Japanese corporate governance 
needed an outside director system and other monitoring measures from outside.  
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have been stagnant due to the general electric utilities’ regional monopoly in the 
power transmission and distribution segment.  
     Furthermore, the general electric utilities, including TEPCO, constructed 
nuclear power plants under the LDP-led government’s initiative from 1966 
onwards. However, the risk of a nuclear plant accident was considered to be too 
enormous for a power company so the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Dam age 
was enacted in order to support victims and promote the healthy development of 
the nuclear power business in 1961. However, MOF, which intended to restrict 
the government’s financial burden, made this law complicated and ambiguous 
(Takemori 2011). Its Section 3 stipulates that the nuclear plant operator shoulders 
the liability without fault for any nuclear accident, whereas according to Section 
7, the government bears the burden up to a maximum of 120 billion yen per plant. 
It is unclear which party should bear compensation exceeding 120 billion yen. In 
addition, the exemption clause of Section 3 states that the operator is exonerated 
from liability if the damage is caused by ‘a grave natural disaster of an 
exceptional character or an insurrection’, but the law does not define these terms.    
     The Great East Japan Earthquake caused the meltdown of TEPCO’s 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, and the release of an enormous amount 
of radioactivity.  The total number of evacuees from the accident exceeded 
150,000, while the agricultural, fishing, tourist and other industries of the 
Fukushima prefecture suffered extraordinary economic damage (including that 
caused by harmful rumours). After the meltdown, there were disputes between 
several minsters of the DPJ-led government and the business community, 
including the major banks and TEPCO, over the exemption clause. The ministers 
insisted that the exemption clause should not be applied to the meltdown, given 
the anti-TEPCO public sentiment, while the business community claimed 
otherwise. As was the case with JAL, the DPJ probably intended to win the favour 
of voters by bashing the TEPCO management as corporate elites who had been 
overindulged by the LDP. The disputes made the CRAs concerned about whether 
135 
 
the government would financially support TEPCO, engendering the plummeted 
credit ratings for TEPCO.  
     However, in May 2011, TEPCO changed its stance and requested the 
government to support its compensation payments on the condition that it would 
pursue drastic restructuring. There were three reasons for the sudden change in 
TEPCO’s stance.79 Firstly, a high-ranked government official threatened TEPCO, 
stating that it should accept the state control and restructuring or otherwise go 
bankrupt without any government support. Secondly, the CRAs also told TEPCO 
that they would further downgrade its ratings if government support was not 
decided by the end of the first half of May 2011. Lastly, TEPCO’s cash in hand 
was likely to decrease from 2.1 trillion yen to 90 billion yen by the end of March 
2012. Although the turbulent political climate surrounding the ailing power 
company further downgraded its credit rating, the bill for the Nuclear Damage 
Liability Facilitation Fund (NDF) that would provide both public funds and 
supervision for TEPCO passed the Diet in August 2011. At first, the NDF injected 
public capital of 1 trillion yen into TEPCO. However, the accumulated public 
money provided for the company exceeded 5 trillion yen as of March 2015. 
However, the aggregate expenses for damage compensation, decontamination and 
plant decommissioning are expected to reach 21.5 trillion yen, according to the 
government estimate as of December 2016, almost double its estimate of March 
2015 (11.2 trillion yen).  However, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission’s 
Technical Subcommittee on Nuclear Power, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, etc. under the 
Cabinet Office revealed in November 2011 that the maximum amount of total 
damages would be 48 trillion yen.  
     A number of scholars and commentators have criticised the government’s 
rescue of TEPCO. Hideo Fukui, a professor at the Graduate Research Institute 
for Policy Studies, proposed TEPCO’s bankruptcy and argued that the 
establishment of the NDF derived from the tacit agreement between the thre e 
                                                   
79 The Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper dated 12 May 2011  
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parties, the creditor banks, which wanted TEPCO not to go bankrupt, MOF, which 
was eager to circumvent state compensation, and TEPCO, which desired its own 
survival.80 He insisted that TEPCO and its shareholders and creditors should bear 
the burden before requesting assistance from the public. Takeo Hoshi, Anil K. 
Kashyap and Ulrike Schaede maintained in the Wall Street Journal dated 19 April 
2011 that the Japanese government should let TEPCO go bankrupt, and 
emphasised three points. Firstly, its stable earnings would facilitate debt 
restructuring. Secondly, its bankruptcy would not jeopardise other utilities. Lastly, 
the government bailout would create a moral hazard.  
Why did the government rescue TEPCO despite these views? Sumiko 
Takeuchi (2014) of the International Environment and Economy Institute claims 
that TPECO’s bankruptcy would not contribute to the protection of nuclear 
accident victims for three reasons. Firstly, the application of the Act on 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage requires the existence of the nuclear plant 
operator liable for the damage (TEPCO). Secondly, difficulty in determining the 
aggregate amount of compensation liabilities would disable the application of the 
Corporate Rehabilitation Law or seriously delay compensation payments. Lastly, 
the compensation liabilities are subordinate to a large amount of secured bonds 
and DBJ loans. The International Environment and Economy Institute is a non-
profit organisation that has close ties with METI and TEPCO, so Takeuchi’s claim 
may support their benefits. Contrary to her argument, both TEPCO’s bankruptcy 
and timely compensation payments for the victims could have been compatible 
through the pre-packaged bankruptcy with the support from the NDF. Why did 
METI and TEPCO endeavour to avoid the bankruptcy? 
     A key point is that both TEPCO and the government are responsible for the 
nuclear damage regardless of how we interpret the exemption clause. The 
government took a strong initiative in introducing nuclear power plants into 
Japan and has supervised the nuclear power business. However, TEPCO has 
                                                   
80 The 9 August 2011 issue of Weekly Mainichi Economist  
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accepted unlimited sole responsibility for the nuclear damage in exchange for 
systemic support from the government, whereas the government, particularly 
both METI and MOF, has avoided taking responsibility and dealing with the 
nuclear damage and compensation directly. If TEPCO had gone bankrupt, its 
management responsibility for the accident would have been investigated even 
more harshly, and perhaps more importantly, the government’s responsibility fo r 
the nuclear power policy and administration would have been pursued more 
severely. Furthermore, TEPCO shares are possessed widely by domestic 
individual investors, whilst a large proportion of TEPCO bonds are held by 
domestic financial institutions and pension investors. If creditor banks had been 
required for the write-down of loans for TEPCO, the banking sector would have 
become further risk averse. Eventually, the government prioritised stability over 
fairness and chose the scheme that would force no dominant elites into a corner. 
The government making TEPCO a scapegoat seems to reflect a ‘system of 
irresponsibility’, which Masao Maruyama (1961) called Japan’s pre-war imperial 
system. He claims that the ethics of unlimited responsibility without any 
specified scope is imposed on Japanese society and that excessively heavy 
responsibility has created a system of irresponsibility (ibid .: 31-8).  
     However, I emphasise that advocates of TEPCO’s bankruptcy fail to 
understand that the bankruptcy would endanger other utilities and the financial 
system. Despite high financial leverage, other utilities enjoy very high 
creditworthiness owing to strong systemic support from the government. Should 
TEPCO go bankrupt without government rescue, the CRAs and financial  
institutions would call government support for other utilities into question, 
potentially causing financial difficulties for them. The electric power business 
requires a constantly high level of maintenance investment in addition to 
enormous initial investment. The entire utilities industry has an aggregate debt 
amount of 25 trillion yen, approximately 50% of which is raised from the bond 
market and accounts for around 20% of the total amount of outstanding straight 
corporate bonds in Japan. Industries such as utilities, transportation, 
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telecommunications, steel, electronics, energies and general trading, which have 
close ties with the government through business licences and industrial and 
energy policies, account for nearly a half of the total debts held by all of the non-
financial companies listed in the TSE. Both Japanese financial institutions and 
the society tend to believe that companies’ close ties with the government and 
major banks, which receive strong government backing, enhance their corporate 
creditworthiness, whilst start-up companies, even with excellent technologies 
and ideas, often struggle with fundraising. One major problem of the Japanese 
financial system, or the entire society, is the household and corporate sectors’ 
excessive reliance on systemic support along with their reluctance to take their 
own risks, which accelerates the debt concentration in the public sector as well 
as the financial asset concentration in bank deposits, and ironically enhances 
systemic risks, which were revealed in the nuclear accident.81 
 
3.4 Corporate Restructuring Funds and Support Measures for SMEs  
Following the examination of the recent major examples of Japanese corporate 
failures and bailouts, several institutions that have provided systemic support for 
financially distressed companies, i.e., government-backed corporate 
restructuring funds and public credit support measures for SMEs, will be 
spotlighted in this section. Why do government-backed funds have to be involved 
in corporate restructuring although there are quite a few domestic and overseas 
                                                   
81 According to national statistics on the flow of funds, the following equation can be 
witnessed: government net debt + corporate net debt + household net debt = overseas net 
asset. In this equation, a decrease in corporate net debt indicates weaker corporate risk 
taking. Takuji Aida, Chief Japan Economist at Societe Generale, argues that a significant 
increase in Japan’s government net debt has stemmed primarily from a sharp decrease in its 
corporate net debt over the last fifteen years, while stronger corporate risk taking would 
decrease government net debt. Moreover, Omura and Mizukami (2007: 400-2) claim that in 
the Japanese financial system and society, most actors of which are homogeneous, given 
both low idiosyncratic (or non-systemic) risk tolerance and weak systemic risk 
consciousness, idiosyncratic risk tends to be low, whilst systemic risk is inclined to be high.  
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private equity funds?  Bankruptcy is regarded as a social stigma in Japan, and 
often unduly impairs corporate value, so out-of-court restructuring is generally 
preferred over bankruptcy by both debtors and creditors. Although main banks 
usually took initiatives in corporate restructuring prior to the late -1990s financial 
crisis, the serious bad debt problem, the Basel capital rules and the shift of 
financial authorities’ supervisory relationship with the banking sector to 
relatively arm’s length principle-based (i.e., less explicit government support for 
banks) deprived them of the capacity to take such initiatives.  
     Fukasawa (2004: 60-1) points out two advantages of public institutions 
supporting corporate restructuring: the pump priming effect and the risk burden 
on tax payers. Firstly, as Japanese corporate restructuring businesses are lagging 
behind those in the US, public institutions’ involvement in corporate 
restructuring as pump priming is expected to bolster private sector corporate 
restructuring. There were insufficient precedents and resources for private sector 
institutions to tackle corporate restructuring businesses in Japan during the early 
2000s. However, once sufficient precedents and resources are accumulated, 
public institutions’ involvement will squeeze private sector institutions. Secondly, 
private sector financial institutions may not bear risks up to the socially desirable 
level, which is called ‘market failure’, whilst public institutions can take larger 
risks than private ones. Japanese society, in which both companies and 
households are generally risk averse, seems to have a strong preference for 
government involvement in risk taking. Nevertheless, public institutions’ 
involvement in corporate restructuring to overcome market failure can result in 
a ‘government failure’ or moral hazard, as these institutions have weaker 
incentives to monitor risks and they can disperse risks thinly throughout society 
(ibid.: 61). Okina (2006: 5) contends that the ‘public sector neutrality’ facilitates 
the adjustment of rights and interests among company stakeholders, which is 
particularly difficult in Japan. But given the vested interests of various 
bureaucracies, the public sector is far from neutral.  
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     Why do Japanese people prefer government involvement in corporate 
restructuring? Yamagishi (2011: 1-6) argues that although in collectivist societies, 
including Japan, where people are connected through networks of strong ties, 
their behaviour is mutually monitored and controlled in order to seek security, 
such security is not based on ‘trust’ (a belief in the integrity of others) but on 
‘assurance’, which can be defined as a system of mutual control within the 
network, and that collectivist societies, which have particularly strong ‘in -group 
favouritism’ vis-à-vis out-group members, produce security but destroy trust.82 
He also maintains that ‘risk taking is a critical element of trust building’ between 
people in different social groups (ibid.: 165). Furthermore, there is a bilateral 
correlation between risk taking and trust.   In Japanese society, which emphasises 
security and stability, both risk taking and general trust are weak – the above-
mentioned difficult adjustments of rights and interests among company 
stakeholders may stem mainly from weak trust. It is likely that weak trust and 
risk taking have made individual actors’ reliance on systemic support from the 
government strong. 83  In this respect, the heavy government involvement in 
Japanese corporate restructuring is based on social relations and norms rather 
than economic rationalities.  
     After the collapse of the financial convoy in the late 1990s, the capacity of 
main banks to promote the corporate restructuring of borrowers was significantly 
deteriorated, and the banking sector itself could not exit the mire of bad debts. In 
                                                   
82 Yamagishi (2011: 3-4) agrees with Francis Fukuyama’s (1995) view that strong familism 
tends to hamper the development of general trust beyond the family, but disagrees with his 
argument that Japan is a high trust society along with the US and Germany. In addition, he 
concurs with Putnam’s (1993) perspective that ‘general trust beyond the family or the group 
is central to the civic society’ and that ‘the decline in trust could result in not only weaker 
economic performance but also a crisis of democracy’ (Yamagishi 2011: 4 ). 
83 Despite the generally high dependence of Japanese people on their government, according 
to the Asian Barometer survey in 2003, Japanese people’s trust in their own government 
was much lower than those in other Asian countries such as China, India, Malaysi a and 
Thailand (Koike 2010). However, Oyama (2009) maintains that this was mainly because of 
Japanese people’s extremely high expectations of the government.  
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2002, the Koizumi administration announced the ‘Financial Revitalisation 
Programme’, which required major banks to reduce their non-performing loan 
ratio (8.4% as of March 2002) by half within a three-year period. As part of this 
programme, the Industrial Revitalisation Corporation of Japan (IRCJ), a 
government-backed, limited-period corporate restructuring fund, was established 
under the Cabinet Office. It is said that MOF proposed the setup of this 
government-backed emergency rescue fund. The IRCJ’s functions included 
purchasing bank loans for distressed companies at fair market values, providing 
loans, equity capital and management consulting for these companies and 
adjusting rights and interests among company stakeholders, for instance, by 
negotiating debt waivers with creditor banks.  
     The purposes of the IRCJ’s establishment entailed: 1) to contribute to the 
enhancement of the competitiveness of the whole spectrum of industries to carry 
out the prompt business revitalisation of faltering companies; 2) to work fo r the 
smooth recovery of financial intermediary functions to rapidly dispose of bad 
debts; and 3) to boldly advance corporate and industrial revitalisation as a joint 
effort of the industrial and financial sectors (Okina 2006: 8). Despite its 
government-sponsored company status, most of its executives and staff members 
were specialists who had worked in the private sector, including management 
consultancies, law firms and accounting firms. Its corporate valuation was based 
on cash flows, whilst its expected investment returns were set according to 
calculated risk levels. Furthermore, the IRCJ rejected Keidanren’s attempt to 
dispatch a senior executive to the fund and sent back bank officers seconded for 
the establishment of the fund to the banks in order to avoid conflicts of interests. 
The fund did not accept many seconded bureaucrats.  
     The number of cases in which the IRCJ assisted was 41, and the amount of 
aggregate debts borrowed by all of the assisted companies just before assistance 
approvals was approximately 4 trillion yen, out of which Daiei (a large retail 
chain) and Kanebo (textiles and cosmetics) accounted for the majority. 
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Furthermore, the IRCJ earned profits of around 40 billion yen through turnaround 
transactions when the fund was dis-incorporated in 2007. However, the IRCJ used 
only 1.2 trillion yen out of the 10 trillion yen government budget allocated for 
the fund, while the number of assistance cases fell short of the target of 100 cases.  
It is fair to say that the IRCJ cautiously selected feasible turnaround projects 
although two companies assisted by the fund subsequently went bankrupt.  
However, banks were reluctant to consult with the IRCJ owing to their fear that 
the fund would demand that the banks forgive debt and borrowers’ management 
take harsh responsibility (Kamesawa 2009: 21). Indeed, the fund sometimes 
dismissed top management and requested that banks forgive debt drastically. 
What alerted banks and borrowers was the IRCJ’s strong faith in market 
discipline – for example, purchasing and selling bank loans at fair market values.  
     The IRCJ’s Chief Operating Officer, Kazuhiko Toyama, commented that the 
fund was successful as it did not succumb to political pressure to distort market 
principles from traditional elite groups such as interventionist bureaucrats, 
conservative politicians and bankers (Toyama 2007: 92-7).84 Many banks have 
established corporate restructuring funds, which usually deal with their parent 
banks’ distressed corporate borrowers. Nevertheless, when the government 
mobilised various forms of systemic support, including quantitative monetary 
easing, the Financial Revitalisation Programme and the bailout of Resona Bank 
in order to prevent another banking crisis in the early 2000s, the IRCJ, albeit 
market-orientated, was a main provider of systemic support.  
     The non-performing loan ratio of the major banks precipitately dropped from 
8.4% in 2002 to 1.4% in 2008, but that of regional banks decreased only from 
8.0% to 3.7% during the same period. Consequently, the focus of corporate 
restructuring has been shifted from large companies to SMEs. In 2009, the ETIC, 
a public-private corporate restructuring fund, was established in order to assist 
                                                   
84 Kazuhiko Toyama, who used to work for the Boston Consulting Group, has been a deputy 
chairman of Doyukai since April 2013.  
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with the restructuring of excessively indebted SMEs and large companies with 
useful business resources, although the fund’s original assistance targets were 
SMEs and entities sponsored jointly by municipalities and private companies in 
rural areas. Another purpose of its establishment was to mitigate the negative 
impact of the GFC on the regional economy. METI took the lead in setting up the 
ETIC, while the fund had the budget for the government guarantee up to 1.6 
trillion yen and functions similar to the IRCJ.   
     The ETIC injected 350 billion yen of capital into JAL and supported its 
restructuring under the pre-packaged bankruptcy proceedings from 2010 to 2012. 
This invited strong criticism, that the fund should allocate resources primarily to 
SMEs, as the ETIC was sponsored widely by regional banks. However, the 
number of ETIC assistance cases and the amount of its aggregate capital 
injections were merely 28 (out of which 11 were SMEs) and 370 billion yen, 
respectively. Despite the heavy personnel and financial involvement of banks in 
the ETIC, contrary to the IRCJ, banks and SMEs feared that the ETIC’s stance 
towards them would be as harsh as that of the IRCJ. Another reason for the SMEs’ 
reluctance to consult with the ETIC was their concern that the compulsory 
disclosure of names of assisted companies would damage their r eputation, while 
the maximum assistance period of three years was quite short. Many SMEs 
seemed to regard receiving support from the government as a disgrace. In 2013, 
the ETIC was reorganised into the Regional Economy Vitalisation Corporation 
of Japan (REVIC). Simultaneously, the disclosure of the names of assisted 
companies became no longer compulsory, while the maximum assistance period 
was extended to five years. The ETIC was initially scheduled to be dis -
incorporated in 2014, but the expiry of the REVIC is 2022. Its discipline has 
become lax in comparison to that of the IRCJ.  
     In 2009, the Innovation Network Corporation of Japan (INCJ), another public -
private fund, was founded on METI’s initiative.  The INCJ’s objectives are 1) 
promoting ‘open innovation’ – the networking of technologies and expertise 
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across industries and firms, 2) networking technological and industrial prowess 
to create new industries for next generations, 3) providing ‘patient risk money’ 
to support the commercialisation of technologies and innovation, and 4) 
enhancing the value of investment portfolio companies. The government has 
made 286 billion yen of equity investment in the INCJ, while 26 corporations, 
including the DBJ, the three mega banks, Panasonic, Toshiba and Toyota have 
collectively invested merely 14 billion yen in the fund. The INCJ’s CEO, 
Kimikazu Noumi, insisted that the fund focused on companies with growth 
potential unlike the IRCJ and the ETIC, which assisted in corporate 
restructuring.85   
     However, the INCJ has provided financial support for Japan Display (which 
combined the display-panel operations of Sony, Toshiba and Hitachi) and 
Renesas Electronics (a manufacturer of micro-controllers and systems-on-chips), 
in which the fund made respective equity investments of 200 billion yen and 140 
billion yen. Individually, none of the display-panel operations of the three 
electronics majors could compete against Samsung Electronics and Sharp, but 
they could not decide to withdraw from their display businesses. Financial 
support from the INCJ is de facto subsidies to the recipient companies. In this 
respect, its large investment in Japan Display was unfair for its rival, Sharp, 
which faced financial difficulty from 2012 to 2016. 86 Against such criticisms, 
METI insists that the conservative and risk averse nature of Japanese top 
management is a major obstacle to creating new businesses and that the 
government highlighting potential growth areas gives corporate managers 
justification for changes in their stance and provides a sense of security for 
companies considering investment in these areas. 87 
                                                   
85 The Wall Street Journal dated 5 December 2011  
86 Sharp, a major Japanese manufacturer of liquid crystal display panels and consumer 
electronic appliances, was acquired by Taiwan-based Hon Hai Precision Industry in 2016.  
87 WorldCareer 2009 
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     The INCJ’s support for Renesas Electronics, which was formed from the 
merger of the application-specific semiconductors operations of Hitachi, 
Mitsubishi Electric and NEC, was also controversial. Although Renesas boasted 
a 40% global market share of micro-controllers for automobiles and the largest 
domestic share of systems-on-chips (mainly for mobile phones, personal 
computers and game consoles), its profitability was very low and it occasionally 
incurred losses. The major reasons for its low profitability included 1) the 
excessive production capacity and high fixed costs, 2) the stagnation of key 
clients’ mobile phone and computer businesses, 3) weak price bargaining power 
vis-à-vis its key clients (automakers and electronic appliance manufacturers), and 
4) the excessive product quality and warranty requirements of automakers. Key 
clients’ involvement in Renesas’ production processes has made it difficult for 
the chip maker to improve its productivity based on its own decisions. One 
anecdote is that automakers often refuse Renesas’ request for changes in the 
production facilities and processes on the ground that the changes would 
potentially lead to car accidents (Yunogami 2011: 38). Such conservative 
thoughts widely dominate the relationship between large establishment 
companies and subcontractors in Japan.  
     In March 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake crippled one of Renesas’ 
major factories. Its client automakers, including Toyota and Nissan, dispatched a 
large number of workers to the factory in order to assist Renesas in resuming the 
operation as microcontrollers are indispensable to automobiles. However, none 
of Renesas’ key clients were willing to provide financial support to it, and in 
August 2012, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, a New York-based private equity fund, 
proposed to invest 100 billion yen in the chip maker. This proposal made key 
clients concerned that Kohlberg Kravis Roberts would raise chip prices or divide 
Renesas up and sell them off, while these clients consulted with METI, which 
urged the INCJ to consider a possible consortium to invest in the distressed chip 
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maker.88 In December 2012, a consortium of 9 companies, such as the INCJ, 
Toyota and Nissan, announced 150 billion yen of capital investment in Renesas, 
but the IRCJ’s portion accounted for the great majority of this. The fund’s ca pital 
injection was tantamount to subsidies to Renesas’ key clients. In this respect, the 
INCJ has been much more constrained by the interests of traditional elite groups 
than the IRCJ. Furthermore, apart from the INCJ and REVIC, there are numerous 
government-backed and public-private funds, including regional funds co-
sponsored by municipalities and regional financial insti tutions and the 
Organisation for Small and Medium Enterprises and Regional Innovation, many 
of which target SMEs. 
     Although the SME sector accounted for 62.0% of Japan’s total employment in 
2012, down from 68.6% in 1987 due to the decrease in the number of SMEs, the 
sector has been regarded as politically important since the early post -war period. 
There are three governmental financial institutions for SME financing, namely 
the Japan Finance Corporation for Small and Medium Enterprises, the Japan 
Finance Corporation and the Shoko Chukin Bank.  In addition, 51 Credit 
Guarantee Corporations (CGCs) under the Japan Federation of Credit Guarantee 
Corporations, a public institution, provide government credit guarantees for 
financial institutions’ SME financing. In addition to the standard government 
credit guarantees for SME loans, a special guarantee programme with full 
coverage of the loan value up to 30 trillion yen, was provided temporarily from 
October 1998 until March 2001 to ease the SME credit crunch, but this 
programme cost the government approximately 2 trillion yen, which is large 
relative to the aggregate credit guarantees, which amount to 40 trillion yen (Lam 
and Shin 2012: 15, quoted from Koo and Sasaki 2010). Subsequently, an 
emergency guarantee programme with full coverage of the loan value up to 36 
trillion yen was arranged specifically from November 2008 until March 2016 to 
                                                   
88 The Wall Street Journal dated 30 November 2012  
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mitigate the negative impact of the GFC and the Great East Japan Earthquake on 
the SME sector.  
     Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, which had 
an extensively negative impact on the Japanese economy, in November 2008 the 
FSA relaxed the classification of restructured loans (which are part of broadly 
defined bad debts) for SMEs into the ‘normal’ category in order to support the 
SME sector. Then, upon the establishment of the DPJ-led administration in 
September 2011, despite the strong opposition from the banking sector, the 
government enacted the SME Financing Facilitation Act, proposed by Shizuka 
Kamei, the Minister of State for Financial Services and Postal Reform, to protect 
SMEs from the negative impact of the GFC. This act, with an initially specified 
expiry of the end of March 2011, required financial institutions to endeavour to 
provide generous treatment (e.g., debt rescheduling) for SMEs in distress. Its 
expiry was later extended to the end of March 2013. According to the FSA’s 
statistics, SMEs with an amount of aggregate loans totalling 120 trillion yen 
applied for changes in loan terms (e.g., rescheduling and lower interest rates), 
and 93% were accepted by banks. Despite the expiry of the SME Financing 
Facilitation Act, the number of SME bankruptcies has not increased sharply due 
to the FSA’s relaxed inspection criteria for SME loans and wide-ranging safety 
net measures, such as the safety-net financing for distressed small businesses by 
governmental financial institutions, government credit guarantees and public -
private funds. 
     Lam and Shin (2012) of the International Monetary Fund point  out six 
problems regarding the Japanese SME sector. Firstly, many SMEs have high 
financial leverage and low profitability, and the GFC aggravated their financial 
performance, particularly that of less creditworthy SMEs. Secondly, public credit 
support measures have made non-viable SMEs less motivated to exit or be 
restructured. Thirdly, government credit guarantees with full coverage of the loan 
value may cause a moral hazard. Fourthly, banks, in particular smaller regional 
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ones, have been reluctant to recognise losses associated with bankruptcies and 
the restructuring of non-viable SMEs as these losses would cause damage to their 
profit and capital. Fifth, the borrowing costs for less creditworthy SMEs have 
dropped below banks’ breakeven rate due partly to government credit guarantees 
and safety-net lending. Lastly, the survival of non-viable SMEs could cause the 
deterioration of banks’ credit assessment capabilities and decrease credit 
availability for viable SMEs and start-up firms. 
     Excessive systemic support has distorted the financial system and hampered 
the vigour and productivity of the SME sector. Nobuo Tomoda, Board Director 
of the Tokyo Shoko Research (a major SME credit information provider), 
maintains that many SMEs tend to rely heavily on their relationships with large 
client companies and public support measures, they have made little effort to 
improve value additions and banks have become reluctant to provide loans for 
less creditworthy SMEs without government credit guarantees, as bank off icers 
who cause credit losses are severely penalised within their organisations. 89 It is 
clear that both banks and the government have enormous latent bad debts in 
regard to SMEs. 
 
3.5 Persistent Systemic Support  
Examining the recent examples of corporate bailouts, the government-backed 
restructuring funds and the public credit support measures for SMEs lead us to 
the question of why systemic support has been so persistent in Japan even since 
the collapse of the financial convoy. This question is related to anot her one: what 
kinds of political and social norms have promoted systemic support, which is 
often at odds with economic rationalities? Takeuchi (2000: 189-90) claims that 
the purpose of bureaucratic regulations is to protect ‘socially vulnerable’ groups 
from free competition, while the burden stemming from the protection is borne 
                                                   
89 Interview with Nobuo Tomoda in October 2014  
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by the general public. Bureaucracies provide protection and occasionally 
penalties for the industries and institutions they supervise, and the industries and 
institutions indicate loyalty and obedience to the bureaucracies, which are 
sources of bureaucratic power, in exchange for that protection. Strong systemic 
support is needed in Japanese society in order to compensate for the weak general 
trust and risk taking of individual actors, while the exchange of dominant elites’ 
systemic support and subordinates’ loyalty has been instilled into society as a 
norm. If bureaucracies do not sufficiently protect the industries under their 
jurisdiction, they will not be able to maintain their power. The agricultural and 
SME sectors and the elderly are often viewed as socially vulnerable groups, but 
they enjoy strong protection and are actually vested interest groups.  
     Masuhara (2012: 27-44) maintains that although a number of regulations to 
protect ‘socially vulnerable’ groups, including the revision to the Money Lending 
Law, the SME Financing Facilitation Act and the Revised Worker Dispatch Law, 90 
have been introduced over the last decade, these regulations have rarely assisted 
truly vulnerable groups in the long term. He also contends that regulations to 
protect socially vulnerable groups tend to be praised by the media and the  public, 
which in turn provides more votes for the politicians proposing such regulations, 
whereas in fact these regulations are usually accompanied by the negative side-
effect of gradually eroding the foundations of both the state and the economy, 
and that when the side-effect is realised, the politicians’ responsibility is unlikely 
to be pursued (ibid.: 38-39). Once such regulations are ushered in, they are likely 
to become vested interests and bureaucrats and politicians are likely to be asked 
for further support measures, whilst removing vested interests is so painful that 
deregulations encounter fierce resistance. Masuhara’s perspective represents 
                                                   
90   The Revised Worker Dispatch Law was enacted in 2006 and intended to protect 
dispatched (non-regular) workers, for instance, by requiring client companies to provide 
employment contracts for dispatched workers who worked for them for longer than 3 years. 
However, this resulted in most client companies limiting dispatched work duration to 3 
years or less, which made dispatched workers worse off.  
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those of the market liberalisation camp within the dominant elites. Furthermore, 
Japanese social norms that emphasise stability and dominant elites’ protection of 
subordinates have also contributed to the proliferation of systemic support for 
socially vulnerable groups.  
     The remaining question is, why have large companies in distress, rather than 
people in unemployment or poverty, been rescued in Japan?  Many of these 
companies are not purely profit-making organisations but have aspects of 
political institutions through which the government rules people indirectly. As 
long as corporate earnings are unstable, some political actors have to bear 
employment risk. Who, out of the government, companies and individual people, 
bear what proportions of this risk varies by country. In Japan, companies shoulder 
a substantial portion of employment risk through lifetime or long-term 
employment and large contributions to social security. Moreover, the social 
credibility of Japanese persons derives primarily from the social status of the 
companies they work for and their positions in these companies, whilst 
unemployment is a social stigma in Japan. In addition, the solidarity within social 
classes, for instance, through trade unions and industrial associations, is weak; 
most managers and workers have to rely on their current employers. Given these 
characteristics, most large Japanese companies, except for those led by capitalists 
(including founding families), are inclined to prioritise business continuity and 
stability over profit maximisation and do not encourage their employees to take 
large risks.  
     To put it differently, most large Japanese companies are dominated by a 
management-labour alliance against capitalists, which is hostile to short -term 
profit making. Both systemic support and in-group favouritism are cornerstones 
of this alliance and deeply embedded in the corporate system at the centre of 
Japanese society. Frequent corporate bankruptcies would destroy a management -
labour alliance, strengthening capitalist power through enhanced capital mobility 
such as corporate restructuring, overseas investment and M&As. If capitalists 
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were to become dominant in the Japanese corporate society, they would sever the 
ties binding anti-free market administrators and subordinates together, and 
consequently, management would be deprived of autonomous power within their 
companies, while regular workers would lose stable employment.  
     The convoy system before the bursting of the bubble economy boosted risk 
taking by Japanese companies through risk socialisation. The corporate sector’s 
strong risk aversion since the 1990s has been attributed not only to the diminished 
growth prospect of the Japanese economy but also the collapse of the financial 
convoy (or explicit government support). In the meantime, the attempt to shift 
the financial system from bank-centred to capital market-based has not been very 
successful, as the capital market-based financial system, hinged on weak ties, a 
promotion orientation and commercial morals, has been incompatible with 
Japanese social norms, which are based on strong ties, a prevention orientation 
and guardian morals. Furthermore, the endeavour to shift Japanese corporate 
governance could not change its essence, in-group favouritism, which has kept 
weak general trust and risk aversion unchanged. The successive establishment of 
government-sponsored funds (including public-private funds) and public credit 
support measures for SMEs can be regarded as attempts to create new risk 
socialisation schemes. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The first section of this chapter has discussed the continuity of Japan’s bank -
centred financial system between the wartime and post -war periods. The bank 
dominance of the financial system reflects Japanese society’s anti -liberal, anti-
free market norms centred on systemic support, which are consistent with its 
orientation for strong ties, prevention and guardian morals. Japanese social norms 
characterised its financial system and formed counter-hegemony vis-à-vis Anglo-
Saxon financial hegemony. However, after the burst of the bubble economy in the 
early 1990s, Japan imported Anglo-Saxon style financial and corporate practices, 
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promoting capital mobility, weakening systemic support temporarily, and 
increasing major corporate bankruptcies from the mid-1990s until the early 2000s. 
These practices are linked to Anglo-Saxon societies’ orientation for effective use 
of weak ties, promotion and commercial morals.  
     The tension between global norms and Japanese social norms was re-
intensified from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, when the former gained 
influence in Japan, whereas the latter was on the defensive. The collapse of the 
financial convoy made many people to expect the future convergence of Japanese 
capitalism to Anglo-Saxon one. Nevertheless, systemic support in Japanese 
society has been more persistent than originally expected. The major corporate 
bailout examples of Elpida Memory (in its first crisis), Olympus and TEPCO as 
well as the establishment of public-private corporate restructuring funds and 
support measures for SMEs have showcased the persistence of systemic support. 
The anti-free market camp has prevented the market liberalisation camp from 
taking over the former’s hegemonic position within Japanese society.  
     The less business friendly DPJ aimed for obtaining favour from voters by 
rejecting the corporate bailout of Elpida (in its second crisis) and JAL and being 
reluctant to provide systemic support for TEPCO at first. There was disagreement 
between the DPJ and Keidanren over economic policy. On the other hand, the 
party set up the SME Financing Facilitation Act and increased social security 
benefits for low-income people and child-rearing households. However, the DPJ 
failed to maintain support from the public, and the DPJ-led government was 
short-lived from September 2009 until January 2012. Many Japanese people still 
appear to believe that what is good for big businesses is good for the country.  
     Moreover, the virtual reversal of the financial liberalisation, including the 
Japanese financial Big Bang, was exemplified by the revised Money Lending Law, 
which caused numerous bankruptcies of consumer credit companies including 
Takefuji. The drastic restriction of consumer finance reflected the prioritisatio n 
of social stability and protection of the socially vulnerable people, which are 
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associated with Japanese social norms (exemplified by strong ties, prevention 
orientation and guardian morals), over market efficiencies, that are linked to 
Anglo-Saxon global norms (epitomised by weak ties, promotion orientation and 
commercial morals). 
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Chapter 4: The Politics of the Japanese Credit Rating Industry  
 
The research puzzle of this thesis is intertwined with another conundrum, which 
is why the major American CRAs, Moody’s, S&P and Fitch Ratings (Fitch), have 
failed to dominate the Japanese credit market despite their growing global 
influence. Sinclair, who carried out extensive interviews on the Japanese credit 
rating industry in the late 1990s, claims that even Japanese market actors and 
officials were sceptical about the ability and neutrality of local Japanese CRAs, 
which lacked their own credit rating methodologies, mimicking those of the 
American CRAs, and were assisted by Japanese financial  authorities and 
financial institutions (Sinclair 2005; Shima 2006: 26-37). In contrast to over 70 
years of experience in the US, Japan had little expertise in American style credit 
rating when rating agencies were established in Tokyo in 1985. The number of 
Japanese borrowers rated by Moody’s skyrocketed from 108 in 1991 to 420 in 
1999 compared to that of Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR), a local rating agency, 
which grew from 227 to 514. The American CRAs, with global brand power and 
superior resources, seemed likely to overwhelm the Japanese CRAs at that time. 
However, contrary to this prospect, the American CRAs’ influence in Japan has 
diminished, whilst the Japanese CRAs have persisted and their legitimacy and 
utilisation within the Japanese credit market have increased. Moody’s coverage 
number in Japan plummeted to 122 in 2014 in comparison to those of S&P, JCR 
and Rating and Investment Information (R&I, another local CRA) which were 
140, 640 and 603, respectively. Fitch virtually withdrew from Japanese  non-
financial corporate ratings in 2009. This is a very puzzling outcome. Before 
tackling this conundrum, the growth, power and transformation of the American 
CRAs will first be discussed.  
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4.1 The US Rating Agencies and Financial Globalisation  
The assessment of creditworthiness developed long before the birth of the two 
major CRAs, Moody’s and S&P, in the US between 1909 and the 1910s. Banks, 
as financial intermediaries, virtually monopolised credit evaluation expertise in 
the pre-CRA period, although there were independent credit information 
providers. In 1909, John Moody, the founder of Moody’s, started ranking the 
creditworthiness of borrowers by using letter rating symbols that measured 
expected losses of investors in the event of default. During the Great Depression, 
which began in 1929, approximately one third of the total outstanding amount of 
bonds went into default, and credit ratings obtained significant attention and trust 
from a large number of investors as a low proportion of bonds wi th high credit 
ratings fell into default (Morita 2010:60-1).  According to Sinclair (2005: 26), 
American blue chip corporates and municipalities dominated the bond business 
centred on the US market from the 1930s to the 1980s, due to successive defaults 
and debt restructuring by major sovereign borrowers such as Russia (in 1918), 
Germany (in 1932 and 1939) and Japan (in 1942).  
     CRAs decide credit ratings for borrowers by assessing their ability and 
willingness to repay debts on schedule based on both quantitative (mainly 
financial) data and qualitative data such as macroeconomic, industry-wide and 
company-specific prospects, international competitiveness and management 
quality. Credit ratings are inevitably based not only on quantitative data but also 
on qualitative data, which significantly affect future financial conditions, and the 
creditworthiness of borrowers depends on their future financial conditions rather 
than their current ones. Furthermore, creditor-debtor relationships significantly 
influence the latter’s willingness to repay debt, and such relationships vary 
greatly by society. In collectivist and anti-liberal societies, default and 
bankruptcy are often regarded as a social stigma so willingness to repay is 
generally stronger than in individualist and liberal societies. Collectivist societies, 
in which financially troubled banks and companies are often rescued, tend to be 
concerned about instability potentially caused by a major bankruptcy. These 
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qualitative factors are likely to contribute to differences in credit ratings for the 
same borrowers by different CRAs.  
     Despite their growing influence within the US capital market, neither 
Moody’s nor S&P was financially prosperous until the 1960s. In the mid-1960s, 
S&P’s corporate rating division had merely three full-time analysts, one part-
time analyst, one assistant and one secretary (Wilson 1987 cited by Morita 2010: 
65). Their prosperity derived from a drastic change in the business model in the 
early 1970s and financial disintermediation and globalisation from the 1970s 
onwards. Although the CRAs depended on fees from investors until the 1960s 
because they were concerned about potential conflicts of interest with bond 
issuers, the agencies started charging issuers rating fees. Moreover, it  was 
disintermediation and higher ICM that significantly enhanced the business and 
political importance of CRAs. Disintermediation means that depositors seek more 
attractive returns from investments, including those in mutual funds, rather than 
interest from deposits, whereas borrowers look for better funding sources such 
as bonds and commercial paper than bank loans (Sinclair 2005: 54-5). This 
phenomenon started in the US and sharply expanded domestic rating businesses 
for the US CRAs. In addition, the breakdown of the financially restrictive Bretton 
Woods system in 1971 marked the initiation of higher ICM, and an increased 
number of industrially advanced countries centred on LMEs supported an open 
liberal financial order. Higher ICM promoted competitive financial deregulation 
and accompanying disintermediation in other countries, which provided overseas 
business for both Moody’s and S&P.    
     Helleiner (1994: 4-6) maintains that the widespread use of capital controls in 
the early post-war period can be attributed to four factors. Firstly, ‘embedded 
liberals’ contended that the policy autonomy of the interventionist welfare state 
needed to be protected from speculative international capital flows. Secondly, 
there was a prevalent belief that a liberal international financial order would 
conflict with a stable exchange rate system and a liberal international trade order. 
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Thirdly, the Cold War engendered the US accommodative stance towards capital 
controls in Western Europe and Japan. Lastly, New York bankers’ uncooperative 
attitude towards Western European governments in curbing enormous capital 
flight from Europe to the US due to the 1947 European economic crisis 
exacerbated the economic difficulty in Europe. However, the globalisation of 
finance started to re-emerge in the late 1950s and was further accelerated by the 
abolition of capital controls after the mid-1970s, which were due to the US and 
the UK pursuing their economic interests and the ensuing competitive financial 
deregulation (ibid.: 8-17). 
     Even before the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, both the British and 
US governments supported the growth of the Euromarket in London, a regulation -
free offshore market trading financial assets denominated in foreign currencies, 
mostly US dollars, during the 1960s.  The British government’s support was 
motivated by its aim to regain London’s international position, whereas the US 
government wanted to enhance the dollar’s appeal to foreigners as its external 
deficit expanded (Helleiner 1994: 83-91). Subsequently, with an increasing 
number of industrially advanced countries shifting from welfare states to 
Competition States, competitive financial deregulation occurred during the 1980s 
and 1990s, led mainly by the US. There are four explanations for why sta tes 
increasingly supported financial globalisation (ibid .: 12-7). Firstly, restrictive 
financial centres witnessed outflows of their business and capital to more liberal 
ones after the emergence of the Euromarket. Secondly, the US abandoned the 
restrictive Bretton Woods system owing to its growing current account and 
budget deficits, whilst the ‘Bank of England-Treasury-City nexus’ in British 
politics kept the government commitment that London should be an international 
financial centre. Thirdly, the mainstream economic ideology shifted from 
Keynesianism, based on which the Bretton Woods system was established, to 
neoliberalism, which favours a liberal international financial order. Lastly, 
central bank officials from G-10 countries, ‘the most cautious of the neoliberal 
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advocates’, cooperated in supporting a regime based around the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) in Basel.  
     Moody’s (1991: 4-5) illustrates that disintermediation, securitisation and 
globalisation promoted the explosive growth of the global credit market during 
the 1970s and 1980s. The ordinary definition of securitisation is the creation and 
issuance of tradable debt securities that are backed by cash flow from an asset or 
a group of assets such as residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, or credit 
card loan receivables. Securitisation, asset-backed securities and structured 
finance are often used interchangeably. Moody’s (ibid.: 9) claims that, in a sense, 
disintermediation is interchangeable with securitisation: the money debto rs used 
to borrow from banks is increasingly borrowed in the form of securities 
(including bonds, commercial paper and structured finance), i.e., it is securitised. 
In addition, structured finance (narrowly defined securitisation) started growing 
rapidly in the latter half of the 1980s – banks and non-banks began to repackage 
their financial assets into pools and sell them off to investors as tradable 
securities. Furthermore, both disintermediation and securitisation started with the 
US and expanded into other advanced industrialised countries including Britain, 
Germany, France, Australia and Japan, which contributed to the globalisation of 
the credit markets. The most remarkable example of this globalisation is the 
Euromarket (ibid.: 11). 
     The internationalisation of the US CRAs started in the mid-1980s – S&P 
opened its first overseas office in London in 1984 and the second in Tokyo in 
1985, whilst Moody’s established its first overseas office in Tokyo in 1985. 
Expanding their footprints into Japan was a natural step given the increasing 
number of Japanese companies’ access to the Euromarket as well as Japan’s 
financial deregulation, for which the US applied pressure through the Japan-US 
Yen-Dollar Committee. Financial globalisation made investors outside  the US 
ask bond issuers for credit ratings during the 1990s, enormously magnifying the 
influence of the American CRAs in the global bond markets (Morita 2010: 78 -9). 
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In addition to the internationalisation of credit ratings, the expansion of sovereign, 
municipal and high yield corporate bonds and the emergence of securitisation and 
credit derivatives further enlarged the US CRAs’ sphere of influence. Thomas L. 
Friedman, a columnist of the New York Times, commented in 1995 that ‘we live 
in a two-superpower world. There is the US and there is Moody’s. The US can 
destroy a country by levelling it with bombs: Moody’s can destroy a country by 
downgrading its bonds’ (cited by Sinclair 2005: 1, Morita 2010: 79). This 
comment epitomises the extraordinary ‘unconscious’ power of the US CRAs in 
the global political economy. However, fierce overseas criticism of the US CRAs 
and substantial friction accompanied their internationalisation: for instance, in 
Europe and Japan, the agencies were criticised on the basis that their US style 
credit rating methodology and management policy did not fit the reality of 
overseas markets (Morita 2010: 78).  
     Sinclair (2005: 59-60) contends that CRAs engender knowledge, which is ‘a 
product of conflicts between social interests’ and hence entails social and 
political partiality initially – credit assessment covers not only quantitative 
factors including the recent profitability and financial leverage but also a 
qualitative judgement regarding factors such as management quality and business 
strategy – and subsequently objectifying this knowledge makes it authoritative. 
In addition, credit ratings do not reflect the current or previous creditworthiness 
of borrowers but the forecast of their future creditworthiness, and forecasting 
always requires a subjective interpretation and judgement. Sinclair (ibid .: 60-63) 
also argues that the US CRAs’ knowledge is powerful for two reasons. Firstly, it 
has an influence on a specific stage of capitalist development (i.e., the decoupling 
of finance from the real economy) through ‘embedded knowledge networks’. 
Secondly, the US CRAs as epistemic authorities are influential on the global 
distribution of capital, jobs and economic opportunity. The US CRAs’ 
fundamental principles are the ‘mental framework of rating orthodoxy’, which 
regards ratings as rational, cross-cultural, instrumental and apolitical (ibid.: 69-
70). However, ratings made by both US and non-US CRAs are based on specific 
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sets of norms, practices and knowledge structures and institutionalised into 
financial markets.  The US CRAs have modified the norms and practices of the 
global political economy into American ways (ibid.: 174). 
   The nature of finance is not universally equal. Cox utilises the two contrasting 
concepts, the ‘synchronic’ and the ‘diachronic’, which originally derived from 
the study of language, in order to explain different mental frameworks of finance 
and production: the synchronic approach to thought fits with the profit -
maximisation of financial markets, whereas the diachronic (or the time of 
duration) corresponds to more complex social processes such as production (Cox 
1996a: 179-83). Sinclair divides investment into the following two forms: the 
synchronic investment form aims for short-term profit-maximisation and 
accumulation in financial markets, whilst the diachronic one connects finance 
with productive assets that enhance the social stock of material capabilities 
(Sinclair 2005: 58-9). Furthermore, Rethel and Sinclair (2012: 23 citing Searle 
1969), following John Searle, maintain that ‘constitutive’ rules, which create 
purposes and new forms of behaviour, can be separated from ‘regulative’ rules, 
which limit existing forms of behaviour by regulation and penalty, and the former 
matter much more than the latter. The constitutive rules of financial markets are 
epitomised by the self-identification of CRAs and banks, investors’ confidence 
in CRAs as epistemic authorities and the subjectivity of credit ratings, whilst the 
regulative ones are exemplified by the BIS capital rules and the Dot-Frank act. 
The characteristics of both banks and the US CRAs have shifted from diachronic 
and constitutive to synchronic and regulative (Marandola and Sinclair 2014: 10). 
Relationship-oriented commercial banking and investment banking (together 
with the ‘originate-to-distribute model’ of lending) fit with the respective, 
diachronic-constitutive and synchronic-regulative categories. Both global and 
domestic changes in governments and financial markets have nurtured an 
increasingly synchronic logic of financial practice and regulation over the last 30 
years, and the US CRAs have contributed to this transformation (Rethel and 
Sinclair 2012: 25).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
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     The dramatic expansion of securitisation ratings and short -term profit 
maximisation have changed the nature of the US CRAs since 2000, when 
Moody’s was listed on the New York Stock Exchange. At a US congressional 
hearing in 2008, Jerome Fons, chairman of the Credit Policy Committee at 
Moody’s, testified that the agency’s management had cooperatively endeavoured 
to make it more friendly to debt issuers, whereas Frank Raiter, former head of 
residential mortgaged-backed securities at S&P, testified that the profit 
contribution to its parent company, McGraw-Hill, had become S&P’s focus by 
2001 (Morita 2010: 89). Moody’s securitisation ratings revenue skyrocketed from 
143 million dollars in 1998 to 873 million dollars in 2007. There are four 
differences between corporate and securitisation credit ratings by CRAs 
(Matsuda 2012: 3). Firstly, unlike ordinary bonds, securitised products cannot be 
distributed without ratings, which promotes investors’ heavy dependence on 
ratings. Secondly, corporate analysts assess the creditworthiness of companies 
and assign appropriate ratings for them, while securitisation analysts cooperate 
with investment bankers to design securitised products with ‘target’ ratings. 
Thirdly, corporate ratings are highly dependent on qualitative judgements of the 
future expectation of companies, whereas securitisation ratings tend to rely 
heavily on quantitative models. Lastly, securitisation ratings are more lucrat ive 
than corporate ratings. These points may illustrate why the US CRAs increasingly 
shifted to the synchronic-regulative category before the GFC. Although Moody’s 
had assigned only 6 companies Aaa ratings globally as of 2010, it provided this 
highest rating, which could attract conservative investors, for over 40,000 
securitised products between 2000 and 2007 (ibid.: 2). 
     Another reason for both Moody’s and S&P’s enhanced synchronic orientation 
was the revival of Fitch in the 1990s and the early 2000s (Sinclair 2005: 179). 
Despite its establishment in 1914, New York-based Fitch was no match for 
Moody’s and S&P at the end of the 1980s. However, its presence in the global 
credit rating industry increased dramatically through its merger with IBCA 
Limited (a London-based CRA) in 1997 and the acquisitions of Chicago-based 
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Duff & Phelps Credit Rating and the rating business of Thomson Financial 
BankWatch, specialised in the financial services, in 2000. 91 These takeovers 
significantly expanded Fitch’s geographical coverage and boosted financial 
institution ratings worldwide. 92 Furthermore, even before the takeovers, Fitch 
was competitive in structured finance and took advantage of the sharp growth in 
this field. Consequently, it became one of the ‘Big Three’ CRAs,  albeit the 
smallest, in the early 2000s. Moody’s and S&P’s combined market share of global 
credit ratings was 80%, and Fitch accounted for 15%.93 The threat of Fitch forced 
Moody’s and S&P to compete to be one of the two CRAs chosen by debt issuers, 
which promoted the American CRAs’ synchronic mind-set to maximise short-
term profit. 
     As Yamauchi and Morita (2010: 2)94 emphasise, credit analysis, including that 
of structured finance, is more of an ‘art’ (a subjective judgement based on both 
quantitative and qualitative factors) than a ‘science’ (an objective outcome 
deriving from qualitative ones). The blind faith in advanced financial engineering, 
closely associated with both the origination and analysis of a soaring amount of 
structured finance, erroneously promoted the smooth-running machine-like 
image of the financial markets, prior to the GFC. However, even numerical 
analytical models based on sophisticated financial engineering need to set up 
certain assumptions and interpret quantitative factors in order to be 
                                                   
91 IBCA focused on rating financial institutions, government agencies and British and 
European corporates, and Duff & Phelps Credit Rating, spun off from Duff & Phelps 
Corporation in 1994, specialised in rating companies in the US and over 50 overseas 
countries. Duff & Phelps Corporation is a global valuation and corporate finance advisor.  
92 Fitch has been dually headquartered in New York and London since the merger with IBCA.  
93 The Economist dated 31 May 2007  
94 Naoki Yamauchi used to be former representative director of Moody’s Japan office and 
securitisation rating expert, whilst Takahiro Morita was former managing director in charge 
of corporate credit ratings for Japan and Korea, Moody’s.  
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operationalised, and there are no absolutely correct analytical models and ratings 
(ibid.: 1-3).  
     Although the subprime mortgage problem damaged the US CRAs’ most 
important asset, their global reputation, unlike Arthur Andersen after the Enron 
failure, the agencies have survived and are still very influential globally. This 
demonstrates how the US CRAs have been deeply entrenched as indispensable 
and hardly replaceable epistemic authorities in the global debt market. However, 
the GFC triggered the backlash to Anglo-Saxon style financial capitalism and 
contributed to the diminished reputation of the US CRAs in Japan. Moreover, the 
primary cause of the US CRAs’ fiasco was the shift in their mental framework 
and rules from diachronic-constitutive as disciplinary agents curbing the short-
term motivations of finance to synchronic-regulative as short-term profit 
maximisers, and the recent efforts by various governments to improve the CRAs’ 
governance – for instance, promoting competition among the CRAs, establishing 
their accountability and calling for more transparency of their rating process – 
have been ineffective in preventing these agencies from becoming a catalyst for 
another financial crisis (Marandola and Sinclair 2014). A key to improving CRAs’ 
governance is the acknowledgement of rating subjectivity among the relevant 
parties, such as the CRAs themselves, financial authorities, investors and debt 
issuers (ibid.: 10, Yamauchi and Morita 2010: 1-3). 
 
4.2 The Kisaikai Regime and the Development of Local Agencies  
Three Japanese local CRAs – Japan Bond Research Institute (JBRI), JCR and 
Nippon Investors Services (NIS) – were incorporated in 1985 when Moody’s and 
S&P opened their Japan offices. However, even prior to their incorporations, 
numerical ratings by the Bond Issue Arrangement Committee  (Kisaikai95), within 
which major banks had a strong voice, began to be assigned in 1959. The major 
                                                   
95 The Kisaikai was originally named Kisai Uchiawasekai from 1949 until 1966, and was 
subsequently renamed as such.  
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banks were more influential in the Kisaikai than large securities firms in the  early 
post-war period due to the strong state backing and their status as the largest 
investors in the corporate bond market. The Kisaikai regime originated from the 
controlled economy during WWII. In the 1920s and early 1930, countless 
corporate bond defaults occurred in Japan due to a series of depressions after 
WWI, and corporate bondholders claimed that the bond underwriters were 
morally responsible for these defaults. In 1933, the banking industry, as the 
largest bond underwriters, took an initiative in regard to the ‘purification 
movement of corporate bonds’ to exclude financially weak companies from the 
market by enforcing the collateral principle, which required corporate bond 
issuers to provide collateral for trustee banks. This movement was suppor ted by 
the financial authorities (MOF and the BOJ), while the collateral principle 
enhanced (trustee) banks’ influence in the corporate bond market at the expense 
of securities firms (Matsuo 1999: 36-40).  
     The depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s was a watershed in the 
history of the US and Japanese corporate bond markets – the depression increased 
the need for CRAs’ information to manage the credit risk in the US market, whilst 
it made the Japanese government and banks exclude credit risk from the market 
(ibid.: 14-5). The Temporary Fund Adjustment Act (Rinji Shikin Chosei Ho) of 
1937, which intended to appropriate domestic funds for the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, diminished ordinary companies’ access to capital markets, and most of them 
had to rely on bank borrowing. MOF, the BOJ and the IBJ decided that the state 
would control corporate bond issuance in 1938, and this control was further 
intensified by the Bond Issue Planning Council (Kisai Keikaku Kyogikai), 
consisting of MOF, the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin), the BOJ and the IBJ, 
from December 1940 until the end of WWII. Furthermore, the revision of the 
commercial law in 1938, which also reflected the wartime state control economy, 
stipulated that if corporate bond issuers could not redeem their bonds, their 
trustee banks would have to replace the redemption responsibilities endorsed by 
pledged collaterals.  
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     This restrictive wartime corporate bond market remained in the early post -war 
period, although the US occupation forces intended to reconstruct the Japanese 
financial system to make it similar to the US one – commercial banks extend 
short-term financing, whereas capital markets provide long-term financing. 
However, the US occupation forces’ elimination of major capitalists (mainly 
landlords and top management of Zaibatsu conglomerates and large firms), 
through the dissolution of Zaibatsu, the purge of top management, the agricultural 
land reform and the wealth tax, made it difficult for the household sector to take 
investment risk. Furthermore, the financial stability of the banking sector was 
relatively maintained due to its exemption from the Zaibatsu  dissolution and the 
alleviation of the burden associated with the termination of indemnity to munition 
war industries. These developments and the government policy of prioritised 
credit allocation for key industries preserved bank dominance of the post -war 
financial system. The role of the Bond Issue Planning Council under the wartime 
controlled economy was inherited first by the Bond Raising Adjustment Council 
(Kisai Chosei Kyogikai) founded in 1947 and then by the Kisaikai. After WWII, 
bond issue control was led by the BOJ at first, but it was delegated to trustee 
banks including the IBJ from 1957.  
     The Kisaikai regime provided major banks not only with lucrative trustee fees 
as an economic benefit but also with their dominance of the credit market as 
political power. Domestic corporate bonds, which accounted for a marginal 
proportion of the entire credit extension to the corporate sector and supplemented 
mainstream bank loans, were virtually variants of syndicated loans under this 
regime (Matsuo 1999: 55). In 1959, the Kisaikai  created its numerical ratings for 
bond issuers as criteria for MOF’s ‘corporate bond issue standards’ (Tekisai 
Kijun), which were tools to control the corporate bond market – these ratings 
were not investment information like US credit ratings but indicated which firms 
could launch bonds. The ratings were based merely on quantitative factors, while 
its rating measurements (e.g., equity ratio and interest coverage ratio), among 
which the most important was the size of equity capital, favoured big businesses, 
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particularly those in the heavy, chemical and trading industries, which were the 
major banks’ key customers as well as strategically important sectors for the 
government. The collateral principle was also favourable for big businesses in 
these industries that could afford to pledge large assets as collateral. Accordingly, 
both the Kisaikai and the collateral principle can be regarded as tools for 
prioritised capital allocation to strategic industries. The major banks tried to 
preserve their vested interest even after their dominance was undermined by 
higher ICM and financial globalisation.  
     Investor protection in Japan traditionally meant that ordinary investors should 
not incur any default risk, which is different from its definition in the US - where 
it means thorough disclosure of investment risk - and that main banks as trustees 
had to purchase all of the corporate bonds issued by their clients at par if they 
had fallen into default (Yamazawa 2003: 18). 96  It is likely that this custom 
nurtured Japanese debt investors’ indifference to credit risk and risk aversion. In 
addition, Shima (2006: 26-9) contends that the Kisaikai ratings were 
mechanically upon decided by a handful of arbitrarily selected financial data and 
ratios and with a particular emphasis on corporate size, and that the role of these 
ratings was not as substance to evaluate default risks but a formality or barrier to 
control corporate bond issuance. Although the Kisaikai’s numerical ratings 
gradually lost influence in the late 1970s due to financial globalisation and were 
abolished in 1990, its mental framework centred on systemic support and an 
emphasis on corporate size was partially inherited by the local CRAs. 
Furthermore, given the pre-determined decision of the government and banks to 
make a preferred credit allocation to specific industries and companies, the 
Kisaikai’s numerical ratings could not reveal their thought process in a detailed 
analysis. 
                                                   
96 Yamazawa is Executive Vice President of the Japan Exchange Group and a former high-
ranked BOJ official.  
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     Despite the abolition of the Kisaikai in 1996 and the corporate bond market 
deregulation, the Japanese market has not escaped aspects of the Kisaikai, such 
as the emphasis on formality – for example, investors are still constrained by 
norms developed under the Kisaikai regime, that they should not invest in non -
investment grade bonds, which reflect a simplistic binominal risk assessment 97 – 
and risk aversion. This may be because the deregulation was driven primarily by 
MOF, highly creditworthy companies, securities firms and the pressure from the 
US government, whereas bond investors did not strongly request the deregulation. 
By contrast, the development of the US credit rating industry was promoted by 
growing investor needs. During the Kisaikai  period, Japanese bond investors did 
not have to examine credit risk seriously since corporate bond default was 
inconceivable. Risk indifference and aversion have remained in the Japanese 
corporate bond market to some extent even since the deregulation. Furthermore, 
as Morita (2010: 117) claims, the primary purpose of most Japanese bond 
investors’ use of credit ratings is not to examine credit risks (i.e., substantive 
conditions) but to meet their investment guidelines (formal requisites).   
   Even prior to the Yen-Dollar Committee in 1984, the Koshasai Kenkyukai 
(Bond Rating Study Group) was inaugurated as an in-house research institute 
within the Nikkei, a Japanese media company, in 1975, and subsequently, in 1979, 
it was reorganised into a non-statutory body named JBRI, which was later 
incorporated as a CRA.98 The Koshasai Kenkyukai’s inauguration was triggered 
by a joint venture between the Nikkei and McGraw-Hill, a parent company of 
S&P. The Nikkei, which was interested in credit ratings, researched American-
style rating methodologies, both quantitative and qualitative, with the aim of 
                                                   
97 In the interview with Takamasa Yamaoka, a criteria officer at S&P, in October 2014, he 
claimed that risk assessment by Japanese financial institutions and investors tends to be 
binominal (viable or not), whereas that by their Anglo-Saxon counterparts is inclined to be 
gradational just like multi-tier credit ratings.  
98 JBRI started distributing its credit ratings and bond yield data in the secondary market to 
bond investors through its magazine, the ‘Nikkei Bonds and Financial Weekly’, in 1979.  
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creating a Japanese version of S&P.99 After a bilateral agreement made with the 
US government at the Yen-Dollar Committee, MOF was committed to the 
establishment and growth of two local CRAs, although the official story indicates 
that the ministry had an arm’s-length relationship with local CRAs – NIS was 
‘guided’ by the Securities Bureau, whilst JCR was a ‘brainchild’ of MOF’s 
International Bureau (Sinclair 2005: 129-30; Egawa 2007: 91-2). Furthermore, 
NIS and JCR were also backed by core members of the Kisaikai led by the IBJ, 
and another group of financial institutions led by the Long Term Credit Bank of 
Japan (LTCB) and the DBJ, respectively. JBRI, independent from the government 
and banks, was spun off from the Nikkei as a CRA in 1985.  In 1987, MOF made 
a revision to the corporate bond issue standards, and required bond issuers to 
meet specific levels of either the Kisaikai’s or the CRAs’ ratings. It nominated 
the three local CRAs and six non-Japanese CRAs, including Moody’s and S&P, 
as Designated CRAs in 1992.  
   The movement for the corporate bond market deregulation started even before 
the Yen-Dollar Committee. The inauguration of the Koshasai Kenkyukai in 1975 
is evidence of this, and the Nikkei is likely to have sensed the rising demand for 
the deregulation from the securities and corporate sectors.  The ‘Report on How 
the Japanese Bond Market Should Be’, published in 1977 by the Securities and 
Exchange Council, MOF’s advisory committee consisting of seven scholars, is 
further evidence. The council proposed the termination of the Kisaikai’s ratings, 
the deregulation of corporate bond issues, the establishment of investors’ self-
responsibility principle and the introduction of an American-style credit rating 
system, among other things, in order to develop the Japanese bond market 
(Matsuo 1999: 73). One cause of financial deregulation in Japan was the 
government’s massive deficit spending in the post-oil shock, the low-growth 
period after 1975 (Toya 2006: 108). Due to the large-scale issuance of JGBs to 
                                                   
99 The joint venture, Nikkei-McGraw Hill, was established in 1969. When McGraw Hill 
sold off their stake in the joint venture to the Nikkei in 1988, the venture was renamed into 
Nikkei BP. 
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finance the deficit spending, it was increasingly difficult for MOF to have banks 
purchase JGBs with artificially low coupon rates, which were sold to the BOJ 
afterwards, and the ministry created a secondary market for JGBs in 1977.  
     Another cause of Japan’s financial deregulation was the rapid expansion of 
highly creditworthy Japanese firms’ bond issuance in the Euromarket. The 
restrictive domestic bond market was not attractive for these firms as interest 
rates on corporate bonds were similar regardless of their creditworthiness, and in 
the 1970s, many of them started to issue bonds in the Euromarket, which made 
MOF and the BOJ concerned over the hollowing-out of the domestic market 
(Yamori, Nishigaki and Asai 2006: 3-4; Laurence 2001: 121-2). From 1984 until 
1993, except for 1987, the total amount of overseas corporate bonds issued by 
Japanese companies successively exceeded that of domestic corporate bonds 
issued. However, oddly, most Eurobonds issued by Japanese companies were 
purchased by Japanese investors, which indicates that the cause of the hollowing-
out was the domestic corporate bond regulation (Matsuo 1999: 79-80). Although 
MOF’s corporate bond issue standards required issuers to obtain specific levels 
of credit ratings from CRAs after the abolition of the Kisaikai’s numerical ratings 
in 1990, the lifting of the issue standards in 1996 100 intensified competition 
among the CRAs in Japan, as bond issuance no longer compulsorily required 
credit ratings by CRAs (Yamori, Nishigaki and Asai 2006: 5).  
      
4.3 Differences in Rating Agencies between the US and Japan  
What are the similarities and differences in the credit rating industry and agencies 
between the US and Japan? At first glance, many similarities between the two 
can be observed. Firstly, the local Japanese CRAs use the same rating symbols as 
S&P and Fitch. Secondly, the local raters’ analytical methodologies, which are 
based on both quantitative and qualitative factors, look similar to those of the US 
                                                   
100 Before the lifting of the corporate bond issue standards, the respective, straight and 
convertible bond issues needed a credit rating from one CRA and ratings from at least two.  
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CRAs. Lastly, credit ratings are major determinants of interest rates on corporate 
bonds in both countries. However, as of 1985, the US rating industry already had 
over 70 years’ experience, while the US CRAs had built up global brand power. 
Shima (2006: 28-9) claims that the local CRAs at the initial stage lacked both 
sufficient accountability for investors and a ‘thought process’ in their rating 
procedures. However, former credit analysts at the US CRAs’ Japan offices admit 
that the human resource quality of these offices was poor prior to the late 1990s 
financial crisis, which shifted high potential young people from Japanese banks 
to non-Japanese firms.101 Furthermore, at first, the New York headquarters of the 
US CRAs had a limited understanding of sectors in Japan such as shipping and 
steel (which are more internationally competitive than their US peers) and 
general trading companies and commuter railways (which are unique to Japan) 
as well as local practices including ‘latent reserves’ of properties and 
shareholdings and strong systemic support.   
   Moody’s (1991: 63) recognised that the American style credit rating system 
could not properly function on its own and needed to be introduced as ‘a broader 
programme intended to open the public debt market and to raise the general level 
of understanding on credit’ after it started its overseas operations in the mid -
1980s. The agency pointed out the following five prerequisites for the effective 
functioning of this rating system, which are entailed by the above programme: 1) 
removing barriers to an active and diverse debt market, 2) introducing open-
market mechanisms, 3) establishing a credible rating agency structure and 
procedures, 4) financial regulators requiring the use of a credit rating for debt 
issuance and credit monitoring, and 5) promoting corporate disclosure and credit 
education (ibid.: 63-7).  
     Regarding the first point above, the Japanese government incrementally 
deregulated its credit market during the 1980s and 1990s but its market liquidity 
                                                   
101 Interviews with Professor Chieko Matsuda and Professor Yoshio Shima in N ovember 
2015 
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remained relatively low because of the homogeneity of the market participants. 
Concerning the third point, the American CRAs are independent of government 
and financial institutions, whilst the Japanese agencies have capital and human 
ties with local financial institutions. However, the Japanese agencies’ 
compromised relationship has not been seriously questioned partly because most 
of the major investors in the Japanese credit market are these financial 
institutions and their affiliates (Shima 2006: 29-31). Regarding the fourth point, 
the Japanese financial authorities’ tacit support for the local CRAs was 
problematic. Furthermore, unlike in the US, a debt issuer obtaining credit ratings 
from at least two CRAs is not a norm in Japan.  Neither Japanese financial 
authorities nor investors have made it mandatory for debt issuers to obtain 
multiple credit ratings since the abolition of the Kisaikai  in 1996. 
     Among the above prerequisites, the second point – debt investors need to be 
responsible for default risk – is the most critical. Moody’s (ibid.: 64-5) clearly 
stated the following: 
 
Perhaps the most crucial precondition is that investors who use ratings 
must be subject to default … Investors may be willing to accept that 
(default) risk because they know in an efficient market they will be 
rewarded for the risks they are taking. However, if there is no default 
perceived risk of default, then investors will not  find real value in 
paying attention to ratings, credit will not be a factor in investment 
decisions, and the rating agency will not be able to earn enough to 
maintain its professional independent status.  
 
Although Moody’s (ibid.) was well aware that systemic support was the largest 
obstacle to its success in Japan, it believed that the Japanese government’s 
decision to introduce open-market mechanisms would help to enhance the 
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perception of default risk among Japanese investors and stimulate their demand 
for credit ratings. In the meantime, the agency thought that the adoption of a 
number of measures, including corporate disclosure and credit education (the 
above-mentioned fifth point), would pave the way for appropriate changes in 
market practices associated with credit (ibid.: 64-7). Since the 1990s, Japanese 
corporate disclosure has gradually improved due to pressure from equity 
investors (mainly overseas) rather than debt investors.  The American CRAs have 
also made efforts to educate Japanese credit investors, but they have not 
successfully removed the norms developed under the Kisaikai regime from these 
investors. Although Moody’s recognised that the norms and practices in the 
Japanese credit market were quite different from those in the US, it apparent ly 
expected the former to converge with the latter in the long term. Nevertheless, 
the agency did not understand that fully functioning open-market mechanisms 
would ultimately require the transformation of Japanese anti -free market norms.  
     In the US credit market, systemic support is extended mainly for major banks 
and public or quasi-public institutions, and few private sector firms can receive 
such support. 102  Nevertheless, until the early 1990s, the American CRAs 
substantially accommodated systemic support for Japanese private-sector 
borrowers, many of which enjoyed high credit ratings with the American agencies 
despite their low profitability and/or high financial leverage. Nishimura (1999, 
215-6), former chief of MOF’s banking bureau, claims that the very high credit 
ratings of the major Japanese banks ultimately relied on strong government 
backing, and that such backing was eroded by the financial liberalisation, MOF 
scandals and breakup of the ministry during the mid to late-1990s. He also admits 
that the failure of MOF to accurately grasp the amount of the bad debts caused a 
systemic concern.  
                                                   
102 General Motors, which received public money under the government backed bankruptcy 
proceedings in 2009, arguably had similar systemic qualities to major banks and was an 
exception to this norm.  
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      One reason why the American CRAs could accommodate substantial systemic 
support in Japan until the mid-1990s but have not done so since the late-1990s 
was that the agencies expected systemic support to decline, which is reflected in 
Moody’s above statement. The other reason is that, observing the Japanese 
Financial Big Bang deregulation and temporarily weakened systemic support 
during the financial crisis in the late-1990s, the American CRAs probably 
considered the Japanese market was converging with the US market, and applied 
‘American standards’ to credit ratings for Japanese borrowers (Kurosawa 2001: 
101-2). 
     According to Yoshio Shima, the American CRAs at first considered that the 
strong social cohesion in Japan would make the government rescue banks in 
trouble and have banks support financially strained large companies, but MOF’s 
weakened grip on the banking industry and the failure of major financial 
institutions such as Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and the LTCB shocked these 
agencies, resulting in the drastic downgrading of Japanese borrowers heavily 
dependent on systemic support. 103  However, due to the persistent systemic 
support, fewer Japanese large borrowers went bankrupt during the early 2000s 
than these downgradings suggested, resulting in the American CRAs’ credibility 
being damaged in Japan. Just four Japanese firms caused defaults of publicly 
placed bonds larger than 10 billion yen from 1997 until 2004. Among them, only 
Mycal was rated by American CRAs. Moody’s assigned Ba and B ratings to 66 
and 24 Japanese firms respectively, as of 2000. Given its global default rates of 
8% for Ba and 25% for B in five years, 11 Japanese firms were expected to fall 
into default. 
     The American agencies’ modified view on Japan resembled that of many 
scholars during the 2000s, focusing on changes in the Japanese political economy 
and its possible convergence towards Anglo-Saxon style capitalism (Laurence 
2001; Schoppa 2006; Jackson and Miyajima 2008; Rosenbluth and Thies 2010). 
                                                   
103 Interview with Professor Yoshio Shima in November 2015  
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However, the systemic support in Japan is much more resilient and persistent than 
both the American CRAs and these scholars expected. 
     The Japanese credit rating industry and agencies are actually more different 
from the American ones than they may seem at first glance. Morita (2010: 114-
42), former head of Japanese and Korean corporate credit ratings at Moody’s, 
points out the following four peculiar features of the Japanese credit rating 
industry. Firstly, there are significant rating splits among the CRAs. Secondly, 
there is virtually no high-yield bond (with credit ratings lower than BBB) market. 
Thirdly, bond investors do not require bond issuers to obtain multiple credit 
ratings. Lastly, its profitability is much lower than that of the US and European 
markets, owing to the low demand for credit ratings and fierce competition among 
the five CRAs (i.e., R&I, JCR, Moody’s, S&P and Fitch).  
     Regarding the first point, as of 2009, credit ratings by the local CRAs were 
on average two notches higher than those for the same borrowers by the US raters. 
Morita (ibid.: 128) claims that such rating splits are due mainly to differences in 
the extent to which CRAs take systemic support into consideration when 
assessing creditworthiness. Hiroaki Hayashi has criticised the US CRAs for 
failing to sufficiently take into account the strong systemic support in credit 
ratings because of their American centric perspective,104 but this criticism cannot 
be applied to the 1980s and early 1990s when the American CRAs accommodated 
substantial systemic support in their credit assessment of Japanese borrowers. 
However, from the mid-1990s onwards, systemic support became diluted and less 
predictable because of the relative power decline of administrators such as MOF, 
banks and the LDP, which will be discussed in detail later. 
     The second, third and fourth points are related to Japanese society’s 
inclination towards a prevention orientation and guardian morals, particularly its 
risk aversion and status quo orientation – bond investors repeatedly purchased 
                                                   
104 Interview with Hiroaki Hayashi, a member of the board at Fukokushinrai Life Insurance, 
in November 2015  
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bonds issued by well-known companies without seriously examining their credit 
risk under the Kisaikai regime. An underdeveloped risk taking culture has 
hampered the creation of a high-yield bond market in Japan, apart from ‘fallen 
angels’ downgraded from high-grade to high-yield, which rarely go bankrupt. 
Kurosawa (2001: 105-8) claims that Japan has aimed to form a ‘riskless society’ 
for corporate bond issuers and investors where all of the credit risk is transferred 
to the government and corporate groups to which issuers belong. Shima (2006: 
283-4) states that Japanese investors tend to invest in bonds blindly depending 
on their credit ratings rather than their own credit judgements, which means that 
borrowers with non-investment grade ratings can find few local purchasers. 
Supposing Companies A and B are assigned an investment grade and non-
investment grade, respectively, despite the fact that their actual creditworthiness 
is equal, Japanese investors are likely to invest in bonds issued by Company A 
but not in those issued by Company B.    
     Credit ratings for US high-yield bonds are regarded as one of the US CRAs’ 
core skills and sources of earning. Nevertheless, without substantial risk 
perception, Japanese bond investors have limited incentives to require bond 
issuers to acquire multiple ratings from different CRAs and ask CRAs for 
rigorous credit assessment, which have been disadvantageous for the US CRAs. 
Many of them use ratings merely to meet their investment guidelines rather than 
to analyse investment risks. Without bond investors’ preference for US CRAs, 
Japanese companies often solicit local CRAs to obtain credit ratings, which 
accommodate systemic support and local practices to a greater degree than US 
ones. The corporate bond market’s risk aversion and status quo orientation 
discourage new potential issuers, to which banks indicate a generous lending 
stance. Less creditworthy Japanese companies prefer borrowing from banks, 
which are visible and negotiable creditors, rather than bonds held by faceless 
investors.  
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     The weaker-than-expected demand for credit ratings and the fierce 
competition have caused significant discounts in rating fees, making corporate 
ratings in Japan less profitable. Earnings from profitable securitisation ratings 
compensated the US CRAs’ Japan operations for losses associated with corporate 
ratings, but the GFC tarnished the credibility of both securitisation ratings and 
the judgement of the US CRAs. The Japanese credit rating industry was 
excessively competitive given that the number of corporate bond issuers in Japan 
(roughly 1,000) as of 2007 was only one sixth of that in the US, whose credit 
rating industry has been dominated by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch (Kurosawa 2007: 
10-1). This excessive competition led to fierce competition for ratings fees from 
bond issuers, and rating fees in Japan were much lower than those in other 
industrially advanced countries (Morita 2010: 119). Although JBRI made a profit 
during the mid-1990s thanks to its investment evaluation services, which analyse 
pension fund performances and assess the abilities of asset managers, both JCR 
and NIS were in the red. In 1998, JBRI and NIS merged, forming R&I due to the 
diminished growth prospect and low profitability of the rating industry and the 
threat from the globally reputed US CRAs.  
     Other differences between the US and local CRAs lie in their relationship with  
government and financial institutions and their management style.  The US CRAs 
do not have any ties with the US government and financial institutions. In 
contrast, both R&I and JCR have accepted retired officials from MOF / the FSA, 
the BOJ and the DBJ although the latter agency has a much closer relationship 
with the government – since 1985, retired MOF / FSA officials have always been 
appointed to the CEO position of JCR. Although R&I, which is a subsidiary of 
the Nikkei, has maintained a relatively arm’s length relationship with officialdom, 
the agency has ties with major banks owing to JBRI’s merger with NIS, which 
was supported by MOF and a group of major banks led by the IBJ (presently 
Mizuho Bank). R&I’s major shareholders include the Nikkei (shareholding ratio 
of 42.8%), Nikkei BP (13.4%), QUICK (8.2%), Mizuho Bank (5.9%), the BTMU 
(4.9 %) and SMBC (4.6%), while those of JCR comprise Jiji Press (19.7%), the 
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employee stock ownership plan (9.5%), Kyodo News (5.9%), Sumitomo Life 
Insurance (2.7%), Meiji Yasuda Life Insurance (2.7%) and Sumitomo Mitsui 
Trust Bank (2.7%).105  The local CRAs have been criticised for their lack of 
independence due to their capital ties with major financial institutions (Shima 
2006: 29-31, Sinclair 2005: 131). However, the transformation of the Japanese 
financial authorities’ relationship with financial institutions from controlling to 
relatively arm’s length and the weakened power of its banking industry in the late 
1990s hindered their involvement in local CRAs’ decision-making. 
     Although the ultimate goal of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch is profit making, just 
like other private sector firms, the critical importance of their credibility and the 
labour-intensive nature of their corporate credit ratings prevented them from 
achieving high profitability until the mid-1990s. However, the explosive 
expansion of securitisation and Moody’s listing on the New York Stock Exchange 
in 2000 significantly enhanced their profit -seeking inclination from the late 
1990s until the outburst of the GFC. The demand for corporate credit ratings from 
new prospective bond issuers has been stagnant in Japan since the mid-1990s, 
whilst that for securitisation ratings surged sharply from 1997 until 2006. 
Securitisation ratings mass-produced by financial engineering models were very 
profitable for CRAs. Moody’s, S&P and Fitch took advantage of their experience 
in the more advanced US securitisation market, and securitisation ratings became 
a major source of their profits in their Japan operations despite the gradual catch-
up by the local CRAs.  Both Naoki Yamauchi and Kei Kitayama, the heads of 
Moody’s Japan office from 2002 until 2005 and from 2005 onwards, respectively, 
and Yu-Tsung Chang, head of S&P’s Tokyo office from 2001 until 2013, were all 
securitisation rating professionals. 106 However, the total origination value of 
securitised products in Japan plummeted from 9.8 trillion yen in 2006 to 2.6 
                                                   
105 Both Nikkei BP and the QUICK are members of the Nikkei group.  
106 Morita (2010: 102) reveals that both regional heads and key senior positions of the US 
CRAs were dominated by securitisation rating professionals during the 2000s.  
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trillion yen in 2010 due to the influence of the GFC as well as both the weak 
demand for and the distrust in securitised products.107  
     All of the US CRAs have substantially scaled back their operations in Japan 
since 2009 because of their previous heavy dependence on earnings from 
securitisation ratings, which compensated for losses from corporate credit ratings 
before the GFC, and the diminished prospect of corporate credit ratings in Japan. 
Both R&I and JCR covered approximately 60% of all of the Japanese corporate 
borrowers (1,081) with credit ratings as of July 2007, while each of the three 
American CRAs (Moody’s, S&P and Fitch) covered merely 15% to 25% 
(Kurosawa 2007: 7). The coverage of both Moody’s and S&P has contracted 
substantially since the GFC.  
     I argue the local Japanese CRAs have more ‘public-oriented’ characteristics 
than the American CRAs. For instance, they make more effort to expand and 
maintain their domestic market share than the American agencies, which 
emphasise their own profitability and responsibility to investors. Nobuyuki Ito, 
CEO of R&I, which has a leading domestic market share along with JCR, boasted 
of its ‘national flag’ CRA status and its position as the most trusted and most 
frequently used CRA in Japan, in his remarks at the ceremony held in 2015 to 
mark 40 years since the foundation of JBRI (Rating and Investment Information 
2015: 5). JCR has aggressively expanded its ratings coverage by providing 
generous credit ratings relative to R&I. JCR is also known for its close ties with 
the government.  
     The following arguments made by Makoto Utsumi, CEO of JCR and former 
Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs, at the European Parliament 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs in January 2012 highlight the 
contrasting perspectives of the American and Japanese CRAs (Utsumi 2012: 21 -
2). Firstly, while the US CRAs seem not to be concerned with the survival of the 
                                                   
107  Statistics from the Japan Securities Dealers Association and the Japanese Bankers 
Association. 
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companies and countries they rate, JCR remains very cautious about downgrading 
issuers whose survival might be jeopardised and carefully avoids simply 
following or accelerating the market trend. Secondly, CRAs should fully 
understand the political and social structure as well as the corporate culture of 
the country where they are engaged in rating business. Lastly, although CRAs are 
privately owned, they should be endowed with an aspect of public goods, and 
consequently public responsibility, because their ratings exert a significant 
influence on the market, the fate of a nation and the fate of so many people. 
Utsumi has criticised US CRAs for neglecting the policy initiative, its underlying 
determination of the policymakers and the endurance of the people when 
assessing Euro-zone countries’ sovereign debts.  
     Utsumi’s first argument conflicts with the CRAs’ fiduciary responsibility to 
investors – if a CRA’s downgrading of a certain bond is delayed, this will increase 
the damage to its bondholders –  although his perspective might be partially 
justified only if strong systemic support is extended for wide-ranging debt issuers. 
Japanese corporate management and related parties’ (including accounting 
offices and CRAs) underdeveloped sense of fiduciary responsibility to investors, 
in favour of systemic support and in-group favouritism, has impeded the 
development of general trust in the financial market and consequently financial 
disintermediation. However, Utsumi’s second and third arguments should be 
heeded by the US CRAs, whose behaviour and judgement tend to be affected by 
US centric norms and synchronic mentality.  Such US centric norms and 
synchronic mentality (i.e., shareholder and financial capitalism) have clashed 
with Japanese social norms, which are centred on systemic support and in-group 
favouritism. Nevertheless, Utsumi failed to point out the possibility that systemic 
risk associated with excessive systemic support can cause enormous damage to 
the political economic system, as witnessed in the catastrophic downgrading of 
some European countries’ sovereign and bank debts.  
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4.4 The Rise and Fall of the US Agencies’ Power in Japan  
Why have the Japanese local CRAs managed to survive and enhance their 
legitimacy despite their challenging situation in the mid to late-1990s? Why have 
their US rivals failed to be dominant and been recently marginalised in the 
Japanese market regardless of their global brand power? Two of the three local 
CRAs, NIS and JCR, received significant support from MOF and local financial 
institutions at the time of their establishment. However, this is not a major reason 
for the US raters’ diminished influence in Japan given the following three points. 
Firstly, during the 1980s, these raters were welcomed by many Japanese banks 
and companies who enjoyed very high credit ratings. Secondly, their drastic 
downgradings of Japanese borrowers enhanced the influence of Moody’s and 
S&P in the 1990s. Lastly, heavy criticism of MOF, the shift in the financial 
authorities’ relationship with financial institutions to rule-based arm’s-length and 
the banking industry’s diminished power in the mid- to late 1990s made it 
difficult for them to control the local CRAs. Japanese media and commentators 
asserted in 1997 that Moody’s downgrading struck a death knell for Yamaichi 
Securities, one of Japan’s four largest securities firms, whose failure marked the 
beginning of the late 1990s financial crisis (Yamazawa 2003: 23; Shima 2006: 
128-9; Motoyama 2008: 66). As the merger of JBRI and NIS to form R&I in 1998 
indicated, local CRAs were threatened by the US CRAs’ global brand power and 
growing influence in Japan during the mid- to late 1990s. However, the massive 
downgradings have made Japanese banks and companies increasingly disgusted 
with the American agencies, while due to systemic support, fewer Japanese 
companies have gone bankrupt than the downgradings suggested.  
     Following the bursting of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, a bad debt 
problem of an unprecedented size and a series of scandals surrounding MOF, both 
of which were by-products of excessive systemic support, caused the post -war 
financial system to malfunction and the financial convoy to ultimately collapse 
in 1997. In the mid-1990s, MOF, with its wide jurisdiction comprising public 
budgeting and finance, taxation, tariffs and customs, national property, 
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supervision of the banking and securities industries and international finance, 
faced both increasing criticism regarding its excessive power concentration and 
relentless pressure to break up the mighty ministry, which were intensified by 
successive financial issues including the failure of both Hyogo Bank and Kizu 
Credit Union, the Daiwa Bank scandal, the resultant emergence of the ‘Japan 
premium’108 in overseas financial markets, the ‘wining and dining scandals’ and 
the Jusen (housing loan company) problem, in which both banks and MOF were 
involved (Nishimura 1999: 183-5; Toya 2006: 126).  
     When Prime Minister Hashimoto announced the Japanese Financial Big Bang 
deregulation in November 1996, most commentators and even MOF expected the 
banking industry to be bi-polarised into strong and weak banks and consolidated 
(Shima 2006: 93-7). Both Hyogo Bank and Kizu Credit Union were relatively 
small financial institutions, but their failure in 1995 signalled the beginning of 
the financial convoy’s collapse. More importantly, the Daiwa Bank scandal made 
overseas investors and the American CRAs call both Japanese banks’ risk 
management capability and MOF’s supervisory power over the banking industry 
into question. In November 1995, the US financial authorities ordered Daiwa 
Bank, a major Japanese bank, to close its US operations within three months, 
owing to the bank illegally covering up US$ 1.1 billion of trading losses in its 
New York branch. However, the size of the Japanese banks’ bad debts was far 
larger than that of this trading loss. The Japan premium from late 1995 until 1998 
reflected overseas financial institutions’ concerns not only over the 
creditworthiness of Japanese banks but also over both the ability and willingness 
of Japanese financial authorities to cope with the bad debt problems.  
     Domestically, the public questioned the integrity and ethics of  MOF officials 
due to the wining and dining scandals involving unscrupulous financiers and the 
Jusen dispute at the Diet in 1995 (Toya 2006: 118).   Whilst many retired MOF 
                                                   
108 The Japan premium was the difference in funding costs between Japanese banks and 
other international banks. 
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officials were involved in the seven insolvent Jusens, which were under the 
ministry’s supervision, the banks were the leading shareholders (founding 
institutions) of, and main lenders to, the majority of these Jusens which had huge 
exposure to distressed property developers. The liquidation of the Jusens required 
approximately 700 billion yen of public money to be injected in order to alleviate 
the losses of agricultural cooperatives, which had also had substantial exposure 
to the Jusens because MOF and Ministry of Agricultural, Fisheries and Forestry 
officials had secretly exchanged an ambiguous memorandum that could be 
interpreted as the founding institutions (mostly banks), backed by MOF, 
guaranteeing that the agricultural cooperatives would be provided with special 
treatment. Naturally, this invited severe criticism of both MOF and banks from 
the public and the media.  
     The Japanese Financial Big Bang planned to make Japan’s financial markets 
‘free, fair and global’ in line with global (i.e., American) standards. Following 
the announcement by Hashimoto, MOF rolled out the Big Bang plan in June 1997. 
The ministry stated that better use of the household sector’s 1,200 trillion yen of 
financial assets and preventing the Tokyo financial market from ‘hollowing out’ 
were the main reasons for the deregulation (Hoshi and Kashyap 2001: 289). 
Modelled on the UK’s 1986 initiative, the deregulation plan had five core themes: 
i) the liberalisation of transaction fees, ii) the lifting of the ban on financial 
holding companies to pave the way for ‘financial conglomerates’, iii) the 
termination of the convoy regulation to let less competitive firms to go out of 
business, iv) a reduction in administrative guidance by enhancing regulative 
transparency, and v) yen internationalisation (Malcolm 2001: 109-10). These 
themes clearly conflicted with systemic support and in-group favouritism. The 
key measures of the deregulation plan included: 1) the liberalisation of 
international capital transactions, 2) the liberalisation of financial products such 
as securities, investment trusts, derivatives and asset -backed securities 
(securitisation), 3) the deregulation of cross-entry into banking, trust banking, 
securities and insurance businesses, 4) the liberalisation of bond issuance for 
183 
 
commercial banks and non-banks, 5) the liberalisation of foreign exchange 
business, 6) the harmonisation of accounting standards with international 
practices, 7) stricter disclosure rules for banks and securities firms, and 8) the 
establishment of the FSA (Toya 2006: 120-8).     
     Prime Minister Hashimoto took a political initiative with the Big Bang in 
regard to its timing and scope, but most of the deregulation plan was created by 
MOF. Toya contends that MOF decided to try and regain public trust by 
supporting the measures, which had a negative impact on its own organisation 
and constituency (financial institutions) interests but was beneficial to the 
economy as a whole (ibid.: 178). Both MOF’s credibility in the supervision of 
financial institutions and the legitimacy of its concentrated power deteriorated 
due to the bad debt problem and the successive scandals during the mid-1990s. 
In 1995, Asahi Shimbun was the first media outlet to call for the ‘MOF breakup’ 
in an editorial and others quickly followed suit (Malcolm 2001: 92). All of the 
political parties, the media and the general public attacked the ministry at that 
time (Toya 2006: 177). Although the financial convoy was a linchpin of the 
systemic support within the Japanese political economy, the convoy collapsed 
immediately after the announcement of Japan’s financial Big Bang deregulation. 
In hindsight, the timing of Japan’s financial Big Bang could not have been worse. 
Both MOF and the LDP underestimated the size of the huge bad debts in the 
Japanese banking sector at the time of the deregulation announcement, due partly 
to the unexpectedly long and steep decline in property values. MOF and the 
banking sector were squeezed by both the financial deregulation and the 
mounting bad debt problem (Nishimura 1999: 168).  
     The financial deregulation and the public opposition to public capital 
injections into distressed financial institutions hindered MOF from providing 
strong systemic support for them. The Hashimoto administration decided to 
withdraw the financial inspection and supervisory responsibilities from MOF and 
shift them to the newly established FSA. However, as of 1997, few people in 
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Japan recognised that what was happening to the Japanese financial system was 
not a crisis of weak financial institutions but a systemic crisis (Shima 2006: 122 -
6). The general public did not clearly understand how the bad debt problem would 
affect the entire economy and their jobs and livings. Even MOF, which was kept 
at bay, did not fully grasp the actual size of bad debt of the banking industry and 
had to prioritise its own organisation survival in the mid-1990s. In November 
1997, the serial failures of Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and 
Yamaichi Securities took place. These failures indicated the collapse of the 
financial convoy. In addition, numerous construction companies and property 
developers went bankrupt, and corporate bonds issued by several companies 
including Yaohan (a supermarket chain) went into default in 1997 and 1998. 
Japanese people no longer felt certain about systemic support during this period.  
     However, the collapse of the financial convoy and the numerous major 
corporate bankruptcies did not necessarily mean the termination of systemic 
support. Banks often conducted out-of-court debt restructuring as debt 
forgiveness and debt-for-equity swaps109 in order to avoid borrowers’ bankruptcy. 
The banks implemented such debt restructuring partly because of pressure from 
the LDP to keep its key constituencies such as the construction industry. The 
LDP-led coalition under the Mori administration (2000-1) pressured banks to 
forgive loans, whilst such direct disposal of bad debts was preferred by LDP 
politicians, as this prevented companies whose executives and employees 
represented electoral constituencies from bankruptcy (Amyx 2004: 243). 
However, banks themselves sometimes chose a relatively small amount of out-
of-court debt restructuring in order to curb a larger impairment on their own 
equity capital associated with bankruptcy proceedings. However, debt 
restructuring was criticised under the Koizumi administration on the basis that 
                                                   
109 Whilst debt forgiveness (or waiver) means that creditors voluntarily waive all or part of 
a debtor’s obligations for debt repayment, a debt for equity swap is a transaction in which 
all or part of a debtor’s debt is exchanged for its equity to alleviate the debt repayment 
burden. 
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debt relief to a distressed company would provide that company with an undue 
advantage vis-à-vis its competitors without such bank support (ibid.: 244).   
     MOF lost its initiative to stabilise the financial system as the ministry was 
under attack owing to the ‘excessive’ wining and dining of MOF officials 
provided by financial institutions in exchange for favours and confidential 
information, which was revealed in early 1998 and resulted in the arrest of five 
officials and the resignation of the finance minister, the BOJ governor, the 
administrative vice minister of finance and the director-generals of both the 
banking and securities bureaus (Nishimura 1999: 183-7).  Furthermore, as Hoshi 
and Kashyap (2001: 275) maintain, ‘the Big Bang blew much of the convoy 
system out of the water’. Although the government belatedly injected 2 trillion 
yen of public capital into 21 banks in March 1998, it could not fully stabilise the 
financial system.  Both the LTCB and the Nippon Credit Bank were relentlessly 
attacked by the financial market, and the respective banks were forced to be 
temporarily nationalised in October and December 1998. Japanese society finally 
realised that the financial crisis was not a problem only for the financial sector, 
and that the entire economy would be dragged into it. At last, in March 1999, 7 
trillion yen of public capital injected into the banking industry contained the 
financial crisis, but even this injection could not fully resolve the bad debt 
problem. 
     The diminished power of both MOF and the banking industry weakened the 
systemic support and enhanced the influence of the US CRAs in the Japanese 
political economy.  Japan’s financial Big Bang triggered the emphasis on ‘self -
responsibility’ for risk taking by companies and investors (i.e., the denial of risk 
socialisation or systemic support) in Japan during the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
This type of neoliberal perspective was promoted by an increasing number of 
‘reformist’ politicians, bureaucrats, economists, corporate executives and 
journalists, particularly those with study and work experience in the US. They 
thought that the convergence of Japan’s financial system and corporate 
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governance to American standards was needed in order to improve its economic 
conditions. Although there were no frequent major bankruptcies between the 
1950s and the 1980s, according to Tokyo Shoko Research, a credit information 
provider, the aggregate annual amount of liabilities held by bankrupt companies 
consecutively exceeded 10 trillion yen from 1997 until 2003. Many scholars and 
credit market professionals consider that the ‘real’ Japanese credit market came 
into existence in 1997, when credit risk was painfully perceived for the first time 
and credit risk premiums on Japanese corporate bonds started differentiating each 
other according to their creditworthiness (Shima 2006: 140-4; Gotoh 2014: 6-8). 
The largest corporate bond default in Japan, of 350 billion yen, was marked by 
Mycal in September 2001, and the default hurt countless institutional and 
individual investors. 
     The receded systemic support in Japan provided a conducive environment for 
the US CRAs, and both Moody’s and S&P wielded a significant influence in Japan 
during the late 1990s. The aggregate amount of domestic corporate bond issuance 
in 1998 exceeded 12 trillion yen, nearly double that of the previous year, due to 
the credit crunch caused by the banking crisis. Although the total amount of 
corporate bonds issued in 1999 plummeted to slightly less than 7 trillion yen 
because of the stabilised banking industry boosted by the massive public capital 
injections, corporate bond issuance increased again in 2000 and 2001, thanks to 
the law enacted in 1999 enabling non-banks to access the bond market. Whilst 
relatively creditworthy non-banks started issuing straight bonds, less 
creditworthy ones relied on securitisation. The securitisation rating business in 
Japan rapidly increased from the late 1990s, which financially contributed to the 
US CRAs’ Japan operations. Besides, Japanese investors expanded their purchase 
of structured finance products originated in the US. Both enormous bad debts 
held by Japanese banks and securitisation were lucrative business opportunities 
for American and European investment banks’ Japan offices, which expanded 
their operations swiftly.       
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     The late 1990s financial crisis temporarily created the myth that Moody’s and 
S&P exerted a great deal of influence in Japan. Already, in 1995, Moody’s 
provided the lowest bank financial strength rating (i.e., creditworthiness without 
taking into account state support) for Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. Some Japanese 
media reported that the failure of Yamaichi Securities was triggered by Moody’s 
downgrading of its rating (Yamazawa 2003: 23). Such anecdotes built up various 
myths over the US CRAs – for example, these agencies could acquire secret 
information that ordinary investors could not, or these agencies were involved in 
conspiracies with overseas governments, companies and investors against  Japan 
and its companies (Shima 2006: 128-30; Matsuda 2011a). However, such things 
as critical information only obtained by the US CRAs and their involvement in 
conspiracies were unlikely, and these myths were generated by uncertainty and 
anxiety for Japanese society when systemic support was receded. In terms of the 
deterioration in Yamaichi Securities’ financial conditions, Moody’s downgrading 
was nothing but ratification after the fact (Shima 2006: 128-9). 
     The stagnant growth of the Japanese credit rating business and the strong 
brand power of the American CRAs forced the three local CRAs to consolidate 
into two – JBRI and NIS merged to establish R&I in 1998. Before the merger, the 
market shares of the CRAs in the Japanese credit rating industry in descending 
order was JBRI, NIS, JCR and then the US CRAs, but higher market shares did 
not necessarily indicate a stronger influence or higher profitability. Yoshihiro 
Hayakawa states that although there was a plan to integrate all three local CRAs 
into one, it failed.110 Although Moody’s and S&P’s rating universes in Japan were 
smaller than those of the local CRAs, the American CRAs had more market 
influence in the late 1990s. When an unprecedented number of large firms, which 
were not rated by the US CRAs except for Mycal though, went bankrupt owing 
to the weakened systemic support from the late 1990s until the early 2000s, even 
                                                   
110 Interview with Yoshihiro Hayakawa, chairman of the audit & supervisory board at the 
Nikkei and former managing director at R&I, in November 2015  
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the local CRAs had to follow the American agencies and implement massive 
downgradings for Japanese financial institutions and firms.    
     The US CRAs’ strong influence in Japan was maintained to some extent by 
the receded systemic support and frequent bankruptcies in the early 2000s, but 
the myths over these agencies started fading during this period. With regard to 
the failure of Mycal in September 2001, no CRAs, including both Moody’s and 
S&P, could expect the Japanese retailer to go bankrupt in the near future even as 
of the beginning of 2001. Moreover, the bankruptcy of Enron, a large American 
energy company, in December 2001, significantly tarnished the credibility of the 
US CRAs – neither Moody’s, nor S&P nor Fitch could detect its accounting fraud 
regarding its enormous off-balance-sheet transactions, and all of them assigned 
Enron a relatively high BBB (Baa) rating even as at the end of October 2001. 
When the energy company filed for the application of Chapter 11, its total 
liabilities reached 31 billion US dollars, but this figure could have been larger if 
all of the off-balance-sheet liabilities had been added. Because Enron’s euro-yen 
bonds of 105 billion yen defaulted and hurt many Japanese investors, the 
American CRAs’ reputation was damaged not only in the US but also in Japan. 
Many Japanese people realised that these agencies did not have a crystal ball or 
magic wand. 
     Nevertheless, even larger damage against the American CRAs was caused by 
the resurgence of systemic support in the mid-2000s. During the early 2000s, the 
bad debt problem of the banking industry was far from over. Based on their 
analysis of the insufficient attempt to contain the late 1990s financial crisis, the 
government and the BOJ made the following successive efforts to prevent another 
financial crisis: 1) the introduction and expansion of quantitative monetary 
easing in 2001; 2) the implementation of the Financial Revitalisation Programme 
(the so-called ‘Takenaka plan’) from 2002-2004 to accelerate the write-off of bad 
debts with rigorous bank inspection and public capital injections; 3) the 
establishment of the IRCJ, a government-backed corporate restructuring fund, in 
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2003; and 4) the bailout of Resona Bank in 2003.  These measures drastically 
reduced the bad debts and major bankruptcies, and consequently the banking 
system regained its stability in the mid-2000s. Although a number of major firms, 
such as Sojitz (a general trading house), Isuzu Motors and Mitsubishi Motors, 
faced financial difficulties in the mid-2000s, most of them were rescued. There 
was no major default of publicly placed corporate bonds from Apri l 2002 to May 
2008 when it was difficult for investors in the Japanese credit market to perceive 
credit risk, which was a negative development for the American agencies.  
     Many Japanese banks and companies enjoyed very high (in hindsight 
excessively high) credit ratings from the US CRAs in the 1980s, but their ratings 
were downgraded more drastically by the American raters than the local ones 
after the bursting of the bubble economy. This massive downgrading made 
Japanese banks and companies antagonistic towards the US CRAs, and due to the 
resurged systemic support, fewer Japanese companies went bankrupt than the 
American agencies’ low credit ratings suggested, which damaged the American 
CRAs’ credibility in Japan. Merely four Japanese borrowers, among which only 
Mycal was rated by American agencies, caused defaults of publicly placed bonds 
larger than 10 billion yen from 1997 to 2004. These factors led to some borrowers’ 
termination of rating solicitation for, or refusal to communicate with, the 
American CRAs as well as local investors’ discontinuance of information 
subscription from these agencies. Matsuda (2011b) claims that Japan traditionally 
does not have a culture of disclosing negative information (e.g., low credit ratings 
and downgrading), which can threaten stability and security from a Japanese 
viewpoint. Such Japanese corporate behaviour reflects their strong inclination for 
strong ties (in-group favouritism), a prevention orientation and guardian morals, 
which prioritise loyalty over fairness (including fiduciary responsibility to 
investors).  
     The fewer-than-expected major bankruptcies and the dwindled credit risk 
perception (i.e., the resurged systemic support) lowered the American CRAs’ 
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influence in the Japanese market from the mid-2000s onwards. The American 
raters tried to cultivate a high-yield bond market in Japan but in vain. This was 
because of Japanese investors’ risk averse nature and excess funds at banks 
leading to cheap loans for less creditworthy companies. Most Japanese consumers 
believe in strong systemic support for the banking industry so bank deposits still 
account for over 50% of the household sector’s aggregate financial assets, which 
is an obstacle to disintermediation. Furthermore, the weak demand for corporate 
credit ratings and fierce competition have caused significant discounts in ratings 
fees, making corporate credit rating business in Japan less profitable. Although 
earnings from profitable securitisation ratings compensated the US CRAs’ Japan 
operations for losses associated with corporate ratings from the late 1990s until 
2006, the 2006 revised Money Lending Law caused immense damage to the non-
banking industry, a major user of securitisation in Japan. Subsequently, the GFC 
fatally impaired the credibility of both securitisation ratings and the American 
CRAs in Japan.  
 
4.5 Credit Rating as an Ideational Battlefield  
As the previous sections of this chapter illustrate, systemic support has been the 
largest obstacle to the convergence of the Japanese credit market towards  the 
American credit rating orthodoxy. The Kisaikai  regime reflected the endogenous 
Japanese social relations and norms, centred on systemic support and in -group 
favouritism. The ethos of the regime (e.g., the exclusion of default risk by 
systemic support) has remained within the ‘mental framework’ of both debt 
issuers and investors to some extent even since the Kisaikai  was abolished in 
1996. Yoshio Shima maintains that the US CRAs were influential in Japan from 
the mid-1990s until the early 2000s, when MOF and the banking industry lost 
power, but these agencies’ influence has waned since the banks regained power 
in the mid-2000s after public capital injections and bad debt disposal. 111  Credit 
                                                   
111 Interview with Professor Yoshio Shima in November 2015  
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rating in Japan is an ideational battlefield between the market l iberalisation and 
anti-free market camps within Japan, which will be discussed further in the next 
chapter. Furthermore, the banking sector’s recovery led to a resurgence of 
systemic support, which is central to Japanese society’s anti -free market norms. 
Even today, what many Japanese debt issuers and investors actually desire credit 
ratings for is security of assurance rather than objective risk assessment – debt 
issuers would like to secure stable access to the corporate bond market, while 
investors hope for security from bond default risk. As long as systemic support 
and in-group favouritism remain, even if Japan tries to import Anglo-Saxon style 
financial and corporate governance, such governance does not really fit its 
society and political economic system. 
     Both the Japanese financial market and corporate society have a strong 
preference for long-term relations, while Japanese financial institutions and firms 
are generally reluctant to accept monitoring from the outside at ordinary times 
but ask for systemic support in times of crisis. At the late stage of WWII, 
corporate management obtained a freehand from the government, shareholders 
and banks after the failed attempts to maximise industrial output through state 
control, and employees acquired significant power within these organisations 
(Okazaki 1993: 118-20). Post-war Japanese financial institutions and firms 
inherited such characteristics, and the government and society had a consensus 
on employment maintenance. Although Japanese people generally do not prefer 
the survival of the fittest in corporate society due to the inflexible market, it has 
been increasingly difficult to maintain long-term employment since the bursting 
of the bubble economy. The failure of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in 1998 caused 
more devastating damage to the economy of Hokkaido 112 than was originally 
expected, whereas the case of Ripplewood Holdings, an American private equity 
                                                   
112 Hokkaido is the second largest and third most populated island in Japan.  
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firm, plundering the nationalised LTCB, traumatised the Japanese elites. 113 Such 
events have made the elites reluctant to let banks and large firms go bankrupt.  
     A major side-effect of systemic support (risk socialisation) is the lack of 
individual actors’ accountability, which can ultimately generate systemic risk, as 
observed in Japan’s bubble economy and its subsequent burst. The Japanese 
financial system experienced serious systemic risk in the 1990s, and the 
government tried to transform it to capital market-based. However, the highly 
public characteristic of the Japanese banks has clashed with market liberalisation, 
whilst the backlash against financial globalisation and capitalist restructuring 
since 2006 has hindered the transformation. Furthermore, the securities industry 
could not become a counterweight against the banking industry because the 
former failed to obtain support from the financial authorities and trust from the 
general public. Although Japanese social norms have resisted the convergence to 
Anglo-Saxon style financial capitalism, some Japanese people, particularly 
younger ones, are disconnected from the traditional norms. Nevertheless, 
according to Yamagishi, even if some people reject the social norms, they cannot 
be certain of whether other people have also rejected the norms so they can hardly 
change their behaviour; this is called ‘pluralistic ignorance’ in social 
psychology.114 Furthermore, some practitioners argue that the key currency status 
of the British Pound and US Dollar and the international use of English facilitated 
the UK and US capital markets mitigating systemic risk within  the banking sector 
through risk transfer to countless third parties, but Japan lacks these 
advantages.115   
                                                   
113 Interview with Mikihide Katsumata, President and COO of the Innovation Network 
Corporation of Japan, in November 2015  
114 Interview with Professor Toshio Yamagishi in November 2015  
115 Interviews with Professor Yoshitake Masuhara at Hiroshima University of Economics 
(previously a Member of the House of the Representatives and a high ranked MOF official) 
and Yasuyuki Kuratsu, CEO of Research and Pricing Technologies (former managing 
director at Chase Manhattan Bank), in November 2015.  
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    The mental framework of the US credit rating orthodoxy is regarded as 
synchronic, whereas the US CRAs should be viewed as a nerve centre of financial 
globalisation under neoliberal hegemony (Sinclair 2005: 69). Synchronic 
financing has a high affinity to networks of weak ties, a promotion orientation 
and commercial morals. The synchronic characteristic of the US CRAs has been 
strengthened by financial activities such as leveraged buyouts, securitisation and 
financing for less industrialised countries, which have significantly expanded 
since the 1980s. In contrast, Japanese people generally have a strong preference 
for diachronic financing, which is closely associated with networks of strong ties 
(in-group favouritism), a prevention orientation and guardian morals (including 
systemic support). They believe that financing should not become an end as 
merely money making but should contribute to the real  economy. The neoliberal 
policy under the Hashimoto and Koizumi administrations, which was a threat to 
traditional social relations and norms, and the GFC have justified Japanese 
society’s strong sense of repulsion towards synchronic financing aligned with  
Anglo-Saxon style financial capitalism.  
     Although the US raters’ power in the Japanese credit market, and its entire 
political economy, was enhanced during the mid- to late 1990s when the banking 
industry, the linchpin of the traditional Japanese financial system, was in crisis, 
its influence has waned due to the persistence of systemic support, central to 
Japanese society’s anti-liberal, anti-free market norms and the recovery of the 
banking industry since the mid-2000s. In contrast, the local CRAs’ legitimacy 
and utilisation within the Japanese credit market have increased, as these agencies 
take systemic support into consideration in their credit ratings to a greater extent 
than their US rivals – the local CRAs’ ratings are closer to Japanese social norms 
and less conflicting with debt issuers. The essence of the local CRAs could be 
defined as a hybrid of the Kisaikai regime and the American CRA model. More 
importantly, the US credit rating orthodoxy aligned with Anglo-Saxon financial 
capitalism has been at odds with the Japanese credit market, which is still 
spellbound by the remnants of the Kisaikai regime. Consequently, the size of the 
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credit rating business in Japan has been constrained by such remnants as risk 
aversion and status quo orientation, although securitisation ratings temporarily 
boomed from the late 1990s until 2006. The US CRAs have scaled back their 
Japan operations because of the low profitability of the Japanese credit rating 
industry, while their local peers have continued to compete with the support of 
their shareholders. Although the US CRAs’ influence in Japan has dwindled, the 
local CRAs are far from real winners. The former have underrated the persistence 
of systemic support for large firms, while the latter may underestimate the long-
term systemic risk of the Japanese financial system.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on an ideational conflict between the American and 
local Japanese CRAs, which belong to the respective market liberalisation and 
anti-free market camps. Although the business size of CRAs in Japan is much 
smaller than that of commercial banks and securities firms, the American and 
Japanese CRAs can be regarded as key ‘ideational platforms’ of these camps. 
Such ideational platforms spread out ideas, norms and practices to certain social 
groups and broader society. The American CRAs have spearheaded financial 
globalisation (i.e., Anglo-Saxon financial hegemony), disseminating synchronic 
financing, which is aligned with Anglo-Saxon society’s orientation for weak ties, 
promotion and commercial morals, in many countries since the mid -1980s. 
     The Kisaikai, dominated by both MOF and the banking industry, displayed 
the continuity of Japanese political economy between the wartime and post -war 
periods as well as Japanese society’s preference for diachronic financing, which 
is linked with its orientation for strong ties, prevention and guardian morals. The 
Japanese CRAs have inherited these characteristics from the Kisaikai, and taken 
a greater degree of systemic support into consideration in credit ratings for 
Japanese borrowers than the American peers. Japanese banks, most bond 
investors and issuers and MOF, which all belong to the anti -free market camp, 
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have been concerned about risk of synchronic financing (i.e.,  capitalist 
dominance) severing strong ties connecting them together. Material interests of 
these elites are intertwined with Japanese social norms, which are their tools to 
dominate subordinates. 
     The enormous bad debt problem, the financial crisis, the prolonged economic 
slump and the political scandals relatively weakened the power of Japanese anti -
free market elites, enfeebling systemic support for financially troubled 
companies and financial institutions and strengthening the influence of the 
American CRAs in Japan from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. The collapse of 
the financial convoy made the American CRAs anticipate the convergence of the 
Japanese credit market to Anglo-Saxon ones. However, despite the relative power 
decline of anti-free market elites, subordinate groups in Japan have continued to 
ask for systemic support, and the massive public capital injections due to the 
public call for stability have revived the banking industry, leading to the 
resurgence of systemic support since the mid-2000s. This proves the significance 
of subordinates’ consent to social norms created and promoted by dominant elites, 
which makes a historic block durable.   
     The American CRAs’ synchronic mental framework focusing on short -term 
profit and their underestimation of the persistence of systemic support in Japan 
contributed to their deteriorated credibility in Japan. The GFC significantly 
enhanced Japanese society’s antipathy towards the American CRAs and 
synchronic financing.  The American credit rating orthodoxy is at odds with 
Japanese social norms, and the influence of the American CRAs in Japan has 
waned despite their global brand and superior business resources since the mid-
2000s. Put it differently, persistent Japanese anti-liberal, anti-free market social 
norms have struck back these agencies and resisted Anglo-Saxon financial 
practices. 
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Chapter 5: Japan’s Ideational Developments and Corporate 
Governance  
 
The rise and fall of the US CRAs’ influence in Japan are associated with wider 
ideational developments, neoliberal reform and the subsequent anti-neoliberal 
backlash. As discussed in Chapter 4, the rise of the American CRAs’ power from 
the mid-1990s until the early 2000s reflected the deteriorated legitimacy of the 
anti-free market camp and the growing influence of neoliberalism, whereas the 
fall of the agencies’ power since the mid-2000s indicates an anti-neoliberal 
backlash. This chapter discusses the ideational contestation between the two 
major industrial associations (business lobbies) from the early 1990s to the mid -
2000s, the persistent systemic support and in-group favouritism in Japanese 
corporate governance under financial globalisation, and the dynamics between 
the equity and credit markets. Major industrial associations have played roles of 
ideational platforms in the Japanese corporate community.  An ideational conflict 
within the Japanese elites between the market liberalisation and anti -free market 
camps can be witnessed not only in the rivalry between the American and 
Japanese CRAs but also in that between the two major industrial associations.  
 
5.1 Ideational Conflict within the Japanese Elite  
Watanabe (2007: 296-318) contends that the Nakasone administration (1982-7) 
made only a preliminary attempt at neoliberal reform, while the beginning of 
neoliberal policy in Japan was observed under the Hosokawa administration 
(1993-4), which launched fiscal restructuring and electoral reforms to combat the 
political corruption and pork-barrel politics after the bursting of the bubble 
economy and the LDP’s defeat.  Afterwards, extensive economic reforms, such 
as deregulation in the financial, telecommunication and retail sectors, a reduction 
in public work, and privatisation of the postal savings system and the highway 
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building authority, were implemented under the Hashimoto (1996-8) and Koizumi 
(2001-6) administrations. Furthermore, capitalist restructuring was conducted in 
Japan during these periods. An ideational conflict within the dominant elites 
between the market liberalisation and anti-free market camps was witnessed from 
the early 1990s until the mid-2000s – the former camp consisted of market-
oriented bureaucrats, reformist politicians, neoclassical economists, Doyukai (a 
neoliberal-oriented industrial association), non-Japanese firms and the US CRAs, 
whilst the latter comprised interventionist bureaucrats, anti -free market 
politicians, Keidanren (the largest, conservative industrial association) , legal 
elites, banks and the local CRAs.   
     Japanese economic bureaucracy is not ideologically monolithic because of the 
bureaucrats’ divergent views on market economy as well as the interests of the 
bureaus, which tend to be prioritised over those of entire ministries. For instance, 
METI has long witnessed an internal conflict between the interventionist and 
framework-oriented (market-oriented) factions. Within the financial authorities, 
the BOJ is regarded as more market-oriented than the interventionist MOF 
(Brown 1994: 204), although both institutions have interventionist and market -
oriented factions. When the iron triangle between the LDP, bureaucracy and big 
business was dominant during the rapid economic growth period, the market -
oriented bureaucrats were powerless. However, with the rising public debt and 
the intensified trade friction with the US from the late 1970s, the market -oriented 
bureaucrats steadily gained influence. Subsequently, the bursting of the bubble 
economy, political scandals and the financial crisis impaired the legitimacy of 
both economic bureaucracy (particularly interventionists) and the LDP, and 
significantly boosted the influence of the market-oriented bureaucrats and 
reformist politicians. Many market-oriented elites have study and/or work 
experience in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
     While members of the anti-free market camp in Japan are connected by both 
formal (institutionalised) and informal (personal) ties, those of the market 
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liberalisation camp tend to rely more on informal ties. As anti-free market norms 
were long embedded in key institutions such as the LDP, economic bureaucracy 
and big business, market liberals within these institutions used to be a minority. 
However, with the erosion of the old regime, market liberals became influential 
and started collaborating beyond the boundaries of their institutions. For instance, 
according to Toya (2006: 156-60), Kiyoshi Mizuno and Yasuhisa Shiozaki, who 
led the LDP’s Administrative Reform Promotion Headquarters, and Eisuke 
Sakakibara, head of MOF’s International Financial Bureau, worked closely and 
contributed to the enactment of the Japanese Financial Big Bang. Doyukai has 
been a key platform for market liberal business leaders, executives of foreign -
capitalised firms and management consultants since the early 1990s. Under the 
Koizumi administration, Heizo Takenaka, an economics scholar and Minister of 
State for Economic and Fiscal Policy, and Yoshihiko Miyauchi, vice chairman of 
Doyukai and chairman of the Council for Regulatory Reform, promoted 
neoliberal restructuring. The two policy councils under the Cabinet Office, the 
Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy and the Council for Regulatory Reform, 
were also important ideational platforms where market -oriented business leaders 
and economists exercised their influence over policy making.  
     The market liberalisation camp was influential under the Hashimoto and 
Koizumi administrations. Public servants, bankers, farmers and small and 
medium-sized retail store owners, among others, were often seen as vested 
interest groups, while the average income of workers substantially declined from 
the late 1990s onwards. At first, many regular workers in the private sector 
probably considered themselves to have nothing to do with vested inte rests and 
supported the neoliberal reform, but subsequently they realised that their jobs 
were also protected by the old employment practices and regulations and that 
further market liberalisation could jeopardise them. Contrary to its neoliberal 
image, the Koizumi administration could not let many banks and large firms go 
bankrupt, and accordingly it injected a massive amount of public money into 
Resona Bank and established the IRCJ in 2003. These events demonstrate the 
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persistence of systemic support and the limit of neoliberal reform in Japan. Since 
2006, when the Koizumi administration ended, an anti-neoliberal backlash has 
been driven both by the anti-free market camp of dominant elites and by 
subordinate groups such as regular workers with lifetime employment contracts 
and SME owners.  These groups have criticised shareholder and financial 
capitalism as money worshipping – for instance, conservative corporate 
establishments despise upstarts, particularly those in the IT and non-banking 
sectors.  Keidanren refused membership to major consumer credit companies 
until November 2002, when their business became much larger than a decade 
previously due to the financial deregulation.116 
 
5.2 Industrial Associations Playing the Role of Ideational Platforms  
Nobuteru Kikuchi (2005: 9), an expert in Japanese industrial associations, defines 
an industrial association as a federation of companies or corporate executives 
that coordinates the interests and opinions of its members and exerts influence 
over the political economy. Japan has three major industrial associations: 1) 
Keidanren, which absorbed Nikkeiren, an industrial association specialised in 
management-labour relations, in May 2002, 2) Doyukai, and 3) Nissho (the Japan 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry), which is a network of local economic 
organisations mainly focusing on SMEs.117 Keidanren (founded in August 1946), 
Nikkeiren (April 1948), Doyukai (April 1946) and Nissho (September 1952) were 
all established in the early post-war period. Many large Japanese firms are 
members of both Keidanren and Doyukai, while the latter’s opinions and 
ideologies have changed drastically since its foundation, partly because of its 
personal (not corporate) membership of business leaders, unlike the former’s 
                                                   
116 The Mainichi Shimbun newspaper dated 12 November 2002  
117 Crump (2003) provides an empirical analysis of Nikkeiren, and sheds light on coercive 
class power, manipulation and mystification as features of capi talism in Japan, like 
elsewhere. 
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corporate membership. Doyukai comprises approximately 1,400 top executives 
of some 950 corporations, whereas Keidanren consists of about 1,350 member 
companies, 109 nationwide industrial associations and 47 regional economi c 
organisations. Doyukai has been basically pro-American throughout the last 
seven decades, and has been affected by US ideologies, starting with broad -
ranging Marxist thoughts including the New Dealers immediately after WWII, 
and neoliberalism since the 1980s.  
     Keidanren’s predecessor was Juuyou Sangyo Tousei Dantai Kyogikai (the 
Important Industry Control Council), an umbrella organisation of ‘control 
associations’, which assisted the government in controlling procurement from 
key industries, boosted collaboration between related key industries and 
promoted key industries to form cartels during WWII. Therefore, Keidanren 
naturally inherited an anti-free market idea. This largest industrial association 
has been centred on wide-ranging manufacturing industries with a large number 
of employees, which has made it difficult to change its ideational stance. In 
particular, the investment goods sector, including industries producing plant, 
machinery, equipment, raw materials (metals, chemicals, etc.) and civil 
engineering goods, which rapidly developed in the wartime controlled economy, 
has been politically vocal and significantly influenced economic policy and credit 
allocation by the government and financial institutions in Japan (Matsutani 2009:  
111-3; Teranishi 2003: 202-8). This has contributed to the prioritisation of 
producer interests over consumer interests. Importantly, until the mid-1990s, the 
government made enormous amounts of public investment in favour of 
investment goods manufacturers, resulting in a higher proportion of capital 
investment in Japan than in other economically advanced countries (Matsutani 
2009 : 112-3). 
     The prolonged economic stagnation after the bursting of the bubble economy 
and successive political scandals involving politicians and MOF officials made 
some groups of dominant elites convinced that the Japanese post-war economic 
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system needed to be changed, while the deregulation of industries such as finance, 
retail, transportation and telecommunications and the introduction of Anglo -
Saxon style business practices, including corporate restructuring, the active use 
of M&A, mark-to-market accounting, and pay-for-performance, executive officer 
and outside director systems were promoted during the 1990s and the first half 
of the 2000s. These movements created a schism between the market 
liberalisation and anti-free market camps.  
     From the demise of the LDP dominance in 1993 until the end of the Koizumi 
administration in 2006, generally speaking, Keidanren supported stakeholder 
capitalism and traditional Japanese style corporate governance (such as lifetime 
employment and in-group favouritism) although it proposed structural reform for 
the survival of big businesses and the reinvigoration of the Japanese economy. In 
contrast, the core members of Doyukai advocated shareholder capitalism and the 
necessity of a flexible labour market. Although the ideational demarcation 
between the two leading industrial associations was not necessarily clear owing 
to their membership overlap,118 I contend that the opinions of Keidanren, which 
reflected the interests of major industries and the whole business community, 
were based on collectivist perspectives, whereas those of Doyukai rested on 
individualist views. As Vogel (2006: 56-7) claims, Keidanren and Nikkeiren 
represented both the proponents and opponents of liberal reform so they had to 
arrange compromises between the two, which appeared somewhat favourable for 
potential losers from the reform. Even when Keidanren and Doyukai proposed 
deregulation, their purposes were sometimes different.  When many of i ts 
members encountered financial underperformance, Keidanren had to protect its 
core members through market liberalisation such as the deregulation of temporary 
employment and the lifting of small retail store protection at the expense of 
                                                   
118 For instance, Yoshihiro Inayama (chairman of Nippon Steel), Gaishi Hiraiwa (chairman 
of TEPCO) and Takashi Imai (chairman of Nippon Steel) actively participated in Doyukai 
before being elected as the respective fifth (1980-6), seventh (1990-4) and ninth (1998-
2002) chairmen of Keidanren.  
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outgroup members (including non-regular workers, SMEs, farmers and the public 
sector). Doyukai advocated market liberalisation based on its core members’ 
individual belief that it served the best interests of capitalists and the capitalist 
economy as a whole. 
     The pre-war industrial association, Nippon Keizai Renmeikai (the Japan 
Economic Federation), was not very influential, mainly because  of the dominant 
power of Zaibatsu conglomerates such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Yasuda 
and Furukawa and the subsequent state economic control. Keidanren has been 
influential as the largest industrial association in adjusting and coordinating the 
different interests of individual industries and firms to exert influence over the 
government due to the dissolution of Zaibatsu. In this respect, the chairman of 
Keidanren have principally come from major manufacturers independent of 
corporate groups such as Nippon Steel, Toshiba, Toyota Motor and Canon. 119 
Kikuchi (2005: 193) contends that these industrial associations’ power, which 
was established by the 1970s, originated from three activities. Firstly, they 
restricted a Zaibatsu style corporate governance system and established an 
economic structure in which the financial sector could not control the 
manufacturing sector. Secondly, the associations resolved problems within the 
business community by themselves and avoided intervention from bureaucrats 
and politicians. Lastly, they formed a system in which the business community 
could realise their demand for the LDP through political donations without falling 
into political collusion. 
     Interestingly, Kikuchi (ibid.: 45-6) claims that one major characteristic of 
Keidanren is that it is ‘liberal’, in that the manufacturing sector has been released 
from the yoke of the government and the financial sector, including Zaibatsu and 
                                                   
119  Paradoxically, this suggests that corporate groups such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui and 
Sumitomo have been influential even since the Zaibatsu dissolution, although these groups 
are only loose alliances among membership companies linked together by shared brand 
names, long-term business relationships and cross shareholdings, and are not tightly 
controlled by holding companies, unlike Zaibatsu.  
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the banks. This might be due to the personal beliefs and leadership of Taizo 
Ishizaka, the second chairman of Keidanren (1956-68) and president of Toshiba 
(1949-56), a major heavy electric machinery company. Ishizaka, who used to be 
with the Ministry of Communications and Transportation, was known for his 
dislike of bureaucracy. After expanding Dai-Ichi Life Insurance from the 
thirteenth to the second largest Japanese life insurance company during the pre -
war period, he successfully turned Toshiba around by settling the labour dispute 
and reducing the workforce by 20% (around 6,000) in 1949. This success brought 
Ishizaka the chairmanship of Keidanren. He took initiatives regarding the 
liberalisation of trade and the deregulation of foreign capital investment into 
Japan. Although Ishizaka was liberal for a Japanese business leader, he was not 
a proponent of shareholder capitalism and capital freedom – he took over the 
helm of Toshiba and tackled its restructuring at the request of Mitsui Bank, its 
main bank. Most leaders (chairmen and vice-chairmen) of Keidanren over the 
past seven decades have been internally promoted in their firms, and constrained 
by systemic support (e.g., the protection of subordinates) and in-group 
favouritism. 
     Even during the 1960s, the major banks and sometimes Keidanren were 
involved in the rescue of numerous large firms. Sheard (1994: 213-9) enumerated 
19 examples of main bank involvement in the restructuring of listed firms in the 
mid-1960s. Ten out of these rescued firms –– were members of Keidanren.120 In 
this respect, contrary to Kikuchi’s view, a number of Keidanren members 
depended on the financial sector. Furthermore, major corporate bailouts by main 
banks from the mid-1970s until the late 1980s included Daishowa Paper 
Manufacturing, Chisso Corporation (petro-chemicals), Hitachi Zosen 
(shipbuilding), Mazda Motor, Eidai Industries (housing construction), Ataka & 
Co. (a trading company), Kanematsu-Gosho (a trading company), Japan Line 
                                                   
120 They were Mitsui Chemical, Nitto Chemical, Maruzen Oil, Onoda Cement, Osaka Iron 
& Steel, Sanyo Special Steel, Nachi-Fujikoshi Corporation (industrial machinery), Fuji 
Heavy Industries (automobiles), Gosho (a trading company) and Yamaichi Securities.  
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(shipping) and Sanko Steamship (ibid.: 219-22). Hoshi and Kashyap (2001: 145) 
argue that the practice of banks bailing out financially troubled firms began in 
the occupation period and became a norm in the rapid economic growth period 
from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. 
     The restructuring of Maruzen Oil (currently Cosmo Oil), a major oi l refinery, 
from 1962 to 1965 was a politically interesting case that involved its main bank 
(Sanwa Bank, which is the BTMU at present), Keidanren and MITI. In May 1962, 
MITI agreed with the financially distressed Maruzen on the establishment of an 
advisory committee to discuss a long-term restructuring plan (Hoshi and Kashyap 
2001: 149-50). The advisory committee was chaired by Kougoro Uemura, vice 
chairman of Keidanren (1952-68), who became its third chairman (1968-74) after 
Ishizaka. The committee recommended the approval of Union Oil Company of 
California’s equity participation in Maruzen on the condition that the American 
company was not directly involved in Maruzen’s management and Maruzen’s top 
management resigned (ibid.). Both MITI and Maruzen accepted these 
recommendations, whilst Sanwa Bank dispatched its executive to Maruzen as its 
new president.  
     The Kokkai Gijiroku (Diet Record) on the 17 th Commerce and Industry 
Committee of the 43rd Diet (1963) reveals that Shunji Nakagawa, a Diet member, 
summoned Uemura and Kazuo Ueda, president of Sanwa Bank, to the diet 
regarding Maruzen’s restructuring on 15 March 1963. Nakagawa expressed his 
concern about financial capital’s growing inroads into industrial capital through 
seconding executives to management positions of industrial corporates, and 
criticised Uemura as a mediator of the business community for his excessive 
intervention in the management of private sector firms. Although Japanese 
manufacturers accepted Ishizaka’s liberalisation policy when they enjoyed rapid 
export-led growth, which started with the special procurement associated with 
the Korean War (1950-3) and a dollar-yen exchange rate that was favourable for 
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Japanese exporters, Uemura’s behaviour reflected Keidanren’s underlying anti -
free market ideology. 
     Another salient example of Keidanren’s support for its member companies 
was witnessed when TEPCO fell into a financial crisis due to the nuclear plant 
accident in March 2011. A month later, Hiromasa Yonekura, the 12 th chairman of 
both Keidanren (2010-4) and Sumitomo Chemical, asserted that the financial 
burden on TEPCO should be alleviated by the application of the exemption clause 
of the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage to the accident, which had been 
caused by an extraordinary earthquake, while the government should take 
responsibility for the compensation payments. 121 Keidanren also opposed the 
separation of electric power generation operations from power distribution and 
transmission operations, which would be a great threat to the monopoly of major 
power companies, and recommended that the government restart the suspended 
nuclear plants immediately despite their environmental risk. This stance made 
Rakuten, an electronic commerce and internet company, withdraw f rom 
Keidanren in June 2011. Hiroshi Mikitani, Chairman and CEO of Rakuten, 
commented that Keidanren was an organisation established to advocate a convoy 
system to provide protection for member firms and make the society believe that 
its perspective was Japanese common sense, and that, in this respect, it was 
different from Doyukai.122 This anecdote demonstrates Keidanren’s underlying 
anti-free market nature, which has hardly changed since the rapid economic 
growth period. 
     In contrast to Keidanren, Doyukai is less constrained by the common interests 
of the business community and key industries and tends to express its opinion 
more openly. The leaders of Doyukai do not necessarily come from specific 
industries or major companies, but two interesting tendencies can be observed. 
                                                   
121 The Nikkei dated 26 April 2011 
122 The 20 February 2012 issue of Nikkei Business 
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Many of Doyukai’s chairmen prior to the 1980s came from the public, utilities 
and banking sectors. 123 In contrast, since the 1980s, most of them – Takashi 
Ishihara (1985-91, Nissan Motor), Jiro Ushio (1995-9, Ushio Electric), Yotaro 
Kobayashi (1999-2003, Fuji Xerox), Kakutaro Kitashiro (2003-7, IBM Japan) 
and Masamitsu Sakurai (2007-11, Ricoh) – have been top management of 
internationally oriented firms. Kikuchi (2005: 29-37) describes ideational 
progressiveness and the incubation of future leaders for other industrial 
associations, including Keidanren and Nikkeiren, as key features of Doyukai.  
     In July 1947, Doyukai’s study group, led by Banjo Otsuka, published a 
research report entitled ‘A Draft Proposal for Democratising Enterprises – 
Modified Capitalist View’, which called for enterprise democratisation, the 
separation of enterprise ownership and management, and co-ownership of 
business enterprises by management, capital and labour (Keizai Doyukai 1947: 
2-9). Doyukai’s executive board declined to accept Otsuka’s perspective because 
of strong opposition from some members, but ‘modified capitalism’ became 
Doyukai’s ideational symbol. James Burnham (1941), an American political 
philosopher, argues that regardless of whether ownership is  corporate or 
governmental, with the separation of control and ownership of the means of 
production, the critical boundary between the dominant elites under the name of 
‘managers’ (such as business executives and bureaucrats), who will eliminate the 
old capitalist class, and the mass of society was control of the means of 
production rather than ownership. Otsuka’s modified capitalism and Burnham’s 
‘managerial revolution’ both separate control and ownership, but the former, 
which proposes an alliance between management, capital and labour, is different 
from the latter, which expects social dominance by managers or ‘administrators’ 
                                                   
123 They include Kei Hoashi (tenure: 1946-7, previously executive director of the Important 
Industry Control Council), Shozo Hotta (1947-8, Sumitomo Bank), Masamichi Yamagiwa 
(1952-5, former Vice Minister of Finance), Sohei Nakayama (1957-9, The Industrial Bank 
of Japan) and Kazutaka Kigawada (1960-2 and 1963-75, TEPCO). Nakayama and Kigawada 
emphasised corporate social responsibility comprising responsibilities for shareholders, 
employees and the public (Okazaki et al. 1996: 108-11). 
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(in this thesis, the latter is used in order to avoid confusion with the former’s 
meanings). 
     However, utopianistic modified capitalism did not work when Doyukai’s 
proposal for labour-management cooperation encountered resistance from radical 
industrial labour unions aligned with the Communist Party between February 
1946 and April 1948. When the US occupation forces shifted from pro-labour to 
pro-management (anti-communism) due to the beginning of the Cold War in April 
1948, Nikkeiren was established to regain managerial authority in labour-
management relations and strengthen the solidarity among employers. The 
industrial association, which publicly referred to itself as ‘Fighting Nikkeiren’, 
took a hard-line stance towards the radical labour unions (Pempel 1998: 94).  
Corporate management, who faced radical activities from existing labour unions, 
formed ‘second unions’, which were cooperative with management. Such second 
unions, protected by management, armed police and often thugs, sometimes 
violently confronted the first unions until the management deposed the leaders of 
the radical unions through ‘personal curtailment’ or other measures (ibid.). 
Crushing radical industrial labour unions and replacing them with obedient 
enterprise labour unions was Nikkeiren’s largest achievement between 1948 and 
1960 (Crump 2003: 77).  
     Japanese management-labour relations at most large firms have become 
cooperative since the management of Mitsui Mining, supported by Nikkeiren, 
defeated the radical labour union in the largest post-war labour dispute in 1960 
(Kawakita 2011: 185). Whilst labour unions were moderated, corporate 
management tried to avoid the dismissal of designated workers, experiencing 
labour disputes against personnel cuts. Furthermore, encountering a labour 
shortage due to the rapid growth period in the 1950s and 1960s, an increasing 
number of large firms started to adopt long-term employment in order to secure 
labour. Transforming labour policy from hawkish to conciliatory, in 1963, 
Nikkeiren started to provide management training programmes for white -collar 
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workers in order to instil a management-like perspective into them, and in 1969 
it displayed the slogan ‘all the employees’ participation in management’ (Crump 
2003: 147-56).  
     Lifetime employment became a social norm, and judicial precedents 
established during the 1970s restricted Japanese employers’ right to dismiss the ir 
employees. In regard to the management-union dispute over layoffs at Nihon 
Shokuen Seizo (a salt producer), in April 1975, the Supreme Court judged that 
an employer’s exercise of its right of dismissal shall be void as an abuse of right, 
if it lacks objectively reasonable grounds and is not considered to be acceptable 
in general social terms. With regard to the layoffs at Toyo Sanso (an industrial 
gas maker), the Tokyo High Court pronounced that layoffs should meet the 
following four criteria: 1) necessity of dismissal, 2) effort to avoid dismissal 
(such as a hiring freeze and voluntary retirement programme), 3) selection of 
redundant workers on objective criteria, and 4) proper procedures including 
sufficient consultation with workers and labour unions.  
     Nikkeiren’s history reveals that cooperative management-labour relations in 
post-war Japan were not achieved by peaceful negotiations but by coercion, 
machinations and compromise. The relations between management, capital and 
labour were close to the managerial revolution described by Burnham rather than 
the tripartite alliance in Otsuka’s modified capitalism. The preconditions for 
administrators’ social dominance were inadvertently created by the US 
occupation forces’ elimination of major capitalists and the subsequent shift from 
pro-labour to pro-management policy. In the early post-war period, most of the 
members of Keidanren, Nikkeiren and Doyukai were not major capitalists but top 
management, promoted from the middle management of Zaibatsu and large firms, 
or bureaucrats, due to the purge of the previous top management by the US 
occupation forces after WWII.  
     Administrators as dominant elites curbed capitalist power through the 
separation of enterprise ownership and management, and provided protection and 
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support for labour in exchange for obedience. Banks were both loan providers 
and major shareholders, but were constrained by their long-term relationships 
with companies, so they could hardly desert major corporate borrowers in 
financial distress. In this respect, the Japanese banks lacked capital freedom and 
acted as administrators of corporate groups and intermediators between the 
private sector and the government rather than purely as profit -seeking capitalists. 
The most important mission for such administrators is the survival of their own 
organisations and (corporate) groups and the stability of the regime under which 
they are socially dominant. Accordingly, neoliberalism or market liberalism 
reasserting capitalist power has been a threat to administrators.   
 
5.3 Growing Influence of Doyukai and Neoliberalism  
Why and how did Doyukai shift from an anti-free market stance and stakeholder 
capitalism to neoliberalism and shareholder capitalism in the 1990s? Jiro Ushio, 
who was Doyukai’s chairman from 1995 to 1999, provided the following 
explanation (the October 2007 issue of Keizai Doyu: 15). 
 
When Taizo Ishizaka was chairman of Keidanren from 1956 to 1968, 
it strengthened its orientation towards a market economy and liberal 
ideology. In contrast, the mainstream ideologies of Doyukai, led by 
Kazutaka Kigawada and Sohei Nakayama, were: the coexistence of 
planned economy and corporate creativity is desirable; and we should 
aim for cooperative competition. In 1955, Kohei Goshi, one of 
Doyukai’s founders established the Japan Productivity Centre. From 
1955 until 1964, nearly 10 thousand Japanese managers visited the US 
through the Japan Productivity Centre in order to learn the best 
practices of American corporate management. Doyukai  recognised the 
importance of learning modern business administration, and in 1962, 
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Rokuro Ishikawa created a study group that attracted prominent 
business scholars. When Yoshihiro Inayama, who was from the steel 
industry which allocated production quota to individual makers, was 
chairman of Keidanren from 1980 until 1986, it became orientated 
towards a managed economy. In contrast, when Doyukai was chaired 
by Takashi Ishihara of Nissan Motor, which started overseas 
production ahead of Toyota Motor, from 1985 to 1991, it began to 
advocate free competition. Consequently, the ideational positions of 
Keidanren and Doyukai were switched.124 
 
Ushio’s explanation sheds some light on the ideological change in Doyukai, but 
Keidanren’s liberalism under Ishizaka’s chairmanship might be exaggerated.  It 
is true that the different characteristics of the chairmen affected Keidanren’s 
behaviour to some extent, but its underlying anti-free market nature is likely to 
have remained unchanged given its collectivist decision making. An alternative 
interpretation is that the industrial association chose its leaders, who had a good 
fit with the respective political economic climates – ‘liberal’ Ishizaka was 
suitable for the rapid export-led growth period, whereas Inayama, who was good 
at coordinating different interests and was nicknamed ‘Mr Cartel’, was chosen 
during the low growth period when Japanese manufacturers ‘voluntarily’ 
restricted exports to the US due to the intensified US-Japan trade friction and 
also formed cartels to avoid the bankruptcy of Japanese manufacturers (Kikuchi 
2005: 215-6). I think that the true colours of Keidanren came to the fore when it 
faced great difficulties. Meanwhile, it is an important fact that Doyukai paid 
attention to American business practices even during the rapid economic growth 
period, but it is unlikely that this factor alone resulted in Doyukai’s ideational 
change.  
                                                   
124 The quote from Ushio’s comment in Japanese has been translated by me.  
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     Nissan, led by Ishihara, chose an alternative strategy to ‘voluntary export 
restrictions’ and cartels, foreign direct investment in overseas factories, which 
contributed to employment in recipient countries and abated trade friction. 
Japanese business leaders and bureaucrats learned about the differences in 
business practices and management philosophies between the US, Europe and 
Japan through the trade friction in the 1980s, but they were still confident in 
Japanese style stakeholder capitalism. Accordingly, Doyukai, under Ishihara’s 
chairmanship, did not denounce Japanese style business customs, such as keiretsu 
transactions and rebates associated with long-term contracts, and stakeholder 
capitalism, although it admitted that such customs intensified the trade friction. 
Actually, Ishihara’s expansionist strategy failed, and Nissan’s financial 
performance continuously deteriorated after the bursting of the bubble economy, 
resulting in financial difficulty in the late 1990s. However, until the arrival of 
Carlos Ghosn from its alliance partner, Renault, in 1999, its management could 
not revive the ailing automaker, owing to the negative aspects of Japanese style 
management, such as the excessively high costs of keiretsu transactions, a 
redundant workforce associated with lifetime employment, and unclear 
management responsibility stemming from the collectivist management style. 
Ghosn successfully turned Nissan around as he was not constrained by Japanese 
business customs and norms.  
     Kikuchi (2015: 261-3) regards the political and fiscal reform, which included 
the privatisation of Japan National Railways (JR), Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone Public Corporation (NTT) and Japan Tobacco and Salt Public 
Corporation, under the Nakasone administration (1982-7) as the first phase of 
neoliberalism in Japan. While the main aim of the reform was ‘fiscal 
reconstruction without tax increases’, Keidanren, Nikkeiren and Doyukai all 
supported it, as large firms were concerned that increases in public debt would 
cause higher corporate tax rates. In fact, Inayama, Keidanren’s chairman, was 
against the JR privatisation (Kawakita 2011: 136). As ment ioned above, during 
the 1980s, the Japanese business community did not intend to shift from 
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stakeholder capitalism to shareholder capitalism. Furthermore, due partly to US 
pressure, MOF accepted the deregulation of the Euro-yen, domestic interest rates 
and money markets, the abolition of the real demand rule regarding futures 
transactions in foreign exchange rates, and the study on CRAs, among other 
things, in 1984. However, MOF and the financial sector had no intention of 
changing the financial convoy system, although MOF acknowledged the 
necessity to deregulate the bond market and domestic interest rates.  In these 
respects, as Watanabe (2007: 296-318) rightly argues, the Nakasone 
administration made only a preliminary attempt at neoliberal reform.  
     The transformation of Doyukai’s stance from stakeholder capitalism to 
shareholder capitalism was made clear in the key-note address entitled 
‘Determination to Restructure Japan: Setting Global Perspective, Market 
Functions and Creative Management as Parameters’ (Okazaki et al. 1996: 314-7). 
This address was given by Doyukai’s chairman (1991-5), Masaru Hayami 
(Chairman of Nissho Iwai), at its annual meeting in April 1993, after the bursting 
of the bubble economy (1991-3) and the LDP’s money politics scandals, leading 
to its defeat in the July 1993 House of Representatives election. 125 Before joining 
the executive board of Nissho Iwai (a trading company), Hayami had long served 
at the BOJ’s international divisions, and he was appointed as the governor of the 
BOJ in 1998 after retiring from Nissho Iwai. The malfunctioning of the 1940 
system was a catalyst in making the market liberals more influential within 
Doyukai, resulting in its ideational change. Hayami insisted that Japanese style 
management, the effectiveness of which depended on a high economic growth 
environment and social uniformity, had reached a dead end and needed to be 
restructured. Furthermore, he proposed: 1) deregulation in the retail, real estate, 
healthcare, food, financial, transportation, utilit ies, information and 
telecommunications industries, 2) the development of new social infrastructure 
                                                   
125 The May 1993 issue of Keizai Doyu 
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regarding R&D, and information and telecommunications, and 3) cultivation of 
a flexible labour market.  
     Ushio, Doyukai’s chairman after Hayami, pushed its neoliberal orientation 
one step further. He obtained a postgraduate degree in political science from the 
University of California, Berkeley in 1957 and founded Ushio Electric, a 
manufacturer of lamps and lighting systems, in 1964. Given its relatively small 
corporate size, Ushio Electric was not a major actor within Keidanren, whilst 
Ushio has long been recognised as a liberal leader of Doyukai. He was involved 
in the privatisation of JR, NTT and Japan Tobacco under the Nakasone 
administration as well as the further deregulation of the telecommunications 
industry – he was chairman of KDDI, the second largest telecoms company after 
NTT, from 2000 until 2003. In his key-note address entitled ‘Creating a New 
“Market”: Our Initiative for the 21st Century’ at Doyukai’s 1996 annual meeting, 
he suggested: 1) rising to the challenge of competition rather than avoiding it to 
accelerate the dynamism of markets; 2) creating market conditions that can 
accommodate international competition and meet ‘global standards’ by 
liberalising and opening markets; 3) building a market economy that is trusted 
by participants and based on transparent rules and laws, not on decisions of 
individuals; 4) making political, bureaucratic, and industrial systems and 
organisations more open; and 5) creating a small government to maximise the 
market’s functions.126  
     After the bursting of the bubble economy, Doyukai nominated four market 
liberals to be vice-chairmen, Yotaro Kobayashi (chairman of Fuji Xerox), 
Miyauchi, Takeo Shiina (chairman of IBM Japan) and Yuzaburo Mogi (CEO of 
Kikkoman), all of whom had experienced American university education and 
were ideationally close to Hayami and Ushio. 127  These nominations made 
                                                   
126 The May 1996 issue of Keizai Doyu 
127 Kobayashi, Miyauchi, Shiina and Mogi obtained an MBA from the Wharton School of 
the University of Pennsylvania in 1958, an MBA from the University of Washington in 1960, 
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Doyukai clearly neoliberal-oriented, and coincided with the epochal political 
event, i.e., the fall of the LDP and the birth of the Hosokawa administration 
(1993-4). The LDP administration, led by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, failed 
to address public concerns over corruption, and the LDP lost power following the 
1993 general election, which also caused significant turmoil in terms of political 
parties splitting, forming and merging before and afterwards. Prime Minister and 
leader of the reformist Japan New Party, Morihiro Hosokawa, formed a non-LDP, 
non-Communist Party coalition of eight parties,128 and his administration focused 
on changes in the election laws intended to prevent political corruption, electoral 
system amendment and deregulation. Because of the growing trade deficit against 
Japan, the US government demanded that Japan open its markets and change its 
economic structure from export-led to domestic demand-led through the 
Structural Impediments Initiative of 1989-90 and the US-Japan Comprehensive 
Economic Council of 1993.  
     Hosokawa established his private advisory organ, the Economic Reform Study 
Group, which was led by Gaishi Hiraiwa (chairman of Keidanren) and included 
members such as Yotaro Kobayashi (vice chairman of Doyukai), Iwao Nakatani 
                                                   
a BS in mechanical engineering from Bucknell University in 1953 and an MBA from the 
University of Columbia in 1961, respectively.  
128 The coalition of eight parties included the Japan New Party established in May 1992, 
the Japan Renewal Party, the New Party Sakigake, the Social Democratic Party of Japan 
and Komeito. Although the Japan New Party was small, Hosokawa was backed by the Japan 
Renewal Party to form a coalition. Both the Japan Renewal Party and the New Party 
Sakigake were created by LDP defectors in June 1993, but the Japan Renewal Party and the 
Japan New Party were dissolved in December 1994 when they were absorbed by the New 
Frontier Party after the collapse of the Hosokawa administration. Subsequently, the New 
Frontier Party was divided into six parties in December 1997, whilst Yukio Hatoyama and 
Naoto Kan, who defected from the New Party Sakigake, formed the Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) in April 1998.  
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(Economics Professor at Hitotsubashi University) 129 and Hiroko Ota130 (Visiting 
Associate Professor at Osaka University). Both Nakatani and Ota, whose 
ideology was similar to that of Doyukai’s market liberals, were known as 
neoliberal economists and influenced the discussion within the study group. 
Faced with the malfunctioning of the 1940 system as well as the mounting US 
pressure, the Hosokawa administration was more strongly motivated to proceed 
with neoliberal reform than the Nakasone administration had been. In 1993, the 
Economic Reform Study Group released the so-called ‘Hiraiwa report’, which 
emphasised deregulation, particularly in the land/housing related area, inefficient 
industries (e.g., retail), agriculture, import and growing industries (e.g., 
information and telecommunications), the creation of a flexible labour market 
and the invigoration of the financial and capital markets. The report proposed 
mutual entry into banking, securities and insurance businesses and the 
liberalisation of new financial products. However, Hosokawa resigned because 
of a financial scandal in April 1994. The proposals of the Hiraiwa report were not 
implemented under the Hosokawa administration, but were subsumed in the 
liberal reforms under the Hashimoto and Koizumi administrations.  
     When Ryutaro Hashimoto of the LDP became Prime Minister in 1996, he set 
up the Administrative Reform Council under the Cabinet Office and chaired the 
council in order to tackle the Six Major Reforms in the areas of administration, 
fiscal structure, the financial system, social security, economic structure and 
education. Hashimoto had been known as a conservative politician, so why did 
he initiate these reforms? When he became Prime Minister, his administration 
encountered strong public criticism against the Jusen problem. Furthermore, the 
LDP had to compete against the New Frontier Party advocating neoliberal reform 
of the Japanese system and the New Party Sakigake proposing a departure from 
                                                   
129 Nakatani obtained a PhD in economics from Harvard University in 1973.  
130  Ota became a Cabinet Secretariat under the Koizumi administration and served as 
Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy under both the Abe and Fukuda 
administrations.  
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the bureaucracy-led system. Core members (mainly manufacturers) of the 
industrial associations were generally supportive of the financial deregulation 
because they believed that unlike the world leading Japanese manufacturing 
sector, the Japanese financial sector lagged behind the progress of the rest of the 
world due to excessive government protection (Kawakita 2011: 139-40). At that 
time, few large Japanese companies fully understood what kind of an impact 
financial deregulation would have on them. Hashimoto had to appeal to the public 
by implementing major reforms in order to regain the LDP’s lost ground  (Toya 
2006: 174-5). 
     The Deregulation Committee was established as part of Hashimoto’s 
Administrative Reforms in 1996,131 and Miyauchi (chairman and de facto founder 
of Orix Corporation, the largest leasing company in Japan) chaired the committee 
on Doyukai’s recommendation, as he was an advocate of deregulation and the 
corporate governance reform within it. He had learned about leasing business in 
the US and developed it from scratch in Japan. He felt strongly that bureaucratic 
authorisation, control and regulation were nothing more than obstacles to 
corporate and economic development (Kawakita 2011: 151-3). Miyauchi’s 
entrepreneurial and capitalist perspective was in stark contrast to that of most 
Japanese business executives, who were internally promoted ‘administrators’. 
The Deregulation Committee gradually expanded, and was renamed the Council 
for Regulatory Reform under the Koizumi administration in 2001.  Miyauchi  
maintained the chairmanship of the committee/council for an unusually long time, 
from 1996 until 2006, thanks to his close relations with Prime Minister Koizumi, 
although he was frequently criticised on the basis that his political position and 
ties significantly contributed to the successful expansion of Orix (ibid .: 151-2).  
                                                   
131 The predecessor of the Deregulation Committee, the Deregulation Subcommittee under 
the Administrative Reform Committee, was founded under the Murayama administration in 
1995. 
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     When Vogel (2006: 99) interviewed Miyauchi in June 2003, the latter made 
the following comment:  
 
Our committee has been all private sector and all pro-reform, so we 
have not had any fights among ourselves. We make our 
recommendations to the government. Then the ministries oppose us. 
And then we have a debate. But government officials can be vulnerable  
to rational argumentation. So eventually they say they will try to 
convince the industry. And then the industry opposes. So we have to 
persuade them all the way – that is the key.  
 
The Council for Regulatory Reform consisted of 15 members from April 2001  to 
March 2003, including Yoshio Suzuki (president of the Asahi Research Centre, 
who had long been involved in privatisation and deregulation), Tatsuo Hatta 
(Professor of Spatial Information Science at the University of Tokyo, who 
proposed the liberalisation of the electric power industry),132 Naohiro Yashiro 
(Professor at the Japan Centre for Economic Research, a neoliberal economist), 133 
Atsushi Seike (Professor of Labour Economics at Keio University), Minoru Mori 
(CEO of Mori Building, a Doyukai member), Eiko Kono (Chairman and CEO of 
Recruit Corporation, a Doyukai member),134 Reiko Okutani (a Doyukai member, 
CEO of The R Co., Ltd. whose second largest shareholder was Orix), 135 Akinori 
Yonezawa (Professor of Computer Science at the University of Tokyo, Okutani’s 
                                                   
132 Hotta obtained a PhD in economics from Johns Hopkins University in 1971, and became 
head of the Policy Analysis Centre at Doyukai in 2013.  
133 Yashiro acquired a PhD in economics from Maryland University in 1981.  
134 Recruit Corporation is an advertisement, publication and human resources (including 
temporary staffing) company.  
135 The R Co., Ltd. is a temporary staffing agency.  
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husband) and Rie Murayama (Managing Director of Goldman Sachs Japan). 136 
No key members of Keidanren were included in the council. Many of the council 
members were Doyukai members, who were potential beneficiaries of 
deregulation, from the temporary staffing, financial services and property 
development industries and scholars close to Doyukai.  
     Although the progress in deregulation was relatively moderate in politically 
sensitive industries including retail despite the Council for Regulatory Reform’s 
efforts, some breakthroughs were witnessed in dynamic industries such as 
telecommunications (Vogel 2006: 99-100). In 1984, Kazuo Inamori (founder of 
Kyocera, a diversified manufacturer, and a key member of Kyoto Keizai Doyukai 
affiliated with Doyukai) founded DDI as a new common carrier, to compete with 
NTT, due to the first wave of telecoms deregulation. The second wave of 
deregulation in the second half of the 1990s comprised a shift from the system of 
individual approval by the authority to the system of not ification for charges by 
Type 1 telecommunications carriers, 137  the complete privatisation of KDD 
(Japan’s dominant international carrier) and the lifting of restrictions on foreign 
capital investment (excluding NTT). When KDDI was established through the 
merger of DDI, KDD and IDO (another new common carrier backed by Toyota 
Motor) in 2000, Ushio, who had been involved in the deregulation of the 
telecommunications industry since the early 1980s, became its chairman. Inamori 
praises Ushio for his skill in coordinating many people and organising large 
projects.138   
     I argue that Doyukai’s political influence was at its peak when Ushio served 
as one of the private sector members at the Council on Economic and Fiscal 
                                                   
136 Murayama was a sell-side equity analyst covering the property development, housing 
and construction sectors. 
137 Type 1 telecommunications carriers offered services using their own facilities, while 
Type 2 carriers did not have their own facilities and leased those from Type 1 carriers. This 
distinction between Types 1 and 2 was abolished in 2004.  
138 The 2 April 2009 issue of Nikkei Business 
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Policy under the Koizumi administration from 2001 until 2006. Koizumi was not 
in the LDP mainstream, which advocated systemic support and encountered 
public distrust of politics and the lengthy economic slump, and made ‘structural 
reform’ his political slogan. He made the council the most important  policy-
making arena. The council was chaired by Koizumi and consisted of 10 other 
members – the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State for Economic and 
Fiscal Policy (Takenaka), the Ministers of Finance, Internal Affairs and 
Communications, and Economy and International Trade, the BOJ governor and 
four private sector members, Ushio, Hiroshi Okuda (chairman of Toyota Motor, 
Nikkeiren’s chairman 1999-2002, and Keidanren’s chairman 2002-6), Masaaki 
Homma (Economics Professor at Osaka University) and Hiroshi Yoshikawa 
(Economics Professor at the University of Tokyo). Takenaka, who learned 
supply-side economics (which can be regarded as a variant of neoliberal 
economics) at Harvard University in the early 1980s and became a professor at 
Keio University in Japan, was a linchpin of Koizumi’s neoliberal restructuring, 
and his perspective was close to those of Ushio and Homma. 139  
     Takenaka closely coordinated opinions beforehand and stood shoulder to 
shoulder with the four private sector members at the council, and obtained a 
majority vote at the council if he received Koizumi’s endorsement (Shimizu 
2007: 24-6). However, it is important to note that Ushio invited Takenaka to the 
policy proposal taskforce in 2000, consisting of business leaders and economist s, 
                                                   
139 Takenaka was influenced by supply-side economics when he worked with Andrew Abel 
(currently Professor of the Department of Finance in The Wharton School of the University 
of Pennsylvania) at Harvard University in 1981. Supply-side economics argues that the 
supply of money, labour and goods / services generates demand and hence economic growth. 
Furthermore, Takenaka has long been acquainted with Lawrence Summers and Jeffery Sachs. 
In 1987, he was invited as an associate Professor of Economics to Osaka University by 
Homma, another supply-side economist, while Yoshikawa also belonged to the same 
department. After resigning from the government, Takenaka became a special advisor to 
Pasona, a major temporary staffing agency, in February 2007, and then its chairman in 
August 2009.   
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which led to the Koizumi reform.140 This taskforce included Nakatani, Homma, 
Yashiro and Miyauchi (Orix’s Chairman) and had meetings with key LDP 
politicians such as Yoshiro Mori (Prime Minister 2000-1), Hidenao Nakagawa 
(Chief Cabinet Secretary for the Mori administration) and Koizumi (Shimizu 
2007: 45). Core members of Doyukai, who were entrepreneurs and capitalists 
unlike most Keidanren members, instilled neoliberal policy proposals including 
fiscal consolidation, bad debt disposal, deregulation, tax reforms and 
privatisation into these LDP politicians by utilising neoliberal economists who 
were ambitious to expand their sphere of influence beyond the academic 
community as policy promoters. Although they were not publicly elected 
politicians, they could exert an unprecedented level of power as private sector 
actors in the political arena through both the Council on Economic and Fiscal 
Policy and the Council for Regulatory Reform during the Koizumi administration.  
 
5.4 Keidanren’s Stakeholder Capitalism versus Doyukai’s Shareholder 
Capitalism 
How, and in what areas, have the ideologies of Keidanren and Doyukai differed 
since the 1990s? There has been no head to head organisational rivalry between 
the two industrial associations on the surface, and their memberships 
substantially overlap. However, some members have been more vocal in one 
association while keeping a low profile in the other. The ideational differences 
between Keidanren and Doyukai from the mid-1990s until the mid-2000s 
contrasted remarkably and the contrast can be described as follows: 1) 
administrators vs. entrepreneurs / capitalists, 2) collectivist perspectives vs. 
individualist perspectives, 3) stakeholder capitalism vs. shareholder capitalism, 
4) anti-free market vs. market liberalism, 5) supporters of guardian morals vs. 
commercial morals, and 6) proponents vs. opponents of systemic support.  During 
                                                   
140 The Asahi Shimbun newspaper dated 30 May 2008  
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this period, the influence of the market liberalisation camp, including Doyukai, 
neoclassical economists and the American CRAs was significantly enhanced due 
to the declining power of the mainstream anti -free market camp. 
     The first example of ideational contestation between Keidanren and Doyukai 
can be observed in the so-called ‘Imai-Miyauchi controversy’ in February 1994. 
This controversy between Takashi Imai (President of Nippon Steel) and Miyauchi 
took place in a Doyukai study group. Although Imai was one of Doyukai’s vice 
chairmen, Nippon Steel was a key member of Keidanren and his management 
philosophy was similar to that of most of the Keidanren members (Kawakita 
2011: 227-9). Asahi Shimbun (2009: 2-3) delineates the dispute as follows.  
 
Miyauchi asserted that, ‘the most important thing for the company is 
the extent to which it can reward its shareholders. Corporate 
management does not have to consider how employment and the state 
should be’. Imai replied, ‘if you really think so, you are a traitor to our 
country. We have not run our firms for that purpose.’ Yoshikazu 
Hanawa, vice president of Nissan Motor, supported Imai and insisted 
that, ‘if lifetime employment is terminated, top management would 
have to take responsibility and resign first’. Then, Ushio backed up 
Miyauchi and contended that ‘lifetime employment and seniority wage 
systems will no longer be sustainable given our inverted population 
pyramid and aging society’. Takeo Shiina, chairman of IBM Japan, 
also claimed that, ‘lifetime employment has generated corporate 
slaves. This may be a good opportunity to address the excessively 
corporate centric society.’ Imai, who had to transfer an increasing 
number of employees to Nippon Steel’s subsidiaries, on lower wages, 
in order to protect lifetime employment, looked frustrated with 
Miyauchi’s further statement that, ‘Japanese companies have 
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shouldered too much responsibility for society. We should focus on 
making a fortune efficiently.’141  
 
I argue that Imai’s perspective demonstrates Keidanren’s stakeholder capitalism 
stance, taking into account the rights of all stakeholders including employees, 
shareholders, creditors, clients and suppliers, whilst that of Miyauchi reflects 
Doyukai’s shareholder capitalism stance, claiming that job cuts are necessary to 
enhance shareholder value. The backgrounds for anti-free market elites 
(administrators) and market liberal ones (entrepreneurs and capita lists) were 
strikingly different. Both Imai and Hanawa were internally promoted 
administrators of manufacturing establishments at the centre of traditional elite 
networks binding bureaucracy, big business and the LDP, whereas Ushio, 
Miyauchi and Shiina were a corporate founder, a de facto founder and the head 
of a major American company’s subsidiary, respectively. Furthermore, the 
respective foreign shareholding ratios of Ushio Electric and Orix were 41% and 
62%, respectively, as of May 2016, and their businesses are internationally 
oriented. By contrast, Nippon Steel (currently Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal) 
is more domestically oriented, and its foreign shareholding ratio is just 13%. As 
mentioned previously, Nissan shifted from stakeholder capitalism to shareholder 
capitalism when Renault acquired a 36.8% stake in it and Ghosn took over its 
helm. This is a rare example of drastic corporate governance transformation in 
Japan. 
     Most executives of leading Japanese firms (particularly manufacturers) or 
Keidanren members, who are administrators, are fundamentally at odds with 
shareholder capitalism, which denounces systemic support. This is because 
unrestricted capitalist power jeopardises not only the lifetime employment of 
regular workers, their subordinate allies, but also their own autonomy from 
                                                   
141 Asahi Shimbun’s original text in Japanese has been translated by me.  
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capitalists, both of which are protected by systemic support. Administrators tend 
to prefer less demanding providers of both debt and equity capital, such as local 
financial institutions and members of the same corporate group (whose 
management can be viewed as administrators), to capitalists. On the other hand, 
capitalists and entrepreneurs, who are less constrained by social ties, such as core 
Doyukai members, are frustrated with the vested interests within Japanese society 
and the inefficiency (lower investment return) of stakeholder capitalism.  In an 
interview with Asahi Shimbun (ibid.: 6-7), Miyauchi commented that his 
company, which was established as a venture business, could not enter the 
mainstream financial industry and had never been protected in the Japanese 
system, and that given that management mistakes would lead the company 
potentially to bankruptcy, he could not insist that the company be run for all 
stakeholders. Imai stated that considering that Japanese manufacturers have a 
community-like consciousness among their employees and rely on their 
development and transfer of technology, they cannot survive without employees’ 
trust towards their employers, and there is no universal value in American styl e 
financial capitalism (ibid.: 7-8).    
     The second example of the contrasting stances between the two industrial 
associations was seen when the Temporary Staffing Services Act was revised in 
1999. This revision lifted the restriction on temporary staffing for any industry 
except for specified businesses such as manufacturing, medical, security and 
construction. Although both Keidanren and Doyukai had asked the government 
to deregulate temporary staffing services, their stances and goals were different.  
Keidanren’s deregulation stance was cautious and reactive, and its primary 
purpose of the deregulation was to protect existing regular workers under lifetime 
employment by hiring cheap, easily dischargeable non-regular workers instead 
of hiring new regular workers. The goal of both Keidanren and Nikkeiren was ‘to 
avoid challenging the lifetime employment system head-on but to expand the 
range of jobs that employers could fill with workers hired under much more 
flexible arrangements’ (Schoppa 2006: 118). Administrators feel obligated to 
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provide systemic support for regular workers but not for non-regular workers. By 
contrast, Doyukai aggressively promoted deregulation in regard to temporary 
staffing services to maximise profits by exploiting non-regular workers from a 
capitalist and entrepreneurial standpoint.   
     There was an indirect disagreement over job cuts between Okuda and 
Miyauchi, which they expressed in separate interviews for the October 1999 issue 
of Bungeishunju, a monthly magazine. Okuda asserted that if management 
discharged employees, they should commit hara-kiri (i.e., resign), while 
Miyauchi warned that protecting employment desperately would result in a 
Titanic-like disaster, and stressed that companies should prioritise profit over 
employment (Kawakita 2011: 230-1, quoting the October 1999 issue of 
Bungeishunju). Okuda’s harsh comment reflected Japan’s adversary business 
environment in which an increasing number of Japanese firms were going 
bankrupt or cutting regular workers. In another interview, he urged corporate 
executives that ‘cutting jobs is the last thing management should do. If you do so 
only to raise profitability or the value of shares, that’s wrong in light of Japan’s 
style of management’ (Vogel 2006: 115, citing Reuters dated 13 May 1999). This 
implies that administrators’ dominant status, as relat ively autonomous from 
capitalists, is based on systemic support for their subordinates (regular workers) 
in exchange for loyalty, and that if the former cannot protect the latter, they will 
lose the legitimacy of their dominance.  
     The third example of Keidanren’s and Doyukai’s contrasting stances was 
witnessed during the Koizumi administration. According to Kikuchi (2005: 267), 
both Koizumi and Takenaka had probably misunderstood that what the business 
community wanted was the acceleration of structural  reforms (such as bad debt 
disposal, fiscal consolidation, privatisation and deregulation) by strong political 
leadership. Ushio believed that such reforms would result in higher growth of the 
Japanese economy (Asahi Shimbun 2009: 220-1), and the core members of 
Doyukai backed up the administration. However, the reactions from Keidanren 
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and Nikkeiren were different from that of Doyukai. These industrial associations 
felt that the structural reforms, in the recession after the bursting of the dot -com 
bubble in 2001, were too painful for companies. In August 2001, Nikkeiren 
requested an ‘urgent employment support programme’ amounting to 1 trillion yen 
for the Koizumi administration, which was the first task of the Council on 
Economic and Fiscal Policy (Kikuchi 2005: 267-8). Keidanren also wanted the 
Koizumi administration to prioritise anti-deflationary measures to reinvigorate 
the economy, such as reforms in corporate tax and land-related tax, rebalancing 
between gift and inheritance taxes and manoeuvres to boost the stock price over 
a rapid clean-up of bad debts (Schoppa 2006: 147). Both Keidanren and 
Nikkeiren asked the government for systemic support rather than neoliberal 
restructuring. Furthermore, as Vogel (2006: 56) claims, Keidanren’s support for 
deregulation was ‘more reluctant than proactive, more formalistic than 
substantive, and more selective than comprehensive’.  
     In contrast, Yotaro Kobayashi, Doyukai’s chairman (1999-2003), emphasised 
at its 2001 annual meeting that Japan’s political leaders must deliver the 
following message to the nation despite its unpopularity with the people: 
although the final disposal of non-performing loans and corporate restructuring 
would make the recession temporarily unavoidable, the nation would be able to 
recover to steady positive economic growth after these structural reforms. 142 In 
addition, Doyukai was proactive in introducing mark-to-market accounting 
(under which an asset or liability is valued based on the current market price) and 
impairment accounting (which means writing down the difference in fixed assets 
between the fair value and the book value) to improve the transparency of 
financial statements, while Keidanren was resistant to this. In April 2003, 
Kakutaro Kitashiro, chairman of Doyukai (2003-7) and Japan IBM, commented 
that although some politicians had tried to postpone or suspend the introduction 
                                                   
142 Doyukai chairman’s address to the 2001 annual meeting, dated 26 April 2001, entitled 
‘The Moment of Truth for Reform’.  
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of mark-to-market and impairment accounting because of the share price slump 
at the end of March, such manipulation would not change the actual corporate 
performance.143 Mitsuo Horiuchi (the LDP’s Chairman, General Council) and 
Tetsuya Katada (vice-chairman of Keidanren) had discussed the postponement of 
the introduction of impairment accounting, which would realise latent losses held 
by many firms.144 
     In May 2002, Nikkeiren was absorbed by Keidanren. Crump (2003: 155-6) 
points out the following three reasons for the merger. Firstly, Nikkeiren’s raison 
d'être gradually waned due to its successful containment of aggressive labour 
union movement. Secondly, Keidanren’s power was also reduced partly because 
the gap between its national focus and the multinational interests of competitive 
Japanese companies widened. Lastly, the membership fees payable to both 
Keidanren and Nikkeiren became a financial burden for many companies, owing 
to the prolonged economic slump. More importantly, Nikkeiren was a bulwark 
against communism, which backed the radical labour movement, but it lost its 
opponent to fight against due to the end of the Cold War (Kawakita 2011: 187, 
Anzai 2014: 14-8).  Other issues were the difficulty in maintaining lifetime 
employment and the heavy social security burden shouldered by companies. 
These became big problems for the business community and they could not be 
handled by Nikkeiren alone (Kikuchi 2005: 68-72). The ban on temporary 
staffing in the manufacturing sector was lifted in 2004. However, after absorbing 
Nikkeiren, which included smaller company members, Keidanren came to 
represent a wider range of companies so it was more difficult for the l argest 
industrial association to overcome the internal schism on reform issues under the 
Koizumi administration (Vogel 2006: 57; Kikuchi 2005: 72). 
     From the late 1990s to the early 2000s, Japanese society’s loss of confidence 
in the economic and business sphere was intertwined with its awe of the US, 
                                                   
143 Press release dated 18 April 2003 from Doyukai  
144 The Asahi Shimbun newspaper dated 17 February 2003  
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which created the feeling that Japan should follow American standards (Ito 2007: 
155-6). This atmosphere peaked during the Koizumi administration, the first half 
of which witnessed a large number of major bankruptcies145 , which indicated 
weaker systemic support. The financial deregulation, the heightened recognition 
of credit risk and the weakened credit extension by the banking sector accelerated 
the rapid expansion of new debt business in Japan, such as bad debt trading, bank 
hybrid securities, 146  securitisation (asset-backed securities) and credit 
derivatives, which developed in the US during the 1980s and 1990s, and sharply 
expanded the Japan operations of both the American CRAs and investment banks, 
taking advantage of their expertise. Furthermore, because of the deregulation in 
M&A from the late 1990s until the mid-2000s, the aggregate number of M&A 
transactions rapidly increased from 1997 to 2006. Whilst many major M&As 
from 1999 until 2003 aimed for survival, an increasing number of M&As from 
2004 until 2006 aggressively sought higher shareholder value.147  
     These developments might give the impression that Japanese capitalism 
started to converge with Anglo-Saxon capitalism under the Koizumi 
administration, but systemic support died hard in Japan. After the share price 
plunge in September 2002, the media and public call for public capital injections 
into the ailing banks intensified as the public recognised that the bad debt 
problem would jeopardise their businesses and employment (Ikeo 2003: 5-9). At 
the time of the Jusen issue in 1996, the public was strongly opposed to any 
                                                   
145  These bankruptcies included Mycal (a retailer), Sato Kogyo (a construction firm), 
Chisan (a property developer) and First Credit (a non-bank). 
146 Bank hybrid securities have both elements of debt and equity securities. Banks issue 
hybrid securities in order to boost equity capital without diluting shareholder value 
excessively. 
147 Major examples of the former type of M&As included the mergers between Nippon Oil 
and Mitsubishi Oil, between Sumitomo Bank and Mitsui Bank, and between Kawasaki Steel 
and NKK, while the latter type of M&As were exemplified by Kao’s acquisition of Kanebo 
Cosmetics, Softbank’s purchase of Vodafone Japan, and Nippon Sheet Glass’ takeover of 
Pilkington. 
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injection of public money into the banks, as they thought that they had nothing 
to do with the banks’ bad debt problem, but the 1997-8 financial crisis changed 
the public stance. Kamikawa (2010: 61) presumes that when Resona Bank, the 
sixth largest bank in Japan, faced the risk of capital inadequacy in May 2003, 
Takenaka, who wanted to accelerate the bad debt disposal through the 
government’s direct involvement in bank management, seized the opportunity to 
inject public capital into Resona Bank. However, the decision on the capital 
injection merely followed the public opinion at that time although the public was 
not interested in the fundamental solution of the bad debt problem but in the 
protection of depositors and good-faith borrowers (Ikeo 2003: 10-1). Furthermore, 
as mentioned in Chapter 4, even after the collapse of the financial convoy, banks 
often conducted out-of-court debt restructuring in order to avoid borrowers’ 
bankruptcy. This can also be regarded as systemic support and the limit of 
neoliberal restructuring in Japan.  
     It is true that Keidanren’s influence has relatively weakened since the 1990s, 
but its diminution should not be exaggerated. During the Koizumi administration, 
Keidanren was defensive in contrast to the rising Doyukai, but maintained 
Japanese style stakeholder capitalism and waited for an opportunity to strike back. 
Hiroyuki Itami, Professor of Management at Hitotsubashi University, was invited 
to give a presentation on the ‘re-evaluation of Japanese style management’ to 
Keidanren’s Economic Policy Committee in September 2005. He emphasised 
three points. Firstly, ‘human capitalism (jinpon-shugi)’, which regards creating 
stable human networks as a very important basic principle for economic 
organisations, is a foundation of Japanese corporate management that was intact 
even during the ‘lost decade’. Secondly, although Japanese companies had had to 
address both an excessive emphasis on employee treatment and disrespect for 
shareholder returns, these issues did not necessarily mean the collapse of 
Japanese style management. Lastly, Japanese companies’ maintenance of human 
capitalism during the 1990s could be evaluated in the future as historically 
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meaningful resistance towards Anglo-Saxon style free-market capitalism. 148 I 
suspect that Keidanren highlighted Itami’s perspective in order to justify their 
stakeholder capitalism stance and counter the Anglo-Saxon style shareholder 
capitalism advocated by Doyukai.  
     In June 2006, just before the end of the Koizumi administration, Keidanren 
published a proposal entitled ‘A Suitable Corporate Governance System for 
Japan’, which stresses three points. Firstly, companies should conduct 
management with an emphasis on corporate social responsibility, taking into 
consideration value creation for diversified stakeholders such as shareholders, 
employees, clients and local communities, which will consequently enhance 
shareholder value. Secondly, corporate management is based on an individual 
society’s idiosyncratic culture, tradition, norms and business customs, and 
suitable corporate governance varies by company according to the individual 
corporate philosophy, vision, culture, history, strategy and industry. Lastly, 
importing overseas corporate governance methods, including internal control 
systems, uniformly to Japan should be avoided because it would cause companies 
and other relevant parties an excessive burden in terms of business confusion and 
higher costs. This proposal can be regarded as Keidanren’s determination to 
maintain Japanese style stakeholder capitalism, which is primarily based on an 
alliance between administrators and regular workers through the exchange of 
systemic support for obedience, leading to an anti-neoliberal backlash.   
 
5.5 Anti-Neoliberal Backlash 
Major achievements of the Koizumi-Takenaka structural reforms included the 
clean-up of bad debts in the banking sector and fiscal consolidation. However, 
the Koizumi administration, lacking a strong foundation within the LDP, had to 
rely on its popularity among voters, so they provided systemic support such as 
                                                   
148 No. 2785 (29 September 2005 issue) of Nippon Keidanren Times 
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the bailout of Resona Bank, the establishment of the IRCJ and quantitative 
monetary easing in order to mitigate the social pain associated with the structural 
reforms. According to Kamikawa (2010: 311), at first, the public supported 
Koizumi because they believed that bureaucrats and industry groups wasted 
public money, causing an increasing budget deficit when the recession prolonged 
and companies proceeded with restructuring. Subsequently, the Koizumi 
administration encountered a difficulty to advance the reforms when the criticism 
for the structural reforms widening income inequality intensified (ibid .). 
However, more importantly, both the anti-free market camp of dominant elites 
and subordinates such as regular workers and SME owners feared  the rising 
capitalist power, and they ultimately prevented it. 2006 was the turning point 
when the anti-neoliberal backlash started. This section will highlight the 
Livedoor and ‘Murakami Fund’ incidents, the revised Money Lending Law and 
the Japanese reaction to the GFC as examples of the backlash. Excessive cash 
stemming from quantitative monetary easing and financial deregulation 
contributed to speculative money games by aggressive investment funds and 
ambitious entrepreneurs in the Japanese financial market from 2004-6.  
Conservative elites and workers with steadily declining wages felt disgusted with 
these funds and entrepreneurs, who were making large profits.  
     The strong anti-neoliberal sentiment was eloquently illustrated in heavy 
media criticism of the Livedoor and Murakami Fund incidents in 2006. Japanese 
prosecutors arrested Takafumi Horie, a young outspoken proponent of 
shareholder capitalism and the CEO of Livedoor, a fast growing IT and financial 
group, on suspicion of securities law violations in January 2006. Five months 
later, the TSE delisted Livedoor due to false statements in its annual securities 
reports. 149  In June 2006, public prosecutors also arrested Yoshiaki Murakami, a 
former reformist METI official and the founder of the so-called Murakami Fund, 
                                                   
149 Horie was accused of window-dressing Livedoor’s consolidated sales by including 5.3 
billion yen of profits from the sale of its own shares held by the investment partnerships in 
which Livedoor invested.  
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a shareholder activist fund, for insider trading of Livedoor shares. Both Horie 
and Murakami were renegade elites and they had a close relationship; their 
offices were located in the same building complex. Livedoor rapidly expanded 
its market capitalisation (which reached 930 billion yen in January 2004) through 
stock splits and serial acquisitions including that of a 35% stake in Nippon 
Broadcasting System, which was a de facto holding company of the Fujisankei 
Communication Group, a major media conglomerate. The Murakami Fund also 
purchased stakes of over 5% in listed companies such as Tokyo Style (apparel), 
Sumitomo Warehouse, Takara (toy manufacturing) and Hanshin Electric Railway, 
and its total investment amount exceeded 440 billion yen as of the end of March 
2006. 
     The delisting of Livedoor might seem harsh in comparison to the continued 
listing of establishments such as Olympus and Toshiba, which conducted much 
larger accounting frauds. However, both Horie and Murakami received prison 
sentences and were severely criticised for being immoral money worshipers and 
greedy neoliberals by the media. Although their conduct was illegal, the 
relentless media bashing revealed Japanese society’s hatred and fear of 
shareholder and financial capitalism, which denounces systemic support and in-
group favouritism. Suda (2006: 37) claims that the special investigative squad of 
the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office started an investigation to prosecute 
Livedoor and Horie at quite an early stage. He also maintains that the following 
statement made by Motonari Otsuru, the new head of the squad who would later 
be in charge of the Livedoor case, at his inauguration press conference in April 
2005, reflected the public’s feelings of disgust with Hor ie: 'by all means, we 
would like to prosecute wrongdoing resented by hard working people, 
unemployed people due to job cuts, and business people who comply with laws 
although they recognise that they could make large profits if they breach laws' 
(ibid.: 37).150 The following comment made by the judge on the Murakami Fund 
                                                   
150 Suda’s original texts in Japanese have been translated by me.  
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case at the Tokyo District Court stunned even Yasuhito Omori (2007: 182), head 
of the Financial Markets Division of the FSA: ‘Murakami’s extreme pursuit of 
profit above all else by buying low and selling high is appalling’.151 The two 
court cases suggest that legal elites in Japan share anti -free market norms with 
other conservative elites. Punishing both Horie and Murakami severely could be 
regarded as a clear warning to other capitalists and entrepreneurs. 
     These incidents enfeebled the power of the market liberalisation camp, in 
particular Doyukai. Horie had a relationship with some members of the Koizumi 
administration, whereas Murakami had close ties with core members of Doyukai 
such as Miyauchi (Chairman of Orix Corporation) and  Ushio (Chairman of Ushio 
Inc.). In particular, Orix was a major sponsor of the Murakami Fund (Kawakita 
2011: 156). The LDP, led by Koizumi,  won the August 2005 election, but his 
administration encountered growing criticism, that the structural reforms had 
widened income inequality by generating a large number of low-waged non-
regular workers. Miyauchi stepped down from the chairmanship of the Council 
for Regulatory Reform, keeping in step with Koizumi's resignation from the 
premiership. Interestingly, Ichiro Ozawa, a long-term power broker of Japanese 
politics, converted from neoliberal to anti -neoliberal in the mid-2000s. He was 
Secretary General of the LDP (1989-91), but left the LDP to form the Japan 
Renewal Party and become a mastermind of the Hosokawa administration.   At 
that time, Ozawa was known as a neoliberal ideologue, but he started revealing 
his social democratic ideas when he became president of the DPJ in April 2006. 
According to Kikuchi (2015: 272), observing exhausted rural economies and 
growing economic inequality among people, he tactfully expected  the correction 
of neoliberalism to appeal to numerous voters.  The 2005 survey (with 1,320 
respondents) on Japanese corporate governance by the University of Tokyo 
indicates that 69.1% of respondents thought employee benefits should be 
                                                   
151 Omori’s original texts in Japanese have been translated by me. 
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prioritised over those of shareholders, while only 18.8% thought the other way 
round (Takahashi 2007). 
     From the summer of 2007, the GFC further accelerated the anti-neoliberal 
trend and strong demand for systemic support in Japan. Growing income 
inequality caused strong criticism of the LDP, which ultimately contributed to its 
defeat in the 2009 election. Despite the relatively small amount of damage in 
Japan, caused by the subprime mortgage problem, compared to the US and 
Western Europe, the securitisation business in Japan shrank dramatically – the 
credibility of both securitisation (as an American style financing) and the 
American CRAs in Japan was tarnished. The sharp contraction of the 
securitisation market, on which many major non-banks depended, and the rising 
social criticism of non-banks’ harsh collecting measures resulting in the revised 
Money Lending Law, which forced numerous non-banks to either go bankrupt or 
be under bank umbrellas (Kobayashi 2009). These trends in the second half of 
the 2000s can be viewed as a de facto reversal of the financial liberalisation that 
contributed to the booming of the non-banks during the late 1990s and the first 
half of the 2000s. Furthermore, the GFC gave Japanese anti -free market elites a 
great opportunity to denounce Anglo-Saxon style shareholder and financial 
capitalism. Takafumi Sato (2010: 70), former head of the FSA, point s out that 
scepticism regarding the policy goal of strengthening the competitiveness of the 
Japanese capital market grew in 2009 due to the financial fiascos in the US and 
Britain.152 Japanese society can no longer fully rely on the old regime, but their 
social norms mean that they cannot accept Anglo-Saxon style market liberalism 
as an alternative. 
     The extent of neoliberal restructuring in Japan and its negative social and 
economic impacts, such as the growing economic inequality, the deteriorated 
                                                   
152  A recently popular argument in Japan is that financial globalisation aligned with 
neoliberalism has given undue advantage to financial capital such as hedge funds at the 
expense of industrial capital and labour (Nakano and Shibayama 2011 : 104-9). 
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rural economies and the weakened international competitiveness of Japanese 
manufacturers, were often exaggerated by left-wing media and social scientists 
(for instance, Watanabe et al. 2009; Ninomiya 2012). As well as the market 
liberalisation camp, the anti-free market camp also contributed to the social and 
economic problems, and the latter frequently made financial globalisation and 
neoliberalism the scapegoat of these problems. However, even the neoliberal-
oriented Koizumi administration had to provide systemic support for ailing banks 
and companies, but this could not satisfy the public for long. Anti -free market 
elites including Keidanren manoeuvred shrewdly in that they avoided direct 
confrontation with the Koizumi administration when it was popular, and t hey 
made the market liberalisation camp look solely responsible for the social and 
economic problems. The collapse of the convoy system was due mainly to the 
accumulated irresponsibility of anti-free market administrators, while these 
administrators, advocates of systemic support, have had to reduce the number of 
their subordinate allies (such as regular workers) – on the other hand, the number 
of non-regular workers who can receive limited support has substantially 
increased.153  
     Having said that, systemic support has been persistent, and since 2006, 
support has spread in a diluted manner, as observed in the revised Money Lending 
Law, the SME Financing Facilitation Act and the establishment of numerous 
public-private funds. Firstly, the revised Money Lending Law of 2006 has 
dramatically shrunk the consumer finance business in order to protect consumers 
from excessive borrowing. My interpretation of this revision is that systemic 
support for financially distressed consumers forced countless money lenders, 
who are regarded as social outcasts in Japan, to go bankrupt.  As described in 
Chapter 3, the Supreme Court judge who triggered the revision of the Money 
                                                   
153 The number of non-regular workers in Japan almost doubled from 9.9 million in 1995 to 
19.6 million in 2015, whereas that of regular workers decreased from 37.6 million to 32.4 
million. 
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Lending Law, as well as conservative LDP politicians and FSA officials appeared 
to share an anti-free market perspective and a feeling of disgust towards 
aggressive capitalists, including the founders and management of non-banks (Ide 
2007, Suda 2010, Masuhara 2012). Secondly, the SME Financing Facilitation Act 
enabled financially distressed SMEs to receive bank support from December 
2009 until March 2013. Japanese politicians are well aware that providing 
support for the socially vulnerable appeals to voters. Thirdly, the establishment 
of public-private funds to support specific industries was due to the combination 
of the need for systemic support and the pursuit of ministerial interests. The 
collapse of the financial convoy in the late 1990s and the financial authorities’ 
relatively arm’s length administrative relationship with the banks made risk 
socialisation less certain. The government has endeavoured to bolster weakened 
risk taking by the private sector through these funds, but the majority of them 
have underperformed.  
     Due partly to the anti-neoliberal trend, Doyukai has moderated its neoliberal 
inclination, and some notable neoliberal proponents, including Ichiro Ozawa  and 
Iwao Nakatani, have defected. At Doyukai’s annual meeting in April 2007, 
Masamitsu Sakurai, chairman of Doyukai (2007-11) and Ricoh (a manufacturer 
of printers and photocopiers) commented that although Japanese management had 
bounced back and forth between the Japanese and American ways, the time had 
come to combine the respective good points of the two ways and meet the 
corporate social responsibility of harmonising business with society based on 
market principles.154 Nakatani, who learned ‘American (neoclassical) economics’ 
at Harvard, was involved in market liberalisation and deregulation under the 
Hosokawa and Obuchi administrations, and some of his proposals were used for 
the Koizumi-Takenaka structural reforms.  However, having experienced the 
structural reforms in Japan and the GFC, he criticises neoliberalism for: 1) 
destabilising global finance and the economy, 2) widening economic inequality 
                                                   
154 The May 2007 issue of Keizai Doyu 
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among people (eliminating the middle class), and 3) accelerating global 
environmental contamination (Nakatani 2008: 18-9). He also claims that 
American economics, based on assumptions such as actors’ extreme 
individualism and the pursuit of profit maximisation, is at odds with traditiona l 
Japanese values, while neoliberal restructuring has damaged Japanese society, 
and that better-informed elites might exploit the masses through a seemingly 
democratic framework of market mechanism and free competition (ibid .: 53-70). 
Although Nakatani rightly points out the conflict between Japanese social norms 
and American economics, I think he exaggerates the degree of neoliberal 
restructuring in Japan.  
     The reversal of financial liberalisation demonstrated by the Livedoor and 
Murakami Fund cases and the revised Money Lending Law made the Japanese 
financial markets (particularly its debt market) less conducive to the driving 
forces of financial globalisation, and subsequently the GFC has further 
accelerated the anti-neoliberal trend in Japan. Most American and European 
financial institutions have scaled back their Japan operations due to problems in 
their home markets and the low profitability of the Japanese debt business since 
the GFC. Against this background, the US CRAs have also shrunk their Japan 
businesses. The political superiority of Keidanren over Doyukai has remained 
unchanged, but interestingly, the ideational difference between the two industrial 
associations has narrowed since the late 2000s. Even conservative members of 
Keidanren have had to accept Anglo-Saxon style corporate governance at least in 
the de jure sense because of mounting pressure from international equity 
investors.  
 
5.6 The Robustness of the Japanese Corporate System  
This section examines three interrelated questions. Why could not the market 
liberalisation camp defeat the anti-free market camp in Japan under financial 
globalisation? Who created Japan’s post-war political economic system and what 
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is the essence of this system? To what extent has Japanese corporate governance  
changed or not changed? A short answer to the first question is that market 
liberalism has been at odds with Japanese society’s anti -free market norms, which 
are centred on in-group favouritism and systemic support, and has not obtained 
vast support from subordinate groups (including regular workers and SME 
owners). However, the second question needs to be explored in order to fully 
answer why such anti-free market norms have been so robust.  
     Calder (1988: 21-6) focuses on ‘circles of compensation’ that conservative 
LDP politicians have expanded by aggressively providing benefits for major 
prospective supporters in order to strengthen their political foundation, arguing 
that big business adopted a risky highly leveraged growth strategy and 
bureaucrats acquiesced this economically irrational behaviour in order to 
maintain broader stability. Although the concept of compensation politics reflects 
some elements of Japanese political economy, it is narrower than that of systemic 
support, which covers wider-ranging social relations, not only between public 
and private institutions (e.g., public financial institutions and firms) but also 
between private institutions (e.g., banks and firms) and within them (e.g., 
management and regular workers). In addition, the distinction between public 
and private in Japan is not as clear as that in the US, and most large Japanese 
firms and banks are not necessarily pure profit maximisers but have public 
characteristics in that their management provides systemic support for 
subordinates. In this sense, both bureaucrats, described as de facto legislators by 
Takeuchi (2000: 367-8), and management of big businesses and banks can be 
categorised as administrators, who play a larger role than conservative LDP 
politicians in the political economic system. As Takeuchi (ibid.: 398-9) rightly 
depicts, Japanese politicians are nominally legislators but in reality are lobbyists 
exerting influence over bureaucrats on behalf of local constituents and interest 
groups. 
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     Over 30 years ago, Johnson (1982) contended that ‘for more than 50 years the 
Japanese state has given its first priority to economic development’. Japan’s 
developmental regime, portrayed by Johnson, and the 1940 system, delineated by 
Noguchi (2010), share some similarities, but the latter is sceptical about 
government policy’s positive impact on economic growth. Some scholars such as 
Samuels (1987), Okimoto (1989) and Calder (1993) claim that Johnson’s 
developmental state perspective overemphasises the bureaucratic leadership a nd 
needs to be improved by highlighting the influence of private mangers, but 
Johnson (1999: 56-7) argues that these scholars has misconceived the relationship 
between public and private actors in Japan as dichotomous. I think that Johnson 
is right regarding this point, but his view of developmental coalition is somewhat 
unclear. In contrast, Noguchi (2010: 7-12) clearly illustrates the following three 
pillars of the 1940 system that were remnants of wartime: 1) Japanese style 
corporate structure, 2) the bank-centred financial system, and 3) the strong 
economic bureaucracy. As discussed in Chapter 2, one weakness of Johnson’s 
argument stems from his extremely negative view of socio-cultural approaches. 
Social norms are persistent but constantly change through interactions with 
domestic and international political economic factors. More importantly, it is 
crucial to identify who created and promoted social norms and institutions.  
     I have contended that anti-free market social norms and the 1940 system were 
created and promoted by administrators, including bureaucrats, conservative 
politicians, corporate executives and bankers, and consented to by subordinates. 
Conversely, a historic bloc constructed by Japanese anti -free market elites and 
subordinates through the exchange of systemic support for obedience to pursue 
political and economic stability has been extremely robust. Noguchi (2010: 207 -
25) claims that although both economic bureaucracy and the banking industry 
have been forced to change to some extent since the 1990s, large firms have 
hardly broken away from the deeply instilled features of the Japanese style 
company as closed in nature and negative perspectives on market -oriented 
economy.  
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     There are various views on who governs the Japanese style  company. Most 
Marxists believe that the capitalist class, including shareholders and corporate 
executives, dominates Japanese firms (Steven 1983; Crump 2003; Watanabe 
2004). However, in reality, shareholders’ power has been restricted in Japan 
(though somewhat strengthened since the late 1990s), and management has been 
relatively independent of shareholders. In contrast, Matsumoto (2011), who used 
to be a MITI official, maintains that Japanese companies, whose management 
rejects capitalist domination and is integrated with labour, are controlled by 
employees sharing part of the corporate risk. However, given that the interests of 
management and labour are not identical, I think that the relationship between 
the two parties is not integration but alliance against capitalists.  
     Nishiyama (1992) contends that Japanese large corporations are not 
dominated by shareholders but by managers (as supervisory workers)  who tend 
to prefer debt financing, which has less influence on management, over equity 
financing. According to him, the decline of capitalists and the dominance of firms 
by supervisory workers was based on an idea that only people that provide labour 
should be rewarded, while those who do not are unqualified for reward (ibid .: 
246). This type of idea was used by communist leaders to criticise capitalists and 
subsequently by post-war Japanese elites. Labour is stipulated by the constitution 
of post-war Japan as one of the three duties of the public along with tax payment 
and child education. 155 Okumura (1991) points out that Japan is a corporate 
centric society in that everybody directly or indirectly depends on and lives with 
companies in which Japanese wealth is concentrated, and argues that Japanese 
companies are mutually controlled through cross-shareholdings by companies. 
Nevertheless, in reality, it is impossible for companies to mutually control each 
other so this situation is actually tantamount to management dominance of 
companies in alliances against capitalists.  
                                                   
155 By contrast, labour was not a public duty in the constitution of pre -war Japan. 
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     As discussed in the previous chapters, a prototype of post -war Japanese 
companies had already been witnessed during wartime. Both the Japanese 
financial market and corporate society nurtured strong preferences for long-term 
relations, while Japanese financial institutions and firms were generally reluctant 
to accept monitoring from outside at ordinary times but asked for systemic 
support in times of crisis (Okazaki 1993: 119-20). Post-war Japanese financial 
institutions and firms inherited such characteristics, and the government and 
society shared a consensus on employment maintenance. Japanese society in the 
early post-war period emphasised economic growth through a public system 
providing systemic support in pursuit of stability and security rather than a 
market promoting efficiency through competition. Furthermore, Takeda (2008) 
maintains that Japanese companies have historically placed top priority on their 
organisational survival and perpetuation, unlike their American peers, which 
focus on financial success and shareholder returns. 156 
     Financial market liberalisation in Japan under Anglo-Saxon financial 
hegemony has been prevented by anti-free market norms centred on systemic 
support and in-group favouritism, which are deeply embedded in the Japanese 
style corporate system. Both systemic support and in-group favouritism, which 
sustain a management-labour alliance, are key components of guardian morals 
and indispensable to the corporate system at the centre of Japanese society. This 
is one major reason why systemic support has been persistent, even when the 
power of the economic bureaucracy and the banking industry (i.e., two pillars of 
the 1940 system) weakened from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. The 
robustness of the Japanese style corporate system can be explained partly by both 
superiors and subordinates (for instance, management and regular workers, main 
banks and corporate borrowers, and large firms and subcontractors) mutually  
                                                   
156 Takeda (2008: 54-6) also points out that in the 1950s the power of management increased 
at many American companies, whose focus shifted from shareholder returns to 
organisational prosperity, and this was called ‘managerial capitalism’. However, capitalist s 
gradually regained power from the 1970s onwards.  
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abandoning their alternative options to long-term commitment. Most large 
Japanese firms, except for those controlled by founding families, are based on an 
alliance between the administrators and regular workers in regard to avoiding 
capitalist dominance. Should capitalists become dominant in Japanese corporate 
society, they would cut off the strong ties that maintain the long-term 
relationships such as the management-labour alliance and keiretsu, resulting in 
the loss of both management’s autonomous power within their firms and stable 
employment.  
     Then, the extent to which Japanese corporate governance has changed or not 
changed also needs to be examined. Key components of Japanese style business 
management include lifetime employment, seniority-based wages, enterprise 
labour unions, corporate groups and keiretsu, cross-shareholdings and a high 
dependence on bank borrowing. The prolonged economic stagnation, the 
financial deregulation, the financial crisis and the introduction of Anglo -Saxon 
financial and business customs have changed some of these elements. An 
increasing number of large firms have faced difficulties in sustaining lifetime 
employment and seniority-based wages, and the number of non-regular workers 
has dramatically increased. Since the 1990s, banks and companies have been 
forced to unwind a large portion of cross-shareholdings due to the financial crisis, 
corporate restructuring and the introduction of both mark-to-market accounting 
and the restriction on shareholdings by banks, resulting in higher foreign 
ownership ratios of Japanese shares. However, despite the unwinding of mutual 
shareholdings, long-term keiretsu transactions and subcontracting are still 
ubiquitous in Japan. The proportion of bank borrowing to corporate finance has 
been lowered since the early 1990s, but the Japanese financial system is still 
bank-centred. In the meantime, a variety of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance 
practices such as mark-to-market and impairment accounting, quarterly financial 
reports, and outside director and executive officer systems have been introduced 
since the bursting of the bubble economy.  
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     Although corporate governance practices in Japan have seemed to change 
substantially as mentioned above, the core of Japanese corporate governance, in -
group favouritism, has remained almost intact due to the persistence of systemic 
support. Noguchi (2010: 222-7) claims that almost all management at large 
Japanese firms, except for those that have gone bankrupt or faced a financial 
crisis, including Shinsei Bank (the former LTCB), Nissan Motor and Japan 
Airlines, are internally promoted, and that the Japanese style company places top 
priority on the survival of its employee community-like organisation and 
considers profit maximisation a sin. Given the growing influence of overseas 
shareholders, listed Japanese firms have had to introduce Anglo-Saxon style 
corporate governance practices in order to enhance or maintain their share prices 
and tap the capital market when necessary. However, most corporate executives 
of these firms do not want overseas shareholders to interfere in management 
issues and desire to preserve their autonomy. Consequently, many of these firms 
have demonstrated mock or cosmetic convergence to Anglo-Saxon style 
corporate governance, for instance, through their nominal introduction of outside 
board members and the executive officer system (Omura and Masuko 2003).  
     Two factors, higher bankruptcy risk and shareholders’ demand for higher 
returns, would change Japanese style corporate governance (i.e., in -group 
favouritism) based on the management-labour alliance. Although these factors 
would enhance the bargaining power of capitalists vis-à-vis management, 
persistent systemic support has prevented capitalist domination. In this respect, 
Japanese banks, which have provided systemic support for financially strained 
companies, do not belong to the capitalist (market l iberalisation) camp. Choosing 
either stakeholder capitalism (the market liberalisation camp) or shareholder 
capitalism (the anti-free market camp) is not simply right or wrong but rather a 
philosophical and normative question. Most importantly, their ultimate fault line 
is either to continue or to restrict strong systemic support. Fujita (2015: 15) 
reveals that industrial and corporate metabolism in Japan is much slower than 
that in the US due to the former’s less frequent major bankruptcies, resulting in 
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the underperformance of the Japanese equity market. 157 Noguchi (2010: 227) 
insists that survival and the status quo maintenance of old (declining) industries 
and companies, which tend to discourage the development of new ones, should 
not be supported in order to escape from the 1940 system and reinvigorate the 
economy. 
 
5.7 Dynamics between the Equity and Credit Markets  
As mentioned in Introduction, Calder (1988: 465-6) and Okimoto (1989: 31-2) 
focus on the trade-off between (market) efficiency and (social) stabil ity / security. 
CMEs including Japan tend to prioritise social stability / security over market 
efficiency, which strongly affect their corporate governance. By contrast, 
corporate governance in LMEs such as Anglo-Saxon countries are inclined to 
prioritise market efficiency over social stability / security. Social stability and 
security are associated with the orientation for strong ties, prevention and 
guardian morals, while market efficiency is linked with that for weak ties, 
promotion and commercial morals.  Furthermore, capitalist dominance (i.e., 
shareholder capitalism) is constrained in CMEs whose financial system is mainly 
based on the credit market, in contrast to LMEs which are dominated by 
capitalists, mainly shareholders in the equity market.  
     In fact, capitalist dominance used to be constrained even in Anglo-Saxon 
countries during the Cold War when there was a compromise between labour, 
government and capitalists in order to restrict the influence of communism on 
labour. However, since the end of the Cold War, the diminished necessity of such 
a compromise has enhanced ICM, hence the power of capitalists. Capitalist 
dominance (mainly driven by the equity market) has been clearly witnessed in 
LMEs, but has encountered stronger resistance in some CMEs.  Importantly, the 
roles of debt in CMEs and LMEs appear to be quite different.  Debt in CMEs, 
                                                   
157 Tsutomu Fujita is vice chairman of Citigroup Global Markets Japan.  
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particularly Japan, often reflects the ties between lenders and borrowers, both of 
who aim for organisational and relational stability. Anti -free market Japanese are 
concerned about capitalist dominance jeopardising social stability. In contrast, 
debt in LMEs is primarily used to maximise shareholder gains by pursuing higher 
capital efficiency. 
     As referred to in Chapter 1, uneven changes in board and management 
characteristics across the Japanese financial market have been observed, and the 
pressure to change is much stronger in the equity market, where the influence of 
overseas investors has increased, than in the credit market, which is dominated 
by local players. While equity markets in advanced industrialised countries tend 
to be fairly open and standardised (i.e., synchronic), credit markets retain more 
parochial elements such as domestic regulations, local practices and a high 
proportion of local participants. One possible reason for this difference is that 
state regulation and home bias are much stronger in credit markets than in equity 
markets because of the former’s much greater market size including that of public 
debt, a greater number of participants (including consumers and SMEs) and lower 
risks and returns (albeit with some exceptions), although synchronic features 
have been enhanced in Anglo-Saxon credit markets. I contend that the Japanese 
political economy contains both equity market pressure for the convergence to 
Anglo-Saxon style capitalism and systemic support, associated mainly with the 
credit market, to resist convergence, but that the latter is still stronger than the 
former. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed an ideational conflict within the Japanese elite, 
particularly focusing on that between Doyukai and Keidanren, which belong to 
the respective market liberalisation and anti -free market camps, and Japanese 
corporate governance. These two major industrial associations are key ideational 
platforms of the respective camps, which display different types of corporate 
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governance in Japan. Keidanren is a successor to the umbrella organisation of 
control associations established in 1940. This is another example to prove the 
continuity of Japanese political economy between the wartime and post -war 
periods. Keidanren has disseminated anti-liberal, anti-free market norms centred 
on systemic support (e.g., bailout of big businesses and lifetime  employment) to 
Japanese society, and shared such norms, closely associated with the orientation 
for strong ties, prevention and guardian morals, with other anti -free market elites 
such as interventionist bureaucrats, conservative LDP politicians, legal 
professionals, bankers and the local Japanese CRAs. A management-labour 
alliance against capitalists and interlocking business relations are the keystones 
of Japanese style stakeholder capitalism.  
     Pro-American Doyukai strengthened its neoliberal orientation from the early 
1990s until the mid-2000s, and the industrial association, together with non-
Japanese firms (including the American CRAs), neoclassical economists and 
reformist bureaucrats and politicians, supported Anglo-Saxon style shareholder 
capitalism. When Japanese society lost confidence in Japanese style stakeholder 
capitalism closely linked to systemic support and in-group favouritism, an 
increasing number of Japanese elites felt that Japan needed to follow American 
standards (including shareholder capitalism, American credit rating orthodoxy, 
and other American financial and business practices), which promoted market 
liberalisation and neoliberal restructuring under the Hashimoto and Koizumi 
administrations. These trends made both anti-free market administrators and 
subordinates such as regular workers and SME owners concerned about risk of 
capitalist dominance severing social ties.  
     The anti-neoliberal counteraction driven by both administrators and 
subordinates, which started in 2006, has diminished the influence of the market 
liberalisation camp including Doyukai, which failed to obtain support from the 
public. I argue that the ideational conflict between the market liberalisation and 
anti-free market camps has been a moral dispute between Anglo-Saxon global 
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norms and Japanese social norms. Making short-term profit in financial markets 
and severing long-term social ties (i.e., prioritising individual goals over those 
of collectives) still tend to be regarded as morally wrong in Japan.  
     Both the American CRAs and Doyukai were ideational platforms promoting 
the American credit rating orthodoxy and shareholder capitalism, respectively, 
both based on Anglo-Saxon global norms, in Japanese society. Global norms are 
influential but not necessarily compatible with social norms in many countries. 
Persistent Japanese social norms, which prioritise stability over efficiency, has 
resisted Anglo-Saxon global norms in order to maintain the dominance of 
administrators who provide support for subordinates in exchange for obedience. 
However, the resistance to global norms has required Japan to take heavy tolls, 
i.e., growing contradictions within Japanese society, which will be discussed in 
the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6: The Dilution of Systemic Support and Growing 
Contradictions 
 
This chapter will analyse the contribution of systemic support to Japan’s rapid 
economic growth first, then examine why and how the characteristics of systemic 
support have changed since the 1990s, and finally discuss growing contradictions 
to systemic support. During the Cold War period, systemic support bonding long-
termist administrators, committed labour and patient capital together, along with 
the hegemonic support from the US, significantly contributed to Japan’s rapid 
economic growth. However, the enhanced ICM after the mid-1970s eroded the 
autonomy of Japanese bureaucrats, and the weakening of the Soviet Union during 
the 1980s and the end of the Cold War in 1991 lowered Japan’s strategic 
importance for the US, reducing the US support for Japan. Furthermore, 
excessive systemic support, which paralysed dominant elites’ sense of 
responsibility, resulted in a series of political scandals, the bursting of the bubble 
economy, the fall of the LDP and the financial crisis  in the 1990s.  
     Although the systemic support in Japan weakened when economic 
bureaucracy (MOF in particular) and the banking sector lost power from the mid-
1990s until the early 2000s, it resurged in the mid-2000s due to the public call 
for stability as Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have demonstrated the remarkable persistence 
of systemic support in Japan. However, the relative power decline of anti-free 
market elites has changed the characteristics of systemic support from quasi -
public goods to virtual subsidies to specific interest groups, which can be called 
a dilution in its public characteristics. The dilution of systemic support has 
generated growing contradictions within the 1940 system.    
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6.1 The Dilution of Systemic Support 
Prior to the bursting of the bubble economy and the fall of the LDP in the early 
1990s, systemic support justified the legitimacy of administrators’ dominance in 
Japan, whilst the great majority of Japanese people were protected both directly 
and indirectly by such support. During that period, systemic support was provided 
as quasi-public goods by dominant elites in an orderly manner. For example, the 
government supported banks that backed large firms, which, in turn, supported 
their employees and SMEs through lifetime employment and long-term business 
relationships, respectively. The agricultural sector, one of the LDP’s traditional 
constituencies, also enjoyed systemic support. Nevertheless, the dominant elites 
primarily aimed for high economic growth, and the government and banks did  
not directly provide strong support for SMEs and citizens. Importantly, the rapid 
growth and the restraint of capital mobility sustained orderly social protection 
via wealth redistribution to wide-ranging social groups. However, administrators 
have lost control of systemic support since the financial crisis, political scandals 
and economic slump diminished the legitimacy of their dominance. This  has 
transformed systemic support from quasi-public goods to de facto subsidies to 
specific social groups. 
     Although the exchange of systemic support for loyalty was not the sole driver 
for Japan’s post-war rapid economic growth, it successfully drew a strong 
commitment from Japanese workers to their jobs, contributing to the expansion 
of Japanese firms from the 1950s until the 1980s (Matsumoto 2011: 12-26, 
Takeuchi 2000: 378-85). However, with regard to Japanese large firms’ 
governance, systemic support exemplified by lifetime employment and seniority-
based wages was central to a management-labour alliance that prevented 
capitalist power from maximising short-term profits. These firms prioritised sales 
expansion and stability (i.e., long-term relations) at the expense of efficiency and 
profitability, but such support was unsustainable without high levels of 
macroeconomic growth. In Japan, SMEs play a role as shock absorbers for large 
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firms, which force the former to lower prices and lengthen the receivable turnover 
period, enhancing SMEs’ bankruptcy risk, in economic downturns. Most SMEs 
did not have the traits of Japanese style companies, including lifetime 
employment and seniority-based wages, and were much more capitalistic than 
conservative large firms (Matsumoto 2011: 111-2). Unlike privileged big 
businesses, the financially strained SMEs were not bailed out by the government 
and banks. The lifting of the wartime state economic control, the dissolution of 
Zaibatsu conglomerates, and the US trading policy and dollar-yen exchange rate 
being favourable for Japanese exporters during the Cold War provided growth 
opportunities for entrepreneurial SMEs such as Sony, Honda and Kyocera in the 
early post-war period, when numerous SMEs were founded and a large number 
of them went bankrupt. 
     The allocation of credit was concentrated in large firms, particularly 
manufacturers, during the early post-war period, and firms with better 
employment conditions attracted high-quality human resources. These factors put 
SMEs in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis big businesses, which dominated 
the domestic market. Furthermore, Watanabe et al. (2013: 86-91) point out that 
excessive competition among SMEs based on abundant cheap labour aggravated 
their bargaining position against large firms. Accordingly, a large portion of 
SMEs without competitive business resources became subcontractors of large 
firms, which exploited the former’s cheap labour, in order to secure stable orders 
from the latter. Long-term subcontracting between large firms and SMEs became 
a form of systemic support and an integral part of Japanese style corporate 
management. While the significant growth of large firms benefited 
subcontracting SMEs during the rapid economic growth period, the latter’s 
dependency on the former was reinforced. However, the following three 
intertwined problems surrounding SMEs have continued since 1950, when large 
firms started recovering: 1) exploitation by large firms, 2) scarce business 
resources as well as limited state and bank support, and 3) market dominance by 
large firms (ibid.: 86-91). 
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     Nishiyama (1992: 247) identifies three major deficiencies of Japanese style 
corporate management. The first deficiency is the risk of corporate 
bureaucratisation through the ‘hierarchicalisation’ of both companies and 
workers, resulting in weakened entrepreneurship and labour market rigidity. The 
second is excessive reliance on debt capital. The last is the inadequacy of 
capitalist monitoring of corporate governance. Regarding the first point, most 
large Japanese firms had a bureaucratic inclination because of the US occupation 
forces’ elimination of major capitalists and the purge of top management at large 
firms. Their bureaucratisation was further reinforced by a management -labour 
alliance against capitalists. Although SMEs had a capitalistic tendency 
immediately after WWII, the entrepreneurship of subcontracting SMEs r eceded 
in accordance with their enhanced dependency on large firms. With respect to the 
second point, generally, Japanese companies’ financial leverage was higher than 
that of their American peers until the financial crisis. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, the corporate loans provided by main banks had the characteristics of 
de facto quasi-equities. Whilst the Japanese corporate sector has lowered its 
financial leverage since the financial crisis, the quasi -equity-like features of main 
bank loans have weakened. Rather, a real problem is the Japanese banking 
industry’s status quo orientation, which has hindered the development of 
emerging industries and companies (Noguchi 1995: 175-6; Ikeo 2003: 89-99). 
Regarding the third point, insufficient monitoring from the outside, in-group 
favouritism of Japanese organisations and risk socialisation made responsibility 
and accountability weaken within the Japanese style corporate system, which 
contributed to the enormous bad debt problem (Ito 2007: 214-25).  
     Market inefficiency associated with domestic systemic support in Japan was 
partly compensated for by the US hegemonic support for Japan during the Cold 
War. Embedded liberalism under Pax Americana, which constrained ICM, was 
favourable for Japan’s CME. However, such external support waned towards the 
end of the Cold War when Japan’s strategic importance for the US diminished. 
The US (and other Anglo-Saxon countries) shifted from a diachronic form of 
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financing and Fordism mass-producing standardised products to synchronic 
financing and post-Fordism, focusing on shorter-run production for more 
diversified and specialised markets through financialisation and information 
technology innovation. However, Japanese manufacturers have encountered 
intense competition with developing countries since the 1980s, whilst Japanese 
administrators have tried to preserve Japanese-style Fordism and diachronic 
financing, delaying the shift to knowledge intensive industries such as finance 
and information technology.      
     When the Japanese economic growth slowed down and the yen sharply 
appreciated against the US dollar from the early 1970s until 1990, the 
relationship between large firms and SMEs became somewhat conflictual. Big 
businesses put pressure on SMEs to lower product prices in order to maintain 
their own earnings, whereas the former entered into areas traditionally associated 
with the latter. Furthermore, domestic demand has stagnated since the bursting 
of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, and large manufacturers have 
increasingly shifted their production abroad to grasp overseas demand and avoid 
the negative impact of the higher yen. The business environment for Japanese 
SMEs has deteriorated due to fierce competition with other Asian rivals and 
Japanese big businesses. Nevertheless, an METI official maintained that most 
SMEs have continuously depended on less profitable transactions with large 
firms as they regard these transactions as sources of social credibility. 158 It has 
been increasingly difficult for large firms to afford to provide support not only 
for SMEs but also for the agricultural sector. In the late 1950s, responding to the 
Socialist and Communist parties’ bids for millions of tenant farmers, the LDP 
successfully formed a ‘steel and rice’ coalition, whereby manufacturing 
industries provided money for anti-communist campaigns and the agricultural 
sector, which, in turn, became voting blocs for the party (Rosenbluth and Thies 
                                                   
158 Interview with Yuki Takishima of the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, METI, in 
November 2014. 
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2010: 77-8). However, Keidanren proposed to deregulate such areas as 
agriculture to ease the protectionist pressure in the US (Schoppa 2006: 105).  
     Since the financial crisis in the late 1990s, it has become difficult for large 
firms to protect regular workers although most of them have tried hard to preserve 
lifetime employment. The failures of major Japanese financial institutions, 
including Yamaichi Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and the LTCB, made 
the American CRAs think that the Japanese government’s grip of the Japanese 
financial and economic system was not as strong as the agencies had previously 
thought and expect the future convergence of Japan’s political economic system 
towards that of Anglo-Saxon countries. The American CRAs significantly 
reduced the expectation of systemic support in credit ratings for Japanese banks 
and companies, downgrading these borrowers severely. A large number of big 
businesses, most of which did not have credit ratings and were mainly in non-
manufacturing industries such as construction, property, retailing and non-
banking, went bankrupt due to weakened systemic support from the government 
and banks from the late 1990s until the early 2000s, when MOF and the banking 
industry lost power. Corporate bankruptcies and the discharge of regular workers 
shook up a management-labour alliance.  
     The financial crisis and the introduction of mark-to-market accounting have 
forced Japanese banks and companies to unwind a large proportion of cross -
shareholdings, which used to contribute to forming corporate groups and keiretsu 
relations. Cross-shareholding was widely introduced to Zaibatsu groups to 
expand equity capital without weakening solidarity among group member 
companies from the early 1930s onwards (Teranishi 2003:  214-6). The US 
occupation forces’ ‘securities democratisation’ had shareholdings b y the 
dissolved Zaibatsu and institutions sold off to individual investors, whose 
shareholding ratio of all of the listed companies reached 69% in 1949 (Ito 2011: 
17). This made the managers of large firms feel vulnerable to corporate takeover 
risk, and these mangers’ strong lobbying through Keidanren successfully relaxed 
253 
 
the restrictions on cross-shareholdings among companies and financial 
institutions in 1949 and 1953 (Teranishi 2003: 217-8). This relaxation together 
with the capital liberalisation in 1963, which was perceived as the risk of takeover 
by foreign capital, dramatically enhanced the corporate and financial institutions’ 
shareholdings ratios and lowered the individual investors’ shareholding ratio 
until the 1980s. Subsequently, the cross-shareholding ratio of the aggregate 
market capitalisation of all of the listed companies more than halved from 18.1% 
in 1990 to 7.6% in 2003, while the foreign shareholding ratio rose from less than 
10% to over 20% (Ito 2007: 218-9). 
     With the rising foreign shareholder ratio (29.8% as of 2015159), the capitalist 
pressure on the management of large firms for changes in corporate governance 
to Anglo-Saxon style and higher shareholder returns has been intensified. Both 
regulatory compliance for companies and shareholder monitoring of management 
have become stricter, while the risk of shareholder lawsuits against management 
has been seemingly heightened. Nevertheless, key elements of the Japanese style 
corporate system, such as the main bank system, lifetime employment, keiretsu, 
and long-term subcontracting, have persisted, although they are somewhat 
weakened. Interestingly, there are relatively few examples of foreign capital 
acquiring Japanese firms - some examples are the acquisition of the LTCB by 
Ripplewood Holdings, Nissan by Renault, Seiyu (retailer) by Wal-Mart, and 
Sharp by Taiwan-based Hon Hai Precision Industry - despite the significant 
unwinding of cross-shareholdings. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
regardless of the introduction of Anglo-Saxon style corporate governance 
measures, the core of Japanese corporate governance, in-group favouritism, has 
remained almost unscathed thanks to persistent systemic support – the great 
majority of top managers at large firms are still internally promoted. A 
management-labour alliance in Japan has been shaken up by intensifying 
capitalist pressure, but not broken, over the last two decades.  
                                                   
159 2015 Shareownership Survey by Japan Exchange Group dated 20 June 2016  
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     Nevertheless, Japanese society’s diminished confidence in systemic support 
along with its stagnant domestic demand has lowered the risk taking capacity of 
the corporate and household sectors, sharply expanding the excess of deposits 
over loans of the banking industry from breakeven in April 2000 to 199 trillion 
yen in December 2014. 160  Japanese companies’ risk taking (such as capital 
investment) used to be bolstered by systemic support from the government, banks 
and corporate groups. However, the corporate sector drastically reduced debts 
because of the weakened systemic support which heightened bankruptcy risk 
from the mid-1990s until the early 2000s. In the mid-2000s, systemic support for 
financially troubled large companies resurged along with the recovery of the 
banking industry after the massive public capital injections and the bad debt 
disposals as well as the establishment of the IRCJ. Even so, corporate risk taking 
has not sufficiently recovered since then, partly due to the transformation of the 
financial regulation from discretionary interventionist to relatively arm’s length, 
principle-based. Japanese banks have become less certain about government 
support for them and more cautious about corporate lending to less creditworthy 
companies, which, in turn, has discouraged corporate risk taking. Furthermore, 
the dismal prospect of the Japanese economy has likely made corporate behaviour 
defensive, reducing debt and piling up cash. The household sector has also 
maintained enormous bank deposits because of anxiety over employment and 
social security, ironically curbing economic growth.  
     More importantly, systemic support in Japan has been transformed to de facto 
subsidies to specific interest groups, particularly the weak, including SMEs, 
people with multiple debts and the elderly, since the mid-1990s, when the power 
of administrators started to deteriorate due to the economic slump and scandals. 
Despite the decline of the elites, subordinates have continuously asked the 
government to protect them based on their consent to the exchange of systemic 
support for obedience. In the past, administrators could prioritise the recipients 
                                                   
160 Bloomberg dated 12 March 2015 
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of systemic support according to their importance in regard to economic growth, 
as long as the economic prosperity legitimised their power: the top priority was 
given to big businesses, which, in turn, supported their regular workers and to a 
lesser extent SMEs, whilst ordinary citizens (except for regular workers of large 
firms) were neglected. However, with the weakened elite dominance, subordinate 
groups have fought for a larger share of support from the public system, whereas 
politicians have been keen to provide support for the weak in order to gather more 
votes, resulting in, for example, the revised Money Lending Law, the 
establishment of public-private funds and the SME Financing Facilitation Act. 
On the other hand, a sharply increasing number of people, mainly non-regular 
workers, have received little systemic support.  
     Ito (2007: 220-3) claims that the ambiguity of both power and responsibility 
within Japanese organisations produces a ‘system of irresponsibility’ – their 
leaders’ power and responsibility are not clearly stipulated but virtually defined 
in relation to their superiors (predecessors) and subordinates. He also argues that 
as long as Japanese organisations work well, their leaders have a free hand to 
make decisions and take initiatives, but in a crisis requiring fundamental changes, 
they cannot make a decision, as they are constrained by loyalty and obedience to 
their predecessors, who appointed them to their current positions, as well as self -
protection (ibid.: 223-5). In other words, Japanese elites are both underpinned 
and constrained by the exchange between superiors’ support for subordinates and 
subordinates’ loyalty to their superiors within organisations. This exchange is 
identical to that between dominant groups’ systemic support for subordinate 
groups and the latter’s obedience to the former, which has long hampered 
political leaders pursuing change and capital mobility. Moreover, risk 
socialisation through networks of systemic support in tandem with in -group 
favouritism has generated and developed a system of irresponsibility in Japanese 
society. Systemic support creates a system of irresponsibility both in 
organisations and in society. This system may be a remote cause of both the 
creation and bursting of the bubble economy and the ensuing financial crisis.   
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     Systemic support contributed to both the rapid growth and the long-term 
stability of the Japanese economy by creating exceptionally strong social 
solidarity, but simultaneously sowed the seeds of havoc by generating and 
developing a system of irresponsibility. Such support works effectively when 
capital mobility and power are restricted, and the cost of such support is 
compensated by high economic growth. When serious economic and political 
problems deteriorate dominant elites’ authority and legitimacy, systemic support 
is likely to transform from quasi-public goods to virtual subsidies to specific 
interest groups under a system of irresponsibility. In this respect, systemic 
support has resulted in both continuity of, and contradictions to, the 1940 system, 
and a system of irresponsibility is one of its major contradictions. The market 
liberalisation camp within the dominant elites attempted to curb systemic support 
and remove the system of irresponsibility, but an anti-neoliberal backlash from 
both anti-free market elites and subordinates has caused the liberalisation attempt 
to fail.  
 
6.2 Growing Contradictions within the 1940 System  
What contradictions in Japan’s 1940 system have been generated by systemic 
support? And how have they grown over time? The most salient contradiction is 
a system of irresponsibility, but concrete contradictory phenomena also need to 
be examined. The following three contradictions have been produced by the 
dilution of systemic support: 1) significantly weakened risk taking of the 
corporate and household sectors, 2) rapid expansion of public debt, which 
reached an alarming level, and 3) a sharp increase in the number of poor non-
regular workers. These problems are closely intertwined. For instance, the 
stagnant economic activities of the corporate and household sectors have been 
compensated by large public expenditure, contributing to increases in public debt. 
On the other hand, it is said that growing concern over a possibl e crisis of social 
security due to excessive public debt has curbed consumer spending and  
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maintained an enormous amount of bank deposits (Okita 2010: 128-34). In 
addition, large firms with deteriorated earnings have hired low-paid, easily 
dischargeable non-regular workers in order to protect existing regular workers 
under lifetime employment.  
     With regard to the first contradiction, negative aspects of systemic support 
include a strong status quo orientation, the protection of economically inefficient 
industries including agriculture and retail, and hindrance to the growth potential 
of emerging industries and companies. In fact, networks of systemic support 
promoted social cohesion and enabled large firms to implement aggressive 
expansionist strategies during the rapid growth period, when dominant elites 
could provide sufficient rewards and protection for subordinate groups, which, 
in turn, legitimised the authority of elites and the system created by them. These 
could be regarded as positive aspects of systemic support from the viewpoint of 
economic growth and social stability. Yoshida (1994: 161-70) contends that the 
Japanese style corporate system, the bank-centred financial system and high 
economic growth were closely related – large firms had to keep growing just like 
a Ponzi scheme in order to maintain lifetime employment and seniority-based 
wages, whilst the bank-centred financial system was indispensable to sustaining 
rapid economic growth and simultaneously preventing shareholders from 
intervening heavily in management and seeking high profitability. However, the 
Japanese economy has been stagnant since the 1990s, and the financial crisis 
damaged Japanese society’s confidence in systemic support.  
     Apart from aggressive risk taking backed by strong systemic support, the 
economic reconstruction from the war damage, young corporate management 
unconstrained by their predecessors and the Cold War contributed to the rapid 
economic growth in the early post-war period.161 SMEs had more opportunities 
                                                   
161 According to the 20 March 2015 issue of Nikkei Business, Masamoto Yashiro, former 
director of Esso Petroleum and the Japanese chairman of Citibank, maintains that young 
executives could take strong leadership after the purge of their predecessors by the US 
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to grow into big businesses in the 1950s and 1960s. Furthermore, during the Cold 
War, the US tolerated Japan’s state interventionism, favourable exchange rates 
for Japanese exporters and these exporters’ good access to the US market. 
However, these conditions for rapid growth started to wane in the 1970s. Since 
then, the negative aspects of systemic support have outweighed the positives. The 
competition between Japanese companies and their peers in developing countries 
has been intensified since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, dominant elites 
have gradually succumbed to a system of irresponsibility, while excessive 
dependence on systemic support has undermined the risk taking capacity of the 
corporate sector.   
     The household sector depositing a large proportion of money in banks was 
left outside the rapid economic growth mechanism, which consisted of mainly 
large firms and financial institutions, but was indirectly rewarded by enhanced 
wages and the redistribution of wealth to less competitive sectors throu gh fiscal 
policy (Noguchi 2010: 114-6). One major reason why Japanese society preferred 
bank deposits over securities investment was the scarcity of individuals who had 
the capacity to take an investment risk due to the elimination of major capitalists 
by the US occupation forces and post-war hyper-inflation, whilst another reason 
was households’ general distrust in securities, stemming from their experience of 
the government bonds forcibly sold to them during wartime becoming almost 
valueless after the war (Ito 1995: 151-2). Importantly, MOF and the BOJ 
promoted household savings for the post-war economic recovery and growth, and 
Savings Promotion Committees were established in all of the prefectures in 1950. 
An additional reason might be the household sector’s faith in systemic support 
for the banking industry – even during the financial crisis, bank deposits were 
intact. Furthermore, over the last two decades, protracted wage declines and 
concerns over job and social security have made households more financially 
                                                   
occupation forces, while war-damage reconstruction naturally boosted rapid economic 
growth. 
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defensive, maintaining a huge amount of bank deposits. However, ironically, the 
banking industry has made an enormous investment in JGBs because of the 
declined corporate demand for borrowing funds.  
     In terms of the second contradiction, enormous fiscal support for drastic 
corporate debt reductions and sharply rising social security burdens associated 
with an aging society have contributed to the skyrocketing public debt from 301 
trillion yen (67% of GDP) in 1990 to 1,285 trillion yen (232% of GDP) in 2016. 
The corporate sector has radically reduced its debts through decreases in capital 
investment and significant cuts in costs, particularly personnel costs, while the 
government has assisted this corporate restructuring through public capital 
injections into the banking sector, increases in public spending, corporate tax cuts 
and monetary easing, all of which can be regarded as systemic support (Tsuchiya 
and Morita 2011: 72-83; Takata 2012: 101-4). Over 40% of listed companies in 
Japan are virtually debt free now – their cash in hand exceeds their debt (Takata 
2012: 101-2). Furthermore, dramatic social security benefit expansion, of both 
public pensions and healthcare in particular, has also enlarged the public debt. 
According to Keiichiro Kobayashi, an economics professor, the present value of 
aggregated public pension and healthcare benefits for the elderly in the next 50 
to 60 years is estimated to be 700 trillion yen (Hashizume and Kobayashi 2014: 
40-3). 
     However, it should be noted that a large proportion of the huge bank deposits 
possessed by the corporate and household sectors has been appropriated for bank 
investment in JGBs. As of the end of March 2013, just before the aggressive 
purchase of JGBs through drastic quantitative monetary easing by the BOJ 
governor, Haruhiko Kuroda, deposit financial institutions centred on banks, 
insurance companies, the BOJ and overseas investors accounted for 37.8%, 
19.9%, 13.2% and 8.4% of the total JGBs (998 trillion yen), respectively.162 In 
addition to the household sector’s savings, totalling 848 trillion yen, out of its 
                                                   
162 Flow of Funds Accounts, the BOJ 
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entire financial assets of 1,571 trillion yen, the non-financial corporate sector had 
bank deposits amounting to 225 trillion yen at that time. 163  Unlike other 
industrialised countries, Japan has financed most of its public debt 
domestically.164 In this respect, although Japan’s ratio of public debt to GDP is 
by far the highest – Japan 232%, the US 111%, Germany 75%, France 121% and 
the UK 115% – its sovereign credit risk (A1 by Moody’s and A+ by S&P as of 
June 2017) is still relatively low thanks to its low dependency on overseas 
investors, which would require higher risk premiums on JGBs than domestic ones 
(Takata 2012: 45-9). The BOJ’s share (39.5%) exceeded that of the deposit 
financial institutions (20.9%) of the total JGBs (1,083 trillion yen) as of the end 
of March 2017, but huge savings held by the household and corporate sectors are 
still appropriated for JGBs via banks’ current accounts at the BOJ. 
     An enormous flow of funds from the household and corporate sectors’ savings 
to JGBs could be regarded as the loyalty and obedience of these sectors to the 
government in exchange for systemic support, but this does not necessarily rule 
out the risk of Japan’s sovereign credit deterioration in the future. One of the 
major risk factors for credit deterioration is sharp increases in the social security 
burden. Although some economists expect an aging society to reduce household 
savings, leading to current account deficits and interest rate hikes (Hashizume 
and Kobayashi 2014, Oguro 2010), Japan’s credit deterioration may be 
exaggerated. As Ito (2007: 248-52) rightly indicates, Japan’s national burden 
ratio (= [tax burden + social security contribution] / national income) is fairly 
low among industrialised countries – Japan 41.6%, the US 32.5%, the UK 46.5%, 
Germany 52.6% and France 67.6% in 2013 – so there is substantial room for 
                                                   
163 Flow of Funds Accounts, the BOJ 
164 According to the statistics Nippon no Zaisei Kankei Shiryo (Japan’s Budget / Fiscal 
Condition-related Data) published by MOF in October 2016, the respective proportions of 
foreign ownership to the outstanding government bonds in the US, Germany, France, t he 
UK and Japan are 41% (as of March 2016), 52% (March 2016), 61% (March 2016), 26% 
(December 2015) and 10% (March 2016).  
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raising its national burden ratio. Furthermore, protracted deflation in J apan has 
caused the financial assets of the household and corporate sectors to be 
concentrated in savings and lowered interest rates, mitigating the government’s 
financial burden. 
     Japan has sufficient ability to reduce the public debt substantially cu rrently, 
but one problem is whether it can demonstrate its political willingness to do so. 
Although Japan should not adopt excessively drastic measures to cut back JGBs, 
which would cause a recession, it has less room to allow its public debt to expand 
further and needs to reduce it at a moderate pace through social security reforms 
and tax increases. Furthermore, if a larger amount of household savings were to 
be used for JGBs, the corporate sector would face a shortage of funds, restricting 
its economic activity. Takata (2012: 210-2) argues that both direct and indirect 
JGB investors’ (i.e., the public’s) tacit confidence in the following three 
assumptions has prevented a JGB crash. Firstly, Japan will return to a growth 
track again in the future. Secondly, the government will decide to exert the power 
of tax collection by raising tax rates when the economy is back on a growth path. 
Lastly, governance to implement policy decisions exists within the government. 
If such confidence were to wane, the risk of capital flight would rise and damage 
JGBs’ creditworthiness, although Japanese society has very strong home bias, 
which has hindered capital flight so far, due to its robust cohesion. However, the 
prolonged economic slump and anxiety about future uncertainty have impaired 
Japanese society’s cohesion.  
     With regard to the third contradiction, the dilution of systemic support has 
pushed an increasing number of people outside its realm, widening economic 
inequality, while interest groups have struggled for a larger share of support from 
the government. The managers of large firms have increased the number of low-
paid non-regular workers (which include the underclass in Japan) in order to 
protect existing regular workers (subordinates) – non-regular workers are outside 
a management-labour alliance, and most of them are excluded from in-house 
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labour unions. The number of non-regular workers (their proportion of total 
labour) more than doubled from 8.8 million (20%) in 1990 to 19.6 million (37%) 
in 2014.165 According to a questionnaire survey by the Japanese Trade Union 
Confederation, around 70% of non-regular workers are categorised as ‘working 
poor’, whose annual income is less than 2 million yen. 166 In contrast to the 
growing economic inequality between the capital ist class and the labour in 
Anglo-Saxon countries, that between regular and non-regular workers is 
highlighted in Japan. 
     Japan’s Gini coefficient (which reflects the income inequality of a society) 
from 2009 until 2012 was lower than those of the US and the UK but higher than 
most other European countries, including Germany, France and Sweden. Its Gini 
coefficient started to rise sharply in the 1980s, and the rising curve steepened 
from the mid-1990s until the 2000s. Furthermore, Japan’s poverty rate in 2012 
was the 6th highest among the 35 OECD countries and higher than those of all 
European countries. Takata (2015) points out that Japan’s wealth concentration 
in ‘ultra-high net worth individuals’ (with a net worth of 50 million US dollars 
or above) is much lower than that of the US, whilst the expansion of the 
underclass and the economic deterioration of the middle class are major issues in 
Japan. Although the total amount of Japan’s social security benefits has been 
skyrocketing over the last two decades due to its rapidly aging society, its social 
security level is lower than that of most European countries. This may be one 
major reason for the enormous savings of the Japanese household sector, apart 
from strong systemic support for the banking industry. In addition, Tsuchiya and 
Morita (2011: 214-5) claim that the younger generations in Japan are generally 
much worse off than the older ones, and that Japan should not allow the elderly 
to become the largest vested interest layer. With regard to social security, the 
existing elderly, at 60 years of age or above, benefit by 120 million yen more per 
                                                   
165 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications report dated 24 July 2015.  
166 The Mainichi Shimbun newspaper dated 20 January 2016  
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person than the future generations, currently under 20 years of age (Oguro and 
Kobayashi 2011: 65). This is analogous to protecting existing regular workers at  
the expense of non-regular workers. 
     Japanese social security heavily depends on families and companies. It is 
often considered that Japan has a large government due to its state 
interventionism, but in reality, the proportion of its social security b enefits to 
GDP (22.2%) as of 2009 was lower than those of the UK (24.1%), Germany 
(27.8%), Sweden (29.8%) and France (32.1%). Article 877 of Japan’s Civil Code 
stipulates that ‘lineal relatives by blood and siblings have a duty to support each 
other’ – for example, elderly people in financial difficulty should be taken care 
of by their children and relatives before receiving public assistance. It is a heavy 
physical, mental and financial burden for Japanese workers to look after their 
parents: 73% of respondents to a survey by the newspaper had experienced the 
excessive burden associated with caring for their relatives. 167 In addition, Japan’s 
national burden rate (the proportion of aggregate taxes and social insurance 
contributions to national income) was the 6th lowest (41.6%) among the OECD 
countries and lower than those of most European countries (the UK 46.5%, 
Germany 52.6%, Sweden 55.7% and France 67.6%) as of 2013. Individual income 
tax rates for wealthy people in Japan were significantly lowered from th e late 
1980s until the mid-2000s, and corporate tax rates have declined dramatically 
since the mid-1980s, owing to international competition initiated by the UK and 
the domestic financial crisis – lowered corporate taxes have assisted corporate 
balance sheet adjustments.  
     Japanese companies provide various social security measures that are 
normally taken on by governments in other countries – for instance, these 
companies carry out unemployment countermeasures by keeping redundant 
regular workers inside their organisations and/or shifting them to other divisions 
and businesses (Matsumoto 2011: 224).  Ito (2007: 248-68) contends that the 
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proportion of tax and security insurance premium burdens on Japanese companies 
to GDP (7.6% in 2003) is relatively light compared to those of their European 
peers (Germany 9.1%, Italy  11.7% and France 14.0%), but the costs these 
companies bear in regard to unemployment countermeasures are not included in 
this proportion. The ratio of Japanese companies’ security insurance premium 
payments to GDP (4.5% in 2003) is lower than those of Germany (7.3%), Italy 
(8.9%) and France (11.4%), but if the unemployment countermeasure costs were 
to be included, the ratio for Japan would be close to those of these European 
countries. Nevertheless, the Japanese corporate sector’s contribution to social 
security has declined owing to the increase in non-regular workers. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the contribution of systemic support to the Japanese 
rapid economic growth during the Cold War, the dilution of systemic support 
since the mid-1990s, and growing contradictions to systemic support. The 
Japanese-style corporate system, in which long-termist administrators, 
committed labour and patient capital connected by systemic support, worked well 
during the Cold War when capital mobility was restricted and the cost of systemic 
support was compensated by US hegemonic support. However, the end of the 
Cold War, which dramatically changed the world order to Anglo-Saxon neoliberal 
hegemony, was a negative game changer for Japanese administrators. This change 
resulted in the dilution of systemic support, which was the transformation in the 
characteristic of systemic support from quasi-public goods to de facto subsidies 
to specific interest groups as the relative power decline of administrators 
(especially bureaucrats and conservative LDP politicians) made them unable to 
control the realm of systemic support.  
     Since the mid-1990s, the dilution of systemic support has generated growing 
contradictions in Japanese society, which can be regarded as side-effects of 
maintaining the 1940 system and resisting Anglo-Saxon neoliberal hegemony. 
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One contradiction is significantly weakened risk taking by the corporate an d 
household sectors, which has prolonged economic stagnation and generated 
another contradiction, i.e., rapid expansion of public debt reaching an alarming 
level. However, I argue that the most serious contradiction is a sharp increase in 
the number of poor non-regular workers, which is a grave social class issue and 
injustice, and that more systemic support in Japan should be provided for 
individuals, particularly those in younger generations, rather than big businesses. 
Without a sufficient level of social security, young people face a difficulty in 
taking risk to pursue their goals and instead tend to be exploited by businesses 
and the elderly. In order to enable young people to do so, the basis of social 
cohesion needs to be enhanced from the small group level to the national one.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has tackled the research puzzle, ‘why has Japan’s financial 
disintermediation lost momentum despite its financial deregulation during the 
1980s and 1990s?’ by adopting a neo-Gramscian approach in tandem with 
sociological, psychological and philosophical concepts. It has focused on an 
ideational conflict within the Japanese elite, and the concept of systemic support 
has been offered as the solution to the puzzle. Neo-Gramscian approaches provide 
three keys – social norms established by dominant elites, subordinates’ consent 
to such norms, and an ideational conflict between key institutions – to solving 
the research puzzle. From an Anglo-Saxon rationalist (i.e., synchronic) 
perspective, Japan’s long-term resistance to financial disintermediation is indeed 
an enigma.   
     The first key to solving the puzzle is to recognise that the administrators (e.g., 
bureaucrats, bankers, corporate executives and LDP politicians) of the 1940 
system created and promoted anti-liberal, anti-free market social norms closely 
linked with Japanese society’s emphasis on strong ties, prevention orientation 
and guardian morals. However, I disagree with cultural or ideological 
determinists who assert that Japanese culture or ideology has exclusively shaped 
Japanese style capitalism (Morishima 1982, Dore 1986, Dore 2000). Morishima 
(1982: viii) argues that a nation’s economic structures and relations are strongly 
conditioned by its ethos and ethics, and that ‘a remarkably idiosyncratic ethos 
prevails in Japanese society, and as a result of these ethical feelings Japanese 
capitalism has to a considerable extent deviated from the typical free enterprise 
system’. According to him, there are two types of religion. The fi rst type justifies 
the power of dominant groups and maintaining the status quo, whereas the second 
one aims to assist the subordinate or individual (ibid.: 194-6). Morishima 
contends that Japan had only the first type of religion (Japanese-style 
Confucianism) and lacked the second one, so Japanese society’s conservative, 
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nationalist and materialistic inclinations ‘could lead to the suppression of all 
liberalistic economic activity, even without the appearance of a strong leader or 
autocrat’ (ibid.: 196). 
     One major weakness of cultural or ideological determinism is that it cannot 
clearly answer a politics question regarding who gets what, when and how 
(Lasswell 1936), although Morishima (1982) rightly points out the significant 
anti-liberal influence of Japanese-style Confucianism on its capitalism. However, 
culture, ideology and norms do not exist indigenously and become influential in 
society; they are tools used by elites to dominate society.  I have contended that 
the anti-liberal, anti-free market norms of Japanese society were established and 
promoted by the administrators of the 1940 system, with the inadvertent support 
of the US occupation forces, which eliminated major capitalists in Japan. 
Meanwhile, classical Marxist scholars stick with the capi talist-labour dichotomy 
when analysing Japanese capitalism (Steven 1983; Crump 2003; Watanabe 2004; 
Watanabe 2009). Although their effort to uncover a latent class conflict in Japan 
is highly appropriate, they fail to grasp the essential characteristics of most 
Japanese corporate executives and bankers, which are similar to those of 
bureaucrats rather than those of entrepreneurs or capitalists. Japanese-style 
capitalism aims mainly for capital accumulation on national and corporate levels 
(i.e., the maximisation of social and corporate wealth) rather than individual 
financial wealth, which is the primary goal of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. 
     Furthermore, analytic eclecticism is very useful in incorporating social 
relations and norms, which are different by region and country, into the variety 
of capitalism and convergence-diversity debates. Recognising differences in 
social relations and norms between Japan and Anglo-Saxon countries is crucial 
to solve the research puzzle. Neo-Gramscian approaches are effective in dealing 
with the influence of competing ideas and norms on international political 
economy, but are macroscopic so that a supplementary toolkit, such as 
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sociological, psychological and philosophical concepts, is needed to handle the 
meso and micro level analysis.  
     The second factor, subordinates’ consent to social norms established by 
dominant elites, enabled Japanese society to form a counter-hegemony under 
Anglo-Saxon financial hegemony. Most large Japanese firms are dominated by a 
management-labour alliance against capitalists. Such an alliance (long-term 
relationship) between superiors and subordinates bound by strong ties is 
ubiquitous in Japanese society. The preference for strong ties and guardian morals 
in Japan has generated strong in-group favouritism, which is closely associated 
with systemic support. Habuka (2014: 39-40), a MOF official, claims that the 
public and private fields are inseparable in Japan, in that employers and 
employees represent the ‘public (superior)’ and ‘private (subordinate)’ statuses 
respectively, similar to the relationship between bureaucracies (public) and 
companies (private) and that people and groups in superior positions are supposed 
to protect their subordinates. During the early post-war period, Japan aimed at 
achieving economic growth through a public system providing systemic support 
in pursuit of social stability and security rather than a market promoting 
efficiency through competition. Japanese people seek assurance from the broadly 
defined public system (including a large proportion of the private sector), which 
covers such areas as banking, employment, healthcare, energy and transportation.  
     MOF, which needed to cope with the increasing public debt, securities firms 
and blue chip companies, had incentives for financial deregulation in the 1980s, 
but the pace of financial deregulation was only gradual prior to the Japanese 
Financial Big Bang, as the ministry (superior) was constrained by systemic 
support for the banking industry (subordinate), which was expected to be 
negatively affected by deregulation. Furthermore, despite the relative power 
decline of the dominant elites since the mid-1990s, the anti-liberal, anti-free 
market Japanese social norms, bolstered by subordinates’ consent, have been 
persistent and resisted financial disintermediation aligned with Anglo-Saxon 
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style financial capitalism, which emphasises short-term profit making. The 
interests of subordinates, who benefit from systemic support (e.g., less 
creditworthy large firms assisted by their main banks, regular workers under 
lifetime employment and SME owners), have been at odds with  financial 
disintermediation and financial capitalism, which generally reject systemic 
support and long-term social relations bound by strong ties and guardian morals.  
     The last factor, an ideational conflict between key institutions, is another 
hallmark of neo-Gramscian approaches. I have argued that there was an ideational 
conflict within the Japanese elite between the market liberalisation and anti -free 
market camps from the early 1990s until the mid-2000s and focused particularly 
on ideational contestations between the American and local Japanese CRAs 
(Chapter 4) and that between Doyukai and Keidanren (Chapter 5). Core members 
of Doyukai had an orientation towards shareholder capitalism and a synchronic 
form of financing and were opponents of systemic support, in contrast to those 
of Keidanren, who were proponents of stakeholder capitalism, a diachronic form 
of financing and systemic support. During the Hashimoto (1996-98) and Koizumi 
(2001-6) periods, the market liberalisation camp, particularly the American CRAs 
and Doyukai, was influential in Japan. Systemic support in Japan was weakened 
in the mid to late 1990s when the power of economic bureaucracy, the banking 
industry and the LDP declined owing to financial crises, the economic slump and 
a series of scandals.  
     However, after the relative power decline of these institutions, the Japanese -
style corporate model, whose features entail its closed nature (in -group 
favouritism) and a negative view of market-based economic systems, was a 
remaining stronghold of the 1940 system (Noguchi 2010: 220-3). Anti-free 
market corporate executives, represented by Keidanren, have quietly resisted 
Anglo-Saxon style financial and business practices, including financial 
disintermediation, an emphasis on shareholder returns, and short-term profit 
maximisation. Their political power derives from a management -labour alliance 
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against capitalists. While many Japanese firms have demonstrated mock and 
cosmetic convergence towards Anglo-Saxon style corporate governance and 
practices since the 1990s, the core of Japanese corporate governance – in-group 
favouritism – has been kept almost intact. Due to the public call for stability, 
massive public capital injections and bad debt disposal resuscitated the banking 
industry, resulting in the resurgence of systemic support during the mid-2000s. 
Chapter 3 demonstrated the persistence of state and bank support for financially 
troubled large firms as well as the expansion of systemic support into the field of 
SMEs and individual borrowers with multiple debts.  
     The three keys provided by neo-Gramscian approaches have led to the answer 
to the research puzzle: Japanese society’s anti-liberal, anti-free market norms 
centred on systemic support are a form of counter-hegemony, constraining 
capitalist domination and resisting financial disintermediation linked with Anglo -
Saxon style capitalism, which would sever strong ties and enfeeble systemic 
support in Japan. Systemic support and in-group favouritism are deeply 
embedded in both Japan’s bank-dominant financial system and corporate 
governance. An anti-neoliberal backlash driven by both anti-free market elites 
and subordinates has diminished the market liberalisation camp’s influence since 
2006. Whilst Japan’s credit market has been dominated by a diachronic 
perspective and systemic support, its equity market increasingly, influenced by 
international investors, has gained synchronic characteristics. Although the 
Japanese political economy is influenced by both equity market pressure for 
convergence towards Anglo-Saxon style capitalism and systemic support 
associated mainly with the credit market, the latter is still strong enough to fend 
off the former. 
     Although many books and articles on Japanese political economy written 
between the late 1990s and mid-2010s observe the hybridisation of the CME and 
LME models in Japan or expect the future convergence of Japanese style 
capitalism with that of LMEs (Anglo-Saxon countries), due to the persistence of 
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systemic support and in-group favouritism, Japan is behind Germany and France 
in terms of the hybridisation of the LME and CME models at present. 
Furthermore, the convergence of the Japanese and LME models seems less likely 
in the foreseeable future, although pressure towards the convergence has 
strengthened in the Japanese equity market.  
 
Financial Globalisation and the US Credit Rating Orthodoxy  
This thesis not only analyses the ideational conflict between market liberalisation 
and anti-free market forces in Japan but also elucidates the characteristics of 
financial globalisation and the US credit rating orthodoxy. Financial 
globalisation does not simply mean the global integration of nationally bounded 
capital and credit markets; it also means the transnational expansion of the 
synchronic form of financing, which has displaced the diachronic form of 
financing through financial disintermediation under Anglo-Saxon financial 
hegemony. The characteristics of the US CRAs have become increasingly 
synchronic, just like those of the financial markets themselves, due particularly 
to the rapid development of structured finance, and the US credit rating 
orthodoxy has been at the centre of financial disintermediation and globalisation.  
     However, as this thesis clearly demonstrates, the nature of finance  is not the 
same everywhere. Even under financial globalisation, how finance works in 
different places is likely to vary, while the social norms characterising the 
financial system are persistent. Finance is a social thing, and social norms, and 
the expectations and interactions of actors matter. Although officials of the US 
CRAs might claim that what they do is analytically neutral, their approach 
reflects the dominant assumptions about how finance works in New York and 
London. In this respect, financial globalisation can be regarded as the 
transnational expansion of the Anglo-Saxon synchronic form of financing and 
shareholder / financial capitalism. However, this expansion has encountered 
resistance from social norms in less liberal economies that favour a  diachronic 
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form of financing and stakeholder capitalism. The ideational battle between the 
US and local Japanese CRAs in Japan reflects the differences in social norms 
between Anglo-American countries (primarily the US) and Japan.  
     Synchronic financing is reflected in higher capital mobility (i.e., less 
constrained capitalist power) pursuing short-term financial profits. The 
synchronic mentality of Anglo-American capitalists and management cannot 
accept an average / lacklustre return on investment. On the one hand, old 
industries with low profitability such as steel, machinery, and autos in the US and 
the UK have lost their international competitiveness partly because of insufficient 
investment, resulting in massive layoffs, bankruptcies and M&A (indus trial 
consolidation). On the other hand, Anglo-American capitalists are strongly 
motivated to invest in innovative and high margin businesses (such as Google 
and Apple), which enables the new entry of a large number of companies into 
their credit markets. Furthermore, this synchronic mentality can be seen in the 
active creation of new credit products such as securitisation and credit default 
swaps in American credit markets. Both the vigorous ‘corporate metabolism’ 
(rapid corporate scrap and build) and active generation of innovative credit 
products are indispensable for the prosperity of the American CRAs in the US 
credit market. 
     Although the US CRAs were expected to overwhelm the local CRAs in Japan 
during the 1990s from a synchronic perspective, the former’s influence in Japan 
has diminished, while the latter have survived and gained legitimacy and utility 
within the Japanese credit market. The US CRAs with a narrow synchronic 
mental framework, just like many scholars on Japanese political economy, fa iled 
to anticipate the persistence of systemic support in the late 1990s, whist the long-
term systemic risk of the Japanese financial system, a side-effect of excessive 
systemic support, may be underrated by the Japanese local CRAs from a 
diachronic viewpoint. The formula of anti-free market social norms (linked with 
the diachronic form of financing) versus financial globalisation (which has 
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promoted the synchronic form of financing) is not unique to Japan; it can also be 
witnessed in other less liberal economies in Asia and Europe.  
     The US CRAs have thrived mainly in countries such as the UK, Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, Mexico and Singapore, where these agencies’ synchronic 
characteristics aligned with capitalist power have been accepted. In this sense, 
the US CRAs’ global influence has not expanded evenly. In addition to Japan, 
other countries with a preference for the diachronic form of financing, including 
China, Russia, France, South Korea and Malaysia, have experienced friction with 
the US CRAs and resistance to their influence. In these CMEs, governments or 
state-owned banks often rescue financially troubled companies and banks, 
whereas local CRAs have been established to compete against the US CRAs. I 
think that administrators such as bureaucrats, authoritarian politicians, and 
executives of public and quasi-public institutions are inclined to be powerful in 
CMEs, and the power of administrators and frequent corporate bailouts may 
indicate the significant influence of systemic support in their societies. It is 
difficult for the US CRAs to accommodate diachronic perspectives as the US 
credit rating orthodoxy is based on an Anglo-Saxon financial society’s synchronic 
outlook. Consequently, whilst dominant, neither financial globalisation nor the 
US CRAs’ power may be as ‘global’ or hegemonic as is often suggested.  
      
Systemic Support and Dominant Elites’ Power in CME and LME  
Anti-free market social norms centred on systemic support and in-group 
favouritism are often in tandem with the interests and power of dominant elites 
(administrators or guardians) in CMEs. Administrators are acutely aware that 
their authority requires the consent (loyalty and obedience) of their subordinates, 
and that once they leave their organisations they will lose their power. In this 
respect, organisations (e.g., bureaucracies, political parties and companies) are 
similar to territories and castles during the pre-modern period, and preserving 
such organisations and territories is a top priority for administrators (guardian s). 
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Administrators are expected to focus on accumulating wealth and capital on 
national or corporate levels rather than on a personal level.  
     In CMEs, capital mobility is constrained by the strong ties between 
administrators and between superiors and subordinates, and capital tends to be 
tied to specific organisations. Subordinates are rewarded in exchange for their 
loyalty and obedience to administrators and their organisations. Both 
administrators and subordinates pursue stability and security through  strong ties 
such as a management-labour alliance and keiretsu. Although, even in CMEs, 
there are some elites who endeavour to shift their countries to LMEs, their efforts 
are hampered by anti-free market social norms and they are often criticised for 
attempting to destroy social cohesion or maximise capitalists’ profits at the 
expense of hard-working labour. One major feature of CMEs is that most 
organisations and people bound by strong ties commit themselves to preserving 
such ties by mutually abandoning alternative options. Moving from a CME to an 
LME is very difficult for most countries. It is probably not a coincidence that 
most LMEs are Anglophone countries centred on the UK and the US, which are 
the respective countries with the former and present key currencies. Japan and 
most other CMEs lack such advantages as an internationally used language and 
key currency status.    
     Capitalists want to minimise systemic support, which often prevents them 
from maximising short-term financial profit, but even in LMEs some elites 
believe that capitalist power needs to be curbed to some extent and that social 
security for the public should be strengthened. In this respect, CMEs and LMEs 
should be regarded as a spectrum rather than as having a binary relationship.  
Germany and France, which are often included in CMEs, are closer to LMEs in 
the spectrum than Japan. Within LMEs, the UK seems to be closer to CMEs than 
the US. However, in addition to the significant capitalist power in LMEs, a large 
proportion of people in these economies are unwilling to be constrained by strong 
ties and abandon alternative options regarding their social relations. In this 
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respect, excessive systemic support, which usually hinders the market mechanism, 
is an anathema in LMEs.   
     Some may think that this thesis exaggerates the differences between Japanese 
and Anglo-American capitalism, pointing out that systemic support was 
extensively provided in the US and the UK during the GFC, while neoliberal 
backlashes have been observed in these countries since then.  Systemic support 
can be seen in any country, and major banks in economically advanced countries 
usually receive support as the banking sector along with the capital market play 
a credit creation function that is indispensable for both CMEs and LMEs. A 
distinction lies in the non-financial corporate sector. Whilst state and bank 
support for financially troubled large firms (particularly manufacturers) is the 
norm in Japan, such support is quite exceptional in the US and the UK – the US 
government bailout of General Motors and Chrysler and the UK government’s 
support for Jaguar Land Rover during the GFC were exceptions.  Moreover, 
although the anti-neoliberal backlash in Japan meant the rejection of the LME 
model by both anti-free market elites and subordinates, resulting in the partial 
reversal of the previous financial liberalisation, those in the US and the UK, 
which demonstrated the tension between capitalists and labour and between 
immigrated and native labour, have not changed their LME model. 
 
Areas for Further Study 
There are two potentially fruitful areas of further study stemming from the 
concepts and findings of this thesis.  The first area is a comparative study o f 
systemic support, particularly the politics of corporate bailouts in various CMEs 
such as Japan, France, South Korea and Malaysia. What are the similarities and 
differences among these countries with regard to the degree and sphere of 
systemic support and the mechanism of corporate bailouts? Are corporate 
bailouts in these countries, for instance, those of Alstom (French engineering 
firm) in 2004, Hynix (South Korean semiconductor manufacturer, currently SK 
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Hynix) in 2001 and Malaysia Airlines in 2014, conducted in order to maintain 
employment and social stability or to sustain national prestige? To what extent 
have financial deregulation and market-based financial practices progressed in 
these countries? Such a comparative study could demonstrate why some CMEs 
prioritise social stability or national prestige over economic efficiency. 
     The second area is a comparative study on the differences in financial 
liberalisation among CMEs, particularly between Germany and Japan. Although 
both Germany and Japan are often categorised as CMEs or stakeholder capitalism 
with a bank-centred financial system, there are many differences between the two. 
For example, Thelen and Kume (2001) point out their different non-liberal 
worker training regimes, which may reflect different social relations and norms. 
In terms of the development of the corporate bond market and market -based 
banking, Germany has been ahead of Japan since 2000 (Hardie and Howarth 
2013a). What factors (e.g., the timing of the financial crisis that hit each country, 
the influence of key political actors, and changes in corporate governance) have 
contributed to the difference between the two countries? Jackson et al. (2004: 39-
41) point out that Germany has experienced substantial changes in corporate 
governance, particularly an enhanced emphasis on shareholder value, while 
preserving ‘the core institutions of German industrial relations, codetermination 
and collective bargaining’. This study could further clarify the characteristics of 
Japanese capitalism. 
 
Epilogue: Future Prospects of Systemic Support in Japan  
Considering that the dilution of systemic support in Japan has caused the 
contradictions and enfeebled economic dynamism described in Chapter 6, what 
future prospects can be conceived for systemic support? Restricting diluted 
systemic support through market liberalisation, which is often proposed by 
neoclassical economists, would face strong resistance given Japanese society’s 
deeply embedded anti-free market norms, particularly among the older 
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generations. Furthermore, in addition to the GFC, anti-liberal backlashes, such 
as those in the UK and the US, which were demonstrated in the former’s EU 
membership referendum on 23 June 2016 and the latter’s presidential election on 
8 November 2016, would encourage the anti-free market camp in Japan. Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe advocated so-called ‘Abenomics’ based on the ‘three arrows’ 
of fiscal stimulus, monetary easing and structural reforms in the December 2012 
general election, but the Abe administration has not been able to implem ent 
meaningful structural reforms because of the political constraint of systemic 
support. However, the growing public debt will restrict systemic support in the 
form of drastic fiscal austerity or hyperinflation over the long term.    
     It will be increasingly difficult for Japan’s decreasing working population to 
shoulder the sharply increasing costs of social welfare. With its deteriorating 
fiscal position, Japan has been inclined to focus on: 1) providing a positive 
environment and incentives that encourage internationally competitive industries 
to continue domestic investment, rather than 2) protecting public safety, 3) 
dealing with the aging issue, 4) enhancing the birth rate, and 5) preserving nature 
and promoting the tourist industry (Tsuchiya and Morita 2011: 221-5).  This is 
not surprising given that administrators have instilled the norm of prioritising 
producer over consumer interests into Japanese society (Noguchi 2010: 147-9). 
This norm tallies with the characteristics of collectivism, which gives precedence 
to the interests and goals of groups (companies) over those of individuals 
(consumers). However, as Tsuchiya and Morita (2011: 220) rightly claim, 
Japanese society should place more emphasis on points 2-5 above and less 
emphasis on point 1. Put simply, support for individuals should be prioritised 
over that for companies. 
     Another problem is that social security in Japan tends to prioritise the older 
generations, who receive larger pension and healthcare benefits, over the younger 
generations, whose future prospects for social welfare are bleak despite their 
heavy social insurance premium burden. Allowing the older generations’ vested 
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interests to prevail erodes society and ultimately lowers the welfare of the entire 
society – there is a significant gap between the older generations, who enjoy the 
fruit of the rapid economic growth period and the bubble economy, and the 
younger generations, who have to shoulder the burden stemming from excessive 
social welfare benefits for the elderly (ibid.: 220). The suicide rate of Japanese 
youngsters (from 15 to 24 years old) skyrocketed from around 7.0 (per million) 
in 1990, which was the lowest among advanced industrialised countries, to 14.8 
in 2012, the highest among them.168 Furthermore, suicide is by far the top cause 
of death for Japanese young people (aged 15 to 39 years), according to the 2015 
statistics of the MHLW. It is increasingly difficult for the younger generation to 
become regular workers, whilst it is not easy for them to live on welfar e. The 
typical working poor in Japan were single women in low-wage non-regular 
employment until the 1980s, but the number of young male non-regular workers 
has dramatically increased since the bursting of the bubble economy. These days, 
the working poor in Japan are single men and women in non-regular employment, 
who are too poor to have a family (Hashimoto 2013: 198-208). Nevertheless, 
anti-government protests by the working poor are not common in Japan, probably 
because most of them could not escape from the anti-liberal social norms, which 
suggest that receiving public assistance has a social stigma.  
     When corporate or sovereign borrowers’ financial position (i.e., 
creditworthiness) deteriorates, they normally have to pay higher risk premiums 
to creditors, which is the norm in Anglo-Saxon countries. However, most 
Japanese borrowers (including the Japanese government) do not pay substantial 
risk premiums in the local bond market. This is mainly because the Japanese bond 
market is dominated by local investors who still believe in strong systemic 
support for major borrowers, while non-Japanese investors account for a minor 
portion of the investment, as they believe that the returns on most Japanese bonds 
are too small to justify their risk.  In addition, the BOJ has actively purchased an 
                                                   
168 World Health Organization’s Mortality Database 
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enormous amount of JGBs and corporate bonds as part of the aggressive monetary 
easing. The behaviour of local investors, depositors and the BOJ could be 
regarded as ‘obedience’ to administrators.  
     What will the Japanese government do when the JGBs reach a level at which 
they cannot be financed by domestic investors without significant interest rate 
hikes? The future prospects for systemic support will be affected by the 
government’s action at that time. There will be three major options for the 
government. The first will be to finance a larger proportion of JGBs from non-
Japanese investors by allowing interest rate hikes. The second will be the 
combination of drastic austerity measures and tax increases. The last option will 
be the BOJ’s aggressive purchase of JGBs, which could potentially lead to 
hyperinflation. While the first option would likely result in Japan’s market 
liberalisation, weakening both administrators’ power and systemic support, the 
second option would restrict vested interest groups’ voice and ad hoc systemic 
support. However, the first option would be least favoured by the government as 
this would further erode its domestic financial autonomy. With regard to the 
second option, austerity measures would face fierce opposition from the older 
generations, while major industrial associations would be opposed to increases 
in the corporate tax rate. Although big businesses would accept drastic increases 
in the consumption tax (value-added tax) rate if the corporate tax rate were 
lowered, both SMEs and consumers would strongly resist consumption tax hikes. 
In these respects, the second option would be blocked by vested interest groups.  
     Then, would the BOJ’s aggressive purchase of JGBs (‘hyper-monetisation’) 
be the most likely option by elimination because this option would not require 
acceptance by the public? Obata (2013: 152-68) claims that hyper-monetisation 
would destroy both the pricing and asset allocation functions of the financial 
markets, resulting in the ‘euthanasia’ of the financial markets where excessive 
capital would be allocated to the government sector that could generate much less 
value addition than the private sector. Moreover, hyper-monetisation would 
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produce spiralling higher inflation via enormous money supply, capital flight and 
drastic currency depreciation, shifting wealth from net creditors with more assets 
than liabilities (mainly the household sector, particularly the older generations) 
to net debtors with more liabilities than assets (chiefly the government). If 
hyperinflation occurs, the public debt would be dramatically reduced at the 
expense of bank depositors (de facto ultimate holders of JGBs). Whilst this would 
be a disaster for the older generations who would likely possess the great majority 
of household assets, it would stimulate business investment and be relatively 
positive for the younger generations. In fact, Japan experienced hyperinflation 
from the end of WWII to 1949, making JGBs almost worthless, and bank accounts 
were blocked from 1946 to 1948 and wealth tax (capital levy) was imposed in 
1947 by the government.  Hyperinflation is an undemocratic way of reducing 
public debt, but it might be the only remaining option if drastic austerity 
measures and tax increases were to be blocked by vested interest groups.  
     Would the third option be the most likely scenario? The BOJ’s hyper-
monetisation to purchase JGBs by aggressively printing money would cause 
substantial inflation but not necessarily hyperinflation, which is extremely 
painful for the household and corporate sectors. The rising fear of hyperinflation 
in Japanese society would strengthen administrators’ power vis -à-vis the general 
public, and justify the government in taking drastic measures (i.e. option two), 
such as austerity and tax increases, to prevent hyperinflation. In this scenario, 
administrators (particularly bureaucrats) might regain power vis-à-vis vested 
interest groups and systemic support as quasi-public goods would be maintained 
but ad hoc systemic support would be curbed. However, if the government were 
to miss the timing of tax increases, hyperinflation might crash JGBs (Fukao 2012: 
28-9). 
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Appendix: List of Interviews 
 
# Date Name Position & Organisation 
1 01/10/14 Kiyoto Ido Vice Chairman, Institute for International 
Economic Studies (Former Head of 
International Bureau, MOF)  
2 01/10/14 Tsuyoshi Oyama Partner, Centre for Risk Management 
Strategy, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 
(Previously Deputy General Manager at 
the BOJ) 
3 02/10/14 Nobuo Tomoda Executive Director (Board Member), 
Head of Information/Operations, Tokyo 
Shoko Research (Provider of credit 
information on SMEs) 
4 02/10/14 Takahiro Morita Director, Japan, World Gold Council 
(Former Managing Director, Head of 
Japanese and Korean Corporate Credit 
Rating, Moody’s) 
5 03/10/14 Prof. Osamu Ito Department of Economics, Saitama 
University 
6 06/10/14 Prof. Yoshio 
Shima 
Department of International 
Management, Tamagawa University 
(Former Managing Director at Deutsche 
Bank, credit analyst at S&P) 
7 06/10/14 Hidetaka Tanaka Senior Executive Vice President, Rating 
& Investment Information (Former 
General Manager at the Industrial Bank 
of Japan) 
8 07/10/14 Shizuharu Kubono Vice Chairman, The Life Insurance 
Association of Japan (Former Deputy 
Head of the Banking Bureau, MOF)  
9 07/10/14 Takamasa 
Yamaoka 
Managing Director, Criteria Officer in 
Japan, S&P 
10 07/10/14 Prof. Kazuo Ikeo Department of Economics, Keio 
University (Previously, a member of the 
government’s Financial Council and 
Financial System Council)  
11 08/10/14 Takuji Aida Chief Japan Economist, Societe Generale 
Securities  
12 08/10/14 Yoichi Kaneko Member of the House of Councillors 
(Previously, an official at the Cabinet 
Office) 
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13 09/10/14 Hirofumi Imaji Chief Marketing Officer, Mezzanine 
Corporation (Private investment funds)  
14 09/10/14 Teruki Morinaga Director, Financial Institutions, Fitch  
15 09/10/14 Hideki Goto Senior Advisor, Research Institute for 
Environmental Finance (Former credit 
analyst at S&P) 
16 10/10/14 Tomone Kawachi Executive Partner & CIO, WERU Asset 
Management 
17 10/10/14 Joji Tagawa Managing Director, Head of Investor 
Relations, Nissan Motors  
18 10/10/14 Yoshinori Komiya Director-General, Office of Space Policy, 
Cabinet Office (seconded from METI) 
19 14/10/14 Dr Azusa 
Takeyama 
Director and Senior Economist, Institute 
for Monetary and Economic Studies, the 
BOJ 
20 14/10/14 Dr Akane Enatsu Senior Analyst, Nomura Institute of 
Capital Markets Research  
21 14/10/14 Taketoshi Tsuchiya Senior Executive, Fixed Income Group, 
Mizuho Securities 
22 15/10/14 Yuki Takishima Deputy Director, Finance Division, Small 
and Medium Enterprise Agency, METI 
23 15/10/14 Tsutomu (Tom) 
Okubo 
Member of the House of Councillors, 
Lead Director, Committee on Financial 
Affairs (Previously Managing Director at 
Morgan Stanley) 
24 16/10/14 Kei Kitayama Representative Director, Moody’s Japan 
K.K. 
25 16/10/14 Nana Otsuki Managing Director, Banking Sector 
Analyst, Bank of America Merrill Lynch  
26 16/10/14 Katsuaki Nakaoki Vice Chairman, Fixed Income, 
Currencies & Commodities Japan Sales, 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch  
27 17/10/14 Hitoshi Oda CIO, American Life Insurance Company 
28 17/10/14 Prof. Toshio 
Yamagishi 
Emeritus Professor in Social Psychology,  
Hokkaido University 
29 18/10/14 Fujio Nakatsuka Head of Financial Markets Research, 
Chief Researcher, Rating & Investment 
Information 
30 20/10/14 Dr Hironari 
Nozaki 
Managing Director, Banking Sector 
Analyst, Citigroup Global Markets Japan  
31 20/10/14 Hajime Takata Managing Executive Officer, Chief 
Economist, Mizuho Research Institute  
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32 21/10/14 Kazutaka 
Shimoura 
Corporate Senior Vice President, Risk 
Management Headquarters, Orix 
Corporation 
33 16/11/15 Prof. Yoshitaka 
Kurosawa 
Saitama Gakuen University (Previously 
an officer at the Development Bank of 
Japan and an credit analyst at Japan 
Credit Rating Agency)  
33 16/11/15 Yoichiro 
Yokoyama 
Director, Japan Credit Rating Agency 
(Former managing executive officer at 
the Development Bank of Japan) 
34 17/11/15 Hirohide Hirai Director-General for Nuclear Accident 
Disaster Response, METI 
35 17/11/15 Dr Nobuteru 
Kikuchi 
Associate Professor, the Department of 
Sociology at Tsuru University 
36 17/11/15 Dr Minoru 
Honzawa 
CEO of Kyosei Investment Advisor 
37 18/11/15 Yasuhiro Harada Member of the Board, Director General, 
Future Architect (Previously CEO of 
Rating & Investment Information, 
Deputy Director General of International 
Department, the BOJ) 
38 19/11/15 Prof. Chieko 
Matsuda 
Graduate School of Social Science, 
Tokyo Metropolitan University (Former 
credit analyst at Moody’s)  
39 19/11/15 Hiroaki Toya Managing Director, LIM Global Advisors 
(Former MOF Official) 
40 20/11/15 Prof. Yoshio 
Shima 
Department of International 
Management, Tamagawa University 
(Former Managing Director at Deutsche 
Bank, credit analyst at S&P)  
41 20/11/15 Prof. Toshio 
Yamagishi 
Emeritus Professor in Social Psychology,  
Hokkaido University 
42 23/11/15 Prof. Yoshitake 
Masuhara 
Hiroshima University of Economics 
(Previously a Member of the House of 
the Representatives, a high ranked MOF 
official) 
43 24/11/15 Toshiyuki Miyoshi Director, Debt Management Policy 
Division, Financial Bureau, MOF  
44 24/11/15 Katsuyuki 
Tokushima 
Chief Fixed Income Analyst, Financial 
Research Department, NLI Research 
Institute 
45 24/11/15 Takanori Mitsui Head of Credit Research and Products, 
DIAM Asset Manager 
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46 25/11/15 Shuzo Ikeda Member of the Board, Japan Industrial 
Solutions 
47 25/11/15 Akira Nakamura General Manager, Tokyo Branch, Lotte 
Capital 
48 25/11/15 Yasuyuki Kuratsu CEO, Research and Pricing Technologies 
(Former Managing Director, Chase 
Manhattan Bank) 
49 25/11/15 Yu-Tsung Chang Executive Officer, Business 
Development & Planning, Ibbotson 
Associates Japan (Former Executive 
Managing Director, S&P) 
50 26/11/15 Prof. R. Taggart 
Murphy 
International Political Economy, 
University of Tsukuba 
51 26/11/15 Yoshihiro 
Hayakawa 
Chairman of the Audit & Supervisory 
Board, Nikkei 
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International Department, the BOJ)  
53 27/11/15 Mikihide 
Katsumata 
President & COO, Innovation Network 
Corporation of Japan 
54 27/11/15 Hiroaki Hayashi Director and Executive Officer, General 
Manager of Investment Department, 
Fukokushinrai Life Insurance  
55 28/11/15 Prof. Tetsuji 
Okazaki 
Economic History, Faculty of 
Economics, The University of Tokyo  
56 28/11/15 Mitsuo Kojima Representative Director, Lombard Odier 
Trust (Japan) 
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